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STELLINGEN 
I 
Gezien het feit dat er in Nederland jaarlijks meer geld wordt uitgegeven aan reclame-
uitingen in de meest brede zin dan aan HBO-onderwijs, universitair onderwijs en 
onderzoek en wetenschapsbeleid bij elkaar, is de dikwijls gebezigde aanduiding 'kennis-
maatschappij' nogal geflatteerd en lijkt de benaming 'reclamemaatschappij' eerder op zijn 
plaats. 
II 
De wijze waarop vele natuurbeschermers aankijken tegen exoten vertoont frappante 
gelijkenis met de manier waarop de partij van Janmaat allochtonen beschouwt. 
III 
Wie te horen krijgt dat hij ergens op afgerekend zal worden, moet vrezen dat er op zeker 
moment met hem zal worden afgerekend. 
IV 
Gezien de gretigheid waarmee de verantwoordelijke politici ons in het riskante avontuur 
van een Economische en Monetaire Unie willen storten, wordt de mogelijkheid om een 
verzekering af te sluiten tegen de gevolgen van 'political failures' node gemist. 
V 
De uitdrukking 'ja, mits' is logisch gelijkwaardig aan de uitdrukking 'nee, tenzij'. 
VI 
Om als werknemer je employability over langere termijn zeker te kunnen stellen, moet je 
tegelijk je eigen werkgever zijn. 
VII 
Om het intellectueel eigendom van de resultaten van wetenschappelijk teamwork wordt 
vaker gestreden dan men gewoonlijk aanneemt. 
VIII 
X 
In een constructivistische benadering kunnen de constructie van feiten en de (deconstruc-
tie van artefacten op een symmetrische wijze worden behandeld, maar dat betekent niet 
dat feiten tot artefacten worden gereduceerd. 
XI 
Het onderscheid tussen kennis en werkelijkheid dient ook door constructivisten te worden 
gerespecteerd. 
XII 
Het wetenschappelijk realisme van Michael Devitt houdt zich niet aan de eigen regel dat 
ontologische kwesties voorafgaand aan epistemische vragen moeten worden beslist. 
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Het adagium 'Volg de actoren' is een ontoereikende methodische leidraad voor het doen 
van wetenschaps- en technologie-onderzoek. 
IX 
Het is niet de ontdekkingscontext maar de rechtvaardigingscontext welke een ontdekking 
tot een ontdekking stempelt. 
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The preface offers the author of a book the possibility to acknowledge his intellectual and 
other debts to all those who in one way or another have been instrumental in helping it to 
come into existence. It is the perfect occasion for professing humility, because it makes one 
realize how many others have actually contributed to the completion of a product which 
nevertheless is usually claimed as one's own intellectual property. Perhaps the idea of being 
an 'author' and being considered as such is indeed no more than a conventional illusion. As 
long as even the French postmodernists who have allegedly deconstructed the entire notion 
of authorship continue to publish books and articles under their own names, however, I have 
no scruples to do the same. 
After having solemnly declared myself herewith to be the 'true and only' author of this 
book (to prevent possible postmodernist misunderstandings from arising), let me now accom-
plish the more grateful task of acknowledging my debts to all the persons whom I owe 
special thanks. 
The origin of this book can be traced back to the early 1980s, when Ton van Helvoort, 
Bart Gremmen and I, all three of us then at the University of Nijmegen, met in an informal 
reading club to discuss the recently rediscovered work of Ludwik Fleck. Thanks to Ton's 
perseverance in gathering and checking Fleck's sources, we soon found out that the latter's 
historical reconstructions were not beyond dispute. Unless my memory plays a trick on me, 
Bart was the first to discern the contours of an alternative story in the material pertaining to 
the struggle over the intellectual ownership of the Wassermann reaction. Subsequently, each 
of us inevitably went their own separate ways. Ton completed a thesis on the history of virus 
concepts, whereas Bart wrote a philosophical dissertation about the mystery of the practical 
use of scientific knowledge. Being intellectually more inert and slow, I eventually decided 
to work up the heterogeneous materials relating to Fleck to a full-fledged thesis in its own 
right. Ton and Bart had offered me the important initial stimuli to embark on this project. 
As godfathers they stood at the cradle of this book. In addition I have to thank Bart for 
permission to use our co-authored article on Fleck's serological thought style ('Specificity 
in the Era of Koch and Ehrlich', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21 [1990]: 
463-79) as a basis for Chapter VIII of this book. 
On several occasions I have given oral presentations on the development of the Wasser-
mann reaction and benefited from the critical remarks of various audiences to elaborate and 
sharpen my ideas. Such presentations have been given at the First World Congress on Medi-
cine & Philosophy in Paris in 1994 and before Karin Knorr-Cetina's 'Laborstudiengruppe' 
at the University of Bielefeld also in 1994, at the Science Studies Unit of the University of 
Edinburgh in May 1996 and during an international workshop on diagnostic practices in 
medicine held in February 1997 at the Hamburger Institut fur Sozialforschung. I have to 
thank in particular Jens Lachmund for inviting me to the latter workshop and for exchanging 
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ideas with me on our respective themes of historical research. During my earlier stay at the 
University of Edinburgh David and Celia Bloor were very obliging by generously offering 
me hospitality at their home for almost one week. I experienced this stay as an enormous 
privilege, not least because it enabled me to find out the truth about the apocryphal story 
disseminated by Ian Hacking, that David is such a total fan of Wittgenstein that his office at 
home is an exact copy of the latter's office at Cambridge. Since my stay and despite the 
burden of his official duties as director of the Science Studies Unit, David has maintained 
a regular correspondence with me and given critical and constructive comments on drafts of 
nearly all the chapters comprising this book. Even if I have not always been able or willing 
to follow up his useful suggestions, I must certainly express my special gratitude to his 
constructive criticism and intellectual encouragement. 
Other sociologists of science have also commented on draft chapters of this thesis. 
Andrew Pickering, working at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and represen-
ting a brand of constructivism different from David's, subjected drafts of Chapters V and VTI 
to critical examination. Although he could not condone my defence of 'interest explanations' 
and my use of the notion of 'constraints' (as was to be expected from his point of view), his 
judgements were nevertheless quite jubilant and encouraging. Finally, Robert K. Merton, 
Professor Emeritus at Columbia University in the City of New York and the reputed 'father 
of the sociology of science', has rendered me the honour of giving a 13-page commentary 
on an earlier, and much different, version of Chapter VI. I have taken his criticisms to heart 
and followed up many of his specific suggestions for change, although I suspect that the final 
version will not be entirely to his liking because I concede still too much, from his point of 
view, to constructivist positions. I must also thank Professor Merton for the many 'exhibits' 
which he sent me along with, and in support of, his written comments - books and copies of 
several, sometimes not easily accessible papers and materials. In this special sense too, his 
commentary was solidly documented. 
Anthony S. Travis at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and Deputy Director of the 
Sidney Edelstein Center in that city read and commented on an earlier version of Chapter 
VII. His suggestions for linguistic and stylistic improvement have been gratefully accepted. 
I am glad that we now share an interest in Paul Ehrlich's life and work, in addition to our 
long-standing common interest in the history of the synthetic dye industry. For what little I 
possess of the historian's craft skills, I must thank my two former colleagues involved in the 
research project on the development of the synthetic dye industry (1979-1983) at the Catholic 
University of Nijmegen, Wim Hornix and Ernst Homburg, who showed me in their different 
ways that the work of a historian of science can be both thorough and relevant. 
I thank Bea Prijn for turning my text into a decent manuscript. It took her a lot of trouble 
to restore the scars I had inflicted upon it out of sheer computer illiteracy. 
In registering my acknowledgements to various persons, I should not forget, of course, 
to express my gratitude to the two men who were officially in charge with leading me to a 
successful completion of my thesis project: Professor Michiel Korthals at Wageningen Agri-
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cultural University and Professor Henk ten Have at the Catholic University of Nijmegen. 
Both allowed me much free scope to follow my own inclinations, but on occasion did not 
hesitate forcing me to make the main line of my argument more clear to myself and to them, 
particularly when the forest threatened to become invisible because of the trees. It would be 
pointless to claim that a study which pretends to span the different fields of the philosophy, 
history and sociology of science is without tensions and imbalances. 
Finally, I want to thank my companion in life, Liz Pigmans, for the emotional support 
and encouragement she has given me during the fairly long period that I needed to complete 
this dissertation. It is a cliché, but no less true for being so, that such work often strains 
personal relationships and demands much tolerance and patience from the partner. Liz surely 
has had to bear her part of the burden. Paraphrasing Holland's foremost constructivist, Wiebe 
Bijker, let me therefore conclude by exclaiming: Liz, do not despair, there is life again after 
the writing of a thesis! 
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CHAPTER I 
FOLLOWING MEDICAL SCIENTISTS THROUGH 
LABORATORY AND SOCIETY, OR HOW TO REPLICATE AND 
EXTEND LUDWIK FLECK'S EXAMPLE 
This book offers a constructivist analysis of several episodes pertaining to the genesis of 
modern medical knowledge about syphilis. Part of it goes over old ground that had already 
been covered in Ludwik Fleck's now classic study from the 1930s, Entstehung und 
Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache.1 Fleck's monograph deals with the 
emergence of the modern concept of syphilis and in particular with the construction of a 
serological test for detecting this disease, the so-called Wassermann reaction. What is 
remarkable about Fleck's book, at least for a study written during the 1930s, is that it 
approaches its subject matter from the perspective of a sociological theory of knowledge. 
This was without precedent. Fleck, a practising physician and bacteriologist but an amateur 
in philosophy and sociology, drew his inspiration from the Durkheimian tradition in the 
sociology of knowledge to develop what he called his 'theory of thought styles and thought 
collectives'. At the beginning of the 20th century, Emile Durkheim and his followers, Marcel 
Mauss and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, had started to study the relationship between the social 
structures of primitive tribes and their world-views or classification systems. 2 Despite the 
intellectual stimulus he derived from them, Fleck criticized the Durkheimians for their 
apparent reluctance to extend their sociological approach from the study of primitive belief 
systems to the analysis of modern scientific knowledge. It was left to Fleck tamself to 
overcome such scruples. Upon its first appearance in 1935, Fleck's monograph largely went 
unnoticed, but it has since been rescued from oblivion by Thomas Kuhn, who in 1962 noted 
that Fleck's essay 'anticipated' many of his own ideas. 3 It was however only in 1979, when 
an English translation appeared, that Fleck's pioneering work was made accessible to a wider 
L. Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache, Basel (Benno Schwabe), 
1935. 
E. Durkheim and M. Mauss, Primitive Classification (translated and introduced by Rodney 
Needham), Chicago (The University of Chigaco Press), 1963 [original French essay: 1901-02]; L. 
Lévy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, New York (Washington Square Press), 1966 [French original: Les 
fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures, Paris (Alcan), 1910]; E. Durkheim, The Elementary 
Forms of Religious Life, translated by Karen E. Fields, New York (Free Press), 1995 [French 
original 1912]. 
T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago and London (The University of 
Chicago Press), 1970 [1962], pp. VI - VII. 
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audience. 4 Soon it then became apparent that Fleck not merely 'anticipated' Kuhn's ideas 
but went beyond them in important respects. Indeed, it could be argued just as well that 
Fleck 'anticipates' several of the central ideas of the various strands of constructivism that 
have emerged in 'post-Kuhnian' science studies from the 1970s onwards. 5 Many proponents 
of contemporary constructivism view him as a worthy precursor and praise his work as an 
early contribution to the sociology of scientific knowledge and the constructivist analysis of 
scientific practice. Fleck is thus widely recognized nowadays as "a pioneer of the 
sociologically-oriented constructivist approach to history and philosophy of science". 6 Of 
course, despite the close affinity between Fleck's approach and the work of contemporary 
constructivists, there are not only similarities but also differences. In Chapter n I will give 
a detailed comparison to spell out both similarities and differences. 
So this book aims at a constructivist description and analysis of the genesis of modern 
medical knowledge about syphilis. But why go over old ground again? Isn't it a waste of time 
and effort to do a restudy of some episodes in the history of medical science that have 
L. Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (edited by Thaddeus Trenn and Robert K. 
Merton), Chicago and London (The University of Chicago Press), 1979. In 1980 the German 
original was republished as L. Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache 
(edited by Lothar Schäfer and Thomas Schnelle), Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1980. References 
to Fleck's monograph will be given in the main body of the text as a pair of numbers, e.g. (42/58), 
where the number(s) before the / sign indicate(s) the page number(s) of the English translation and 
the number(s) after the / sign indicate(s) the page number(s) of the German Suhrkamp edition. 
A note on terminology: 
The term 'constructivism' is used here to denote a variety of schools in the 'new' social studies of 
science and technology. They are 'new' in the sense that they date from the 1970s or later, in 
contrast to the older Mertonian school which dominated the sociology of science in the 1950s and 
1960s. Rather than giving a precise characterization of the defining tenets of modern 
'constructivism' (if that would indeed be possible!), let me indicate its extension by simply 
enumerating some of the schools and approaches that can be subsumed under this term: 
- The Strong Programme (David Bloor, Barry Barnes, Steven Shapin); 
- The Empirical Programme of Relativism (Harry Collins, Trevor Pinch); 
- Discourse Analysis (Michael Mulkay, Jonathan Potter); 
- Actor-Network Theory (Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, John Law); 
- Ethnographic Laboratory Studies (Karin Knorr-Cetina); 
- The Reflexive Programme (Steve Woolgar, Malcolm Ashmore); 
- Ethnomethodology (Michael Lynch); 
- Symbolic Interactionism (Susan Leigh Star, Joan Fujimoro). 
This enumeration reflects only the division of schools existing at a certain moment in time. Indeed, 
younger constructivist researchers are trying to move beyond such divisions (e.g. Andrew Pickering 
with his 'turn to practice'). The expression 'sociology of scientific knowledge' (acronym: SSK) is 
sometimes used to denote the first two approaches. Some investigators (e.g. Karin Knorr-Cetina) 
prefer to speak of 'constructionism' rather than 'constructivism'. Outsiders often employ the 
expression 'social constructivism' indiscriminately to refer to all of the above-mentioned schools, 
but this is inadvisable as representatives of some approaches would certainly object to this label 
(e.g. Latour, Lynch, Knorr-Cetina). 
I. Löwy, The Polish School of the Philosophy of Medicine: From Tytus Chalubinski (1820-1889) to 
Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961), Dordrecht (Kluwer), 1990, p. 125. 
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already been studied before, presumably in a thorough way? Ideally, the importance of 
repeating empirical inquiries for testing and validating knowledge-claims should need no 
special defence, of course, but in the social sciences replication studies are nonetheless often 
held in low esteem. This common judgement may reflect a serious bias. A study by the 
American sociologist of science, Susan Cozzens, contrasting the citation records of two 
classical papers in neuropharmacology and sociology of science (her own field) respectively, 
gives one food for thought. 7 Whereas the references to the paper in neuropharmacology -
the classic 1973 publication by Candace Pert and Solomon Snyder on the opiate receptor 8 -
paid extensive attention to the experimental procedures and empirical details associated with 
the main knowledge-claim (before the latter got stabilized and codified), the pattern of 
references to the paper in the sociology of science - the 1966 article by Joseph Ben-David 
and Randall Collins on the influence of role-hybridization in the emergence of psychology 
as a new discipline 9 - was completely different. A large part of the citations to the Ben-
David and Collins paper were of an 'interpretive' or 'conceptual' sort, that is, they linked 
the paper to more general ideas. Virtually no attention was paid to the empirical details of 
the work. As Cozzens observes: "The authors might as well have written a short note, or 
even a letter to the editor, rather than a full article, for all the attention their data received 
in the citation record. In short, their empirical material was delivered to an empty 
house" . 1 0 Although I did not do a systematic citation context analysis as Cozzens did, my 
personal impression is that much the same holds true for the reception of Fleck's work. 
Almost all commentators have fastened on the conceptual and theoretical issues raised by his 
pioneering monograph, but have neglected to discuss the empirical adequacy of the case 
studies used to support his sociological and philosophical v iews. 1 1 And while there is 
nothing wrong with conceptual analysis per se - I myself will engage in it, especially in 
S.E. Cozzens, 'Comparing the Sciences: Citation Context Analysis of Papers from 
Neuropharmacology and the Sociology of Science', Social Studies of Science 15 (1985): 127-53. 
C.B. Pert and S.H. Snyder, 'Opiate Receptor: Demonstration in Nervous Tissue', Science 179 
(1973): 1011-14. 
J. Ben-David and R. Collins, 'Social Factors in the Origin of a New Science: the Case of 
Psychology', American Sociological Review 31 (1966): 451-65. 
Cozzens, op. cit. (note 5), p. 147. 
There is one exception of which I know, and this exception is only partial. liana Lowy, who has 
published a book and several articles illuminating the philosophical and professional backgrounds of 
Ludwik Fleck (e.g. the work cited in note 6), has also written an article on the history of the 
Wassermann reaction. See I. L6wy, 'Testing for a Sexually Transmissible Disease, 1907-1970: the 
History of the Wassermann Reaction', in V. Berridge and P. Strong (eds.), AIDS and 
Contemporary History, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1993, pp. 74-92. This article, 
however, covers a longer historical time-span than Fleck's monograph and is also primarily based 
on French and American sources, whereas Fleck analyzed the genesis of the Wassermann reaction 
in its original German context. 
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Chapters II and IX -, such a massive overall imbalance in favour of conceptual analysis and 
to the detriment of empirical discussion is surely not a sign of intellectual health. A 
reconsideration of Fleck's empirical case studies might contribute to redressing the 
imbalance. I also believe that a 'replication' study may be illuminating and fruitful in that 
it offers the possibility to discuss theoretical and conceptual issues raised by Fleck's work 
in relation to empirical questions. This may be a preferable way to make those issues more 
tractable. After all, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. 
This thesis, however, attempts to be more than a replication of Fleck's original study. 
By examining several episodes in the genesis of medical knowledge about syphilis I intend 
to explore and evaluate the usefulness of concepts and theories derived not only from Fleck's 
work but from modern varieties of constructivism as well. I think this extension of theoretical 
concerns follows quite naturally once one seriously tries to establish Fleck's important 
insights and contributions. In determining what Fleck has to say to us, we are unavoidably 
guided by our own lights and prejudices. 1 2 In other words, to give an account of Fleck's 
ideas is to interpret them. 1 3 It is therefore not remarkable that different strands of 
constructivism have produced different readings of Fleck's work, emphasizing one aspect or 
another of the overall theoretical structure as the crucial feature of his approach. Without 
pretending to offer the definitive reading or ultimate synthesis, I think that the risk of an 
unduly restricted interpretation can be minimized by taking the views of modern varieties of 
constructivism into account as fully as possible. 
A useful way to simplify the contemporary picture of a bewildering diversity of different 
constructivisms is to follow Rob Hagendijk and distinguish two broad varieties of 
constructivism: moderate constructivism and radical constructivism}* The distinction is 
made according to the extent to which the various approaches challenge deeply entrenched 
conceptions about nature, society and scientific knowledge. The adherents of the Strong 
Programme (Barnes, Bloor) and of the Empirical Programme of Relativism (Collins, Pinch) 
are moderate constructivists. They take a relativist stance with regard to scientific knowledge: 
variations and alterations in knowledge are explained by relating them to differences and 
changes in social structures and processes. The independent existence of the latter is 
This is an instance of the 'dialogue' between the present and the past as highlighted in Gadamer's 
philosophy. See H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen 
Hermeneutik, Tubingen (J.C.B. Mohr), 1965 (2nd edition). 
This is also recognized by the hermeneutical phenomenologist Patrick Heelan, when he writes about 
his own account of Fleck's work: "The summary given above of Fleck's epistemology was guided 
by my own set of philosophical interests [..]. Any translation of a work like Fleck's will reflect the 
dominant interests [..] of the translator, and any philosophical critical paraphrase will likewise do 
the same". See P. Heelan, 'Fleck's Contribution to Epistemology', in R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle 
(eds.), Cognition and Fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck, Reidel (Dordrecht), 1986, pp. 287-307, on 
p. 294. 
R. Hagendijk, Wetenschap, Constructivisme en Cultuur, Amsterdam (Thesis), 1996. 
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presumed and not called into question. The proponents of the Strong Programme even 
profess to be ontological realists with regard to natural reality, although they do not allow 
verbal accounts of that reality to figure directly in their explanatory schemes. Radical 
constructivists, on the other hand, try to define their position in such a way as to circumvent 
or bypass the epistemological debates between relativism and realism. In contrast to moderate 
constructivists, they do not think it legitimate to assume the existence of pre-given social 
structures which can be used to account for the content of knowledge. Rather, both 'nature' 
and 'society' are seen as being 'co-produced' by science, which is conceived of as a set of 
constructive practices that create order out of disorder. Radical constructivists reject a priori 
distinctions between 'social' and 'cognitive', 'subject' and 'object', 'nature' and 'society' or 
'nature' and 'culture'. Instead of considering such distinctions as explanatory resources 
available to the analyst, they hold that those very distinctions should themselves be treated 
as the outcomes of construction processes. Hagendijk mentions as approaches falling under 
the label of radical constructivism: Knorr-Cetina's ethnographic laboratory studies, Callon 
and Latour's so-called actor-network theory, and the reflexive programme elaborated by 
Woolgar and Ashmore. To these can be added Andrew Pickering's 'science-as-practice' 
approach and the Heideggerian-inspired 'practical hermeneutics' developed by Joseph Rouse. 
Fleck's work cannot be unambiguously assigned to either the moderate or radical variety of 
constructivism; certain features of it are in agreement with the former, whereas other aspects 
exhibit more affinity with the latter variety. Modern forms of constructivism can therefore 
be used as a basis of comparison to sort out the different tenets and strands in Fleck's work. 
A detailed discussion of the problems raised by his work may also clarify the issues that 
divide contemporary constructivists. 
In comparison to Fleck's original monograph, the present study has also widened its 
empirical scope by including two additional episodes from the history of syphilology. Fleck's 
book, it will be recalled, deals with the genesis of the modern concept of syphilis and in 
particular with the formation of the Wassermann reaction. These subjects (with suitable 
extensions) are reconsidered in Chapters III, V and VI of this dissertation. However, I have 
also included chapters on the discovery in 1905 of the causative agent of syphilis by 
Schaudinn and Hoffmann (Chapter IV) and on the development of an effective medicine 
against the disease in 1909-1910 by Paul Ehrlich and co-workers (Chapter VII). These two 
discoveries (or inventions) fall within the same time period as the development of a 
serological test by August Wassermann and his collaborators, which constitutes the main 
subject of Fleck's essay and is discussed in Chapters V and VI. It so happened that the first 
10 years or so of the 20th century were an exceptionally productive decade in the whole 
history of syphilology. 1 5 The discoveries responsible for this rapid progress were intimately 
According to Crissey and Parish, this decade was "far and away the most fruitful in the 500-year 
history of the disease". See J.T. Crissey and L.C. Parish, The Dermatology and Syphilology of the 
Nineteenth Century, New York (Praeger), 1981, p. 394. 
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related to each other. It would be wrong to consider them as just so many isolated 'point 
events'; they should rather be seen as nodes of an interconnected and expanding conceptual 
network of medical knowledge. 1 6 This consideration constitutes the main reason for 
including the above-mentioned two additional episodes in the history of syphilology, which 
are not extensively dealt with in Fleck's book (apart from occasional asides), into the 
compass of this investigation. Adding these two case studies has the further advantage of 
creating extra opportunities for an empirical discussion of the several issues that are raised 
by Fleck's work and modern varieties of constructivism. 
Central issues 
An issue that must certainly be addressed is generated by the central constructivist claim that 
facts are not simply 'found' but are actively 'constructed' (or 'socially constructed'). How 
exactly is this thesis to be interpreted, what are its implications, and can it be succesfully 
defended against criticism? Although Fleck does not employ the by now rather overused 
terminology of 'social construction', his view on the formation of scientific facts essentially 
agrees with modern constructivist versions. As he put it, facts are not states of affairs which 
can be directly ascertained by properly passive observation of natural reality; they are not 
so much discovered as invented in a prolonged social process of gaining collective 
experience. He supported this view by a sustained and impressive criticism of the possibility 
of 'pure observation' or observation without presupposition, using vivid illustrations from 
his own field of bacteriology to great effect (87-95/115-24). To most of his contemporaries, 
however, the very title of Fleck's monograph expressed an unfathomable paradox. This is 
nicely brought out by an anecdote recounted by Thomas Kuhn, who had shown a copy of 
Fleck's monograph to his Harvard mentor James Bryant Conant. When a few years later 
Conant became US High Commissioner for Germany, he mentioned the title of the book to 
one of his German associates. The latter's reaction was one of perplexity and disbelief: "How 
can such a book be? A fact is a fact. It has neither genesis nor development". 1 7 Today the 
constructivist claim that scientific facts are (socially) constructed has become rather 
commonplace, but it is still sufficiently offensive to arouse outcries of indignation among 
philosophers of a rationalist and realist persuasion. The Canadian philosopher Mario Bunge, 
for instance, holds that "in matters of knowledge the only genuine social constructions are 
The term 'network' used here alludes to the notion of a Hesse net or Hesse network (after the 
British philosopher of science, Mary Hesse). See M. Hesse, The Structure of Scientific Inference, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles (University of California Press), 1974. See also Chapter n for further 
explanation. Fleck himself conjured up the image of a "network in continuous fluctuation" (79/105) 
to explain the development of the Wassermann reaction as a result of a junction of various lines of 
thought. 
T. Kuhn, 'Foreword' to L. Fleck, op. cit. (note 4), p. VIII. 
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the scientific forgeries committed by two or more people" 1 8 , his prime example being the 
notorious Piltdown fossil skull. To assert that scientific facts are socially constructed is often 
held to detract from the authority and credibility of science. 1 9 Modern constructivists are 
thus accused of making it effectively impossible to draw a distinction between facts and 
artefacts. 2 0 It is significant that a similar charge had already been brought against Fleck 
in an early review of his work . 2 1 I think this particular criticism deserves careful 
consideration. The objection can be answered in two ways. A philosophical reply will be 
given in the final chapter of this book. A more empirically oriented response, however, is 
also possible. In fact, in their daily practice natural scientists are frequently confronted with 
the problem of whether or not they are dealing with an artefact in their observations and 
measurements. It would seem that the way in which they deal with such a recurrent problem 
is itself amenable to empirical inquiry. This problem figures prominently in the historical 
case-study on the discovery of the aetiological agent of syphilis that will be discussed in 
Chapter IV. There I attempt to show that the social construction of 'facts' and the social (de-
)construction of 'artefacts' can be handled simultaneously using a single analytical 
framework. 
The debate turns not only on the noun 'construction' but also on the precise meaning 
of the adjective ' social ' . 2 2 "Cognition", Fleck proclaims, "is the most socially-conditioned 
activity of man, and knowledge is the paramount social creation" (42/58). Knowledge is 
social in the fundamental sense that it is always an outcome of intense 'intellectual 
interaction' between many individuals. There can be no strictly private knowledge, just as 
there can be no private language. Fleck rejects traditional epistemology which considers 
cognition as a two-way affair between subject and object. He adds a third component, the 
thought collective, defined as a community of persons maintaining intellectual interaction, 
which he sees as the social bearer of a certain thought style, (loosely) defined as a disposition 
ML Bunge, 'A Critical Examination of the New Sociology of Science Part 2', Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 22 (1992): 46-76, on pp. 66-67. 
P.R. Gross and N. Levitt, Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science, 
Baltimore MD (Johns Hopkins University Press), 1994. 
R. Nola, 'There are More Things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio, Than are Dreamt of in Your 
Philosophy: A Dialogue on Realism and Constructivism', Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science 25 (1994): 689-727. To avoid misunderstanding: 'artefact' is taken here in the sense of a 
spurious fact or spurious phenomenon produced by the investigation itself, not in the sense of a 
human-made useful object like a tool or some other device. 
H. Petersen, 'Ludwig Fleck's Lehre vom Denkstil und dem Denkkollektiv', Klinische 
Wochenschrift 15 (1936): 239-42. 
For a critical review of several forms of (social) constructivism which focuses on the different 
meanings of 'construction', see S. Sismondo, 'Some Social Constructions', Social Studies of 
Science 23 (1993): 515-53; for a philosophical analysis of the social nature of science, see S.H. 
Downes, 'Socializing Naturalized Philosophy of Science', Philosophy of Science 60 (1993): 452-68. 
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for selective perception and thinking. A fully socialized member of a thought collective, 
Fleck holds, looks through his own eyes but sees with the eyes of the collective. 2 3 Fleck's 
way of conceiving of the social is thus rather 'collectivistic', giving primacy to the collective 
as a whole over its individual members. This collectivistic tendency is echoed in the strong 
approval which he bestows on the following statement by Ludwig Gumplowicz: "The greatest 
error of individualistic psychology is the assumption that a person thinks. [..] What actually 
thinks within a person is not the individual himself but his social community" (46-47/63). 
Fleck also denies the reputed 'intellectual fathers' of the discoveries of the aetiological agent 
of syphilis and of the serodiagnostic test for detecting the disease - Fritz Schaudinn and 
August Wassermann, respectively - their status as 'discoverers': "Wassermann, like 
Schaudinn, is rather a standard-bearer in discovery than its sole agent" (42/57). Several non-
constructivist commentators have criticized Fleck's collectivistic or "extremely anti-
individualistic standpoint". 2 4 Foremost among the critics of this standpoint is Thomas 
Kuhn, who on his first acquaintance with Fleck's book already felt repelled by a "vaguely 
repulsive perspective of a sociology of the collective mind" and still rejects this particular 
aspect of his work . 2 5 Presumably, the famous (non-constructivist) sociologist of science 
Robert Merton, co-editor of the English translation of Fleck's monograph, would also take 
exception to Fleck's collectivism, because in his work he has always tried to steer a careful 
middle course between the individualistic and collectivistic views of discovery and 
invention. 2 6 The anthropologist Mary Douglas, by contrast, has expressed her full approval 
of this feature of Fleck's approach. 2 7 
Some, but by no means all, modern constructivists would agree with Fleck's emphasis 
on the essentially social character of cognition. Harry Collins, for example, spells out several 
ways in which scientific activity is social, summarizing his analysis as follows: "Thus, 
learning scientific knowledge, changing scientific knowledge, establishing scientific 
knowledge, and mamtaining scientific knowledge are all irremediably shot through with the 
social. They simply are social activities". 2 8 He even comes close to Gumplowicz's dictum: 
L. Fleck, 'To Look, to See, to Know [1947]', in Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 13), pp. 129-
152, on p. 134. 
R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle, 'Introduction' to Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 13), p. XI. 
See Kuhn's foreword to Fleck, 1979, op. cit. (note 4), on pp. IX-X. 
R.K. Merton, The Sociology of Science (edited and introduced by N.W. Storer), Chicago (The 
University of Chicago Press), 1973. 
M. Douglas, How Institutions Think, London (Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1987, especially pp. 12-
19. 
H.M. Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, Cambridge MA and 
London (MIT Press), 1990, p. 5. 
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"To put the issue in the starkest form, the locus of knowledge appears to be not the 
individual but the social group; what we are as individuals is but a symptom of the groups 
in which the irreducible quantum of knowledge is located. Contrary to the usual reductionist 
model of the social sciences, it is the individual who is made of social groups". 2 9 Similar 
declarations on the primacy of the social can be found with other proponents of the sociology 
of scientific knowledge (SSK), especially with the adherents of the Strong Programme like 
David Bloor and Barry Barnes. Other constructivists, however, have meanwhile become 
rather disenchanted with the term 'social', if not with its content. Symptomatic for this 
tendency is the decision of Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar to drop the term 'social' from 
the subtitle of the second (1986) edition of their famous book Laboratory Life: now it has 
simply become 'the construction of scientific facts ' . 3 0 The alleged reason for this 
remarkable deletion, as they state it in the postcript to the second edition, is that "[b]y 
demonstrating its pervasive applicability, the social study of science has rendered 'social' 
devoid of any meaning". 3 1 Actually, the changed terminology is indicative of the fact that 
both Latour and Woolgar have completely abandoned the original explanatory ideals of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. Woolgar disputes the adequacy of so-called 'interest 
explanations' in the style of the Strong Programme (i.e. the attempt to explain the esoteric 
content of scientific knowledge from social interests). 3 2 Latour, for his part, holds that 
facts and artefacts as well as new social structures are 'co-produced' in the constructive 
practices of techno-scientists. It is therefore not acceptable, in his view, to adduce social 
factors when explaining the constitution of facts and artefacts, because those factors are 
themselves in need of explanation. More particularly, he maintains that interests, far from 
being given, are malleable and can be modified and manipulated by the deliberate efforts of 
techno-scientists. To get their projects off the ground, the latter have to 'enroll' other parties 
by 'capturing' and 'translating' their interests. 3 3 It remains to be seen, however, whether 
this is so fundamentally at odds with the explanatory tenets of the Strong Programme as 
Latour himself suggests. Anyway, as he himself declares, Latour is not in the business of 
offering social explanations. Nor are such explanations very popular among representatives 
Ibid., p. 6. 
B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, Princeton NJ 
(Princeton University Press), 1986. The first edition was entitled Laboratory Life: The Social 
Construction of Scientific Facts, Beverly Hills (Sage), 1979. 
Ibid. (Latour and Woolgar, 1986), p. 281. 
S. Woolgar, 'Interests and Explanation in the Social Study of Science', Social Studies of Science 11 
(1981): 365-94. 
B. Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Milton 
Keynes (Open University Press), 1987. 'Artefacts' is taken here in the sense of human-made useful 
objects such as tools, machines, and other devices. 
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of other constructivist schools like ethnomethodology (Lynch), ethnographic lab studies 
(Knorr-Cetina), discourse analysis (Mulkay), 'practical hermeneutics' (Rouse) and the more 
recent study of 'science-as-practice' (Pickering). In view of such widespread skepticism, I 
consider it one of the tasks of the present thesis to re-examine and elucidate the possible role 
of social explanations in general and of interest explanations in particular within science 
studies. 
It is perhaps no coincidence that Latour, Knorr-Cetina, and Lynch - all three of them 
prominent critics of social explanations, albeit in different ways - originally entered the social 
studies of science field through participant observation in scientific laboratories undertaken 
during the 1970s. 3 4 For Knorr-Cetina it is the notion of a 'laboratory' itself, suitably 
redefined in analytical terms, which promises to provide an alternative theoretical framework 
for science studies. Adherents of the Strong Programme will certainly object that this still 
leaves the macrosocial determination of laboratory work out of account. Responding to the 
macrosociological challenge of (microsociological) laboratory studies - namely, how to detect 
the influence of societal relations of power -, Latour has found a felicitous way of posing the 
problem, or rather of rhetorically reversing it and reformulating it in terms congenial to his 
own approach: How to explain the power of the laboratory over the surrounding society (its 
leverage effect), or in other words, how does the science get out of the laboratory? Latour's 
own answer to this question is that, as a matter of fact, the science never really gets out of 
the laboratory. Scientific results can be made applicable to society at large only by extending, 
as far as possible, the laboratory conditions which gave rise to their production in the first 
place. In other words, the 'outside' world has to be reshaped in the image of the 
laboratory. 3 5 Whatever the merits of Latour's answer (and I will certainly have to consider 
them), there is no doubt that the question he raised is a fruitful one. It will be a leading 
question in the two case-studies reported in Chapters V and VU. Indeed, my main criticism 
of Fleck's historical study of the Wassermann test for syphilis is precisely that his account 
stays too much within the boundaries of the serological laboratory. 
A recent trend in constructivism is the movement away from a primary concern with 
'science-as-knowledge' toward an explicit interest in 'science-as-practice'. 3 6 In the opinion 
B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts, Beverly 
Hills (Sage), 1979; K. Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the 
Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science, Oxford and New York (Pergamon), 1981; M. 
Lynch, Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science: A Study of Shop Work and Shop Talk in a Research 
Laboratory, London (Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1985. 
B. Latour, 'Give Me a Laboratory and I will Raise the World', in K.D. Knorr-Cetina and M. 
Mulkay (eds.), Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science, London/Beverly 
Hills/Delhi (Sage), 1983, pp. 141-70. 
D. Gooding, T. Pinch and S. Schaffer (eds.), The Uses of Experiment, Cambridge (Cambridge 
University Press), 1989; A. Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago and London 
(University of Chicago Press), 1992; J.Z. Buchwald (ed.), Scientific Practice: Theories and Stories 
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of the protagonists of this 'turn to practice', the proponents of the older sociology of 
scientific knowledge (SSK) are still too preoccupied with the cognitive aspects of science. 
Among the newer constructivists the focus is more on the constructive engagement of 
scientists with the material world as it is conducted under definite (though adaptable) material 
and social conditions. Doing science is not just testing theories against the data provided by 
experiments; it also involves assembling, deploying and modifying resources (both material 
and conceptual) for the production of knowledge. In the new approach it is, to use Ian 
Hacking's distinction, the 'intervening' rather than the 'representing' that is put into the 
foreground. 3 7 The recent focus on science-as-practice has also infused a whiff of 
'pragmatic realism' into constructivism, although it is still a matter of debate how much and 
what kind of realism can be allowed without subverting the aims of constructivist science 
studies. Some (e.g. Peter Galison) would admit that reality imposes 'constraints' in one way 
or another on the constructions of scientists, while for others (in particular Andrew 
Pickering) all talk about 'constraints' is anathema. This dispute may also be relevant to the 
interpretation of Fleck's work in view of the ambiguities related to certain submerged realist 
tendencies in it. Ironically, Fleck's monograph is not only 'appropriated' by the adherents 
of the Strong Programme as a pioneering example of the sociology of scientific knowledge, 
it is also 'claimed' by the newer constructivists of 'practical hermeneutics' and the science-
as-practice approach in virtue of its exemplary analysis of the practical work performed by 
Wassermann and his collaborators in developing a serological test for syphilis. 3 8 Pickering 
points out that Fleck uses the significant metaphor of 'toning' in his analysis of the 
Wassermann reaction: "[Wassermann] and his co-workers [..] 'toned' their sets until these 
became selective" (86/113; Fleck refers in this connection to the efforts to enhance the 
success rate of the serological reaction by manipulating the quantities of each of the five 
required reagents.) The term 'tuning' is also used by Pickering himself to designate the so-
called 'mangle of practice', or the dialectic between resistance and accommodation, as the 
most general pattern discernable in the pursuits of scientists. When scientists come up against 
'resistances' or unexpected problems, they can of course 'accommodate' by revising their 
theoretical models of the phenomenon under investigation, or their interpretations of how the 
apparatus works, but it is just as likely that they will try to adjust their material procedures 
of Doing Physics, Chicago and London (University of Chicago Press), 1995; A. Pickering, The 
Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency & Science, Chicago and London (University of Chicago Press), 
1995. 
I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, 
Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1983. 
L Golinski, "The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory: Sociological Approaches in the 
History of Science', Isis 81 (1990): 492-505; J. Rouse, Knowledge and Power, Ithaca and London 
(Cornell University Press), 1987; J. Rouse, Engaging Science: How to Understand its Practices, 
Ithaca and London (Cornell University Press), 1996. 
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and tinker with their instruments. In general, scientists seek to achieve coherence between 
all three elements. Pickering stretches the meaning of the term 'tuning' still further by 
extending it to the revision of theories ('conceptual tuning') and the reconfiguring of social 
relations ('social tuning'). Thus even the social relations (work styles, institutional structures 
etcetera) under which scientific work is conducted are subject to the 'mangle of practice'. It 
will by now be clear that the science-as-practice approach offers a broad agenda of inquiry. 
In empirical studies it encourages us to pay attention to such issues as the acquisition of 
resources, the refractoriness of raw materials (including test animals!), and the coordination 
and organization of scientific work . 3 9 
Latour's question, how the science gets out of the laboratory, can also be fruitfully taken 
up within this framework as it is able to develop a deeper understanding of the problems that 
must be confronted when laboratory findings or products are to be transferred to the outside 
world. As I already said, I will have occasion to examine this question in the two empirical 
case-studies reported in Chapters V and VII. Especially in the latter chapter, dealing with the 
development and clinical introduction of an effective medicine against syphilis by Paul 
Ehrlich and his team, the empirical potential of the science-as-practice approach will be 
explored. 
Up till now not much has been said about a concept that plays a central role in Fleck's 
theory, the concept of thought style. That is no mere coincidence. Contemporary 
constructivists are less than enthusiastic about this concept, at least about the explanatory role 
it is given in Fleck's work. In particular they object to Fleck's ascription of "an absolutely 
compulsive force" to thought styles (41/57). The historian of science Jonathan Harwood, 
intellectually close to the Strong Programme, accuses Fleck of abandoning his sociological 
approach and falling back into an intellectualist and idealist way of thinking. Thought styles 
emerge in and through the actions of a scientific community. By imputing to such styles the 
power to constrain thought and action, Harwood maintains, Fleck reverses the causal arrow 
and depicts human actors as being at the mercy of their cognitive creations. 4 0 (In Chapter 
II I will discuss the so-called finitist theory of meaning and concept application which 
provides the underlying philosophical rationale to such objections.) 
Modern constructivist strictures against the concept of thought style do not directly affect 
its use in a descriptive context. However, Fleck's descriptive use of this notion also deserves 
critical attention. He gives a characterization of the so-called 'serological thought style' (or 
In many respects the position reached by Karin Knorr-Cetina in the tradition of ethnographic 
laboratory studies is quite similar to Pickering's science-as-practice approach as described above. 
See K. Knorr-Cetina, 'Laboratory Studies: The Cultural Approach to the Study of Science', in S. 
Jasanoff et. al. (eds.), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Los Angeles (Sage), 1994, pp. 
140-66. 
J. Harwood, 'Ludwik Fleck and the Sociology of Knowledge', Social Studies of Science 16 (1986): 
173-87, on pp. 182-83. See also D. Bloor, 'Some Determinants of Cognitive Style in Science', in 
Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 13): 387-97. 
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the thought style of the 'serologists' collective') by enumerating a number of elements that 
supposedly make up this particular style (59-64/79-84). But this raises the question why these 
elements actually constitute a thought style, or more generally: when do different elements 
add up to a style; what makes a collection of elements a stylistic whole? A further question 
is whether such stylistic units necessarily have to coincide with the boundaries of a particular 
scientific discipline. Or to press the issue: Can a thought style be limited to a single 
discipline? Harwood argues strongly and convincingly for the comparative use of styles as 
a descriptive category: "Notice that unless one identifies recurring elements in several 
cultural sectors, there is little point in using the term style" . 4 1 This would mean that (some 
of) the 'recurring elements' that Fleck identified as constituting the (presumed) style of the 
serologists' collective must also be found in other disciplinary (or cultural) sectors, and that 
such a collection of recurring elements must be matched with at least one contrastive set of 
elements covering a comparable range of sectors. The implication is that the questions raised 
by Fleck's idea of thought styles cannot be adequately dealt with as long as the analysis is 
restricted to the discipline of serology or the development of the Wassermann reaction. My 
decision to include additional episodes from the history of syphilology into the compass of 
this thesis, thus allowing consideration of several 'sectors', will therefore help fulfil one of 
the requirements Harwood deems essential for a proper stylistic analysis. Happily, with 
regard to the other requirement of finding a contrasting style, some of the preparatory work 
has already been done by the historian Pauline Mazumdar. In her book Species and 
Specificity she interprets the history of immunology (encompassing serology) as a continuous 
opposition between the protagonists of 'pluralist' and 'unitarian' views or styles. 4 2 Fleck's 
so-called 'serological' thought style can thus both be extended to new disciplinary sectors and 
re-characterized as an instantiation of Mazumdar's 'pluralist' (or specificity) style as opposed 
to the 'unitarian' style. After this redescription we can also more profitably re-examine the 
riddle of the apparent coercive force of the pluralist thought style, or the 'power' of the idea 
of specificity, within microbiology and immunology. 
Synoptic preview 
The theoretical and empirical scope of this study thus clarified, an outline of the chapters 
which follow can now be presented. 
In Chapter II I shall systematically compare Fleck's theories with the approaches 
adopted by contemporary constructivists. My strategy is partly to use modern forms of 
constructivism as a foil for extracting relevant and valuable insights from the richness of 
Fleck's elaborations, partly to identify theoretical and conceptual issues that can possibly be 
J. Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933, Chicago 
and London (The University of Chicago Press), 1993, p. 9. 
P.M.H. Mazumdar, Species and Specificity: An Interpretation of the History of Immunology, 
Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1995. 
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clarified through an empirical 'replication' of Fleck's work. In the following chapters I will 
therefore deliberately put on spectacles grinded according to different constructivist recipes 
in order to illuminate various aspects of the concrete episodes under study (always allowing 
for a comparison with Fleck's empirical analyses) and to elucidate, as far as possible, the 
theoretical issues involved. Starting out from moderate constructivist approaches (Chapters 
m and IV) I will move on to more radical forms of constructivism (Chapters V and VU). 
In the concluding chapter the spectacles themselves will be the object of examination. 
Chapter HI reconsiders the historical genesis of the modern concept of syphilis, which 
is also the main subject of the first part of Fleck's monograph. Its purpose is to demonstrate 
the prima facie legitimacy and fruitfulness of a broadly constructivist approach towards the 
historical genesis of disease concepts. The aim of the chapter is therefore less to criticize 
than to consolidate and extend Fleck's insights. I do so by following the example of many 
modern constructivists in adopting Mary Hesse's finitist theory (or 'network theory') of 
meaning as my starting-point. The results of my explorations vindicate Fleck's view of the 
(socially) constructed and 'culture-laden' character of the modern concept of syphilis. I also 
follow up one of Fleck's more specific suggestive remarks, to the effect that moral 
considerations in particular entered into the construction of concepts of syphilis. To 
substantiate this suggestion, I pay special attention to the (formerly presumed) 'hereditary' 
and (still uncontested) venereal character of the disease. By performing a cross-cultural 
comparison with some non-venereal tropical and subtropical diseases closely related to 
syphilis, I hope to loosen the hold on our minds of the 'venereal fixation' characteristic of 
the modern concept of syphilis. Some of the findings discussed in this chapter are calculated 
to unsettle the tranquillity of mind of hard-headed anti-constructivists and thus, by the same 
token, to earn credibility for a broadly constructivist approach. 
Chapter IV describes and analyzes the discovery of the causative agent of syphilis, a 
subject to which Fleck devotes some brief but interesting passages in his monograph. In this 
chapter I shall put on the type of spectacles that belong to the special brand of (social) 
constructivism represented by Harry Collins. 4 3 Characteristic of this approach, which 
preferably focuses on the study of scientific controversies, is that the analyst takes a strictly 
agnostic stance as to the reality or otherwise of the (purported) natural phenomenon under 
dispute and treats the arguments and actions of the conflicting parties in a symmetrical and 
impartial way. The empirical subject of this chapter provides a favourable occasion to follow 
these precepts. During the years 1905-1907 two different microorganisms, Spirochaeta 
pallida and Cytorrhyctes luis, were in fact proposed and defended as the looked-for 
aetiological agent of syphilis. Such a situation would seem to be a pre-eminent case calling 
for a symmetrical treatment in the modern constructivist sense. Indeed, Fleck himself already 
H. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, Beverly Hills (Sage), 
1985; see also H. Collins and T. Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know About Science, 
Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1993. 
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presented a symmetrical analysis of this episode in his monograph, but - as I will argue - the 
particular account he offered lacks plausibility. I will undertake a new effort, more sustained 
and hopefully more thorough-going than Fleck's failed attempt. In the debate on the aetiology 
of syphilis several issues were raised that are highly relevant for a constructivist analysis, 
e.g. about the reliability of (microscopic) observation and the possibility of creating 
'artefacts' by staining tissue preparations. Fleck's general views on the role of perception and 
observation, expounded in his monograph and other writings, prove to be useful and 
pertinent. The case also illustrates the general constructivist insight that appeal to formal 
methodological rules and criteria is unable to resolve controversies. Finally, the chapter will 
present a conceptual analysis of the notion of 'discovery' in line with the findings of the 
historical case-study. A consistently sustained constructivist approach leads to a major 
rethinking of this notion, taking up but going beyond Thomas Kuhn's views on the matter. 
To put it briefly and somewhat paradoxically, using the familiar distinction of traditional 
philosophy of science, the constructivist proposal is to transfer the category of discovery 
from the 'context of discovery' to the 'context of justification', or rather, to the social 
context of validation and acceptance. 
Chapter V deals with the genesis and development of the Wassermann reaction as a 
clinically usable serological test for detecting syphilis. This is also the main subject of 
Fleck's monograph. The 'scientific fact' to which the title of his book refers is "the fact that 
the so-called Wassermann reaction is related to syphilis", which was, according to Fleck, 
"one of the best established medical facts". The establishment of this fact is seen as the result 
of a cooperative effort by the so-called 'serological thought collective' led by August 
Wassermann, which under the influence of the social urgency of the syphilis problem and 
ancient ideas about syphilitic blood worked unceasingly to improve and perfect the test until 
a practically usable diagnostic instrument was finally obtained. 
In this chapter I examine the empirical and theoretical adequacy of Fleck's analysis. I 
take issue with several elements of his account, but the main objection is that he simply 
ignores the 'clinical connection' and depicts the development of the Wassermann reaction as 
if it occurred exclusively within the four walls of the laboratory, with serologists busily 
'tuning their sets'. In my alternative account of the whole episode, the interaction between 
serologists and clinicians figures much more prominently. This account is loosely inspired 
by Bruno Latour's ideas on 'enrollment' and 'translation of interests ' . 4 4 To convince 
clinicians of the value and reliability of the Wassermann reaction, serologists were initially 
caught in a 'dilemma of application' 4 5: if the outcome of the test agreed with the clinicians' 
own judgement, it would tell them nothing new; if it disagreed with their judgement, they 
Latour (note 33). 
This notion is derived from M. Mulkay, T. Pinch and M. Ashmore, 'Colonizing the Mind: 
Dilemmas in the Application of Social Science', Social Studies of Science 17 (1987): 231-56, on p. 
233; these authors elaborate on Bruno Latour's notions of enrollment and translation of interests. 
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would doubt its validity and reliability. Through active involvement of clinicians 
('enrollment'), the dilemma could be overcome by, on the one hand, changing the technical 
execution and clinical meaning of the Wassermann reaction, and, on the other, redefining the 
diagnostic and therapeutic interests of clinicians to which the test would attend. Ultimately, 
a practically usable serological test for syphilis was achieved by the joint efforts of 
serologists and clinicians. This analysis also elucidates some riddles that were left unresolved 
within Fleck's account. However, I intend to do more than rectifying the shortcomings of 
Fleck's account. I also want to venture, albeit rather cautiously, some radical-constructivist 
exercises. In addition to the Latourian notions of enrollment and translating interests already 
mentioned, I have taken into the account the views of Pickering and Rouse on the character 
of scientific activity as a practice, in particular with regard to the realization of experimental 
systems and the practical engagement with raw materials, test animals and 'patient material'. 
In contrast to these radical constructivists, however, I see no reason to reject the notion of 
interests as used by the moderate constructivists on grounds of principle. In my judgement, 
a modest role even accrues to the professional interests of serologists and clinicians to 
understand and explain the development of the Wassermann reaction. Interest explanations, 
in my view, are perfectly compatible with the phenomenon of interest translation highlighted 
by Latour. 
Chapter VI is devoted to an analysis of the dispute over the intellectual ownership of the 
Wassermann reaction, which erupted in the aftermath of the development of this serological 
test - as a bitter epilogue, so to speak. It was in 1921 that August Wassermann got embroiled 
in a lively polemics with, among others, his former collaborator Carl Brack and his former 
critic Eduard Weil over the question of who could call himself the legitimate intellectual 
father of the Wassermann reaction. The reason for devoting a separate chapter to what was 
considered at the time a rather 'unsavoury' dispute, is that it offers us a unique possibility 
to critically examine on the basis of historical material the much-criticized 'collectivistic' or 
'anti-individualistic' stance characteristic of Fleck's approach. The conclusion of my analysis 
is that this 'collectivistic' feature of Fleck's sociology of knowledge made him, indeed, ill-
equipped to adequately deal with the struggle over the intellectual ownership of the 
Wassermann reaction. He uncritically takes the assertions made by the protagonists during 
the course of this struggle as simply reflecting their views on the development of the 
Wassermann reaction, without taking account of the fact that these utterances were made for 
strategic reasons to bolster up their respective claims to the intellectual property of the 
serological test or to defeat the claims of others. My own account of this 'unsavoury' episode 
is inspired by Robert Merton's sociology of science which takes a more balanced stance on 
the relationship between individual and collective. 4 6 For the Mertonian sociology of 
science, the struggle over intellectual property between (former) team members is a still 
unexplored theme (it has mostly concentrated on priority disputes between independent 
Merton, op. cit. (note 26). 
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scientists). I also relax Merton's restriction on analyzing the content of scientific knowledge: 
the question of who has had a creative part in the making of a discovery is indissolubly 
bound up with the question of what exactly has been discovered. In the struggle over the 
Wassermann reaction participants could argue their case only by taking a stand on both 
questions. In this way I attempt to integrate Mertonian insights within a broadly constructivist 
approach. In view of the fact that Merton's sociology of science has received a barrage of 
criticism from constructivist quarters, the attempt may be interpreted as a plea for 
rehabilitation. 
Chapter VU deals with the development of an effective chemotherapeutic medicine 
against syphilis by Paul Ehrlich and his co-workers. Fleck's monograph contains only a few 
passing remarks on this development. The reason for including a chapter on this subject, 
apart from the fact that it constitutes an important node in the expanding conceptual network 
of syphilology, is that Ehrlich's work appears to be an excellent case on which to perform 
the kind of analysis that has become customary in more recent forms of (radical) 
constructivism, viz. those connected with the movement away from 'science-as-knowledge' 
toward 'science-as-practice'. Andrew Pickering is the most outspoken exponent of this 
tendency, but it is also manifest in Joseph Rouse's work and in Karin Knorr-Cetina's earlier 
contributions. Some aspects of Latour's work too can be brought under this heading. The 
crucial question of how laboratory results can be applicable, or be made applicable, to the 
world outside the laboratory (in other words, how the 'science' gets out of the laboratory), 
which he has raised to such prominence, can be fruitfully taken up in an analysis of 'science-
as-practice'. Such an analysis had already been partially attempted in Chapter V, but is 
conducted in a more sustained and systematic way in this chapter. The object of analysis is 
Paul Ehrlich's practice of 'experimental therapeutics' (or 'chemotherapy'), which modern 
pharmacologists often consider to be the beginnings of rational drug design. To inaugurate 
this practice he built up a vast 'construction machinery' (Knorr-Cetina) by acquiring the 
necessary funds and material and human resources through an intimate symbiosis with the 
German chemical (synthetic dye) industry. In order to put these resources to productive 
work, he borrowed from this same industry a model of research management and division 
of scientific labour, which he tailored to his own needs by combining chemical work with 
the large-scale testing of chemical preparations on experimental animals. The secret of 
Ehrlich's success was in fact the combination of 'chemical mass-labour' with 'biological 
mass-labour' and the creation of 'experimental systems' (Rouse) through the suitable selection 
of test animals. Of course, Ehrlich and his collaborators had to overcome many constraints 
and limitations of the raw materials and test animals. The entire venture was not oriented to 
finding a remedy against syphilis immediately from the start; it was only during the course 
of the programme and through 'opportunism in context' (Pickering) that the turn to this 
disease occurred. Initially, Ehrlich had boasted that through his approach, using animal 
experiments on an extensive scale, the most 'optimal' drugs could be developed and selected 
so as to make the final test on man no more, as it were, than proving the sum. Things would 
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dramatically turn out otherwise. After an effective substance had been found against 
syphilitically infected rabbits, the gap separating laboratory and outside world had to be 
bridged and this proved to be an even more exacting task than developing the medicine in 
the first place. A constructivist analysis inspired by the science-as-practice approach 
highlights the difficulties that have to be confronted when laboratory products are to find 
their way into the 'wider' society. In this particular case, the insufficiency of Latour's own 
answer to the question he raised is clearly revealed: the clinical introduction of Salvarsan 
involved much more than simply transplanting laboratory conditions to the outside world, it 
also involved the 'normalization of the object' (Knorr-Cetina), legal, social and political 
intervention, and continued experimentation with the medicine after its commercial 
introduction (the thesis of 'society as laboratory'). 
Chapter VUI does not deal with a particular episode in the history of syphilology, but 
offers a reconstruction of the so-called 'serological thought style' which according to Fleck 
determined the way of thinking and acting of the serologists' collective led by Wassermann. 
In contrast to Fleck, contemporary constructivists generally reject, on the basis of finitist 
arguments, such an explanatory use of the notion of thought style. This still leaves the 
possibility that the term refers to an interesting phenomenon worthy of investigation as an 
explanandum. Fleck's descriptive characterization of the serological thought style, however, 
also raises questions. Following Harwood I argue that this concept can be meaningfully 
employed only in a comparative way. It does not make sense to speak of the thought style 
of a serologists' collective, if this same style cannot be recognized in other sectors than 
serology and if it cannot be contrasted with different styles. To carry out this comparative 
investigation I will draw upon the various episodes in the history of syphilology as discussed 
in the preceding chapters, which together cover several sectors of medical science (nosology, 
aetiology, serology, and therapy). The unity of Fleck's 'serological' thought style will be 
found in the basic idea of specificity. Viewed in this way it represents the so-called 'pluralist' 
style, previously analyzed by Pauline Mazumdar, which can be contrasted with the so-called 
'unitarian' style. Harwood's requirements for the meaningful employment of style concepts 
can thus be met. Finally I show that the 'power' of the pluralist style (and of the basic idea 
of specificity) can be partially explained from the unprecedented power structure which the 
Koch-Ehrlich group had built up in German medical science in the years around 1900. 
In Chapter IV, finally, I have attempted to develop, by building on the results of the 
preceding chapters, a reasoned and well-considered position vis-a-vis the two big fundamental 
problems which continue to haunt constructivist studies of science and technology, to wit, 
the problem of realism and the question of how to conceive of 'the social' and the 
relationship between the individual and the collective. The latter problem includes the 
question of how to adequately conceptualize the notion of 'social practices' in general and 
of 'scientific practices' in particular. Moderate and radical constructivism take very different 
positions with regard to both fundamental problems. Radical constructivists push the 
construction metaphor to such extent that in their view not just plastics or genetically 
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modified organisms but also microbes, electrons and quarks are held to be constructed by 
science. Latour and Woolgar's 'splitting-and-inversion' model about the genesis of facts often 
lies hidden behind this view. It is because of such views that radical constructivism clashes 
with current realist conceptions, despite the fact that radical constructivists themselves believe 
to have transcended the entire debate between realism and anti-realism. Among the moderate 
constructivists, the term 'construction' refers exclusively to the formation of knowledge about 
natural reality, not to that reality itself or its constituent objects. The adherents of the Strong 
Programme even take a stance as common-sense realists vis-a-vis reality. I think such a 
position is excellently defensible. It is preferable, in my opinion, to so-called 'scientific 
realism', which is too strongly committed to the existence of those theoretical entities which 
are currently accepted in science. Moreover, this variety of realism also argues rather 
problematically from the practical success of applications of science to the truth of the 
underlying theories and fails to appreciate the open-ended character of concept application 
as emphasized in the finitist theory. 
As regards the second fundamental problem I should declare that I do not share the 
hypercritical skepticism which radical constructivists display vis-a-vis 'the social'. I have 
attempted to rebut each of several objections which they have adduced against 'social' 
explanations of the content of scientific knowledge. Latour's argument, for example, to the 
effect that society does not provide a solid basis for such explanations because 
technoscientists themselves act as 'society builders', is only a half-truth, for even when acting 
in that capacity technoscientists act under definite, not freely chosen or fully controllable 
societal relationships. I also confront Rouse's criticism that moderate constructivists tend to 
treat the validation of knowledge-claims within self-enclosed scientific communities and the 
position defended by Knorr-Cetina that the validation of such claims has no need for a social 
locus beyond the laboratory itself. I further reject the criticism expressed by Woolgar that 
any attempt to demonstrate the social determination of scientific knowledge invariably 
involves portraying competent and knowledgeable actors as mere puppets or 'cultural dopes'. 
I admit, however, that it is very difficult to strike a proper balance between the spontaneity 
and agency of individual actors, on the one hand, and the effects of social structures 
('constraints'), on the other hand. It would therefore be very welcome to have a theory which 
is able to do justice to both aspects. That is why I finally examine Anthony Giddens's 
'structuration theory' to see whether it fulfils these desiderata. In the end it appears that the 
modification of Giddens's theory proposed by William Sewell may be reasonably satisfactory. 
Whereas Giddens views social structure as a virtual order consisting of a set of rules and 
resources that is reproduced in concrete practices, Sewell reformulates the duality of structure 
as a duality of virtual elements, namely rules or cultural schemas, and actual elements, 
namely resources. The deployment of (material and human) resources is informed by cultural 
schemas; conversely, in order to be reproduced the latter must actually be used in the 
accumulation of resources. Within this framework the 'agency' of individuals is conceived 
as empowerment through access to resources and the competence to apply existing cultural 
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schemas to new contexts. Sewell's emphasis on the transposability of cultural schemas to new 
situations exhibits similarity to the finitist view. He also conceives of 'agency' as thoroughly 
social. Finally I argue that his conceptualization of the notion of social practices is able to 
incorporate the valuable elements in Pickering's 'science-as-practice' approach and Rouse's 
'practical hermeneutics' without taking the dubious 'posthumanist' and 'anti-social' tenor of 
the latter approaches also on board. 
CHAPTER II 
LUD WIK FLECK AND MODERN CONSTRUCTIVISM 
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1. Introduction 
Historically, Ludwik Fleck's doctrine of thought styles and thought collectives represents a 
'missing link' connecting the older Durkheimian tradition in the sociology of knowledge and 
modern forms of constructivism. When he launched his bold programme for a sociologically-
informed, comparative epistemology in the 1930s, logical positivism was one of his main 
targets. Precisely because of the dominant position of this school of thought in the philosophy 
of science, however, Fleck's work found little resonance with professional philosophers 
among his contemporaries, as it was seen to deviate too much from the accepted standards 
of logical analysis and rational reconstruction. Fleck's book Entstehung und Entwicklung 
einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache largely went unnoticed when it was published in 1935. It 
received reviews in some German medical weeklies but did not draw the attention of philo-
sophers and sociologists, despite the fact that Fleck wrote some additional articles in both 
German and Polish to popularize his views. 1 
Of course, the political circumstances of the times were not auspicious for a Polish Jew 
who published (also) in German. 2 The German occupation of Poland some years later 
brought disaster to Fleck and his family. In 1943 he was sent to Auschwitz and from there 
he was deported in 1944 to a vaccine production unit in the Buchenwald concentration camp. 
After the war Fleck wrote two or three more articles on epistemology and the sociology of 
knowledge (one of these reflecting on a curious experience in Buchenwald) 3, but he concen-
The following English versions are available: 
- 'Scientific Observation and Perception in General [1935]', in R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle (eds), 
Cognition and Fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck, Dordrecht (Reidel), 1986, pp. 59-78; 
- "The Problem of Epistemology [1936]', ibid., pp. 79-112; 
- 'On the Question of the Foundations of Medical Knowledge [1935]', Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 6 (1981): 237-56; 
- 'Some Specific Features of the Serological Way of Thinking [1937]', Science in Context 2 (19-
88): 343-44. 
Biographical details about Fleck's life and work can be found in T. Schnelle, Ludwik Fleck: Leben 
und Denken, Freiburg (Hochschulverlag), 1982. 
These are available in English: 
- 'Problems of the Science of Science [1946]', in Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 113-
27; 
- 'To Look, to See, to Know [1947]', in ibid., pp. 129-51; 
- 'Crisis in Science [I960]', in ibid., pp. 153-58 (this article was not published during Fleck's 
lifetime). 
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trated his energies on a successful career in Polish medical science. Toward the end of his 
life he and his wife got permission to emigrate to Israel and join their son living there. 
For Fleck, the belated recognition that his 1935 monograph received in 1962 by being 
mentioned in the Preface of Thomas Kuhn's epoch-making The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions as an essay that anticipated many of the latter's ideas, was just too late. One year 
before he had died in Israel. When an English translation and a German re-edition finally 
made Fleck's monograph accessible to a wider audience in 1979 and 1980, respectively, a 
vigorous constructivist tendency had meanwhile emerged in the philosophy, history and 
(particularly) sociology of science which this time was to secure a much stronger resonance 
to his ideas. Indeed, Fleck became posthumously celebrated as a precursor and pioneer of 
modern constructivism. 
In retrospect many have wondered how a rather unknown medical microbiologist, and 
an amateur in philosophy and sociology to boot, living in the relatively provincial town of 
Lwów in pre-war Poland, could develop the highly original constructivist approach to the 
philosophy and sociology of science that we now recognize as a classic contribution. Fleck's 
own doctrine would rule out attributing such originality to an accidental outburst of purely 
individual creativity. Different authors have come up with a number of intellectual influences 
which may have made a decisive contribution to the formation of his thought. liana Löwy 
has argued that Fleck's professional experience in microbiology and immunology (in which 
he defended rather heterodox positions challenging mainstream views) constituted a major 
source of inspiration for his constructivist epistemology. 4 She has also drawn attention to 
the so-called 'Polish School of Philosophy of Medicine' - a tradition of philosophical reflec-
tion on the foundations of medicine by physicians-cum-philosophers like Titus Chalubinski 
(1820-1889) and Zygmunt Kramsztyk (1840-1920) - as an important background to Fleck's 
thought. 5 Other authors like Thomas Schnelle and Jerzy Giedymin have explored the possi-
ble influences of the more well-known analytically oriented 'Philosophy of Lwów' (Twar-
dowski, Ajdukiewicz, Chwistek) on Fleck's epistemological ideas. 6 Further influences inclu-
de Gestalt psychology, Niels Bohr's interpretation of quantum physics, and the Durkheimian 
school in the sociology of knowledge. Without denying the importance of the other intellectu-
al influences on Fleck's thought, I will be primarily concerned in section 2 with the signifi-
cance of the Durkheimian tradition for the genesis of his approach. Linking his thought to 
I. Löwy, "The Epistemology of the Science of an Epistemologist of the Sciences: Ludwik Fleck's 
Professional Outlook and its Relationship to his Philosophical Works', in Cohen and Schnelle, op. 
cit. (note 1), pp. 421-42. 
I. Löwy, The Polish School of Philosophy of Medicine: From Tytus Chalubinski (1820-1889) to 
Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961), Dordrecht (Kluwer), 1990. 
T. Schnelle, 'Ludwik Fleck and the Influence of the Philosophy of Lw6w', in Cohen and Schnelle, 
op. cit. (note 1), pp. 231-65; J. Giedymin, 'Polish Philosophy in the Inter-War Period and Ludwik 
Fleck's Theory of Thought-Styles and Thought-Collectives', in ibidem, pp. 179-215. 
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this tradition will prepare the way for a more penetrating discussion of Fleck's doctrine of 
thought styles and thought collectives in comparison to modern forms of constructivism in 
section 3. 
2. The path to a comparative epistemology 
The lure of the sociology of knowledge 
Fleck's first epistemológica! essay dates from 1927. 7 Its title shows that the characteristics 
of his own field of activity, medicine, constituted the object of his reflections. Fleck defended 
the view that diseases or 'morbid units' can in no way be considered as objectively given 
entities, but have to be seen as produced by the medical way of thinking, through selective 
observation and deliberate abstraction. Fleck noted that medical terminology itself testifies 
to the historical variability of disease classifications: witness the ubiquitous use of prefixes 
like 'para' and 'pseudo' (e.g. typhoid and para-typhoid, anaemia and pseudo-anaemia). 8 
Although, as Lowy points out, Fleck's view with regard to the constructed character of 
disease concepts was by no means exceptional within the Polish School of Philosophy of 
Medicine 9, he soon generalized this constructivist approach. What holds for diseases, Fleck 
realized, also holds for their aetiological agents. Hence bacterial species too must be conside-
red as at least partially constructed concepts, as he argued in his next epistemological arti-
c l e . 1 0 He now extended his constructivist views beyond the domain of medical science to 
include other forms of scientific knowledge. 
Following recent philosophical interpretations of the new quantum physics (in particular 
those of Niels Bohr), Fleck denied the existence of an objective, absolute reality independent 
of human observation and cognition. "For cognition", he wrote, "is neither passive contem-
plation nor acquisition of the only possible insight into something given. It is an active, live 
relationship, a reshaping and being reshaped, in short, an act of creation. Neither the 'sub-
ject' nor the 'object' receive a reality of their own; all existence is based upon interaction and 
L. Fleck, 'Some Specific Features of the Medical Way of Tmnking [1927]', in Cohen and Schnelle, 
op. cit. (note 1), pp. 39-46. 
Ralph Grasbeck provides a striking example of this terminological tendency: "There is a disease 
called pseudopseudohypoparathyroidism. Such a monstrous name tells you at once that the diagnosis 
of hypoparathyroidism has been subdivided into more and more entities. [What about the name 'hy-
poparathyroidism' itself? It suggests a prior history of subdivisions - HvdB]". See R. Grasbeck, 
'Health and Disease from the Point of View of the Clinical Laboratory', in L. Nordenfelt and 
B.I.R. Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine, Dordrecht (Reidel), 
1984, pp. 47-60, on p. 56. 
Lowy, op. cit. (note 5), p. 220. 
L. Fleck, 'On the Crisis of "Reality" [1929]', in Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 47-57, 
on p. 52. 
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is relative". 1 1 For Fleck, observation was not just 'theory-laden', as we would call it today, 
but also 'culture-laden' and socially conditioned. Any new epistemology, therefore, had to 
be "brought into a social and cultural-historical context". 1 2 At this stage Fleck was clearly 
receptive to a sociological input into his epistemological project. 
Around 1929 Fleck must have become acquainted with some of the leading ideas and 
insights of the Durkheimian sociology of knowledge, especially through the German translati-
on of Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures, written by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, a 
follower of Durkheim. 1 3 In the introduction to the German edition, the Viennese philoso-
pher Wilhelm Jerusalem also expounded Durkheim's views on the sociology of knowled-
g e . 1 4 Fleck was also familiar with Jerusalem's contribution to a volume on the sociology 
of knowledge edited by Max Scheler. 1 5 Karl Mannheim's works were apparently unknown 
to him (curiously enough, Mannheim's notion of 'thought style' would also become a key-
concept in Fleck's theory!). So Fleck's familiarity with the classical sociology of knowledge 
was rather narrow and superficial. Only Lévy-Bruhl's and Jerusalem's ideas did he know 
from first hand; Durkheim's ideas were known to him through the intermediary of these two 
writers. 
We may nonetheless presume that Fleck got excited by the enthralling prospect of a new 
and positive theory of knowledge, based on the comparative method, that was set out in the 
introduction to Lévy-Bruhl's book: 
"To be able to understand the processes by which institutions have been established (especially among 
undeveloped peoples), we must first rid our minds of the prejudice which consists in believing that 
collective representations in general, and those of inferior races in particular, obey the laws of a psycholo-
gy based upon the analysis of the individual subject. Collective representations have their own laws, and 
these (at any rate in dealing with primitives) cannot be discovered by studying the 'adult, civilized, white 
man'. On the contrary, it is undoubtedly the study of the collective representations and their connections 
in uncivilized peoples that can throw some light upon the genesis of our categories and our logical princi-
ples. Durkheim and his collaborators have already given examples of what may be obtained by following 
this course, and it will doubtless lead to a theory of knowledge, both new and positive, founded upon the 
1 1 Ibid., p. 49. 
1 2 Ibid., p. 48. 
1 3 L. Lévy-Bruhl, Das Denken der Naturvölker, Vienna (Braumüller), 1921; originally Les Fonctions 
Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures, Paris (Alcan), 1910. English translation: L. Lévy-Bruhl, 
How Natives Think, New York (Washington Square Press), 1966. 
1 4 W. Jerusalem, 'Vorbemerkungen des Herausgebers', in L. Lévy-Bruhl, Das Denken der Naturvöl-
ker (translated by Paul Friedländer), Vienna (Braumüller), 1921, pp. V - XVII. 
1 5 W. Jerusalem, 'Die soziologische Bedingtheit des Denkens und der Denkformen', in M. Scheler 
(ed.), Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens, Munich (Dunckerund Humblot), 1924, pp. 182-
207; reprinted in V. Meja and N. Stehr (eds.), Der Streit um die Wissenssoziologie, Frankfurt am 
Main (Suhrkamp), 1982, Vol. I, pp. 27-56. 
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comparative method".16 (On the next page, Levy-Bruhl also spoke about "the comparative, that is, the 
sociological method".) 
However path-breaking and inspiring this formulation of a sociologically-based comparative 
epistemology may have been in Fleck's judgement, he also censured L6vy-Bruhl severely for 
not delivering upon this promise. 1 7 Nor did he see the programme of a comparative episte-
mology actually implemented in the works of Dürkheim and Jerusalem. Although Fleck 
derived many stimulating ideas from Dürkheim, Levy-Bruhl and Jerusalem, he found that 
their approaches were still embryonic and represented only the first steps toward a mature 
sociological theory of cognition. Their major shortcoming, in Fleck's opinion, was that they 
applied the principle of the 'social conditioning of thinking' to the thought of primitive 
peoples only, not to modern scientific thought: 
"However, these embryos [the theories of Dürkheim, Levy-Bruhl, and Jerusalem] lack consistency, 
because they did not succeed in extricating themselves from the prejudice that modern scientific thinking 
presents a basic exception, being 'objective' and not subjected to the principle of social conditioning".18 
Both Levy-Bruhl and Jerusalem held that the liberation of the individual from the social 
bondage of the tribe or other closely-knit community and thereby from the concomitant grip 
of collective representations on his consciousness was sufficient to create a situation in which 
objective perception and purely logical reasoning were possible. Said L6vy-Bruhl: 
"The attributes we term objective, by which we define and classify entities of all kinds, are to the primiti-
ve enveloped in a complex of other elements much more important, elements exacting almost exclusive 
attention, at any rate to the extent allowed by the necessities of life. But if this complex becomes simpler 
and the mystic elements lose their predominance, the objective attributes ipso facto readily attract and 
retain the attention. The part played by perception proper is increased to the extent in which that of the 
mystic collective representations diminishes".19 
Levy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, op. cit. (note 13), pp. 3-4. Part of the same passage, in slightly 
different translation, is quoted in Fleck (46/62-63). Of course, designations like 'inferior races' or 
'uncivilized peoples' or even 'primitives' will no longer be considered acceptable today. 
See the passage in 'To Look, to See, to Know', op. cit. (note 3), p. 140 where Fleck accuses 
Levy-Bruhl of "departpng] from his own theory". 
Fleck, 'The Problem of Epistemology [1936]', op. cit. (note 1), p. 80. 
Levy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, op. cit. (note 13), p. 336. Compare the quoted passage in slightly 
different translation in Fleck (47-48/65). 
26 
Similarly Jerusalem: "Only the strengthened individual acquires the ability to state facts 
purely objectively [ . . ] " . 2 0 This "strengthened individual" (or "the independent and self-
reliant personality") was seen as the product of a historical process of social differentiation 
and increasing division of labour. The suggestion is that as soon as the old social bonds have 
been loosened sufficiently, modern science can be started immediately by the unaided efforts 
of the emancipated individual who alone is capable of objective perception and logical reaso-
ning. Fleck objected strongly to such a fairy-tale. He went at great length to argue that there 
is no such thing as 'objective perception' which would automatically ensue once one rids 
oneself of social prejudices. The perception of scientifically accepted properties, Fleck argued 
- assuming that Lévy-Bruhl and Jerusalem would accept such properties to be 'objective' -, 
must first be learned. It requires training and participation in a scientific group. In other 
words, scientific observation is itself socially conditioned. 
Although he found the sketch of a programme for a sociologically-based comparative 
epistemology in the writings of Lévy-Bruhl and Jerusalem, it was thus left to Fleck himself 
to further develop and consistently implement this programme. In arguing for the desirability 
and necessity of a comparative epistemology, he vehemently opposed the existing dominant 
version of the theory of knowledge, which he called 'speculative epistemology' or epistemo-
logía imaginabilis (the latter designation was chosen in analogy to the speculative anatomía 
imaginabilis of the late Middle Ages). According to Fleck, this form of epistemology is too 
much concerned about "what cognitive thinking ought to be like, and too little about what 
it really does look l ike" . 2 1 Its inquiries "are almost always limited to a few symbolic exam-
ples and logical connections, preferred over and above all other connections, between the 
objects of investigation" (173 note 17/50 note 17). In criticizing 'speculative epistemology' 
Fleck was clearly aiming at the standard analyses of the logical positivists (and of the repre-
sentatives of the 'Philosophy of Lwow') who considered it their task to provide rational 
reconstructions and justifications of scientific knowledge. 
In Fleck's view, a sociologically-oriented comparative epistemology should be less one-
sided and much more concerned with what cognitive thinking really looks like. In such an 
approach, modern science would lose the privileged epistemological status that had been 
tacitly granted to it and that served to exempt it from the meddlings of the sociology of 
knowledge. A comparative epistemology would not hesitate to study and compare different 
types of thinking, e.g. primitive, archaic, infantile, psychotic and also scientific thought-
W. Jerusalem, in Meja and Stehr, op. cit. (note 15), p. 39. On p. 38 of this same article, Jerusa-
lem sounds much more 'symmetric' with regard to primitive and modern scientific thought when he 
states that the mechanism of mutual reinforcement or 'social consolidation' [soziale Verdichtung], 
which gives such figments of the primitive imagination like spirits and demons "some degree of 
reality and stability", is also active and necessary within science. This latter insight was valuable to 
Fleck, who pointed out the apparent contradiction in Jerusalem's article. 
Fleck, "The Problem of Epistemology [1936]', op. cit. (note 1), p. 80. 
27 
forms from a uniform point of view (cf. 51/70). Perhaps modern science may legitimately 
lay claim to certain special virtues, but these can be determined only at the end of our 
investigations: "It is only by way of a comparative method, in the framework of general 
sociology of thinking that we can get acquainted with the features of scientific thinking". 2 2 
To those who hold that epistemology is concerned first of all with how scientific know-
ledge is logically constructed and systematically legitimized (what Fleck calls its Legitimie-
rung) and not with its historical genesis - or, to translate this in Reichenbach's well-known 
distinction, that its business resides in the context of justification and not in the context of 
discovery -, Fleck has a ready-made answer: 
"Whatever is known has always seemed systematic, proven, applicable, and evident to the knower. Every 
alien system of knowledge has likewise seemed contradictory, unproven, inapplicable, fanciful, or mysti-
cal. May not the time have come to assume a less egocentric, more general point of view and to speak 
of comparative epistemology?" (22/34). 
Fleck's advocacy of a comparative, less 'egocentric' epistemology exhibits a striking similari-
ty to the considerations which led David Bloor and Barry Barnes, in the 1970s, to the formu-
lation of the so-called Strong Programme in the sociology of science. Just like Fleck they 
took inspiration from the investigations of anthropologists into the thought of primitive 
peoples (Levy-Bruhl in Fleck's case, Mary Douglas and Evans-Pritchard in the case of Bloor 
and Barnes). Their respective criticisms of the classical sociology of knowledge (for Barnes 
and Bloor represented by Durkheim, but especially by Mannheim) are also quite similar. 
Fleck reproaches the exponents of the Durkheimian tradition of not being consistent enough 
to extend their sociological approach to an analysis of modern scientific knowledge. Their 
characteristic error, according to Fleck, was "an excessive respect, bordering on pious reve-
rence, for scientific facts" (47/85). The content of science was held to be 'objective' and 
therefore not amenable to sociological analysis. The (Durkheimian) sociology of knowledge 
thus failed to become a sociology of scientific knowledge. In a similar vein, Bloor criticized 
the "lack of nerve and will" of the old sociologists of knowledge (including Durkheim and 
Mannheim) which made them reluctant to "bring science within the scope of a thorough-
going sociological scrutiny". 2 3 Barnes and Edge also noted that "the sociology of knowled-
ge failed to live up to its name: it long confined itself to the realm of error and ideology, and 
studiously avoided anything suspected of validity". 2 4 In a moment we will see that Fleck 
actually came very close to formulating the principles of symmetry and impartiality that were 
Fleck, 'Problems of the Science of Science [1946]', op. cit. (note 3), p. 127. 
D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, second edition, Chicago (University of Chicago Press), 
1991 (first edition 1976), p. 4. 
B. Barnes and D. Edge (eds.), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science, Milton 
Keynes (Open University Press), 1982, p. 65. 
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originally stated by Bloor and are held to be constitutive of all modern forms of construc-
tivism. But first we have to discuss the relationship between Durkheim's sociology and 
modern constructivism. 
Dürkheim and constructivism: thefinitist elaboration 
For adherents of the Strong Programme such as Barnes and Bloor, the later work of Emile 
Dürkheim is seminal to the sociology of scientific knowledge. Although they criticize Dürk-
heim for not extrapolating his approach from the investigation of primitive belief systems to 
the study of modern science, they also indicate how the Durkheimian approach can properly 
be so extended. It will be useful to have a closer look at Durkheim's sociology of knowledge 
and the elaboration proposed by Barnes and Bloor. 
The sociology of knowledge can be said to have emerged in 1903 when Emile Dürkheim 
and his nephew Marcel Mauss published their famous essay on Primitive Classification25, 
followed in 1912 by Durkheim's voluminous book Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieu-
se}6 The term Wissenssoziologie (sociology of knowledge) may have been coined in the 
1920s by the German philosopher Max Scheler, but the domain of the new specialism had 
already been clearly staked out by the previous explorations of Dürkheim and his French 
school. 
In their essay Primitive Classification, Dürkheim and Mauss report a mass of ethnogra-
phic data on the cosmologies or classification systems of Australian Aborigines and North 
American Indians. Their main thesis is that the classification of things reproduces the classifi-
cation of me n 2 7 , or in other words, that the cosmology held by a particular tribe reflects 
its social organization. Thus a tribe may be successively divided into moieties, marriage 
classes, clans, sub-clans etcetera, each of the divisions being represented by a particular 
totem or sub-totem. Animals, plants, minerals, rivers, stars, in fact everything under and 
above the sun, are also assigned to and are considered to be an integral part of these social 
divisions. Natural classifications are not merely anthropocentric; they are, as Dürkheim and 
Mauss emphasize, sociocentric}9. Even modern scientific classifications betray there primi-
tive social origins, according to Dürkheim and Mauss, for ultimately the hierarchical relation-
E. Dürkheim and M. Mauss, 'De quelques formes primitives de classification: contribution à l'é-
tude des représentations collectives', Année Sociologique, vol. VI (1901-2), Paris, 1903, pp. 1-72. 
English translation: E. Dürkheim and M. Mauss, Primitive Classification (translated and introduced 
by Rodney Needham), Chicago (The University of Chicago Press), 1963. 
E. Dürkheim, Les Formes Elémentaires de la Vie Religieuse, Paris (Alcan), 1912; a new English 
translation by Karen Fields has recently appeared as E. Dürkheim, The Elementary Forms of Reli-
gious Life, New York (Free Press), 1995. 
Primitive Classification (note 25), p. 11. 
Ibid., p. 86. 
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2 9 Ibid., p. 83. 
3 0 Elementary Forms (note 26), pp. 147-48. 
3 1 W. Schmaus, Durkheim's Philosophy of Science and the Sociology of Knowledge, Chicago and 
London (University of Chicago Press), 1994, p. 205. 
3 2 Ibid., p. 257. 
ship between genera and species derives from the hierarchical organization of tribal social 
life: 
"It is because human groups fit one into another - the sub-clan into the clan, the clan into the moiety, the 
moiety into the tribe - that groups of things are ordered in the same way". 2 9 
In his later work on The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Dürkheim undertook to demon-
strate the social genesis not just of the 'logical' function of classification but also of the other 
'categories' of human thought besides 'class', like space, time and causality. He also consi-
dered it a primary task for the sociology of knowledge to offer a social explanation of the 
phenomenon of religion, which he defined in terms of the distinction between the sacred and 
the profane. Religion, according to Durkheim's theory, represents the moral authority of 
society over its individual members. 
Barnes and Bloor discern in Durkheim's work an implicit programme for the comparati-
ve study of systems of natural classification as they are systematically related to the social 
structures to which they correspond. The following passage from the Elementary Forms looks 
rather promising from this point of view: 
"[..] a certain intuition of the similarities and differences created by things has played a role in creating 
[..] classifications. 
But a feeling of similarity is one thing; the notion of kind is another. Kind is the external framework 
whose content is formed, in part, by objects perceived to be like one another. The content cannot itself 
provide the framework in which it is placed. The content is made up of vague and fluctuating images [..]. 
By contrast, the framework is a definite form having fixed contours, but can be applied to an indefinite 
number of things, whether perceived or not and whether existing or possible. Indeed, the potential scope 
of every genus is infinitely greater than the circle of objects whose resemblance we have become aware 
of through direct experience. [..] The idea of genus is a tool of thought that obviously was constructed 
by men". 3 0 
It is, however, doubtful whether Dürkheim himself intended to assert that each society has 
its own system of classification which mirrors its social structure. 3 1 According to Warren 
Schmaus, Durkheim's theory of the social genesis of the categories in primitive society 
"provides no basis for establishing identities between scientific classifications and social 
classifications in contemporary society". 3 2 As Schmaus succinctly summarizes Durkheim's 
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theory: "We all have the same idea of subsuming species under genera because we all have 
totemists for ancestors [ . . ] " . 3 3 It would indeed seem that such a theory leaves little room 
for studying empirical variations in the relationship between social structure and cognitive 
content under contemporary conditions. 
Dürkheim held that the very objectivity of modern science could itself be explained from 
the social conditions of modernity. The internationalization of social life and the increase in 
communication between persons of different societies are the most salient influences here: 
"If logical thought tends more and more to jettison the subjective and personal elements [..] the reason 
is [..] that a new kind of social life gradually developed: international life [..]. As that international life 
broadens, so does the collective horizon [..] As a result, things can no longer fit within the social frames 
where they were originally classified; they must be organized with principles of their own; logical organi-
zation thus differentiates itself from social organization and becomes autonomous. This, it seems, is how 
the bond that at first joined thought to defined collective entities becomes more and more detached and 
how, consequently, it becomes ever more impersonal and universalizes. Thought that is truly and peculiar-
ly human is not a primitive given, therefore, but a product of history [..]". 3 4 
Dürkheim's vision is not without subtlety. Under modern conditions scientific concepts and 
classifications are no longer "social frames" but become increasingly "autonomous"; this 
entire development is however the result of social factors. We can give it a paradoxical 
formulation: on Durkheim's view, social factors are ultimately responsible for the fact that 
social factors do not normally enter into the very content of science. That is why Durkheim's 
sociology of knowledge did not develop into a sociology of scientific knowledge. 
All this is of course no conclusive argument against the attempt to develop Durkheim's 
embryonic views on natural classification in a direction that was not intended by himself. 
Indeed, it would be perfectly possible to argue with Dürkheim against Dürkheim. Fleck's 
objections to the possibility of 'objective perception' postulated by L6vy-Bruhl also apply 
here. It is implausible to presume that 'social frames' gradually give way to 'autonomous' 
classifications. How on earth could it ever be possible, one might object, for things to 
become "organized with principles of their own" (emphasis added)? After all, it is still human 
beings who have to sort things into classes or kinds; things do not classify themselves. 
Dürkheim himself expressly said so in the passage quoted earlier: "The content cannot itself 
provide the framework in which it is placed. [..] The idea of genus is a tool of thought that 
obviously was constructed by men" . 3 5 
3 3 Ibid. 
3 4 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, op. cit. (note 26), p. 446. 
3 5 Fleck would also have objected to Durkheim's vision of a broadened international social life as the 
relevant social factor determining the general character of modern thought. To a similar view pro-
pounded by Jerusalem he replied: "The concept of a thought collective comprising the whole of 
Homo sapiens is of little use, because the intellectual interactions between different types of human 
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Barnes and Bloor have argued that Durkheim's insight into the 'constructed' character of 
natural classifications can indeed be fruitfully extended to the study of modern scientific 
thought. 3 6 They admit that Dürkheim lacks a fully adequate theory of the classificatory 
process that would have enabled him to understand the relations between social structures and 
natural classifications, but they believe that the required theoretical basis has meanwhile 
become available in the form of the so-called flnitist or network theory, developed by the 
British philosopher of science, Mary Hesse. 3 7 I will explain the central ideas of this theory 
here. Basically, the theory is about the application of concepts or terms (classes, kinds) to 
cases or instances with which people are confronted in their experience and about the ways 
concepts are linked to each other. It is denied that there is such a thing as an 'inherent 
meaning' which would determine how a given concept should be applied. In other words, 
there is no pre-determined domain of application or extension attached to a concept. Whether 
a newly appearing instance (say a certain aquatic bird) falls under concept A (say the concept 
of 'duck') or under concept B (say the concept of 'goose') or under any other concept is not 
fixed in the nature of things but is a matter for communal judgement and decision. Perhaps 
after some deliberation the new bird will be reckoned to be a duck because it is (considered 
to be) more 'like' all those other birds which have already been classed as ducks than those 
birds which have been classed as geese. Judgements of similarity and difference are, how-
ever, never simple and straightforward. It can be plausibly argued that any single object or 
instance is similar to, yet also different from, any other object or instance. (There is no 
metric for overall similarity, establishing how sameness in one respect may compensate for 
difference in another!) At a certain point in time the 'extension' of a given concept is no 
more than the finite set of things that have been brought together under that concept; those 
things may be held to exhibit some (culturally selected) 'similarity relation'. New members 
of society can be introduced to the use of a concept by teaching them to perceive the establis-
hed 'similarity relation' that is exemplified by the various instances of the concept. Thus 
children are taught the proper use of the term 'duck' under the authoritative guidance of 
adults who show them both examples and counter-examples ("Yes, this is a duck and that is 
a duck, and that one too; no, that one over there is not a duck but a goose; and the black 
bird swimming here is also not a duck, it is a moorhen.") in the hope that they will somehow 
society are too weak" (174 note 41/68 note 41). 
See in particular D. Bloor, 'Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of 
Knowledge', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13 (1982): 267-97. 
M. B. Hesse, The Structure of Scientific Inference, London (Macmillan), 1974. There are several 
presentations of the finitist or network theory available in the constructivist literature. A textbook-
like presentation can be found in J. Law and P. Lodge, Science for Social Scientists, London (Mac-
millan), 1984. More sophisticated is the account given in B. Barnes, T.S. Kuhn and Social Science, 
London (Macmillan), 1982. A carefully balanced exposition is presented in the more recent book 
by B. Barnes, D. Bloor and J. Henry, Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis, London (Ath-
lone), 1996. 
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pick up the relevant 'similarity relation'. And that is what normally happens, of course. One 
might object that giving explicit verbal definitions constitutes a viable alternative for teaching 
the use of a concept, but this only shifts the problem to the terms figuring in the definition 
("So a duck is a web-footed bird, you say, but then explain the use of the term 'web-footed' 
tome!") . 
If there is no 'inherent meaning' of a concept which compels its 'proper' application in 
the present, then neither does the established usage of a term determine its future applica-
tions. The future applications of terms are open-ended in principle (and even their past 
applications are révisable!). There is always more than one way to proceed in extending our 
concepts to new instances. Such extension to new cases must be equated with the extension 
of an analogy. Whether the next instance falls under a given concept is a matter of collective 
judgement, negotiated on the basis of more or less varying individual intuitions. Often, there 
may be a strong and generally shared sense of how to proceed, and 'everybody' may be 
convinced that it is 'the only right way' to go on, but this does not the least diminish the 
importance of the point of principle that is raised by the finitist or network theory: every act 
of classification and every extension of an analogy is sociologically problematic, even if such 
acts as a matter of fact occur routinely and in a taken-for-granted manner thanks to a massive 
unreflective agreement in practice. 
Until now we have largely focused on the way concepts relate to the instances which are 
taken to fall under their purview (it is this aspect that is highlighted in the designation^nrfi'^r 
theory), but concepts are also related to each other. They are mutually connected through 
'laws' or 'generalizations', thus forming conceptual networks or fabrics (this aspect explains 
why the designation network theory is also used). It is not just empty taxonomies or classifi-
cation systems that are culturally transmitted; simultaneously beliefs about the world are 
passed on to later generations: the two components are fused together in one package. The 
important point to note is that all the indeterminacy and open-endedness which characterize 
the relationship of concepts to their instances automatically carry over to the conceptual 
network as a whole. It is the entire network that confronts experience. Any 'law' linking two 
or more concepts (e.g. "Fire is hot") can be upheld in the face of (apparently) 'recalcitrant' 
experience, if some repair work is done at some other place in the fabric. This, of course, 
is just another formulation of the well-known Duhem-Quine Thesis. If some parts of the 
network are held stable and intact come what may, it is by virtue of a conventional communi-
ty decision to treat them in that way. Communities may have different inclinations and 
preferences about which parts of the network actively to protect and which parts to modify 
in the light of experience that impinges on the whole fabric. To capture these selective 
preferences, Mary Hesse introduced the notion of 'coherence conditions', i.e. requirements 
that indicate how to maintain the integrity of the entire network. In her view, both biological 
constraints of 'learning organisms' and 'culturally conditioned metaphysical principles' can 
in principle fulfil the role of coherence conditions. Barnes and Bloor, however, dismiss her 
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recourse to the realm of culture as 'idealistic'; they prefer to locate the coherence conditions 
in the social sphere (e.g. social interests). 
The upshot of all these finitist arguments is that the accepted usage of scientific concepts, as 
of any other concepts, is conventional through and through and not dictated by the structure 
of objective reality. Hence the finitist or network theory provides powerful philosophical 
support to the constructivist undertaking in the sociology of science. 3 8 
Not only does the finitist theory provide a philosophical undeipinning for constructivism, 
it can also be used to criticize some widely held views about what is involved in following 
norms or rules. In functionalist sociology, for example, the successful internalization of the 
basic social norms is considered a necessary and sufficient condition for maintaining the 
normative order of society. Norms are held to define unambiguously the types of action 
which are in conformity with them. However, what the finitist theory highlights is that in 
trying to act in accordance with a norm people have continuously to (re)negotiate and (rees-
tablish what the norm implies. There is no 'inherent meaning' of the norm that would lay 
down in advance how it should be applied in all possible situations (cf. Wittgenstein's com-
ments about rule-following: a rule does not contain a rule for its own application). Barnes 
formulates the following criticism of the functionalist view: 
"Normative functionalism mistakenly attributes the power people exercise in deciding what is involved 
in following norms to the norms themselves. It empowers norms, and represents people as acting under 
pressure from that power".39 
In fact, according to Barnes, such 'empowerment' is a very widespread tendency in social 
science generally and is extended to traditions and all of the elements of which traditions 
consist (ideas, ideology, norms, laws, even 'technology'), which are thus represented as 
inherently constraining. With his colleagues Bloor and Henry, he has therefore formulated 
the following rule for explanation in constructivist sociology of knowledge: 
"If finitism is accepted, then verbal formulations of values, rules, aphorisms and ideas are all alike 
debarred as causally potent, as are the inherent persuasiveness of rhetoric, or the alleged powers of 
ideologies or legitimations".40 
A finitist analysis of the history of the concept of syphilis will be given in Chapter III. I have previ-
ously used the finitist theory to elucidate the historical patent dispute about aniline red or fuchsine 
in France during the 1860s, in which the sameness or difference of various commercial dyestuffs 
was at issue. See H. van den Belt, 'Action at a Distance', in R. Smith and B. Wynne (eds.), Expert 
Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law, London (Roufledge), 1989, pp. 184-209. 
B. Barnes, The Elements of Social Theory, London (UCL Press), 1995, p. 59. Barnes also criticizes 
Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy on the way it treats rules as 'empowered' (see p. 201 ff.). 
Barnes, Bloor and Henry, op. cit. (note 37), p. 119. 
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We will later have to address the question whether Fleck's attribution to a thought style of 
the power to determine the thinking and perception of the members of the corresponding 
thought collective also amounts to a violation of this rule. 
The case of the microbiological laymen collective in Buchenwald 
In his first publication on epistemology published after the war, Fleck comes very close to 
formulating an equivalent of the tenets of symmetry and impartiality which can be considered 
the defining principles of all modern forms of constructivism. The article reports about a 
remarkable, though somewhat sinister episode during Fleck's stay in the Buchenwald concen-
tration camp. (In an attempt to spiritually survive the Holocaust, Fleck had maintained as far 
as possible his research interests in serology and epistemology. 4 1) Here, in August 1943, 
the SS had set up a laboratory for the study and production of typhus vaccine in Block 50 
(not far from the notorious Block 46 in which experiments on prisoners were performed). 
In December 1943 Fleck, who was known as a leading typhus expert, was deported from 
Auschwitz to this laboratory in Buchenwald. What he found there was a kind of microbiolo-
gical research-team or (to use his terminology) 'thought collective' consisting of 8 persons 
who were laymen in microbiology under the direction of a German SS physician who also 
lacked proper qualifications. 4 2 In effect, without knowing it, the SS had set up a unique 
and interesting experiment in the sociology of knowledge. The collective had at its disposal 
laboratory facilities and instruments, test animals, handbooks and other professional litera-
ture, in sum all the necessary wherewithal to do research. It was charged with isolating from 
the lungs of artificially infected mice and rabbits the causative agent of typhus, Rickettsia 
Prowazeki, in order to prepare typhus vaccine. On Fleck's arrival in Buchenwald it seemed 
as if the collective had already realized its task. Large quantities of typhus vaccine were 
apparently produced and sent to the Eastern front for use by the SS troops. It soon transpired 
to Fleck, however, that whatever it was that the collective isolated from the lungs of infected 
test animals, it was definitely not the agent of typhus, Rickettsia Prowazekil Thereupon it was 
decided to keep this discovery secret from the Germans. Until the end of the war hundreds 
of liters of ineffective vaccine continued to find their way to the Eastern front. In addition, 
small quantities of effective vaccine were produced for use by prisoners who were exposed 
T. Schnelle, 'Microbiology and Philosophy of Science, Lw6w and the German Holocaust: Stations 
of a Life - Ludwik Fleck 1896-1961' , in Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 3-36, on p. 26. 
"The collective consisted of: (1) a young Polish physician, without any specialist preparation; he 
was the head of the collective [NB: Fleck is not reckoning the German SS physician among the 
members of the collective - HvdB]; (2) a doctor of laws and philosophy - an eminent Austrian 
political figure; (3) a worker from a factory making rubber articles - a German Communist activist; 
(4) a young Czech physician, with rudiments of bacteriological preparation; (5) a practising Czech 
veterinarian, without bacteriological preparation; (6) a Dutch student of biology, with his assistant, 
a student of the 3rd or 4th year of medical studies; and (7) a Vienna confectioner". See L. Fleck, 
'Problems of the Science of Science [1946]', in Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 113-27, 
on p. 118. 
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to special risks and to prepare samples that had to be sent regularly to external institutes for 
verification purposes. 
In his 1946 article Fleck attempted to draw epistemological lessons from these experien-
ces. It was not an occasional and isolated 'mistake' that had been committed by the microbio-
logical laymen collective, he maintained, but it was rather a "closed, harmonious system of 
errors" that had been gradually built up during a process of social stimulation and consolida-
t ion. 4 3 In the end members of the collective 'found' in their microscopic preparations, 
which they made by scrupulously following the handbook instructions, all the stages of the 
developmental cycle of Rickettsias in the sequence required by the handbooks: "from the 
dyestuff precipitates, fat globules, various bacteria and cellular remnants they managed to 
arrange the entire developmental cycle" . 4 4 The spell of this vicious circle or "harmony of 
illusions" could be broken only by an expert outsider, Fleck himself in this particular 
case . 4 5 
The main conclusions Fleck derived from the activities of the microbiological laymen collec-
tive are the following: 
"Most important in our story is the fact that [...] the social mechanism of the origination of an error is 
the same as that of the origination of true knowledge [...]. Both in faulty and in true science it is the same 
collective forces that play the role of a motor, while the individual is the representative of certain social 
functions rather than a conscious source of action. In both false and true knowledge a view does not arise 
by logical calculation of some elements, but by way of a complex process of stylization. There exists no 
Ibid., p. 123. The notion of 'social consolidation' is derived from Wilhelm Jerusalem (see also note 
20). 
Ibid., p. 119. 
In addition to the epistemological conclusions which Fleck explicitly draws from this experience, 
the case of the microbiological laymen collective in Buchenwald also illustrates the insufficiency of 
written instructions and hence the relevance of unarticulated and partly unarticulable skills ('tacit 
knowledge') for transmitting knowledge from one place to another. The theme of 'tacit knowledge' 
is an important subject in contemporary sociology of scientific knowledge, especially in the work of 
Harry Collins. See his book Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, 
Beverly Hills and London (Sage), 1985, pp. 56-57 and 70-71. A very interesting application of the 
idea is developed in D. MacKenzie and G. Spinardi, 'Tacit Knowledge and the Uninvention of 
Nuclear Weapons', in D. MacKenzie, Knowing Machines: Essays on Technical Change, Cambridge 
MA (MIT Press), 1996, pp. 215-60. Fleck himself stresses the importance of Erfahrenheit or "bei-
ng experienced" as a condition for the ability to perceive and recognize the characteristic Gestalts 
of a certain discipline (e.g. diphtheria bacilli in microscopic preparations): "One has to acquire a 
certain experience, a certain knack, which cannot be replaced with verbal formulae" (Fleck, 1935, 
op. cit. [note 1], p. 60). Written research papers are inherently incomplete; they do not explicate 
the underlying skills that are required to conduct experiments: "It is as if the words of a song were 
published without the tune" (96/126). Fleck's digressions on the role of Erfahrenheit are quite 
comparable to modern discussions of 'tacit knowledge'. 
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observation that would not be forestalled by a directing and limiting readiness of thought [emphasis 
added]".46 
Fleck's statements here can be compared to the principles of impartiality and symmetry 
which are constitutive of modern constructivism. In 1976 Bloor formulated four defining 
tenets or principles of the Strong Programme in the sociology of science. These four princi-
ples are: 
1. causality: the programme is concerned with the conditions which bring about belief or 
states of knowledge; 
2. impartiality: the programme is impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or 
irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will require explanation; 
3. symmetry: the programme would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same 
types of causes would explain, say, true and false beliefs; 
4. reflexivity: the programme would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation 
would have to be applicable to sociology itself. 4 7 
It is rather common to speak of the principle of symmetry in a new sense, in which the tenets 
of impartiality and symmetry distinguished by Bloor are fused together. I will also conform 
to this current usage. The principle of symmetry (in this new sense) is in fact a strategic 
counter move to the rationalist view of science to which philosophers like Lakatos, Laudan 
and Newton-Smith subscribe. It is the conviction of these philosophers that only 'pathologi-
cal' episodes in the history of science (e.g. the Lysenko affair in Soviet Russia or the Pilt-
down forgery in Britain) are amenable to analysis by the sociology of knowledge. As long 
as scientists follow the rules of scientific rationality, there is nothing to be explained by the 
sociologist; they will only become an object for sociological investigation if they deviate from 
these rules (cf. Newton-Smith: "sociology is for deviants"). With the principle of symmetry, 
Bloor actually claims the whole range of scientific activity, both 'good' and 'bad' science, 
as a potential object for the sociology of knowledge. Although most other varieties of con-
structivism do not subscribe to the other two principles formulated by Bloor, the principle 
of symmetry is beyond dispute within constructivist circles. 
By stating in the passage just quoted that "in faulty and in true science" the same social 
mechanisms are at play, Fleck anticipated the formulation of the defining principle of modern 
constructivism. 
In the passage quoted we also find the ingredients that are characteristic for Fleck's 
comparative epistemology: the individual as a representative of social functions rather than 
as a conscious source of action, Fleck's rejection of 'logical calculation' and his emphasis 
4 6 Ibid., p. 123. 
4 7 D. Bloor, op. cit. (note 23), p. 7. 
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on 'stylization', and his notion of a 'readiness' for selective thinking and observation as 
typical of a thought style. Let us therefore have a closer look now on Fleck's 'doctrine of 
thought styles and thought collectives'. 
3 . Fleck's doctrine of thought styles and thought collectives 
I will first examine Fleck's theory with regard to two big problems, the relationship between 
the individual and the collective and the question of realism. These two problems are not 
only relevant when considering Fleck's theory, but can also be raised vis-a-vis modern 
varieties of constructivism. Barnes, Bloor and Henry note that sociologists of science general-
ly, in describing the actions of scientists, have been forced to consider what institutions, 
social relations, groups and collectives are: "In particular, they have had to confront the 
perennial problem of the relationship of the individual and individual action to the collective, 
whether as a group, or a social structure, or an institution, or a culture". 4 8 The second 
problem, the question of realism, is of course hardly less of a "perennial problem". Like the 
first problem it has a wide relevance for different fields of inquiry, but it has gained special 
prominence and urgency in constructivist studies of science. With regard to both problems, 
Fleck's views will be compared to the positions taken by modern varieties of constructivism. 
Subsequently, I will discuss two different issues which are more specific for Fleck's ap-
proach: the relationship between 'active linkages' and 'passive linkages' and the idea of a 
thought style and of a stylized thought constraint. Even in these more specific issues, how-
ever, the two "perennial problems" are also implicated. 
The collective and the individual 
In contradistinction to traditional epistemology, which construes cognition as a dual relation-
ship between a knowing subject and the object to be known, Fleck's comparative epistemo-
logy considers this process as involving a threefold relationship; it introduces a third factor 
into the equation: the thought collective (and together with it the thought style, because for 
Fleck these are correlative concepts): "every cognition is a process between an individual, 
his thought-style which results from affiliation to a social group [a thought collective -
HvdB], and the object". 4 9 
Fleck defines a thought collective as "a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas 
or mamtaining intellectual interaction" (39/54). As it stands, there is nothing objectionable 
to this definition. It could be an element in an interactionist view according to which know-
ledge emerges from social interaction and is sustained and reinforced through continued 
Barnes, Bloor and Henry, op. cit. (note 37), p. 113. 
Fleck, 1947, op. cit. (note 3), p. 148. 
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Interactionism is one of three basic forms of social theory distinguished by Barry Barnes, the other 
two being individualism and functionalism. In individualism (e.g. rational choice theory) human 
beings are presumed to be independent, rational/calculative, goal-oriented and self-regarding indivi-
duals. In interactionism, by contrast, human beings are not seen as autonomous, pre-constituted 
individuals who combine stategicaUy for their own expedient reasons, but rather as individuals 
susceptible to each other in interaction. In functionalism entire social systems are seen as having 
their own functional needs and requirements, largely independently of the individuals of which they 
are composed. See Barnes, op. cit. (note 39). 
In terms of Barnes' three basic forms of social theory (see previous note), what I have described as 
'collectivism' would come closest to 'functionalism'. I have not used the latter designation to 
characterize Fleck's position because we do not find in his writings the systems vocabulary which is 
characteristic of the usual forms of functionalism. 
Compare: "[Certain] types of conduct or thought are not only external to the individual but are, 
moreover, endowed with coercive power, by virtue of which they impose themselves upon him 
independent of his individual will"; E. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, New York 
(Free Press), 1964 [1895], p. 2. 
Barnes (op. cit. [note 39], p. 95) depicts Durkheim as seminal to interactionist social theory, but 
this downplays the collectivistic strand and the 'empowerment' of 'collective representations' also 
present in his work. 
interaction. 5 0 What is however problematic in Fleck's theory, is that he does not consistent-
ly stick to an interactionist view but often switches over to what may be termed a collectivist 
view, i.e. when he attributes primacy and an independent existence to the thought collective 
as a whole over and above its interacting members. 5 1 Hence his view of individuals, not 
as "a conscious source of action", but as the passive exponents of the collectives to which 
they belong, or, to use the terminology of ethnomethodology, as the 'judgemental dopes' of 
the thought style: 
"Although the thought collective consists of individuals, it is not simply the aggregate sum of them. The 
individual within the collective is never, or hardly ever, conscious of the prevailing thought style, which 
almost always exerts an absolutely compulsive force upon his thinking and with which it is not possible 
to be at variance" (41/56-57). 
This passage seems to echo Fleck's own brief paraphrase of Durkheim's view presented 
earlier: "Durkheim speaks expressly of the force exerted on the individual by social struc-
tures [..]. He also mentions the superindividual and objective character of ideas belonging 
to the collective [collective representations - HvdB]" (46/62). 5 2 Indeed, the oscillation 
between interactionist and collectivist views that we find in Fleck is also characteristic of 
Durkheim. 5 3 
With his 'collectivism' Fleck moves in a direction contrary to that of modern constructi-
vism. As Barnes, Bloor and Henry note: "The trend in the sociology of science since Merton 
has been to emphasize more and more strongly the standing of individuals as active agents 
in order to make sense of their actions or explain their provenance. This is consistent with 
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an analogous shift in the social sciences generally". 5 4 The general trend takes two forms 
in the sociology of science. One way to present the individual as an active agent is to con-
ceive of him or her as a participant in a 'way of life'. Participants share a culture or tradi-
tion. Cultural elements, however, are considered to be facilitating resources for, rather than 
constraints upon, individual actions. This approach is best exemplified in the work of Harry 
Collins. It could be termed 'interactionist' in Barnes' sense and retains a strong and 'thick' 
notion of 'the social'. In the second approach 'the social' (in its customary sense) is substan-
tially thinned out by reverting to an 'economic' (individualist) conception of the individual. 
Barnes, Bloor and Henry see this line exemplified in Bruno Latour's actor-network theory. 
In agreement with the Hobbesian tenor of this theory no social bond whatsoever is presumed; 
actors are constantly trying to 'enroll' others or are being 'enrolled' by them. The 'associa-
tions' or 'links' that are forged last only as long as expediency permits. Actually, as a 
solution to this problem (?), the social is partly shifted from the realm of human actors and 
their relationships on to the sphere of material artefacts. 5 5 In other forms of radical con-
structivism (e.g. Pickering's science-as-practice approach or Rouse's practical hermeneutics) 
the same minning out or de-centring of the social in its customary sense is taking place. In 
both moderate and radical constructivist approaches, the emergence of cognitive and social 
order becomes (more) difficult to explain as social 'constraints' may no longer be invoked. 
In Fleck's theory the compulsive force of the thought style over the individual members 
of the thought collective is somewhat mitigated to the extent that individuals normally belong 
to different (scientific and non-scientific) thought collectives. Such common memberships 
facilitate the inter-collective communication of ideas which is seen as an important source of 
innovation. Within a thought collective, Fleck distinguishes between the so-called 'esoteric 
circle' and one or more so-called 'exoteric circles'. The 'esoteric circle' consists of 'initiates' 
who are directly involved in the creation of new knowledge; the 'exoteric circles' have only 
an indirect relation to this knowledge through trusting the initiates; the latter, however, are 
in their turn dependent upon 'public opinion', that is, upon the opinion of the exoteric cir-
cle^) (105/139). Only the confidence of the exoteric circle(s) confers solidity and certainty 
to the knowledge produced within the esoteric circle. 5 6 Fleck's notion of 'esoteric circle' 
Barnes, Bloor and Henry, op. cit. (note 37), p. 114. 
B. Latour, 'Une sociologie sans object? Note théorique sur rinterobjectivité', Sociologie du travail 
36 (1994): 587-608. Latour reverses Durkheim's well-known formula: "[..] il faut trailer les choses 
comme des faits sociaux" (p. 606). Karin Knorr-Cetina likewise introduces the notion of 'object-
centered sociality'; see her 'Epistemics in Society: On the Nesting of Knowledge Structures into 
Social Structures', in W. Heyman, H. Hetsen, and J. Frouws (eds.), Rural Reconstruction in a 
Market Economy, Mansholt Studies 5, Wageningen Agricultural University, 1996, pp. 55-73. 
It is remarkable that Fleck analyzes the intellectual interaction between the esoteric circle of a 
collective with its exoteric circles (or the exoteric circles of other collectives?), but ignores the 
possibility of intense intellectual interaction taking place between the esoteric circles of two diffe-
rent collectives. One might imagine that this possibility becomes actual whenever a medical labora-
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resembles the concept of the 'core-set' (the relatively small group of scientists who are most 
directly involved in negotiating the outcome of a controversy) as used by Harry Collins. 5 7 
Collins also notes that the certainty of knowledge increases dramatically with distance (in 
both space and time) from the 'core-set'. He formulates a special proposition to describe this 
effect: 
"Proposition Eleven: 'Distance lends enchantment': the more distant in social space or time is the locus 
of creation of knowledge the more certain it is". 5 8 
This may be compared to the following pronouncement of Fleck: 
"The greater the distance in time or space from the esoteric circle, the longer a thought has been conveyed 
within the same thought collective, the more certain it appears" (106/140). 
Likewise: 
"Social distance transforms the author from a creator to a discoverer. The developing scientific fact 
changes from mental composition to an object. It becomes impersonal, self-contained, it becomes a 
thing".5 9 
The philosopher Stephen Toulmin has suggested that Fleck gave so much emphasis to the 
collective aspects of science because, in his time, it was desirable to counteract the excessive-
ly individualistic view of scientific thinking that was then current. 6 0 At any rate, Toulmin 
notes that Fleck's writings also contain, in addition to his 'collectivism', a more adequate and 
promising strand of thought which he terms 'populational'. 6 1 This alternative line is found 
in Fleck's discussion of the differences between 'journal science' and 'vademecum science'. 
Scientists present their ideas in scientific journals as 'personal and provisional' contributions, 
tory has to develop diagnostic methods for use in a clinical context. Fleck's own example of the 
development of the Wassermann reaction would be a case in point, as it involved a close coopera-
tion between serologists and clinical venerologists. He describes this development, however, as the 
exclusive work of the so-called "serologists' collective" and neglects the clinical connection altoge-
ther. See chapter V. 
H. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, London (Sage), 1985, 
pp. 142-45. 
Ibid., p. 145. 
Fleck, 1936, op. cit. (note 1), p. 108. 
S. Toulmin, 'Ludwik Fleck and the Historical Interpretation of Science', in Cohen and Schnelle, 
op. cit. (note 1), pp. 267-85, esp. on p. 275. 
In terms of Barnes' distinctions this would be a variety of 'interactionism'. 
41 
which will be incorporated into the common stock of knowledge ('vademecum science'), if 
at all, only after intense scrutiny and modification. In journal articles, Fleck observes, we 
find typical turns of phrases such as 'I have tried to prove . . . ' , 'It appears possible that 
whereas it is only in impersonal vademecum science that we find expressions such as 'This 
or that exists' or 'It has been firmly established tha t . . . ' (118/157). By following scientific 
findings on their way from 'journal science' to (possibly) their final incorporation into 
'vademecum science', we may conceive of science as an interplay between (individual) 
variation and (collective) selection. Such ideas have been taken up and elaborated by evolu-
tionary theories of science. 6 2 They clearly reconcile the 'individualistic' and the 'collectivis-
tic' aspects of science. 
In my opinion, Fleck's analysis of intellectual interaction (Denkverkehr) within a thought 
collective, with ideas passing from one person to another and thereby undergoing subtle 
changes and transformations (42/58), can also be usefully interpreted in 'populational' terms. 
Gerard de Vries has aptly characterized this view as an 'epidemiology of intellectual con-
tac t ' . 6 3 Fleck, however, seems too eager to sacrifice such insights for a Durkheimian reifi-
cation and hypostatization of the thought collective and the thought style as independent 
social and cognitive structures exerting a powerful influence over individuals (46/62). Fleck's 
image of a circulation of ideas within the thought collective is strongly reminiscent of a very 
similar image of Latour and Woolgar, except that the latter do not speak of the circulation 
of ideas but of statements (because of their self-imposed moratorium on cognitive terms) and 
are less inclined to give in to Durkheimian temptations. 6 4 Actually, Fleck's discussion of 
'journal science' and 'vademecum science' can be considered as an anticipation of Latour and 
Woolgar's well-known view of the construction of scientific facts as effected through altera-
tion of the modalities attached to statements (e.g., moving a modality from 'it is probable 
that A is B' to 'it is firmly established that A is B'). Fleck's assertion that "even the simple 
communication of an item of knowledge can by no means be compared with the translocation 
of a rigid body in Euclidean space" (111/145) would fit in well with Latour's criticism of the 
'diffusion model' and his advocacy of a 'translation model ' . 6 5 Likewise, Fleck's insight 
that every understanding between persons involves some misunderstanding 6 6 would be 
L. Boon, 'Variation and Selection: Scientific Progress without Rationality', in W. Callebaut and R. 
Pinxten (eds.), Evolutionary Epistemology, Dordrecht (Reidel), 1987, pp. 159-77. See also D. Hull, 
Science as a Process, Chicago (University of Chicago Press), 1988. 
G. de Vries, 'De Besmettelijkheid van Intellectueel Contact', Kennis en Methode 5 (1981): 156-64, 
on p. 162. 
B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts, Beverly 
Hüls (Sage), 1979. 
B. Latour, Science in Action, Milton Keynes (Open University Press), 1987, pp. 132-36. 
Fleck, 1936, op. cit. (note 1), p. 85. 
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endorsed by Latour who emphasizes that every 'traduction1 is a 'trahison' (following the 
Italian saying 'traduttore traditore,).6J 
Noting that in intellectual interaction a thought passes from one individual to another, 
each time a little tranformed, Fleck cannot resist to ask: " Whose thought is it that continues 
to circulate?" [emphasis added], and he feels obliged to answer: "It is one that obviously be-
longs not to any single individual but to the collective" (42/58). It would seem that Fleck 
unnecessarily switches over here from an interactionist to a collectivist approach. The strange 
thing is that Fleck is fully aware of the possible objection to this particular move but remains 
completely unimpressed by it, as appears from the following passage: 
"We could agree with anybody who calls the thought collective fictitious and the personification of a 
common result produced by interaction. But what is any personality if not the personification of many 
different momentary personalities [..]?" (44/60). 
Why should a thought as "a common result produced by interaction" be assigned to the 
'collective' as its presumptive 'author'? Can a collective act at all in the capacity of an 
'author'? Members of a scientific thought collective show by their behaviour that they see 
things differently from Fleck: as Latour and Woolgar also observe, a new idea is committed 
to the general circulation only after having been provided, so to speak, with a personal label. 
Whether both, the idea and the property claim, will survive the vicissitudes of social interac-
tion is of course another matter. The disputes over intellectual property which often result 
are the stock-in-trade of Robert Merton's sociology of science. Such a dispute was the 
struggle over the ownership of the Wassermann reaction, which will be discussed in chapter 
VI. It will present a useful opportunity to confront Fleck's analysis with a (constructivistical-
ly amended) Mertonian approach. 
The question of realism 
Constructivism is often opposed to realism. Such a simple opposition is rather misleading, 
however, because there are many different forms of constructivism as well as many varieties 
of realism. Things are even more complicated because there is also no generally accepted 
classification of the existing forms of constructivism and of realism (there are forms of 
'would-be' realism - e.g. Hilary Putnam's 'internal realism' - that are not considered to be 
proper forms of realism by the adherents of other varieties!). Instead of a general opposition 
between constructivism and realism, we thus have a situation in which certain tenets of 
particular forms of constructivism conflict with, or are seen to conflict with, certain cheri-
"La traduction est toujours par définition un mal-entendu [..]", in B. Latour, Les Microbes: Guerre 
et Paix suivi de Irréductions, Paris (A.M. Métailié), 1984, p. 73; or "To translate is to betray: 
ambiguity is part of translation" and "In the translation model there is no transportation without 
transformation [..]", both in B. Latour, Aramis or the Love of Technology, Cambridge MA (Har-
vard University Press), 1996, p. 48 and p. 119. 
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shed principles of particular forms of realism. It will be clear that this situation does not lend 
itself easily to adequate and comprehensive description. 
A provisional but feasible way to address the issues may be to examine how the question 
of realism has been raised and dealt with in various forms of constructivism. For the sake 
of simplicity, a division can be made between 'moderate' and 'radical' forms of constructi-
v ism. 6 8 Among 'moderate' constructivists the debate is about what status, if any, objective 
reality or the natural world should be accorded in the sociological explanation of knowledge 
and belief. Harry Collins, who is the foremost representative of the so-called Empirical 
Programme of Relativism, defends the position that an agnostic stance with regard to objecti-
ve reality is the most appropriate one to take when doing the sociology of scientific knowled-
ge, or as he laconically states: "the natural world has a small or non-existent role in the 
construction of scientific knowledge" (this statement has meanwhile acquired some notorie-
t y ) . 6 9 To take the principle of symmetry to its conclusion, Collins deems it necessary to 
treat all description-type language at the outset as though it did not describe anything real. 
Thus the manner in which generalizations come to be accepted must be understood in a 
similar way, whether they are about the colour of emeralds or about the number of angels 
dancing on the head of a p in . 7 0 Collins calls this a 'meta-methodological presupposition'. 
His colleagues from the Strong Programme, Barnes and Bloor, strongly disagree. They 
consider themselves to be ontological realists. The sociologist, they hold, should be willing 
to acknowledge the causal relevance of the physical environment when studying the formation 
of knowledge and beliefs. Whereas Collins claims that the prevailing sense of natural order 
and regularity derives entirely from culture and not at all from nature, Barnes and Bloor 
present a view in which cognition is seen as resting on a symbiosis of nature and culture. 7 1 
Among 'radical' forms of constructivism, the question of realism is posed in a quite 
different way. Radical constructivists often claim to be able to circumvent or bypass the 
epistemological debate on realism and anti-realism. This claim is however highly problema-
tic. The reason is that they take the construction metaphor much further than their moderate 
In distinguishing 'moderate' from 'radical' constructivism, I follow Rob Hagendijk. See his Weten-
schap, Constructivisme en Cultuur, Amsterdam (Thesis), 1996. In my opinion, however, Hagendijk 
does not satisfactorily elaborate the differences between both varieties of constructivism with regard 
to the question of realism, because he appears to take at face value the radical constructivist claim 
to have circumvented the epistemological debate between realism and anti-realism (or the debate 
between realism and 'relativism' as it is called rather misleadingly). 
H.M. Collins, 'Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism', Social Studies of Science 11 
(1981): 3-10, p. 3. 
Collins, op. cit. (note 45), p. 174. 
A recent exposition of the Strong Programme view on the role of natural reality in the formation of 
belief and a criticism of the position of Harry Collins can be found in Barnes, Bloor and Henry, 
op. cit. (note 37), esp. p. 73 ff. 
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colleagues. Whereas moderate constructivists almost exclusively speak about the construction 
of knowledge (sometimes also of 'facts', but these are then put on a par with knowledge), 
radical constructivists have no qualms to extend the metaphor and to speak also of the con-
struction or fabrication of the objects populating our world. Thus, science is seen by Karin 
Knorr-Cetina as "secreting" an unending stream of "entities and relations that make up the 
world" 7 2 , whereas Latour's techno-science is hardly less productive in its contribution to 
the "proliferation" of new "quasi-objects" or "hybrids". 7 3 Among the objects and entities 
(thought to be) so created are not just, say, plastics and transgenic plants, but also microbes, 
atoms, genes, quarks, pulsars, black holes, supernova etecetera. It is this (in my eyes rather 
implausible) view which brings these radical varieties of constructivism in direct conflict with 
most if not all forms of realism. 7 4 
How is the question of realism posed in Fleck's thought? Is he a moderate or rather a 
radical constructivist on this matter? Although his primary concern with epistemology and 
knowledge suggests an affinity with the views of moderate constructivism, we also find 
several indications in his work which point in the direction of radical constructivism. 
While there are many different forms of realism, it might still be helpful to have a 
provisional working definition of realism as a standard of comparison for characterizing 
Fleck's views. Let us therefore follow David Papineau and take realism, for any body of 
putative knowledge, to involve "the conjunction of two theses: (1) an independence thesis: 
our judgements answer for their truth to a world which exists independently of our awareness 
of it; (2) a knowledge thesis: by and large, we can know which of these judgements are 
t rue" . 7 5 There is no doubt that Fleck is opposed to realism so defined. 
Already in his 1929 essay 'On the Crisis of "Reality"', he formulated a view which 
would later acquire so much fame and notoriety in the wake of debates on Thomas Kuhn's 
work that it was dubbed 'many-worldism' by its realist opponents. Fleck stated that "[m]em-
bers of different scientific communities live in their own scientific and also professional 
reality". 7 6 
K. Knorr-Cetina, "The Ethnographic Study of Scientific Work: Towards a Constructivist Interpreta-
tion of Science', in K.D. Knorr-Cetina and M. Mulkay (eds.), Science Observed: Perspectives on 
the Social Study of Science, London (Sage), 1983, pp. 115-40, on p. 135. 
B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, Cambridge MA (Harvard University Press), 1993. 
R. Nola, "There are More Things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio, Than are Dreamt of in Your 
Philosophy: A Dialogue on Realism and Constructivism', Studies in the History and Philosophy of 
Science 25 (1995): 689-727. 
D. Papineau, 'Introduction', in D. Papineau (ed.), The Philosophy of Science, Oxford (Oxford 
University Press), 1996, p. 2. 
Fleck, op. cit. (note 10), p. 49. 
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Kuhn would later defend the, for realists outrageous and bizarre, view that when paradigms 
change, the world itself changes with them; thus he stated that "after Copernicus, astrono-
mers lived in a different world", and likewise "after discovering oxygen Lavoisier worked 
in a different world" , 7 7 The 'many-worldism' view was therefore not Kuhn's original inven-
tion, but neither was it Fleck's; before him, the thesis of the 'plurality of realities' had 
already been propounded by Leon Chwistek, a representative of the famous 'Philosophy of 
L w o w ' . 7 8 
Fleck would have denied both the 'independence thesis' and the 'knowledge thesis', 
which Papineau takes to be, in conjunction, constitutive of realism. After having argued that 
the history of science cannot be construed as an approach to the ideal, 'absolute' reality, "not 
even asymptotically" (thus implicitly rejecting approximation versions of the 'knowledge 
thesis' such as defended by Richard Boyd 7 9 ) , Fleck attacks the notion of an 'independent' 
reality head-on: 
"Of what ought the absolute reality to be independent? If one wished it to be independent of man, one 
ought to consider that in this event it would also be of no use to man".8 0 
The 'many-worldism' view and the rejection of the idea that science gradually approximates 
the true, objective picture of the world are combined in the reply that Fleck puts in the 
mouth of Sympatius (figuring in a constructed dialogue) to answer the challenge of Simplici-
us: "You will not gainsay that today's science is closer to the objective picture of the world 
than the science of 100 years ago?". Sympatius (who is obviously Fleck's mouthpiece) 
replies: 
T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago (University of Chicago Press), 1970 
[1962], p. 117 and p. 118. Kuhn remained loyal to this view. In a more recent contribution, dating 
from 1989, he stated: "The heavens of the Greeks were irreducibly different from ours". See T.S. 
Kuhn, "The Natural and the Human Sciences', in D.R. Hiley et al. (eds.), The Interpretive Turn, 
Ithaca and London (Cornell University Press), 1991, pp. 17-24, on p. 21. 
Schnelle, op. cit. (note 6), pp. 254-56. It must be noted that there is also a biological version of 
'many-worldism', as transpires from the following passage derived from Jakob von Uexkull and 
quoted by Fleck: *[..] the biologist claims that there are as many worlds as there are subjects, that 
all worlds are worlds of appearance that can be understood only in connection with the specific 
subject" (179 note 6/138 note 6). Uexkflll's thought has been a major source of inspiration for 
Konrad Lorenz' ethology. 
R. Boyd, 'On the Current Status of the Issue of Realism', Erkenntnis 19 (1983): 45-90. 
80 Fleck, op. cit. (note 10), p. 55. 
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"I do not think that today's science is closer to the objective picture of the world than the science of 100 
years ago. On the other hand, I am sure that today's science is closer to our world of today, while the 
science of 100 years ago was closer to what was then the world of the creators of science".81 
One might wonder what the presumed mechanism is that brings today's science closer to "our 
world of today". Does science somehow create the world, or at least 'our' world? If Fleck 
attributes 'world-making' powers to science, then on that account he would indeed move very 
close to the radical varieties of contemporary constructivism. In the following passage he 
seems to go all the way in that direction: 
"[..] the theory of thought-styles throws a specific light on the relation between 'reality' and 'cognition': 
the chasm between 'nature' and 'culture' fades away because the cognitive activity (note: the collective 
one, which creates a separate thought-style) is not a unilateral action as, e.g., the figurative rendering of 
a certain object, but consists in a bilateral interaction: The thought-style creates reality, not in a different 
way from other products of culture and, at the same time, itself undergoes certain harmonious chan-
ges". 8 2 
(The fading away of the chasm between 'nature' and 'culture' would of course nicely corres-
pond with the radical constructivist rejection of any a priori distinction between the two.) 
Fleck charges the realist who strives to know absolute reality with a strange misunderstan-
ding: "Is [such striving] not the same as if one wanted to open up a pristine jungle, without 
changing its condition?". 8 3 Gerard de Vries presents a further elaboration of this simile 
which highlights the 'world-making' quality of modern science: 
"In the eyes of the relativist [= radical constructivist - HvdB], realists are as deceived as tourists are, who 
travelled long to enjoy what they take to be 'pure nature', and who fail to notice that the sand-beaches 
are cleaned and raked every night, that the exuberant flora of their pet-island is artificially irrigated and 
that the 'original dances' of the natives are organized by the national airline. What tourists perceive as 
'pure nature' is made possible by their pecuniary investments and the efforts of local organizers; analo-
gously, what scientists experience as 'the natural world' is made possible by their conceptual investments 
and the organization of manpower and laboratory equipment".84 
Fleck, 1946, op. cit. (note 3), pp. 116-17. 
Fleck, 1936, op. cit. (note), p. 112. 
Fleck, op cit. (note 10), p. 55. Fleck's comparison is well-chosen. The American environmentalist 
and photographer Ansel Adams, who wanted to keep the wilderness of Yosemite pure in order to 
protect its 'spiritual potential', realized the tragic paradox involved: "unfortunately, in order to keep 
it pure we have to occupy it". Quoted in S. Schama, Landscape & Memory, London (HarperCol-
lins), 1995, p. 9. 
G. de Vries, 'Explaining "Truth" in a Relativist Way', in T.A.F. Kuipers (ed.), What is Closer-to-
the-Truth?, Amsterdam (Rodopi), 1987, pp. 217-28, on p. 219. 
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Active and passive linkages 
We have seen that Fleck is no realist in Papineau's sense. There is no human-independent 
world which as such is accessible to scientific investigation. As soon as the jungle is opened 
up, it is no longer pristine. Still, one might concede that any research requires conceptual 
investments and the organization of manpower and laboratory equipment as active contribu-
tions on the part of scientists, and yet deny that this entails that reality has no share in deter-
mining the outcome of research. In other words, one could attempt to strike a balance be-
tween what the world contributes to our knowledge and what scientists do, or between 
discovery and invention. Such a position could perhaps be considered a constructivist variety 
of realism. 8 5 At first sight it appears that this is just what Fleck is aiming at when he intro-
duces the distinction between 'active linkages' and 'passive linkages' (or 'couplings') which 
together are held to compose all knowledge. Fleck writes: "Cognition [...] means, primarily, 
to ascertain those results which must follow, given certain preconditions. The preconditions 
correspond to active linkages and constitute that portion of cognition belonging to the collec-
tive. The constrained results correspond to passive linkages and constitute that which is 
experienced as objective reality. The act of ascemining is the contribution of the individual" 
(40/85). There are however a lot of problems connected with this formulation. First, the 
chosen terminology is somewhat unfortunate. 'Active linkages' are not presuppositions that 
are open to free rational choice - as conventionalism, in Fleck's opinion, maintains. 8 6 They 
represent the contribution of the collective to cognition and can be explained historically from 
the development of science and culture. Fleck assigns the act of ascertaining the 'passive 
linkages' to the individual, but this is a rather empty concession, because this ascertaining 
should precisely amount to the elimination of the individual 'arbitrariness' or 'caprice' of 
thought. Fleck attempts to construe the genesis of a 'fact', or the establishment of 'passive 
linkages', as a process of progressive restriction on the 'freedom of thought' of the investiga-
tors: in the end the collective has to feel firm ground which resists its arbitrary will (Fleck 
speaks of a Widerstandsaviso or 'signal of resistance'): "This is how a fact arises. At first 
In the terminology of Frank Farrell, this position would be characterized as parochial realism: "Let 
us say that someone might be a parochial realist regarding a certain feature. The realism of the 
position consists in the claim that regarding the feature in question we are dealing with a tracking 
of some real aspect of the universe. Yet the position is a parochial one in making the further claim 
that a certain sensibility not shared by all thinkers or experiences, or a particular way of engaging 
the world, is a condition for letting that feature emerge as determinate". See F.B. Farrell, Subjecti-
vity, Realism and Postmodernism, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1996 [1994], p. 160. 
Farrell mentions David Wiggins as a representative of parochial realism. 
Jerzy Giedymin, who is a specialist on conventionalism, points out that Fleck is liable to a widely 
shared misunderstanding here. Like many others, Fleck mistakes "the claim that our fundamental 
concepts are not uniquely imposed upon us by experience or by a priori intuitions and in this sense 
are conventional (and arbitrary, free) with another claim - never made by conventionalists [emphasis 
added] - that conventions depend only on the free choice or on the whims of the individual scientist 
and are unaffected by experiential, socio-historical or biological circumstances" (I. Giedymin, op. 
cit [note 6], p. 186). 
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there is a signal of resistance in the chaotic initial thinking, then a definite thought con-
straint, and finally a form to be directly perceived. A fact always occurs in the context of the 
history of thought and is always the result of a definite thought style" (95/124). Fleck's 
reconstruction of the establishment of 'passive linkages' leaves many questions unanswered. 
These linkages, he says, constitute "what is experienced as objective reality", but what role 
exactly, if any, does he allow 'objective reality' to play? Fleck's thought seems to be oscil-
lating here. At one place he suggests that "objective reality can be resolved into historical 
sequences of ideas belonging to the collective"; from the viewpoint of comparative epistemo-
logy this factor could thus be eliminated (40-41/56). Cognition would then no longer be seen 
as a process involving subject, thought collective, and object. Elsewhere, however, Fleck 
asserts mat a scientific fact cannot be substantively reconstructed in toto from a cultural-
historical and sociological investigation (83/110). But then, again, he suggests that the 
residual, "something inevitable, steadfast and inexplicable by historical development", can 
in turn be explained by "an intrinsic constraint imposed by thought style" (79-80/105-06). 
This would appear to leave no role for 'objective reality' after all. 
In addition to this unclarity with regard to the role left for 'objective reality', there is 
another problem with Fleck's conception of 'passive linkages' as 'inevitable' results, given 
certain presuppositions (the 'active linkages'). This notion of inevitability and intellectual 
constraint runs counter to the basic tenet of the finitist theory. Barnes, Bloor and Henry 
oppose the widely shared view which first concedes that conventions can indeed be freely 
chosen, but then holds that once they have been chosen they will determine our subsequent 
classificatory activity. As if everything will be fixed after the 'premises' have been decided 
upon. This view conflicts with the open-ended character of the application of terms (and, 
consequently, also of conventions). 8 7 Fleck's conception of 'active' and 'passive' linkages 
seems to exemplify this way of thinking. He illustrates his distinction with the example of 
the atomic weights of the elements: "The origin of the number 16 for the atomic weight for 
oxygen is almost consciously conventional and arbitrary. But if 16 is assumed as the atomic 
weight for O, oxygen, of necessity the atomic weight of H, hydrogen, will inevitably be 
1.008" (83/110). If we look more closely at the actual history of our changing ideas about 
atoms, molecules, elements, and atomic weights, we may get a clearer picture of what is 
wrong with Fleck's notion of 'inevitable' results. 
In the first half of the 19th century and beyond there was widespread disagreement 
among chemists concerning the relative atomic weights for elements and consequently also 
concerning chemical formulae. 8 8 For oxygen and hydrogen, for example, the ratios of 16 
Barnes, Bloor and Henry, op. cit. (note 37), p. 55. 
The following account is mainly based on The Open University Course Team, The Structure of 
Chemistry, Milton Keynes (Open University Press), 1976. See also J.R. Partington, A Short History 
of Chemistry, London (MacMillan), 1957 (3rd edition), pp. 256-58 and J. Hudson, The History of 
Chemistry, Houndmills etc. (MacMillan), 1992, chapter 9. 
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to 1 and 8 to 1 were both current. There was also a cleavage between the two main depart-
ments of chemistry: inorganic chemistry used one set of atomic weights, organic chemistry 
a different set. An international conference was held at Karlsruhe in 1860 to find a solution 
for the general state of confusion. At the conference the Italian chemist Stanislao Cannizzaro 
made a strong case for the use of Avogadro's hypothesis (known already for almost half a 
century) in the determination of (relative) atomic weights, which required a distinction to be 
made between 'molecules' and 'atoms'; but he was opposed by a 'big shot' like Kekulé who 
questioned the admissibility of physical evidence for chemical molecular weights. For oxygen 
and hydrogen, adoption of Cannizzaro's ideas led to the ratio of 16 : 1. The ratio mentioned 
by Fleck of 16 : 1.008 reflects the discovery of isotopes at the end of the century, which in 
turn led to a debate on the meaning of the concept of 'element'. Only after all these contro-
versies had been settled and a system of relative atomic weights had become established, did 
a more narrowly 'conventionalist' debate on which standard to take as a basis ( H = l or 
0 = 1 6 ) get started. Some chemists argued in favour of taking H = l , mainly for pedagogic 
reasons (it is easier to teach), whereas others argued for taking 0 = 1 6 , which would be more 
convenient for experimental research because the atomic weights of many elements could be 
determined only through combination with oxygen. Around 1900 a commission installed by 
the German Chemical Society conducted an international survey among professional chemists 
to decide the issue. Because most of the chemists were in favour of oxygen, 0 = 1 6 was from 
then on taken as the standard. 8 9 Fleck's assertion that, assuming O to be 16, H will "inevi-
tably" be 1.008, glosses over this whole convoluted history. He indicates the victor after the 
battle-smoke has cleared. With hindsight outcomes will nearly always look 'inevitable'. Such 
a retrospective procedure does not do justice to the constructivist insight (in particular empha-
sized by Harry Collins) that research results are always in principle 'interpretively flexible' 
and 'socially negotiable'. It took indeed a lot of 'negotiation', at the Karlsruhe Conference 
and beyond, before the currently accepted set of atomic weights was in place. 
Fleck's use of 'passive linkages' can be compared to the use of the notion of 'constraint' 
by some modern critics of constructivism. Such critics take constructivists as holding that 
scientists just say whatever they wish about nature, to which they then react by saying that 
of course this is not true and that surely there must also be 'constraints' on construction. 9 0 
Andrew Pickering in his turn has passionately opposed all 'constraint talk' as essentially 
The latter part of the story has been told by the German history of science student, Britta Goers, as 
reported in 'An Atomic Weight Controversy in Nineteenth-Century Germany', Chemical Heritage, 
Volume 14, Nr. 1, Winter 1996-97, p. 29. 
An example is Y. Gingras and S.S. Schweber, 'Constraints on Construction', Social Studies of 
Science 16 (1986): 372-83. 
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begging the question. 9 1 He conceives of scientific practice as an open-ended process of 
'modelling' with no pre-determined destination. Every cultural element involved in this 
'modelling' - the material procedure, the interpretive model (the understanding of how the 
apparatus works) and the phenomenal model (the theoretical understanding of the pheno-
menon under investigation) - is a flexible resource susceptible to endless tinkering and tuning. 
Still, this does not imply that scientific work should be easy or that scientists can 'construct' 
anything they like. The point of experimental practice is to achieve coherence between all 
three elements and that is not something easily attained. In the course of their experimental 
work, Pickering notes, scientists are repeatedly confronted with 'resistances'. Unlike 'cons-
traints' - which are held to obtain from the outset -, 'resistances' only emerge in the real time 
of practice. They are just as 'emergent' and 'contingent' as the accommodations to which 
they may give rise. In Pickering's view, it is therefore possible, indeed mandatory, to eschew 
the notion of 'constraint' without giving up the conviction that science is really hard work. 
It will be clear by now that modern constructivism has little use for Fleck's "intrinsic 
constraint imposed by thought style" (80/106). In his comments on Fleck, Bloor rejects the 
assumption that a style unfolds itself: "It contains no inherent implications that 'determine 
our Reason' or guide our understanding". 9 2 Fleck himself maintains that the thought collec-
tive is always looking for the unique solution to a given problem that is in conformity with 
the thought style. As an example he refers to the acceptance by the medical community of 
Fritz Schaudinn's Spirochaeta pallida and its rejection of John Siegel's Cytorrhyctes Ms as 
the aetiological agent of syphilis (100/131). I will show in Chapter IV that this particular 
example does not support Fleck's thesis. Nor do I see any a priori reason why there should 
be "always only one [...] stylized solution" to any given problem (100/131). 
The concept of style and its grammar 
It is not surprising that modern constructivists have little sympathy for Fleck's view that a 
style exerts a constraining force over the thought and action of the members of the correspon-
ding collective. After all, they find it unacceptable to treat any element of a cultural tradition 
as inherently constraining (Barnes et al.) or reject the invocation of constraint altogether 
(Pickering). In their judgement, Fleck illegitimately 'empowers' thought styles and represents 
people as acting under pressure from those powers. This violates the tenets of finitism and 
goes against the precept to analyze scientific practice as occurring in real time. 
If the notion of a 'stylized thought constraint' (stilgemasser Denkzwang) must be rejec-
ted, this will greatly reduce the explanatory significance of the concept of thought style. It 
A. Pickering, 'Beyond Constraint: The Temporality of Practice and the Historicity of Knowledge', 
in J.Z. Buchwald (ed.), Scientific Practice: Theories and Stories of Doing Physics, Chicago (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press), 1995, pp. 42-55. 
D. Bloor, 'Some Determinants of Cognitive Style in Science', in Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 
1), pp. 387-97, on p. 393. 
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does not, however, exclude the possibility that the concept refers to an important kind of 
phenomenon that in its own right is worthy of systematic inquiry and explanation. In other 
words, a thought style may be an explanandum rather than an explanans. To decide whether 
it should be granted this status, it would be very helpful if some instructions could be given 
as to how thought styles are to be recognized and identified. So what makes up a thought 
style, what are its defining traits? 
Thought styles would hardly merit systematic attention if they were no more than what 
Fleck's commentators Cohen and Schnelle make them out to be: 
"What the thought-style dictates is accepted as a matter of course by members of the collective. But in 
fact it is never more than a conglomerate of shared convictions, on the basis of which views are developed 
which conform to them, i.e. 'stylized' views, which when pursued far enough take the shape of an 
internally consistent 'system of opinion'".93 
If a thought style were just a "conglomerate of shared convictions", it would lack the unity 
and internal harmony that would make it an interesting phenomenon in the first place. In-
deed, it would hardly be justified to call such a conglomerate a style at all. 
It must be admitted that the explication given by Cohen and Schnelle captures Fleck's 
use of the term 'thought style' reasonably well. Already in the 1930s the medical historian 
and Fleck's compatriot, Tadeusz Bilikiewicz, commented on this use: 
"This term [the term 'style'] is undoubtedly not applied in its usual meaning. Usually we interpret 'style' 
as a form that is a manifestation of some kind of creativity. In Fleck's formulation the term means a set 
of sociological conditions on which depend not only Xhsform but the substance of creation, too". 9 4 
Although Bilikiewics' comment partly reflects the typical humanist's aversion to a sociologi-
cal approach, he is certainly on target with his charge that in Fleck's formulation a style also 
pertains to the substantive (and not exclusively to the formal) aspects of intellectual creations. 
Fleck's use of the style concept thus lacks the clarity and coherence that characterizes its 
dominant use in art history as popularized by Heinrich Wolfflin. 9 5 This approach analyzes 
the Classical (Renaissance) and Baroque styles of European art history in a rigorously compa-
rative way by describing works of art belonging to the domains of architecture, painting and 
sculpture in terms of purely 'formal' oppositions, e.g. 'linear' versus 'pictorial', 'two-dimen-
sional' versus 'spatial', 'closed form' versus 'open form'. Fleck's use of the style concept 
R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle, 'Introduction', in Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 1), pp. DC-XXX-
III, on p. XX. 
Bilikiewicz, 'Comments on Ludwik Fleck's "Science and Social Context"', in Löwy, op. cit. (note 
5), pp. 257-66, on p. 258. 
H. Wölfflin, Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Basel (Benno Schwabe & Co), 1915. 
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falls far short of the systematic rigour achieved by Wolfflin's approach. His characterization 
of the so-called 'serological thought style', for example, is no more than a simple enumera-
tion of a number of substantive elements that supposedly make up this particular style (59-
64/79-84). These elements include such items as serological specificity, the distinction be-
tween cellular and humoral immunity, the 'chemical delusion', the battle metaphor for 
infectious diseases, the emphasis on systematic observation as the basis of diagnosis and the 
methodical necessity of applying 'controls'. He does not indicate of what the unity of this 
style consists, nor does he explicitly state whether there is such a unity at all. 
Fleck was not opposed to drawing analogies between science and art. In this respect he 
shows a striking difference with the sociologist Karl Mannheim, who was the first to introdu-
ce, in 1925, the term Denkstil into the sociology of knowledge, "in the absence of a better 
expression" . 9 6 We have already mentioned that Fleck was not acquainted with any of Mann-
heim's writings. Whereas Mannheim emphatically declares that he by no means intends to 
'analogize' between thinking and artistic creation 9 7, Fleck exhibits no inhibitions on this 
score: "In science, just as in art and in life, only that which is true to culture is true to 
nature" (35/48). Fleck shows a great sensitivity to the role of anatomical illustrations and of 
images in general in scientific cognition. 9 8 
For Fleck, the main thrust of his use of stylistic categories is against the kind of logical 
analysis of systems of scientific statements that was practised by the members of the Vienna 
Circle. The following passage elaborates this contrast and delineates the tasks of 'comparative 
epistemology' in understanding the emergence and transformation of different styles: 
"In the history of scientific knowledge, no formal relation of logic exists between conceptions and eviden-
ce. Evidence conforms to conceptions just as often as conceptions conform to evidence. After all, concep-
tions are not logical systems [..] They are stylized units which either develop or atrophy just as they are 
or merge with their proofs into others. [..] It is one of the most important tasks in comparative epistemo-
logy to find out how conceptions and hazy ideas pass from one thought style to another, how they emerge 
as spontaneously generated pre-ideas, and how they are preserved as enduring, rigid structures [Gebilde] 
owing to a kind of harmony of illusions" (27-28/40-41). 
K. Mannheim, Konservatismus: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Wissens, Frankfurt am Main (Suhr-
kamp), 1984 [1925], p. 51 and p. 227, note 5. 
Ibid., p. 227-25, note 5. 
A comparable interest in the role of pictorial representation is also characteristic of modern con-
structivism. See M. Lynch and S. Woolgar (eds.), Representation in Scientific Practice, Cambridge 
MA (MIT Press), 1990. See further the special issue of Biology & Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 2 (A-
pril 1991), on pictorial representation in biology. 
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Strangely enough, for all his emphasis that "epistemology [..] is a science of thought-
styles" 9 9 and that epistemology should be conducted on a comparative basis, Fleck never 
draws what would appear a rather obvious conclusion, viz. that thought styles themselves 
should be preferably conceived in comparative terms. Precisely the latter point of view has 
been persuasively defended by the British historian of science, Jonathan Harwood. 1 0 0 I 
think that we can extract from his digressions some niinimal requirements for the meaningful 
use of the term 'style', or the rules governing its grammar, so to speak. 
Harwood argues that styles can be said to exist when various cultural sectors embody 
particular recurring elements and when those elements are distinctive, i.e., when they differ 
from one situation (society) to another. Typographically, the point can be brought home as 
follows: 
It makes no sense to use the term style, Harwood insists, unless recurring elements are 
identified in several cultural sectors. Otherwise one could say just as well, or indeed with 
more justification, that the architecture of society x and that of society y were simply diffe-
rent. The concept of style is intended to draw attention to the fact that the cultural differences 
between societies are patterned. Thus when styles are involved one may say, for instance, 
that the architecture of society x differs from that of society y in the same way (where the 
meaning of 'same' has to be further specified) as the sculpture of x differs from the sculpture 
of y. The existence of such patterned differences enables us to distinguish between 'form' 
and 'content'. Harwood's considerations may appear rather simple and elementary, but they 
are very useful for critically scratinizing the extensive literature on (concepts of) style. It is 
striking how infrequently current uses of the term 'style' satisfy the seemingly minimal 
requirements laid down by h i m . 1 0 1 Wolfflin's employment of the style concept in art his-
tory is a positive exception to this rule. I have already intimated, however, that Fleck's use 
of the concept of 'thought style' is also unsatisfactory in this regard. 
However serious the shortcomings of Fleck's concept of style may seem to be, on the 
level of empirical description they are not beyond repair. Harwood's requirements imply that 
(some of) the elements that Fleck identified as constituting the (presumed) style of the serolo-
Fleck, "The Problem of Epistemology', op cit. (note 1), p. 98. 
J. Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933, Chicago 
and London (The University of Chicago Press), 1993. 
See, for example, how the concept of 'life-style' is used in the sociology of Anthony Giddens. 
Society x Society y 
architecture ARCHITECTURE 
SCULPTURE 
PAINTING 
sculpture 
painting 
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gists' collective must also be found in other cultural (or, in this case, disciplinary) sectors, 
and that such a collection of 'recurring elements' must be matched with at least one contras-
ting set of elements covering a comparable range of sectors. It so happens that bom condi-
tions can in fact be fulfilled. We can recognize similar elements as identified by Fleck for 
the sector of serology in other sectors of medical science (nosology, aetiology, and therapy) 
and, happily enough, it proves also possible to find a contrasting style spanning the same 
range of sectors. A detailed demonstration in support of this assertion builds on a more 
intimate knowledge of and familiarity with the various fields of medical science that will be 
discussed in the next historical chapters, so this must be postponed till Chapter VUI. 
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CHAPTER III: 
CULTURE, HEREDITY, AND THE CONCEPT OF SYPHILIS 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have seen that the medical scientist Ludwik Fleck was led to a 
constructivist view of scientific knowledge through a critical reflection on concepts of disease 
that were current in his own discipline. In the first part of his monograph Genesis and 
Development of a Scientific Fact he offered a more detailed analysis along constructivist lines 
of the historical emergence of the modern concept of syphilis. Like other diseases this par-
ticular disease unit was not an objectively given entitity, Fleck argued; he attempted to show 
that it was rather the product of a long process of Herausmeisselung (chiseling out). Fleck 
considered it utterly naive, however, to assume that this long process of conceptual develop-
ment had finally reached completion in our own century. His constructivist conception of 
disease entities was thus diametrically opposed to any essentialism or conceptual realism 
which views diseases as specific natural kinds possessing essential properties of their own 
and waiting to be properly delimited by medical science. 
In this chapter I will elaborate and extend Fleck's analysis by drawing on more recent 
contributions to the history of syphilis and also, on occasion, by adducing new historical 
material. Although I will have to criticize Fleck's account on the level of historical detail, 
my primary aim here is to consolidate his constructivist approach towards the genesis of 
disease concepts. In this venture I hope to derive additional inspiration from Mary Hesse's 
finitist theory or network theory of meaning and concept application. As we have seen in the 
last chapter, this theory has been turned into a powerful support for the sociology of scien-
tific knowledge by the two founders of the Strong Programme, Barry Barnes and David 
Bloor. Let me briefly recapitulate the finitist or network theory here. The theory holds that 
the established meaning of a term does not determine its future applications. Concepts do not 
have fixed domains of application or 'reference classes' attached to them; they are open-
ended in principle. Whether a new instance falls under a given concept is a matter of judge-
ment, subject to social negotiation. Concepts do not exist in isolation, however. They are 
mutually connected through 'laws' or 'generalizations', thus forming a conceptual network 
or fabric. It is the conceptual network as a whole which confronts experience. Any concep-
tual relationship can be upheld in the face of (purported) 'anomalies', provided that suitable 
rearrangements are made elsewhere in the system (the Duhem-Quine thesis). The finitist 
theory therefore leads naturally to the view that the accepted usage of scientific concepts is 
conventional through and through and not dictated by the structure of objective reality. In this 
chapter I will attempt to show that the case of the concept of syphilis is no exception. As 
such this attempt is hardly original. David Bloor has already used Fleck's account of the 
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genesis of the modern concept of syphilis to illustrate the finitist theory. Nevertheless, an 
elaboration of the finitist account by drawing on a larger set of historical data may still be 
worthwhile. 
A further objective of this chapter - beyond arguing for the conventional and constructed 
character of disease concepts - is to ascertain to what extent social and cultural factors, in 
particular considerations of morality, have entered into the framing of concepts of syphilis. 
Fleck observes that, from the Renaissance on, the "fixation upon the emotive venereal 
character of [the] disease entity" has imprinted a "stigma of fatefulness and sinfulness" upon 
syphilis (3/5). He explains this fixation on the venereal character of syphilis from the preva-
lent 16th-century attitude dominated by astrology and religion, but does not make clear why 
this fixation could maintain itself for centuries despite the withering away of this prevalent 
attitude. So why has syphilis, even in recent times, been constructed as an essentially 
venereal or sexually transmitted disease? Could it have been, a conceptual realist might be 
tempted to suggest, because despite all their superstition our 16th-century ancestors happened 
to hit upon an essential trait of the disease? Because syphilis simply is a venereal disease? 
After all, is there anybody who would deny that indeed it is? It seems as if the sheer weight 
of the verdict of reality prevents any sensible constructivist endeavour from getting off the 
ground. Fortunately, it is still possible for the constructivist analyst to get a handle on this 
difficult matter. During the 20th century some medical investigators who were familiar with 
non-venereal tropical and subtropical diseases closely related to syphilis have actually ques-
tioned prevalent disease classifications. In section 2 I will pay attention to the views of this 
dissident minority because they enable us to loosen the hold on our minds of the 'venereal 
fixation' characteristic of the modern concept of syphilis. 
In pursuing the influence of moral considerations on the framing of syphilis concepts I 
have devoted a separate section to the vicissitudes of the curious notion of 'syphilis inson-
tium' (or 'syphilis in the innocent') which was very popular at the end of the 19th century. 
Explicitly framed in moral terms, this concept was instrumental in bringing about a partial 
'de-moralization' of syphilis. 
Fleck spoke about the "stigma of fatefulness and sinfulness" which was imprinted upon 
syphilis by the fixation upon the emotive venereal nature of the disease (see above). I would 
like to add that this moral stigma was even more pronounced by the fact that before 1900 
syphilis was not only considered a venereal but also a hereditary disease, thereby reinforcing 
in particular the aspect of 'fatefulness'. 2 In modern eyes it may seem rather strange to 
D. Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge, London and Basingstoke (Macmillan), 
1983, pp. 34-37. More correctly, Bloor uses Fleck's account to defend Wittgenstein's theory of 
family resemblances, but the latter theory is closely connected to Mary Hesse's finitist theory. 
For Fleck, this aspect of fatefulness was already established by astrological speculation at the turn 
from the 15th to the 16th century. At that time many authors considered the syphilis epidemic in 
Europe from 1494 onward to be caused by a particular astrological constellation occurring on 25 
November 1484: a "conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter under the sign of Scorpio and the House of 
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consider a particular disease as being both infectious and hereditary. Before 1900, however, 
and even beyond, both properties were not generally regarded as mutually exclusive. Just as 
it may be appropriate to ask why certain diseases are constructed or framed as venereal 
diseases, likewise we can also inquire why they are conceived as being of a hereditary or, 
for that matter (keeping to the tenets of symmetry and impartiality), of a non-hereditary 
character. 3 I have devoted section 4 to an extensive discussion of the concept of 'hereditary 
syphilis' to explore how it was associated with cultural values and perceptions and how it 
gradually gave way to our modern concept of 'congenital syphilis'. The latter transition was 
part of a major transformation of the conceptual network which resulted in the attributes 
'infectious' and 'hereditary' becoming mutually exclusive properties. The wide conceptual 
ramifications of this change underscore the appropriateness of the network metaphor. 
The ramifying character of conceptual networks also poses a problem for writing this 
chapter. Ostensibly about the historical genesis of the modern concept of syphilis, it cannot 
fully avoid discussing some other nodes in the expanding conceptual network of medical 
knowledge to which this concept became connected (such as those of the aetiological agent 
or the Wassermann reaction) and which I had reserved for treatment in later chapters. I take 
comfort in the thought that this is not simply to be blamed on my lack of compository skills 
but agrees with what can be expected from the network theory. As Barnes in an exposition 
of this theory explains: 
"[..] there is no way of acquiring knowledge in a genuinely step-by-step manner, with each step being 
completely understood and justified before moving on to the next. The knowledge associated with any part 
of a conceptual fabric is only fully acquired when the whole fabric has been acquired. Conceptual fabrics 
[..] have the character of hermeneutic systems [ . . ] \ 4 
The same problem will of course recur in later chapters. Everything is connected to every-
thing else, but one can only discuss in sufficient detail one thing at a time. In chapter VTA 
I will try to give an overview of 'the whole fabric'. 
In the next section I start with reconstructing and commenting upon Fleck's account of 
the making of the modern concept of syphilis, before expounding my own views relating to 
certain problems in the 'aetiological' concept of syphilis and to the venereal character of the 
disease. Section 3 will deal with 'syphilis insontium', section 4 with 'hereditary syphilis'. 
Mars [..] The sign of Scorpio, which rules the genitals, explains why the genitals were the first 
place to be attacked by the new disease" (Iwan Bloch, cited by Fleck 2/4). 
See E.J. Yoxen, 'Constructing Genetic Diseases', in P. Wright and A. Treacher (eds.), The Pro-
blem of Medical Knowledge: Examining the Social Construction of Medicine, Edinburgh (Edinburgh 
University Press), pp. 144-161. 
B. Barnes, T.S. Kuhn and Social Science, London and Basingstoke (Macmillan), 1982, p. 73. 
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2. The making of the modern concept of syphilis 
In broad outline Fleck distinguishes four successive concepts of syphilis spanning the histori-
cal period from the end of the 15th to the first decade of the 20th century: 
(a) syphilis as an ethical-mystical disease entity 
of 'carnal scourge' (Lustseuche); 
(b) syphilis as an empirical-therapeutic disease 
entity responding to mercury compounds; 
(c) a pathogenetic concept of syphilis as a 
generalized disease (related to the idea of 'foul blood'); 
(d) the aetiological concept of syphilis as a disease 
caused by a specific microbial agent. 
I will follow Fleck's exposition and comment on each of the concepts distinguished by him. 
Most attention will be paid, however, to the more recent 'aetiological' concept of syphilis. 
Under this heading I will offer my own thoughts about the subject, referring to Fleck's views 
only when these can be usefully taken into account. 
The carnal scourge and the differentiation of venereal diseases 
The conception of syphilis as the carnal scourge tout court comprises not just what we today 
would call syphilis but also the other venereal diseases, viz. gonorrhoea, ulcus molle (soft 
chancre, chancroid) and conditions that were only later recognized as such like 
lymphogranuloma venereum. Slightly disagreeing with Fleck, Kenneth Flegel maintains that 
it was only after 1540 or 1550 that syphilis, gonorrhoea and soft chancre were generally 
taken as manifestations of the same 'Venus disease' or lues venerea; earlier writers had 
distinguished syphilis at least from gonorrhoea. 5 From about 1550 to about 1750 the belief 
in the existence of one venereal disease was unchallenged. Since the second half of the 18th 
century until well into the 19th century, however, fierce controversies were raging between 
the adherents of the so-called identity and duality theories. Flegel asserts that the confusion 
was finally resolved in 1838, when the famous French venereologist Philippe Ricord, on the 
basis of clinical evidence and experimental findings (in the previous 7 years he had per-
formed no less than 2.500 inoculation experiments!), proclaimed to the world that gonorrhoea 
and syphilis were different diseases. But the process of enlightenment was not completed 
even with Ricord, for he apparently did not yet differentiate between syphilitic chancre and 
K.M. Flegel, 'Changing Concepts of the Nosology of Gonorrhea and Syphilis', Bulletin of the 
History of Medicine 48 (1974): 571-88. 
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Flegel, op. cit. (note 5), p. 586 footnote 83; O. Temkin, "Therapeutic Trends and the Treatment of 
Syphilis before 1900', Bulletin of the History of Medicine 29 (1955): 309-16, p. 310. 
Flegel observes in a footnote: "The fact is that present-day physicians regard gonorrhea and syphilis 
as different diseases, most particularly because the causative agents are different. However, physi-
cians believed that they were different before the discovery of bacteria [..]"; Flegel, op. cit. (note 
5), pp. 575-76, footnote 23 (emphasis added). 
Flegel, op. cit. (note 5), p. 575. 
chancroid. 6 This differentiation was to be the contribution of his pupil Bassereau and of the 
Lyonnese physician Rollet. It is important to note that the distinction between the three 
venereal diseases was already fairly widely accepted before the actual onset of the bacterio-
logical era. 7 The subsequent identification of the causative agents of gonorrhoea (Neisser, 
1879), ulcus molle (Ducrey, 1889) and syphilis (Schaudinn and Hoffmann, 1905) merely 
confirmed the already accepted separation of three different diseases. 
One aspect of this historical development that deserves further comment is the role 
played by inoculation experiments in the eventual separation of syphilis from other venereal 
diseases. It is difficult not to agree with Fleck's view that one single experiment has a very 
limited significance compared with "the total experience consisting of experiments, observa-
tions, skills, and transformations of concepts available within a given field" (10/16). A well-
known example is the notorious experiment performed by John Hunter in the second half of 
the 18th century. Hunter inoculated himself with the urethral discharge of a man who was 
alleged to have gonorrhoea and ... obtained an ulcer followed by a typical syphilis. Later 
writers have explained this outcome, which for Hunter proved the unity of syphilis and 
gonorrhoea, from the unlucky coincidence of a mixed infection. Fleck uses this example to 
draw an important epistemological conclusion: "Even a heroic 'crucial experiment', such as 
that performed by Hunter, proves nothing, for its result must now be regarded as either an 
accident or an error" (10/16). Contemporary philosophy of science would concur with the 
view that 'crucial' experiments in the literal sense of the word do not exist, due to the 
Duhem-Quine Thesis. Still we should not overlook the persuasive force of the very large 
number of inoculation experiments performed by Ricord, all pointing in the same direction. 
In science and in medicine, sheer numbers do count for something. 
It must be admitted that the above description of the amalgamation and subsequent 
differentiation of the three venereal diseases has a rather 'Whiggish' savour. In such a brief 
compass this seems hardly avoidable. The following formulation of the problem given by 
Flegel also smacks of 'Whig history': "Soft chancre, gonorrhea and syphilis were considered 
as one. This conviction was a central tenet of venereology for three hundred years. How 
could maladies which had been previously well known become confounded with a striking, 
supposedly new, epidemic disease?". 8 Here the 'Whiggish' tendency is somewhat too 
strong. We would do well, I think, to avoid the patronizing suggestion that the medical 
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writers of previous centuries should have known better. Bearing this in mind, however, it 
is still legitimate to ask why those writers recognized only one venereal disease. 
Part of the explanation may undoubtedly be found, as Fleck suggests, in the early 
fixation on the sexual mode of transmission as a morally relevant trait of the disease, which 
was reinforced by religious (and astrological!) convictions. An additional explanatory factor, 
according to Temkin, may be found in the theory of humours which dominated medical 
thought during the Renaissance and afterwards: "The venereal poison, having entered the 
body, was compelled towards its exterior. Fortunate those whom it was discharged in form 
of a gonorrhea, for they might escape the true lues!". 9 The theory of humours would also 
offer a persuasive interpretation of the treatment of syphilis with mercury compounds which 
were already introduced early in the 16th century. 
The 'empirical-therapeutic' concept of syphilis 
Before the syphilis epidemic at the end of the 15th century, mercury was already in use as 
a remedy against scabies and leprosy. Because the new disease also manifested eruptions on 
the skin, it was understandable that the familiar metal should be tried on it too, and, appa-
rently, with some positive effect. Fleck contrasts the 'ethical-mystical' concept of syphilis 
as 'carnal scourge' with the 'empirical-therapeutic' concept of syphilis as a disease entity 
responding to mercury. Although he considers the two concepts to be mutually contradictory, 
he also notes that they eventually became amalgamated (5/8-9). It may be doubted whether 
the 'empirical-therapeutic' concept ever constituted a full-blown concept of syphilis in its own 
right, but apart from that Fleck's contrast of this supposedly 'empirical' concept with the 
allegedly 'mystical' concept of 'carnal scourge' is too strong. It is significant that mercurial 
therapy was also interpreted in 'ethical-mystical' terms as an atonement for sin. Temkin cites 
the following statement from the 16th-century physician Jacques de Béthencourt, one of the 
first to use the name mal vénérien (venereal disease), about the influence of mercury on the 
body and soul of the syphilitic sinner: "It is never resolved except under the influence of a 
medication which imposes on the body the chastisement of its impurity and on the soul the 
punishment of its errors" . 1 0 Hence the terror of the mercurial cure that was imposed on 
the poor sinful souls! 1 1 The more 'empirical' effect on the body was interpreted in the light 
Temkin, op. cit. (note 6), p. 313. 
O. Temkin, 'On the History of "Morality and Syphilis"', in: The Double Face of Janus and Other 
Essays in the History of Medicine, Baltimore and London (The Johns Hopkins University Press), 
1977, p. 472. Compare C. Quétel, History of Syphilis, Cambridge (Polity Press), 1992, chapter 2. 
It is remarkable that also in later periods a disguised punitive intent has often been attributed to the 
application of such a painful and disagreeable cure as mercurial therapy: "Continuation of the un-
pleasant treatment long after the subsidence of the outward manifestations may well have been 
motivated by a Calvinistic sadism to discourage the miscreant from further immoral activities" (L.J. 
Goldwater, cited in J.R. Walkowitz, Prostitution and Victorian Society, Cambridge [Cambridge 
University Press], 1982, p. 55). 
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of the humoral theory, which regarded the elimination of the morbid humours through 
salivation or sweating as essential to the cure . 1 2 Fleck also notes that the mercurial therapy 
was aimed at the "evacuation of the syphilis toxin through the sputum" (4/7), i.e. at stimula-
ting the flow of toxic saliva - on modern understanding a very dangerous endeavour! "And 
for about 200 years or more'" Temkin observes, "to treat syphilis by mercury or 'to salivate' 
became synonymous expressions". 
The 'pathogenetic' concept of syphilis 
The next concept of syphilis considered by Fleck is the idea of a pathogenetic disease entity, 
i.e. a view about the supposed mechanism of the pathological associations. According to 
Fleck, the pathogenetic concept of syphilis was based on the theory of humours. This theory 
could account for the 'constitutional' or 'generalized' character of (secondary) syphilis in 
terms of an alteratio sanguinis or 'change in the blood'. This Uridee or proto-idea of 'foul 
blood' would ultimately find its fulfilment in the Wassermann reaction, a serological test 
developed in 1906 to detect syphilis. Elsewhere, together with Bart Gremmen, I have criti-
cized this suggested connection between the proto-idea of 'foul blood' and the Wassermann 
test as untenable. 1 3 In laying so much stress on the theory of humours as the underpinning 
of the pathogenetic concept of syphilis, Fleck unduly neglects other pathogenetic ideas. 
Important contributions of the 19th century which resulted in a gradual rounding out of the 
clinical picture of syphilis - e.g. Ricord's division of the course of the disease in a primary, 
secondary, and tertiary stage; Welch's recognition of the syphilitic origin of aortic aneurysm; 
and Founder's view of tabes dorsalis and general paresis as 'para-syphilitic' conditions -
cannot be fitted into Fleck's preconceived scheme. This scheme is also open to historical 
criticism. During the 18th century, as Temkin observes, many of the ideas of humoral 
pathology, in particular the belief in the occult powers of human blood, were relegated to the 
realm of superstition, "because the philosophy of the Enlightenment did not admit the 
occult". 1 4 Fleck is not blind to this general trend of medical thought, but he takes the case 
of syphilis to be the singular exception to this trend: '"Change in the blood' was a popular 
phrase used to explain all generalized diseases. Whereas it went progressively out of fashion 
for other diseases, however, its significance only increased in the case of syphilis" (11/18). 
In my opinion, it is largely Fleck's wish to see the Wassermann reaction as a realization of 
the proto-idea of foul blood which is responsible for this historical judgement. Temkin points 
Temkin, op. cit. (note 6), p. 313. 
H. van den Belt and B. Gremmen, 'Specificity in the Era of Koch and Ehrlich: A Generalized 
Interpretation of Ludwik Fleck's "Serological" Thought-Style', Studies in the History and Philoso-
phy of Science 21 (1990): 463-479. 
Temkin, op. cit. (note 6), p. 312. 
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out that the abandonment of humoral ideas was not without effect on the treatment of syphi-
litics. It resulted in the spread of milder mercurial treatment regimes without salivation. 1 5 
The 'aetiological' concept of syphilis 
The 'aetiological' concept of syphilis became established with the discovery in 1905 of the 
causative agent, Spirochaeta pallida (now Treponema pallidum), by Fritz Schaudinn and 
Erich Hoffmann. As Fleck rightly points out, this achievement does not constitute the final 
consummation of the development of the modern concept of syphilis as a specific disease, 
because such a process is "incomplete in principle, involved as it is in subsequent discoveries 
and new features of pathology, microbiology, and epidemiology" (19/28). In the next chapter 
I will deal in detail with the discovery and subsequent acceptance of the pale spirochaete as 
the aetiological agent of syphilis. Here I will use the example of syphilis to discuss a funda-
mental question that is often raised in the philosophy of medicine: How should diseases be 
defined? Can they be defined by their 'causes' or, in the case of infectious diseases, by their 
'aetiological agents'? The case of syphilis presents some interesting complications which may 
shed a new light on this philosophical problem and stimulate further reflection. Discussion 
of these complications will also provide a suitable occasion for broaching the vexed question 
of the essentially venereal character of syphilis and for examining alternatives to the preva-
lent 'venereal fixation'. 
In the history of medical science it is a quite normal occurrence that a particular disease, 
after its cause has been identified, will become redefined precisely in terms of that specific 
cause. A case in point is the redefinition of tuberculosis. Already in 1883, only one year 
after Koch's discovery of the tubercle bacillus, Adolf Strümpell wrote in the first edition of 
his well-known Lehrbuch der speciellen Pathologie und Therapie: "The definition of tubercu-
losis is no longer based on any outward anatomical characteristic. Any disease which is 
caused by the pathogenic action of a specific species of bacterium, the tubercle bacillus 
discovered by Koch, is considered tuberculous". 1 6 This redefinition raises a problem, 
because it would seem to transform the prima facie informative statement that tuberculosis 
is caused by the tubercle bacillus into a mere tautology. 1 7 The problem has been high-
lighted by the Danish physician and philosopher Henrik Wulff in a comment on the position 
1 5 Ibid., p. 313. 
1 6 A. Strümpell, Lehrbuch der speciellen Pathologie und Therapie, Leipzig, 1883; quoted from F. 
Wibaut, De Methode der Geneeskunde, Haarlem (De Erven Bonn N.V.), 1962, p. 63. 
1 7 Lester King holds that tuberculosis only became a neatly defined disease with Koch's discovery: 
"Instead of vague standards of tissue structure, such as tubercles or giant cells, Koch offered a 
precise standard, namely the identification of the tubercle bacillus. According to this scheme when 
the bacilli are identified, the case is one of tuberculosis by definition". See L.S. King, 'Dr. Koch's 
Postulates', Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 7 (1952): 350-61, p. 356. 
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taken by the Australian philosopher J.L. Mackie. In a seminal article on causes and condi-
tions, Mackie used the example of yellow fever: 
"[...] we may say that the yellow fever virus is the cause of yellow fever. (This statement is not, as it 
might appear to be, tautologous, for the yellow fever virus and the disease itself can be independently 
specified)".18 
Not so, replies Wulff: 
"I think that he is wrong on this point. There are mild cases of infection with yellow fever virus which 
no clinician could recognize clinically with certainty, but we should still say that the patient suffered from 
yellow fever, if we succeeded in isolating the virus from a blood sample. Similarly we can imagine 
clinical pictures, which are indistinguishable from typical yellow fever, but we would not say that such 
patients suffered from yellow fever, if some other infective agent was isolated. Yellow fever has been 
redefined to mean yellow fever virus infection [emphasis added]." 1 9 Wulff holds that this case can be 
generalized and that causal factors are never (or very rarely) necessary in relation to a disease entity 
except by definition. 
Although I agree with Wulff that redefinition of diseases in terms of presumed causes is what 
normally happens in medicine (the above example of tuberculosis is just another illustration), 
I would like to amend his position in order to avoid some of its unpleasant consequences. Is 
it really no more than a tautology to state that yellow fever is caused by the yellow fever 
virus, tuberculosis by the tubercle bacillus, or syphilis by the pale spirochaete? 
It must be stressed that the introduction of an aetiological definition of a certain disease 
entity does not occur at point zero of historical development. As a purportedly stipulative 
definition it is not a free choice independent of all preceding history, as Fleck would also 
emphasize. It often presupposes a prior definition of the disease entity in clinical or other 
non-aetiological terms. In order to clarify a point of principle we can divide, somewhat 
artificially, the period following the discovery of a candidate microbial agent of a particular 
disease into two stages. In the first stage the relevant scientific community will have to reach 
a decision whether it will accept the proposed microbe as the aetiological agent responsible 
for the disease. Ideally, the community will be guided in this decision by the methodological 
rules for establishing causality laid down by Robert Koch and known as Koch's postu-
J.L. Mackie, 'Causes and Conditions', American Philosophical Quarterly 2.4 (October 1965); 
partly reprinted in : E. Sosa (ed.), Causation and Conditionals, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 
1975, pp. 15-38, p. 29. 
H.R. Wulff, "The Causal Basis of the Current Disease Classification', in: L. Nordenfelt and B.I.B. 
Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Mediane, Dordrecht (Reidel), 1984, 
p. 174. 
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lates. To be meaningful at all, these rules presuppose that the candidate agent and the 
disease itself can be, to use Mackie's words, "independently specified". Of course, in prac-
tice the application of these rules is not always simple and straightforward. 2 1 Sometimes 
circularity cannot be completely avoided. 2 2 Let us suppose, however, that these difficulties 
have been adequately dealt with and that the microbial candidate Y applying for the vacancy 
of 'aetiological agent of disease X' has passed Koch's severe test with flying colours. At that 
moment we would have good reasons to assert "Disease X is caused by microbe Y" without 
thereby uttering an empty tautology. Now the second stage sets in and disease X will be 
redefined as 'the disease that is caused by microbe Y' . This means that the relevant scientific 
community will treat the proposition "Disease X is caused by microbe Y" from then on 
effectively as an analytic statement. It is to be left in place, come what may. Apparently 
contrary phenomena, such as those alluded to by Wulff, have to be assimilated by making 
adjustments elsewhere in the conceptual fabric. Perhaps they can be addressed by introducing 
Nicolle's notion of infection apparente (cf. Fleck: 18/27), or by splitting off a new disease 
entity called pseudo-X or para-X. Such at least is the solution the finitist or network theory 
would suggest for the problem of tautology or analyticity which engaged the philosophers 
Mackie and Wulff. 2 3 It will be clear that the finitist viewpoint represents an intermediate 
position between the views of both. 
Finitism emphasizes, however, that analyticity is not an intrinsic property of statements. 
As Barnes explains: 
"Analytic propositions are intrinsically no more immune to experience or exempt from adjustment than 
any others; they are merely those which a particular community, as a matter of convention, is currently 
treating as analytic. As the practice of the community alters, so too does the status of its generalisations. 
K. Codell Carter, 'Koch's Postulates in Relation to the Work of Jacob Henle and Erwin Klebs', 
Medical History 29 (1985): 353-74. 
Some of the typical difficulties involved in the application of Koch's postulates are illustrated for 
the case of influenza by Ton van Helvoort, Research Styles in Virus Studies in the Twentieth Centu-
ry: Controversies and the Formation of Consensus, Maastricht (Thesis), 1993, Chapter 3, pp. 58-
76. 
Though not all circularity is necessarily of a 'vicious' sort; there is also 'virtuous circularity', as is 
argued by Thomas Nickles, 'Twixt Method and Madness', in N. Nersessian (ed.), The Process of 
Science, Dordrecht (Martinus Nijhoff), 1987, pp. 41-68. 
A similar view has been developed by Herman Koningsveld. He argues that empirical 
generalisations acquire a lawlike status by being armed against negative instances - in the finitist 
terminology by becoming analytic statements -, but requires that the so-called 'exceptions' be ade-
quately dealt with by on-going concept- and theory-formation. See H. Koningsveld, Empirical 
Laws, Regularity and Necessity, Wageningen (Thesis), 1973. 
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Yesterday's empirical claims may be made today's analytic truths; or the analytic statements of days gone 
by may be demoted into mere empirical generalisations - and false ones at that [..]". 2 4 
Thus in medical science statements about the causative agents of diseases routinely alter their 
status from empirical claim to analytic truth once the proposed aetiology is generally 
accepted. One marginal note should be added to the passage just quoted from Barnes: there 
is not always unanimous or community-wide agreement on treating certain propositions as 
analytic. Clinicians, for example, have sometimes objected to (re-)defming diseases in aetio-
logical t e rms . 2 5 
After this philosophical excursion it is time to return to the historical case of syphilis. 
What were the consequences for the concept of syphilis when in May 1905 Schaudinn and 
Hoffmann proclaimed to the German medical world that they had identified a pale 
spirochaete, Spirochata pallida, as the probable causative agent of the disease? 
Initially, their announcement met with extreme skepticism. The pale spirochaete also had 
to contend with a rival pretender for the title of aetiological agent of syphilis, John Siegel's 
Cytorrhyctes Ms, which was supported by eminent protozoologists. 2 6 According to an 
official German report released on 12 August 1905, however, spirochaetes had already been 
found "by more than a hundred authors in the most diverse products of syphilis" (16/25). 
This large number of confirmations tipped the balance in favour of Spirochaeta pallida. On 
18 January 1906, Germany's foremost dermatologist and venereologist, Albert Neisser, 
declared that Schaudinn's spirochaete was "in all likelihood" (mitgrdsster Wahrscheinlichkeit) 
the aetiological agent of syphilis, "although the compelling proof: 'experimental production 
of the disease through pure cultures', has not yet been provided". 2 7 This 'compelling proof 
would never be produced. The spirochaete stubbornly resisted any attempt at pure culture. 
Koch's postulates could therefore not be fully satisfied. Even in the absence of this crowning 
Barnes, op. cit. (note 4), p. 78. A well-known example of such a transition is provided by the 
chemical law of constant composition: from a (false) empirical claim in pre-Daltonian chemistry it 
changed into an analytic truth when Daltonian chemistry redefined the concept of chemical com-
pound. See T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago (University of Chicago 
Press), second and enlarged edition, 1973 [1970], p. 133. 
The French clinician René Cruchet writes: "It is however not with the pneumococci or with Koch's 
bacilli that one can establish a clinical diagnosis. What characterizes pneumonia are the symptoms 
that it exhibits, and the same holds for pulmonary tuberculosis, bronchial pneumonia and purulent 
pleuresy [..]. The error began on the day when specificity became a function of the bacillus itself". 
See R. Cruchet, De la Méthode en Médecine, Paris, 1951, pp. 37-38, cited in Wibaut, op. cit. 
(note 16), pp. 279-80. This is contrary to Lester King's view quoted before in note 17. (Fleck 
himself, though no clinician, was of course also strongly opposed to aetiological definitions of 
diseases!) 
The controversy between the adherents of the two microbes will be analyzed in the next chapter. 
A. Neisser, 'Versuche zur Uebertragung der Syphilis auf Affen', Deutsche medizinische Wochen-
schrift 32 (1906), p. 102. 
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piece of evidence, Spirochaeta pallida was accepted as the causative agent of syphilis. The 
modalities which accompanied the attribution of its aetiological status ('probable', 'in all 
likelihood' etcetera) were eventually omitted. 
It may be worthwhile to examine the views of one particular dissident who questioned 
the aetiological status of the pale spirochaete: Professor Ottomar Rosenbach, a colourful 
critic of bacteriology and a staunch defender of the virtues of clinical medicine. 2 8 In his 
book Das Problem der Syphilis (1903, second edition 1906) he had already launched a full-
scale attack on modern ideas about syphilis. Rosenbach dissociated himself from the widely 
held alarmist view that the incidence of syphilis had increased dramatically during the previ-
ous decades. In his opinion, this impression was largely the result of a diagnostic fashion: 
"for one hardly meets a case history of myocardial affection, arteriosclerosis, or nervous 
disease, in which lues is not adduced as aetiology". 2 9 Rosenbach did not recognize the 
syphilitic nature of neurological disorders like tabes and general paresis or of cardiovascular 
affections like aortic aneurysm. He opposed what he called the "monistic way of thinking", 
which attempted to trace various kinds of affections back to a syphilitic origin and syphilis 
itself to a tangible microbial agent. Rosenbach accused the adherents of the pale spirochaete 
of taking insufficient care to avoid the vicious circle: "Because one considers the carrier of 
the spirochaetes to be luetic, one is naturally tempted to attribute to the microbes found with 
him the character of Spirochaeta pallida [ . . . ] " . 3 0 The vicious circle was also supposed to 
turn the other way around: "The problem is to establish the causative agent of lues, and it 
is not allowed, if one considers Spirochaeta pallida as such, to assume as proved what has 
yet to be proved, i.e. to take the presence of spirochaetes as positive evidence for the exis-
tence of a luetic infection [ . . . ] " . 3 1 Rosenbach therefore formulated the following methodo-
logical requirement: "One should, without knowing the clinical diagnosis, consequently 
without any subjective prejudice, attempt to determine the parasites in all tissues and lesions 
in which spirochaetes are to be found, or, even better, have them determined by a person 
uninformed about the nature of the disease case" . 3 2 
Information on Ottomar Rosenbach can be found in R.C. Mautitz, '"Physician versus Bacteriolo-
gist", the Ideology of Science in Clinical Medicine', in M.J. Vogel and C.E. Rosenberg (eds.), The 
Therapeutic Revolution, Philadelphia (University of Pennsylvania Press), 1979, pp. 91-107. See 
also K. Faber, Nosography: The Evolution of Clinical Mediane in Modern Times, New York, 
second edition, 1930, pp. 119-29. 
O. Rosenbach, 'Genügt die moderne Diagnose syphilitischer Erkrankung wissenschaftlichen Anfor-
derungen?', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 43 (1906): 1157-60, p. 1158. 
Ibid., p. 1159. 
Ibid.,p. 1160. 
Ibid., p. 1159. 
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It was not too difficult for bacteriologists and clinicians to meet Rosenbach's challenge. In 
a rejoinder Julius Heller and Lydia Rabinowitsch pointed out that they had already taken the 
methodological precautions he demanded. 3 3 Vicious circles can sometimes be avoided. 
Once the aetiological status of the pale spirochaete had been accepted, its presence or absence 
could be used to clarify the nature of those conditions of which the syphilitic origin was still 
insecure or disputed. Hideyo Noguchi's demonstration of Spirochaeta pallida in the brains 
or spinal cords of patients with general paresis or tabes, for example, resulted in the defini-
tive assimilation of these disorders to syphilis. They became even more firmly linked to 
syphilis than Fournier had admitted when he granted them the status of 'para-syphilitic' 
conditions. 3 4 
Although the aetiological concept of syphilis became more firmly entrenched, it also had 
to meet a challenge from an unsuspected quarter. By a strange coincidence the year 1905 not 
only witnessed the discovery of Spirochaeta pallida but also the discovery of another 
spirochaete, which was admittedly indistinguishable from the first one yet presumably diffe-
rent, because it was found in a disease that was (presumably) different from syphilis. This 
microbe was called Spirochaeta pertenuis by its discoverer, Aldo Castellani, director of the 
clinic for tropical diseases at Colombo (Ceylon). Castellani had found the spirochaete among 
sufferers from yaws (framboesia tropica) at his clinic. After consulting Schaudinn about his 
find - they jointly examined the microscopic preparations -, Castellani drew the following 
conclusion as to the nature of his spirochaete: 
"In my view this species is at the moment morphologically indistinguishable from Spirochaeta pallida 
(Schaudinn). But because I believe that yaws differs from syphilis, I am inclined to think that the 
spirochaete I have found in yaws - if it figures indeed in the aetiology - must be biologically different 
from the syphilis spirochaete. I therefore suggested the name Spirochaeta pertenuis seu Pallida".35 
These considerations clearly support the observation made by Fleck in a related context, that 
it is the disease that defines the causative agent rather than the other way around (18/27). 
The same view was expressed several decades later. Writing about the classification of 
pathogenic treponemes, Paul Hardy Jr. stated in 1976 that"[..] the identity of some members 
of this group depends more upon certain features of the diseases they produce than upon 
specific characteristics of the organisms themselves". 3 6 If Castellani had concluded that 
J. Heller and L. Rabinowitsch, 'Erwiderung', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 43 (1906), p. 1357. 
H. Noguchi and J.W. Moore, 'A Demonstration of Treponema pallidum in the Brain in Cases of 
General Paralysis', Journal of Experimental Medicine 17 (1913): 232-38. 
A. Castellani, 'Untersuchungen über Framboesia tropica (Yaws)', Deutsche medizinische Wochen-
schrift 32 (1906): 132-34. 
P.H. Hardy Jr., 'Pathogenic Treponemes', in R.C. Johnson (Ed.), The Biology of Parasitic Spiro-
chetes, New York (Academic Press), 1976, pp. 107-19, on p. 107. 
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Spirochaeta pallida apparently causes syphilis on some and yaws on other occasions, he 
would have violated the principle of aetiological specificity. 3 7 If the diseases are different, 
then the causes must be different (although as yet no difference was discernable!). But are 
syphilis and yaws really distinct disease entities? 
On the basis of inoculation experiments performed on apes and monkeys during his 
expeditions to the Dutch East Indies (1905-1907), Albert Neisser tried to answer this ques-
t ion . 3 8 Primates which were first infected with yaws could be reinfected with syphilis and 
vice versa. Neisser therefore concluded that syphilis and yaws were distinct diseases. At the 
time, this conclusion found wide approval. 
To the Dutch physician J.D. Kayser, a resident of the Dutch East Indies, those inocula-
tion experiments were however far from conclusive. 3 9 The old opposition between 'dua-
lists' and 'unitarians', so familiar from the history of syphilis, emerged in a new version. 
Initially, the second group counted only a small group of adherents, Kayser among them. The 
latter did not deny all the differences that were emphasized by the 'dualists' - the non-
venereal mode of transmission, the absence or relative infrequency of congenital forms of 
yaws and of neurological disorders like tabes and paresis, the different appearance of the 
primary and secondary lesions etcetera -, but disputed their relevance. He stressed, on the 
other hand, the striking similarity of the tertiary lesions in syphilis and yaws, the 
indistinguishability of the respective spirochaetes, the fact that both syphilitics and sufferers 
from yaws reacted positively to the Wassermann test and that both responded to the same 
medication (mercury and Salvarsan). In other words, the case of syphilis and yaws exhibits 
the typical pattern of a crisscrossing of similarities and differences to which adherents of the 
finitist theory have drawn attention. Kayser also pointed out that ethnicity was often tacitly 
used as a diagnostic criterion in the medical practice of the Dutch East Indies: a person of 
European origin with certain symptoms would be diagnosed as having syphilis, an indigenous 
person exhibiting the same symptoms would be diagnosed as suffering from yaws. He con-
cluded that yaws was probably a special form of syphilis. This conclusion was to be echoed 
by several subsequent investigators: "Yaws is regarded by many as a tropical type of sy-
philis, modified by continuous residence in the black races in tropical climates". 4 0 
"The principle of etiological specificity of disease implies that every disease entity is produced by a 
quite particular cause, that different diseases cannot arise from the same cause, nor can different 
causes produce the same disease"; Jendrassik, cited in Faber, op. cit. (note 28), p. 183. 
A. Neisser, 'Ueber experimentelle Syphilis bei Affen (Sitzungsberichte)', Berliner klinische Woch-
enschrift 43 (1906): 373-74. 
J.D. Kayser, 'Vereenigingsverslagen: Over framboesia tropica', Nederlandsch rijdschrift voor 
Geneeskunde 57 (1913): 1577-84. 
E.O. Jordan and W. Burrows, Textbook of Bacteriology, Philadelphia and London (W.B. Saun-
ders), 1948, p. 690. 
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By the time Fleck wrote his monograph, he noted that "the relation of syphilis to Frambdsia 
tropica [..] is still disputed" (172 note 45/28 note 45). For him this circumstance illustrated 
once more the incompleteness in principle of the development of the concept of syphilis as 
a specific disease (19/28). 
Around the mid-1930s, when Fleck's monograph appeared, non-venereal forms of 
syphilis, so-called 'endemic syphilis', were found among peoples living under more primitive 
hygienic conditions, where infection normally occurs during childhood. An mteresting 
example was reported by E.H. Hudson in 1937. 4 1 The Bedouin semi-nomads of the Syrian 
desert were familiar with a non-venereal form of syphilis called bejel which affected almost 
90 percent of the population. Although its causative agent was morphologically indis-
tinguishable from Treponema pallidum, the agent of (venereal) syphilis, its clinical symptoms 
clearly set it apart from the venereal form. The Bedouins themselves recognized this diffe-
rence by using two names, bejel and franghi respectively, to refer to the two types. Accord-
ing to Hudson, bejel occupied an intermediate position between (venereal) syphilis and yaws 
(whose aetiological agent, as we have seen, is also indistinguishable from Treponema palli-
dum). One year later, in 1938, the disease pinta, from Central America and related to sy-
philis and yaws, was added to this family. In 1946 Hudson offered a 'unitarian' interpreta-
tion, placing syphilis, yaws and pinta as well as forms of 'endemic syphilis' such as bejel and 
the newly discovered njovera of Rhodesia in the category of treponematoses, all caused by 
a single microbial species, Treponema pallidum. In his view they were not so much different 
diseases as different manifestations of the same disease appearing under varying climatic, 
environmental and hygienic conditions. 4 2 
The intention of the above discussion was not to argue that yaws and pinta are, or are 
not, forms of syphilis. That question should be left to the medical scientists themselves. 
Whatever decision is to be taken on this issue - and there may indeed be good reasons for 
choosing either of the two alternatives! -, the point is that it is not strictly predetermined by 
the established meaning the term 'syphilis' possessed when it was first confronted with these 
anomalies. Nor could the decision be forced by a possible future elucidation of the nature of 
the spirochaetes in question, for this would only shift the problem to the level of 
E.H. Hudson, 'Lecture on bejel (Verenigingsverslagen)', Nederlandsen rijdschrift voor Genees-
kunde 81 (1937): 4737-38. 
See G.E. Davis, "The Spirochetes', Annual Review of Microbiology II (1948): 305-33, on p. 318 
(containing a reference to Hudson, Am.J. Trop. Med., 26, 135-39 [1946]). See also E.H. Hudson, 
Nonvenereal Syphilis, Edinburgh and London (E & S Livingstone), 1958. The 1968 edition of a 
well-known textbook on microbiology stated: "While the differences among these diseases are felt 
by some to require considering them as separate entities, the differences are not much greater than 
those between syphilis in the Middle Ages and present-day venereal syphilis. It is believed by many 
that the similarities are more striking than the differences and these, together with other considera-
tions, have led to a 'unitarian' view of treponemal infections in which the several clinical manifes-
tations are considered to be variations on a central theme." (W. Burrows et al., Textbook of Micro-
biology, Philadelphia [W.B. Saunders], nineteenth edition, 1968, p. 751). 
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microbiological classification. This level is not inherently more unambiguous than the level 
of clinical symptoms. As Fleck observes: "The idea of the syphilis agent leads into uncer-
tainties attending the concept of bacteriological species [..]" (19/28). 4 3 Our general con-
clusion is in agreement with the finitist or network theory. 4 4 
An interesting consequence of adoption of the 'unitarian' view which considers syphilis, 
yaws and pinta as different manifestations of the same disease would be a relaxation of the 
'venereal fixation'. Recognition of the existence of non-venereal forms of 'endemic syphilis' 
such as bejel in the Middle East or njovera in Rhodesia points in the same direction. It is the 
latter consideration which led the Dutch venereologist J.R. Prakken to a carefully worded 
definition in a textbook on venereal diseases. As venereal diseases are designated, according 
to his definition, "a number of contagious diseases, which in societies with decent hygienic 
conditions are as a rule transmitted through sexual intercourse". 4 5 He insists that the restric-
tion with regard to the general state of hygiene cannot be omitted in the definition. Still the 
venereal character of syphilis is not completely relinquished, far from it. But what, if any-
thing, is a venereal disease? The fact that also in countries with high standards of hygiene 
syphilis is sometimes transmitted through non-sexual routes, would make it rather implausible 
to consider sexual transmission as an essential trait of the disease. However, the circumstance 
that those other routes are often referred to as 'accidental' provides food for thought. This 
usage carries the suggestion that the only 'non-accidental' transmission route is sexual inter-
course, thereby also implying that syphilis is 'essentially' venereal. To counteract the force 
of this suggestion it may be helpful to cite the following 'relativistic' comment given by the 
venereologist Prakken on his own medical specialty: 
"Such a classification [i.e. the uniting of various conditions as venereal diseases, HvdB] according to the 
character of the contagious contact is very unusual. One can contract many different infectious diseases 
by eating contaminated food, but probably no one has hit upon the idea to bring them together as eating 
diseases within the framework of a separate subject of instruction, let alone of a specialty".46 
The existence of the specialty of venereology, according to Prakken, cannot be justified on 
purely scientific grounds, but has to be legitimated on practical and social grounds. 
In a 1976 study on cross immunity between different species of treponemes and between different 
strains within the several treponeme species Paul Hardy Jr. concluded: "The differences [between 
strains within species] are greater than those previously shown to exist between the representatives 
of the different species"; Hardy, op. cit. (note 36), pp. 117-18. 
Today the causative agents of syphilis, yaws and pinta can be distinguished from each other by 
using DNA probes. For a finitist, this would not be final proof that the diseases are 'really' dis-
tinct. Eveiything depends on weighing the relevance of similarities and differences. 
J.R. Prakken, Leerboek der Geslachtsziekten, Amsterdam (Scheltema & Holkema), 1956, p. 11. 
J.R. Prakken, Geslachtsziekten, Amsterdam (Querido), 1968, p. 8. 
71 
3 . 'Syphilis insontium' 
It is one thing to argue the conventional, constructed character of concepts of syphilis in a 
general way, but it is another matter to show in detail how moral considerations have entered 
into and helped to shape such constructions. In the preceding section we have seen that moral 
factors have influenced such early concepts as the notion of a 'carnal scourge' or the punitive 
element contained in the severe mercurial treatment of syphilis as an 'atonement for sin'. 
Moreover, there may even be a moral element hidden in the very definition of syphilis as a 
venereal disease. In this section I shall discuss a more recent and perhaps also more ambi-
guous example of moral considerations shaping medical classifications. 
During the Victorian age the moral assessment of syphilis and other venereal diseases 
was often a clear and straightforward matter, perhaps somewhat too straightforward: 
"Syphilis is a venereal disease that is acquired above all through extramarital intercourse, coitus impurus. 
Acquisition of lues is proof of offence against morality, of an alliance with vice. Syphilis and vice are 
linked together, and the reward of vice is disgrace. Thus syphilis is inevitably stigmatized as disgrace-
ful". 4 7 
Whereas Temkin considers such a moral assessment as characteristic of the epoch of bour-
geois emancipation, in which virtue and the institution of marriage were held in high regard, 
others would rather point to the influence of the moral teachings of the Christian churches 
which defined extramarital sex as s in . 4 8 Whatever the emphasis, it is clear that this view 
of syphilis as a fitting punishment for immoral conduct does not encourage, and would even 
lead people to frown upon, active medical intervention to alleviate the suffering of syphilitics. 
Some physicians indeed refused to treat the inexcusable sufferers from this disgraceful 
affliction, but for many such a refusal would be too harsh. It would also be hardly compa-
tible with the ethical tradition of the medical profession, embodied in its Hippocratic Oath, 
which enjoins physicians to help those who suffer from illness. As late as the 1950s the 
Dutch venereologist Prakken still had to insist that "the physician's moral judgement of those 
who are ill should not influence the execution of his work" . 4 9 However, despite the counter-
pressure exerted by the Hippocratic Oath, it was not always feasible for physicians to disso-
ciate themselves from the moral condemnation expressed by other members of society. 
Temkin, op. cit. (note 10), p. 480. 
J. Cassel, The Secret Plague: Venereal Diseases in Canada 1838-1939, Toronto (University of 
Toronto Press), 1987, pp. 87-88. 
Prakken, op. cit. (note 43), p. 14; the continuation of the quoted passage is also interesting: "More-
over, through his knowledge and experience, the physician's judgement differs from that of the 
mass of the people. He knows that venereal disease can also be acquired outside sexual intercourse, 
and therefore in an 'innocent' way (syphilis insontium is a common designation for lues that is not 
acquired through sex)." 
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The concept of syphilis insontium, which entered into extensive use at the end of the 19th 
century, marks the peculiarly paradoxical route through which a partial 'de-moralization' and 
a reduction of the moral stigma attached to syphilis was obtained. This concept comprised 
three large categories: (1) hereditary syphilis (what we today would call congenital syphilis); 
(2) syphilis acquired through legitimate sexual intercourse; (3) syphilis acquired via trans-
mission of the contagium through direct or indirect contact excluding sexual intercourse. 5 0 
Uniting the three categories under one concept, despite the scientifically sounding Latin 
name, appears to make sense only from a moral, not from a strictly biological, point of view. 
Syphilis remained, as Allan Brandt remarks, "an essentially morally-defined malady". 5 1 
As long as the concept of syphilis insontium was limited to the first two categories, the 
implied distribution of moral 'culpability' and 'innocence' remained fairly clear. In accor-
dance with Victorian assumptions about male and female sexuality it was supposed that 
married middle-class women got their infections in complete innocence. The blame was thus 
put squarely on men, and, by extension, on prostitutes. Moreover, the sins of the fathers 
were also thought to be visited, along the route of heredity, upon the 'innocent' children. The 
medical profession was however reluctant to translate such insights into concrete measures 
for protecting the health and wellbeing of the weaker parties. Physicians often acted in 
complicity with male patients to keep their infected spouses uninformed about the true nature 
of the infection. France's leading authority in venereology, Alfred Founder, had even pre-
scribed active deception as the line to be followed, for the sake of mamtaining marital 
happiness. 5 2 As a consequence, infected married women often failed to get serious treat-
ment, which probably resulted in more abortions and births of syphilitic children. After the 
turn of the century the wisdom of this policy of deception was increasingly questioned on 
ethical and medical grounds. 5 3 
Moral connotations became more diffuse with the addition of the third category of 
syphilis insontium, which underwent rapid extension at the turn of the 19th to the 20th 
century. It comprised various modes of extra-genital infection, e.g. through cups, cutlery, 
bedding, toilet seats, tooth brushes, inoculations, midwifery, ritual circumcision, tattoos 
M.S. Gutteling, 'Syphilis insontium', Nederlandsen Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde 41 (1897) II: 841-
42 (this is a review of a lecture by Professor Lesser in the Berliner klinische Wochenschrift of 12 
July 1897). 
A.M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 
1880, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1987, p. 22. 
A. Founder, Syphilis et manage, Paris, 1880. 
G.O. Lotsy, 'De gedragslijn van den medicus volgens Founder', Nederlandsch Tijdschrift voor Ge-
neeskunde 50 (1906) I: 163-66; N. Macry, 'Standesangelegenheiten: Darf der Arzt der vom Ehe-
mann mit Lues infizierte Frau die Natur ihres Leidens verschweigen?', Deutsche medizinische 
Wochenschrift 34 (1908): 2127-28. 
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5 4 L.D. Bulkley, Syphilis in the innocent, New York, 1894. 
5 5 Brandt, op. cit. (note 51), p. 22. 
5 6 Cassel, op. cit. (note 48), p. 96. 
5 7 Brandt, op. cit. (note 51), p. 22. 
5 8 A. Neisser and M. Chotzen, 'Ersuchen an die deutschen Aerzte', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 
43 (1906), p. 464. 
etcetera. The list was rapidly growing. In his classic study on Syphilis in the innocent L. 
Duncan Bulkley had already catalogued more than 100, sometimes rather idiosyncratic, 
modes of infection. According to modern medical opinion, however, all these suggested non-
sexual modes of contagion must have been far-fetched and mostly imaginary, because outside 
the human body the pale spirochaete cannot survive long. 
The consequences of the wider use (or inflation) of the notion of syphilis insontium were 
rather ambivalent. On the one hand, Brandt observes: "Venereal disease remained a stigma; 
the possibility of innocent infections only implied a larger susceptible population". On the 
other hand, however, he notes: "The belief in non-sexual transmission served to make 
treatment more respectable. For members of the middle class, these infections provided a 
safety-valve; patients could acquire a venereal disease within the boundaries of Victorian 
morality". 5 5 Likewise, Jay Cassel observes that "[t]he idea [of 'innocent infection'] pro-
vided a release for some people, a means of avoiding, at least in part, the opprobium cast 
on anyone with VD". On the other hand, however: "With the new theory came increased 
fears, for now it seemed that many more people might be threatened - even upright, morally 
virtuous individuals might be stricken". 5 6 These divergent assessments of the two historians 
probably reflect the ambivalence and complexity of the historical situation. 
The concept of syphilis insontium could also provide a moral alibi to physicians who 
contracted the disease. Brandt writes: "Many physicians who became infected [..] suggested 
that they had received the contagion in the course of treating their patients - a possibility that 
today would be considered highly unlikely". 5 7 Leaving aside the question of the relative 
improbability of this mode of infection, we can infer that about the turn of the century 
German physicians had great difficulty to convince insurance companies of the reality and 
sincerity of beruflicher Syphilisinfektion (syphilitic infection contracted in the course of 
medical practice), from frequent complaints that those companies refused to pay compensa-
tion for alleged professional accidents involving syphilitic infection. 5 8 This illustrates once 
again the ambiguous status of the concept of syphilis insontium. 
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W.F. Bynum, Science and the Practice of Medicine in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge (Cam-
bridge University Press), 1994, p. 221. 
A. Reibmayr, Het Immuniseerings-proces bij Erfelijke THekten (translated and revised by Dr Ste-
phan), Amsterdam (Scheltema & Holkema), 1908, pp. 5-6 [original German edition: A. Reibmayr, 
Die Immunisirung der Familien bei erblichen Krankheiten (Tuberculose, Lues, Geistesstörungen): 
Ein Wort zur Beruhigung für Aerzte und Gebildete, Leipzig and Vienna, 1899]. 
M. Meyer, 'Introduction' to H. Ibsen, Ghosts (translated by Michael Meyer), London (Eyre Me-
fhuen), 1973, p. 21. 
4. 'Hereditary syphilis': the sins of the fathers 
In the fin-de-siècle climate prevailing at the end of the 19th century, syphilis was strongly 
associated with moral degeneration. It contributed to, but also reflected, an atmosphere of 
cultural pessimism and decadence during the Late-Victorian e r a . 5 9 No other disease, accor-
ding to Fleck, was so much regarded as a cause of moral decay (176-77 note 25/102-103 
footnote 25). The special stigma that was attached to syphilis resulted not merely from the 
fact that it was transmitted through sexual intercourse, but also from the fact that it was often 
passed on to the offspring, presumably along the route of heredity, as was assumed at the 
time. 'Hereditary syphilis' was a recognized and much-discussed item in medical journals and 
textbooks. In this section I will describe the cultural values and perceptions associated with 
mis notion and analyze how it slowly and gradually gave way to our modern concept of 
'congenital syphilis'. 
Ibsen's Ghosts 
The cultural image of 'hereditary syphilis' around the turn of the century can best be 
recovered through contemporary literature and drama. In the preface to a popular brochure 
on 'hereditary' diseases like syphilis and tuberculosis, Dr Stephan, medical director of the 
Burgerziekenhuis (Civilians' Hospital) in Amsterdam, wrote: 
"The doctrine of heredity has depressed many and brought them to a pessimism and fatalism, which has 
turned life into a burden from which death appears to be the only escape. Modern literature, informed by 
undoubtedly somewhat one-sided and certainly premature medical speculations, then got hold of the 
subject and furnished products so terrible and gruesome, that many people were driven into desperation 
and despair".60 
Foremost among those "terrible and gruesome" literary products were the plays of the 
Norwegian dramatist Henrik Ibsen. He has influenced, as no other writer, his contempo-
raries' image of 'hereditary syphilis'. 
The "connection between heredity and decadence" was a much-discussed theme around 
1880 in the Scandinavian immigrant group in Rome to which Ihsen belonged. 6 1 They care-
fully studied Darwin's works. Ibsen was of the opinion that his contemporaries unduly 
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neglected the significance of heredity. His notes dating from early 1881 show why he was 
occupied by this subject: "We raise monuments to the dead; because we feel a duty towards 
them; we allow lepers to marry; but their offspring - ? The unborn - ? " . 6 2 Already in his 
play A Doll's House (also known as Nora), written in 1879, Ibsen had obliquely broached 
this theme. In this play Dr Rank, the family friend of Torvald and Nora Helmer, dies from 
the effects of a syphilis 'inherited' from his father - although the disease is not mentioned by 
name. To an old girlfriend Nora gives an explanation about their family friend: "But he's 
really very ill, poor man, he has consumption of the spine. The fact is, his father was a 
horrible man who had mistresses and that sort of things, so, you see, the son's been delicate 
all his l i fe" . 6 3 Somewhat later Dr Rank himself, in a cynical mood, declares to Nora: "Yet, 
indeed, the whole thing's nothing but a joke! My poor innocent spine must pay for my 
father's amusements as a gay young subaltern". After asking himself what justice there is in 
paying for someone else's sins, he observes on the basis of his practical knowledge as a 
physician: "Yet in one way or another there isn't a single family where some such inexorable 
retribution isn't being exacted" . 6 4 
Ibsen's A Doll's House would cause some public uproar, but not because of this theme 
which was only incidentally treated. The reason was that Nora decided, at the end of the 
play, to leave her husband and children. She wanted to become an independent woman and 
no longer be her husband's doll. This urge towards female independence was too much for 
many of Ibsen's contemporaries. 
In Ibsen's next play Ghosts, written in 1881, the theme of 'hereditary' syphilis was 
given a much more central and prominent place. Young Osvald Alving, next to his mother 
the main character of the play, heard mysterious biblical allusions when he consulted a 
physician for his complaints: "The sins of the fathers are visited on the children . . . " . 6 5 Just 
like Dr Rank, the innocent Osvald had to pay for the sinful life of his father, who, at the 
beginning of the play, appears to have died quite some time ago. At the end of the play the 
first signs of Osvald's insanity manifest themselves. Through this dramatic climax Ibsen 
managed to draw the public's attention much more emphatically to the theme of 'hereditary' 
syphilis. The response must have surpassed his worst expectations. 
Although he had again not dared to mention the disease by name, "[w]hat was so offen-
sive of Ibsen's Ghosts [..]", according to historian Peter Gay, "was that so many in his 
6 2 Ibid., p. 20. 
6 3 H. Ibsen, A Doll's House and Other Plays, Harmondsworth (Penguin Books), 1987, pp. 183-84. 
6 4 Ibid., p. 192. 
6 5 H. Ibsen, Ghosts and Other Plays, Harmondsworth (Penguin Books), 1984, p. 74. 
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audiences knew precisely what he was talking about". 6 6 The piece aroused hostile and ne-
gative criticisms; Ibsen's publisher was forced to take back most copies from the book shops 
- in those days plays were first read as books; for the time being a dramatic performance was 
out of the question. In the year 1882, however, the play received its world première in 
Chicago, of all places, before an audience of Scandinavian immigrants. Now it started on a 
slow but steady European career. After performances in Stockholm, Christiana (Oslo), and 
Helsinki, the play was performed in Vienna and Amsterdam in 1890, followed the next year 
by a scandalizing première in London. Critics reacted violently, if not hysterically. In a 
leading article, the Daily Telegraph spoke of "an open drain"; Era called the piece "[a]s foul 
and filthy a concoction as has ever been allowed to disgrace the boards of an English the-
atre. . ". Many similar characterizations can be found in the anthology of extracts from press 
criticisms which Pall Mall Gazette had collected three weeks after the performance. 6 7 Only 
a single anonymous critic dared to defend the play: Ghosts was no "mere hospital ward play" 
but a "great spiritual drama". 6 8 
This same interpretative strategy of sublimation and spiritualization was followed by 
later critics and by Ibsen's biographer, Michael Meyer. The problem of 'hereditary' syphilis 
was ignored as much as possible. The full emphasis was shifted to the ethical problematics 
of the piece; and Osvald's mother (who had placed duty before love) instead of Osvald 
became its central figure. To quote the critic Halvdan Koht: "Osvald was branded with 
disease, not because his father was a beast, but because Mrs Alving had obeyed the immoral 
ethics of society [..] Ghosts is a play about ethical, not physical debility". 6 9 
Such attempts to sublimate the theme of Ibsen's play to the purely ethical aspects appear 
rather forced and artificial to me. For Ibsen and his contemporaries, I suppose, the play was 
about what could only be seen as both an ethical and a physical debility; the ethical debility 
could not be separated from its physical consequences, nor could the latter be abstracted from 
its moral meaning. Precisely the view of syphilis as both a moral and physical degeneration 
can explain its strong emotive connotations. It was this view that excellently fitted the general 
cultural pessimism of the fin-de-siècle era. After all, had the German educationist Dr Her-
mann Rohleder not pointed out that the progress of 'civilization' corresponded to the progress 
of 'syphilization'?. 7 0 
6 6 P. Gay, The Bourgeois Experience: Education of the Senses, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 
1985, p. 326. 
6 7 Reprinted in B. Shaw, The Quintessence of Ibsenism, London (Constable and Company), 1913, pp. 
87-90. 
6 8 Meyer, op. cit. (note 61), p. 103. 
6 9 Quoted in Meyer, op cit. (note 61), p. 21. 
7 0 Quoted in Gay, op cit. (note 66), p. 326. 
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It is amusing to read the rather unhelpful attempt of Ibsen's biographer Meyer to defend the 
play against medical criticism: 
"In view of the oft-repeated complaint that syphilis cannot be inherited from one's father, it is worth 
pointing out that it can be inherited from one's mother, and that a woman can have syphilis without 
realizing it or suffering any particular discomfort. In other words, and this is a far more frightening 
explanation of Osvald's illness than the usual one, Mrs Alving could have caught syphilis from her 
husband and passed it on to her son. Dr Jonathan Miller has pointed out to me that Osvald could also have 
been infected by smoking his father's pipe. Ibsen knew more about medicine than some of his critics".71 
Meyer has indeed heard something about the matter, but not quite enough. According to 
modern insights, syphilis is not inherited at all, neither from one's father nor from one's 
mother. A syphilitic mother can give birth to a luetic child, but this is not an example of 
inheritance but of (intra-uterine) infection. Still it remains true that a case of 'congenital' 
syphilis always presupposes a luetic mother. If Osvald had congenital syphilis, Mrs Alving 
must have had syphilis too. Finally, it appears doubtful to me whether Ibsen, by having 
Osvald smoke his father's pipe, wanted to suggest a possible route of infection. If so, it 
would not have been a case of inheritance! And it would have been too dramatic to cite 
Exodus on the sins of the fathers being visited upon the children. 
Of course, it would be absurd to reproach Ibsen that he did not know what we know 
today. 7 2 Below we will see that medical science did not always draw such a clear-cut 
distinction between inheritance and infection as it does now. Indeed the possibility of a direct 
'inheritance' of syphilis from the father, as against an exclusively maternal 'inheritance', was 
the object of intense medical debate around the turn of the century. 
The imprint ofLamarckian heredity 
Views on the inheritability of syphilis can be broadly characterized as Lamarckian. Lamarck, 
as is generally known, assumed the possibility of inheriting acquired characteristics. 7 3 It 
is not difficult to detect such views in medical treatises on syphilis from the second half of 
the 19th century. In a brochure from 1884 we can read for instance: "It must be accepted 
with certainty that acquired syphilis turned into inherited syphilis A treatise from 1867 
states: "[Syphilis clings] like the breath of pestilence to youth and beauty, fastening like an 
evergrowing and monstrous burden of sin onto a single lapse as well as poisoning the blood 
M. Meyer, Ibsen, Harmondsworth (Penguin Books), 1985, p. 514 (footnote). 
What is implausible in Ibsen's play from a medical point of view (on the assumption that Osvald 
had congenital syphilis), is that the symptoms of insanity manifested themselves only at a relatively 
late date after an apparently vigorous and healthy youth. See J.B. Lyons, Thrust Syphilis Down to 
Hell and Other Rejoyceana, Dublin (The Glendale Press), 1988, p. 33. 
For a useful discussion of (Neo-)Lamarcldsm, see P.J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, 
Berkeley (University of California Press), 1984, pp. 243-52. 
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of unborn innocent children" (both passages quoted in Fleck: 176, note 25/102-103, footnote 
25). 
The last quotation suggests that an Uridee or proto-idea (to use one of Fleck's favourite 
concepts) of respectable biblical antiquity might also be echoed in Lamarckian views on 
heredity. Here is a direct allusion to Exodus 20: 5-6 in an older medical publication from 
1846: "The innocent victims of syphilis are infinitely more numerous than the guilty; for it 
is a disease which follows vice down to the third and fourth generation . . " . 7 4 A more 
recent example is found in a publication from 1901: "Now, if there is one conclusion to 
which we think experience surely leads us as medical men, it is that the sins of the father do 
tend to be visited upon the children even unto the third and fourth generation. We think we 
see this demonstrated day after day" . 7 5 Here, appeal is made to old wisdom and daily expe-
rience to argue against those who, like August Weismann, denied the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics. It is no coincidence that Ibsen also took his inspiration from the Great Code 
of world literature when he worked up the theme of heredity offered by medical science. As 
we saw above, an unsuspecting Osvald heard from his physician: "The sins of the fathers are 
visited on the children . . .". 
According to Exodus, the sins of the fathers will be visited on the children "unto the 
third and fourth generation". In the medical literature of the late 19th century we find reports 
on cases of three successive generations suffering from syphilis (presumably furnishing proof 
for two succesive generations with inherited syphilis). Particularly suggestive were cases in 
which both mother and child exhibited typically deformed teeth, socalled Hutchinson's teeth, 
which were considered as specific stigmata of hereditary syphilis. 7 6 It was admitted that 
the empirical proof for inheritance of syphilis over more than one generation was not water-
tight because of the practical impossibility of excluding new infections in the second gene-
rat ion 7 7 but that was no reason for most physicians to doubt the reality of the phenomenon. 
It is also possible to relate the cultural pessimism of the fin-de-siecle to the dominant 
ideas about heredity. The last 'heirs' of European culture - "the latecomers, those dull late 
offshoots of more vigorous and joyful generations", as Nietzsche characterized them 7 8 -
were weighed down, as it were, by the heavy burden of sins of their numerous ancestors. 
This conviction was not without a scientific, or as we might prefer to say a pseudo-scientific, 
Lancet 1 (1846): 279; quoted in Walkowitz, op. cit. (note 11), p. 49. 
J.G. Adami, 'On Theories of Inheritance with Special Reference to the Inheritance of Acquired 
Conditions in Man', reprint from the New York Medical Journal of June 1, 1901, pp. 6-7. 
'Tot in het derde geslacht?', Nederlandsen Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde 43 (1899) II, p. 1111. 
E. Finger, 'lieber die Nachkommenschaft der Hereditärsyphilitischen', Wiener klinische Wochen-
schrift 13 (1900): 383-89. 
F. Nietzsche, Unzeitgemüsse Betrachtungen, in Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 
Banden, Volume 1, Munich (Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag/de Gruyter), 1980, p. 303. 
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foundation: "It is only with fairly advanced culture, as soon as natural selection is artificially 
tampered with, that one sees degenerative and hereditary processes occurring among domestic 
plants and animals and among men" . 7 9 Hereditary diseases were thought to be an exclusive 
white man's burden, socalled Naturvölker were supposedly free from them. The advance of 
culture became almost synonymous to progressive degeneration. The progress of 'syphiliza-
tion' was thus considered to be an integral part of the progress of civilization. 
For some 19th-century medical writers the heredity of syphilis did not merely concern 
the transmissability of a specific condition to the offspring but also involved a more broad 
and diffuse pattern of inheritance according to which a general predisposition to a variety of 
'constitutional' disorders could be transmitted. French physicians, who were particularly fond 
of the idea, called this broad pattern l'hérédité syphilitique in contradistinction to la syphilis 
héréditaire. Anglo-Saxon writers had less use for the theory and spoke of occult syphilis.80 
In 1900 the Austrian syphilologist Ernest Finger expressed this view as follows: 
"Hereditary-syphilitic children already exhibit, in addition to the manifestations of true syphilis, other 
symptoms, several forms of nutritive disturbances and developmental retardations. Flabby, delicate, grey-
headed at birth, they remain badly nourished, backward in growth, the development of teeth and hair is 
insufficient, sexual maturity sets in hesitantly and insufficiently, nutritive disturbances and certain charac-
teristic affections like [..] Hutchinson's trias occur [..].All these symptoms are also inherited independen-
tly, apart from the inheritance of syphilis as such".81 [Emphasis added]. 
Significantly, many of these symptoms were designated as the dystrophic stigmata of here-
ditary syphilis. 8 2 They were held to epitomize most graphically the degenerative influence 
of syphilis on future generations. 
A variation on this theme was provided by Sigmund Freud in his case history of Dora. 
Freud held the opinion that "the offspring of syphilitics are particularly predisposed to severe 
neuropsychoses". "A remarkably high percentage of my psychoanalytically treated patients", 
he wrote, "comes from fathers who suffered from tabes or paralysis". He concluded that 
"syphilis of the father should certainly be considered as an aetiological factor in the 
neuropathic constitution of children". 8 3 Dora's 'hysteria' could therefore be partially 
Reibmayr, op. cit. (note 60), p. 26. 
E. Lomax, 'Infantile Syphilis as an Example of Nineteenth Century Belief in the Inheritance of 
Acquired Characteristics', Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 34 (1979): 23-39, 
pp. 31-33. 
Finger, op. cit. (note 77), p. 384. 
E. Founder, 'Beitrag zum Studium der hereditären Syphilis in der zweiten Generation', Wiener kli-
nische Wochenschrift 13 (1900): 985-89. 
83 S. Freud, Bruchstücke einer Hysterie-Analyse: Krankengeschichte der 'Dorn', Frankfurt am Main 
(Fischer), 1981, p. 74 and pp. 23-24 (footnote). 
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explained from the frivolous life of her syphilitic father. Syphilis was thus supposed to lead 
to a more general hereditary 'taint'. It goes without saying that in this way the picture of 
heredity has become rather complicated and diffuse. 
Paternal or maternal 'inheritance' 
The breakthrough of more 'enlightened' views on heredity met with many obstacles in 
medical circles. Before 1900, August Weismann, the great crusader against Lamarckism, had 
already proclaimed that the case of syphilis did not exemplify "true inheritance", only infec-
tion by microbes. 8 4 Weismann's theory of the continuity of germ plasm proposed a rigo-
rous distinction between germ cells and somatic cells; whereas the germ cells could influence 
the somatic cells, the vicissitudes of the latter could have no influence on the former. (The 
Central Dogma of molecular biology can be considered a modern version of Weismann's 
theory: information can pass from DNA to proteins, but not from proteins back to DNA.) 
A consequence of this theory was that the inheritance of acquired characteristics was impos-
sible. For most physicians, however, Weismann's theory was either too difficult to under-
stand or too speculative. Its esoteric details were intelligible to a few pathologists, but inac-
cessible to most clinicians. 
Some pathologists, like John Adami and H. Beitzke, agreed with Weismann that it was 
absurd to speak of 'hereditary syphilis ' . 8 5 Adami did not spare his medical colleagues in 
his criticism of current linguistic usage: 
"[..] it is necessary to lay down clearly what is not inheritance, for in medical writings and in ordinary 
medical parlance a terrible confusion prevails upon this point, and much that is certainly not inherited is 
commonly spoken of as being hereditary. There is, for example, no such thing as hereditary syphilis".86 
We should not let ourselves be deceived, however, by this apparently firm rejection of the 
possibility of hereditary syphilis. Both Adami and Beitzke were convinced that Weismann 
had not been successful in blocking all possible loopholes for the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics. Adami found it implausible to assume that "the immature germ cells lie 
absolutely dormant in the organism". 8 7 These cells could be affected by the toxins or other 
metabolic products of the microbe responsible for syphilis. The results of such "damaged 
A. Weismann, Das Keimplasma: Eine Theorie der Vererbung, Jena (Gustav Fischer), 1892, p. 510. 
"It must be simply obvious that it is wrong-headed to speak of inherited infectious diseases, e.g. 
hereditary syphilis"; H. Beitzke, 'Ueber Vererbung und Vererbbarkeit in der Pathologie', Berliner 
klinische Wochenschrift 42 (1905): 1156-58, p. 1156. 
Adami, op. cit. (note 75), p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 30. 
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germ plasm" (Beitzke) would show up in inferior offspring suffering from severe general 
disturbances, or "parasyphilitic lesions", as Adami called them: 
"[..] the offspring may show, not syphilitic lesions, but parasyphilitic lesions - various forms of arrested 
and imperfect development of different tissues due to the intoxication and therefore modification of the 
germ plasm while still a portion of the parental organism".88 
By 'parasyphilitic lesions' Adami referred to phenomena that were also known as the mani-
festations of 'occult syphilis' or l'hérédité syphilitique.89 His view was in agreement with 
the theory elaborated by the Austrian syphilologist Ernest Finger, who considered the general 
dystrophic disturbances of 'hereditary' syphilis as the effects of a 'depravation' of sperm or 
ovum caused by toxins of the syphilitic agent. 9 0 Finger had already suggested that these 
general dystrophic disturbances could be passed on to the progeny of syphilitic parents 
without 'syphilis as such' being transmitted. While the inheritability of 'syphilis as such' was 
increasingly questioned, Lamarckian heredity found a final refuge in the realm of 'occult' 
syphilis. 
Meanwhile, shortly after the turn of the century, clinical syphilologists were engaged 
in a related but different debate. For them the issue was whether syphilis could be 'inherited' 
from (or transmitted by) the mother only or whether a direct 'inheritance' from the father 
(without first infecting the mother) was also a definite possibility. Most clinicians, among 
them the leading authorities of syphilology such as Alfred Fournier, Albert Neisser, and 
Ernest Finger, defended the possibility of paternal inheritance. A minority, headed by the 
Austrian clinician Rudolf Matzenauer, emphatically rejected this possibility and admitted 
placentary infection of the foetus or child in utero as the only possible mode of transmission. 
Although the semantics of 'inheritance' and 'infection' was not uniform between both parties, 
Virchow's definition could be used as a common ground: "Inheritance is realized through the 
act of conception. Whatever influences or modifies the embryo or foetus afterwards [..] has 
no claim to being called hereditary". 9 1 According to this definition a so-called germinative 
infection (from contaminated seed or ovum at the moment of conception) would be an 
instance of inheritance, a so-called post-conceptional infection would not. Of course, this 
does not correspond to modern usage. The net result of Matzenauer's attempts to exclude any 
8 8 Ibid. 
8 9 Lomax, op. cit. (note 80), p. 36. 
9 0 Finger, op. cit. (note 81), p. 384. 
9 1 Cited in Beitzke, op. cit. (note 83), p. 1156; Alfred Fournier had offered a similar definition of 
heredity. See T. Broes van Dort, 'Review of A. Fournier, Die Vererbung der Syphilis, translated 
and revised by E. Finger, Leipzig and Vienna, 1892', Nederlandsch Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde 
36 (1892) II: 694-705. 
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possibility of inheritance or germinative infection, however, was that the old concept of 
'hereditary syphilis' was transformed into the modern concept of 'congenital syphilis'. 
Why did physicians believe in the paternal inheritance of syphilis in the first place? For one 
thing, many were familiar in their own private practice with cases of syphilitic fathers beget-
ting syphilitic children (or stillborn foetuses), without the mothers showing any visible 
symptoms at all. The idea of paternal inheritance found further support in the remarkable 
fact, first observed in 1837 by the Irish surgeon Abraham Colles and therefore known as 
Colles's Law, that mothers suckling their luetic children never became infected, while wet 
nurses easily got ulcerations at their breasts. This apparent immunity of the mother was 
interpreted in either of two ways. According to some, it indicated that the foetus had com-
municated the disease, albeit in a mild and harmless form, to its mother (the socalled choc 
en retour). According to others, it indicated that the mother had only received from her 
foetus toxic products produced by the microbe but not the microbe itself. 9 2 Both interpreta-
tions assumed that the foetus had received the disease directly from its father. Later writers 
argued in an even more subtle way that a handful of reported cases of exceptions to Colles's 
Law furnished the most compelling proof for the existence of paternal inheritance: if the 
mother could still become infected when suckling her child, she must have been healthy 
before. 9 3 
In 1903, Rudolf Matzenauer launched an all-out attack on the supposed inheritability of 
syphilis in general and the idea of paternal inheritance in particular, which was followed by 
a heated controversy. 9 4 Matzenauer subjected alleged cases of paternal inheritance to a 
painstaking scrutiny; not a single case could withstand his criticism. There were actually no 
exceptions to Colles's Law. The immunity of mothers from their sucking luetic babies could 
be simply explained from the fact that these mothers themselves had latent syphilis. Matze-
nauer denied the very possibility of germinative infection, be it from a contaminated ovum 
or sperm cell. It would be unthinkable that a fertilized ovum, containing a microbe capable 
of such extreme ravages, could just develop further into an embryo and foetus. 
Responding to Matzenauer's criticism, the adherents of paternal inheritance appealed 
once again to the many cases from their own professional experience in which women 
without visible signs of syphilis had given birth to luetic children or stillborn foetuses. They 
challenged Matzenauer to come forward with an adequate explanation for this remarkable 
fact. Simply sticking the label 'latent syphilis' would not do: "It is inadmissable to diagnose 
Broes van Dort, op. cit. (note 91), pp. 699-701. 
Ibid., p. 697; Hofrat Professor Neumann [without initials], 'Ueber Vererbung der Syphilis', Wiener 
klinische Wochenschrift 17 (1904): 551-58, p. 557. 
R. Matzenauer, 'Die Vererbung der Syphilis. Ist eine paterne Vererbung erwiesen?', Wiener kli-
nische Wochenschrift 16 (1903): 175-181; with ensuing discussions on pp. 229-36, 263-67, 292-96, 
325-30, 361-68, and 392-98. 
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latent syphilis on the basis of existing immunity without proof of a previous infection". 9 5 
This was a real point. However, the apparent absence of syphilitic symptoms in so many 
cases could also be partially explained from the fact that physicians, for reasons of prudence 
and discreetness, did not always thoroughly examine their female clients. As Elizabeth 
Lomax states: "The physician usually accepted a patient's statement that she had never 
suffered from a chancre or disseminated rash. Since respectable women simply did not 
confess to venereal disease, the concept of paternal transmission was strengthened fur-
ther" . 9 6 
Finally, the adherents of paternal inheritance put forward as an argument that the denial 
of this doctrine would bring in its train very evil social consequences. Neumann appealed to 
the French syphilologist Founder, who had called "the denial of spermatic infection a dange-
rous view, because it would deprive syphilis from the greater part of its hereditary hazards 
and carelessly open the gates of marriage to a group of syphilitic men, to whom those gates 
had hitherto been closed for fear of injuring the offspring". 9 7 The almost circular character 
of this argument illustrates the tenacity with which physicians stuck to the idea of paternal 
inheritance. Were they still under the spell of the biblical Uridee that the sins of the fathers 
are visited on the children? After all, Exodus 20: 5-6 had been silent on the sins of the 
mothers. 
Actually, professional interests too weighed in the balance when physicians showed 
themselves reluctant to reject the doctrine of paternal inheritance. Neumann asserted that the 
denial of paternal inheritance would require "the treatment of the assumed latent syphilis of 
the mother and the putting aside [Ausserachtlassung] of the treatment of the paternal sy-
philis". As a matter of fact, this is a most disingenious criticism (no one argued for not 
treating the father), but the reproach could be easily returned in minor-image to the adhe-
rents of paternal inheritance. Their private practices were aimed primarily at treating male 
patients for syphilis. This was also conceded by Neumann, when he stated that the experience 
acquired in private practice was more relevant than experience in the maternity clinics for 
discussing paternal inheritance, because "in private practice above all syphilitic men come 
into observation". 9 8 It was quite normal for general practitioners to act in complicity with 
the husband to deceive the spouse. Ironically, Neumann himself nourishes the suspicion that 
married women might not have received much serious antiluetic therapy by pointing at the 
many cases of exclusive treatment of the husband resulting in subsequent births of healthy 
children as a massive empirical support for the doctrine of paternal inheritance. Clearly, this 
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doctrine constituted a theoretical legitimation for a private practice that was primarily 
oriented to serving the medical needs of male syphilitics. 
An unresolved issue in the controversy about paternal inheritance concerned the alleged 
'latent syphilis' of the mothers of luetic children. The Wassermann reaction would contribute 
decisively to the solution of this problem. It turned out that most of these mothers without 
visible symptoms (90 to 95 %) reacted positively on this serological t e s t . " The present-day 
view is that the foetus is infected by the mother through the placenta; a direct infection from 
the sperm can be considered virtually impossible. This does not mean that men are now 
exonerated from all blame, if only because it is often (but how often?) they who infected 
their wives in the first place. Paternal sin is no longer associated with the fatalism of here-
dity. The fatal chain of contagion can now be interrupted by the means of medical science. 
5. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have attempted to consolidate Fleck's constxuctivist approach towards the 
historical genesis of the concept of syphilis, drawing additional inspiration from Mary Hesse-
's finitist or network theory. Following Fleck, I have traced the shifting boundaries attributed 
to this disease concept during the four or five centuries of its history. Ironically, the dis-
covery of the causative agent, Treponema pallidum, in 1905 did not end debate about the 
proper extension of syphilis but led to new complications. The re-defmition of syphilis in 
aetiological terms ran up against the subsequent identification of the agents of yaws (1905) 
and later also of pinta (1938) which proved morphologically indistinguishable from 
Treponema pallidum. For a minority of medical investigators this circumstance provided a 
reason to count syphilis (including endemic forms such as bejel and njovera), yaws, and pinta 
as a single disease, but the majority did not want to give up the established distinctions. 
Neither the minority nor the majority decision, as I have argued in conformity with the 
finitist theory, can be seen as predetermined by the meaning the term 'syphilis' already 
possessed when it was confronted with these anomalies. Current usage of a concept does not 
determine future applications. 
I have also followed up Fleck's suggestion that moral considerations in particular have 
entered into the construction of concepts of syphilis. For older notions like that of the carnal 
scourge or the empirical-therapeutic concept of syphilis (mercury treatment as atonement for 
sin!) this is clear enough, but it can also be demonstrated for more recent concepts such as 
'hereditary syphilis' and 'syphilis insontium'. The example of the latter concept is very 
significant; as an explicitly moral category it aimed at an alleviation of the moral stigma 
F. Bering, 'Welche Aufschlüsse gibt uns die Seroreaktion über das Colles-Baumessche und das 
Profetasche Gesetz?', Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 36 (1910): 219-21; H. Rietsehl, 'Das 
Vererbungsproblem der Syphilis', Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 36 (1910): 531. 
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attached to syphilis. The case of 'hereditary syphilis' shows that in the later part of the 19th 
century medical views on the heredity of the disease were closely intertwined with cultural 
perceptions of moral (and physical!) degeneration and of gender roles. 
The limitations of the analyses presented in this chapter should not be overlooked. Due 
to the long stretch of history that had to be covered, I haven't always been able to do full 
justice to the tenets of symmetry and impartiality that are constitutive of the sociology of 
scientific knowledge. Sometimes, as in my description of the amalgamation and subsequent 
differentiation of the three venereal diseases, the story had a rather 'Whiggish' tenor. I think 
this is almost inevitable when the span of history to be dealt with is so extensive. A more 
thorough-going symmetrical analysis is only possible if the object of inquiry consists of a 
much briefer episode. (The next chapter on the discovery of the pale spirochaete discusses 
in depth the controversy over the aetiology of syphilis covering a period of no more than 
three years.) The broad historical scope of this chapter may also be responsible for certain 
unsought reminiscences of the old-fashioned history of ideas. Only in section 4 have I been 
able to connect the prevalent ideas of medical practitioners on paternal inheritance to their 
professional interests and the built-in 'gender bias' of their therapeutic practices. In later 
chapters more attention will be paid to the analysis of scientific and clinical practices and the 
role of professional interests. 
Have I succeeded in demonstrating the 'culture-laden' character of the specifically 
modern concept of syphilis? I must admit that section 4 in particular is susceptible to a 
Whiggish reading. It is true - so the argument might go - that the ideas of hereditary syphilis 
and paternal inheritance testify that in the bad old days medical science was indeed caught 
up in cultural prejudices about moral degeneration and gender roles, but this is no longer the 
case today: the analysis in section 4 shows precisely that by sustained effort medical investi-
gators were able to cut through the tangle of confusions and to break away from prejudice 
altogether. I must confess that I am somewhat at a loss for a convincing answer to this 
objection. The standpoint it expresses has been forcefully defended by Susan Sontag. In her 
book Illnes as Metaphor she asserts that only diseases which are poorly understood and 
therefore mysterious (like cancer in our time) can function as metaphors and symbols for 
what is felt to be socially and morally wrong; once such diseases are fully understood and 
become effectively treatable, the metaphors and symbols will wither away automati-
ca l ly . 1 0 0 In this view science occupies an Archimedean place outside the ambit of culture 
from where it can liberate us from the rule of metaphors. A contrasting view has been 
expressed by Owsei Temkin: " [..] neither as scientists nor physicians can we live outside the 
world of culture and morali ty". 1 0 1 Fleck would certainly have sided with Temkin. He 
S. Sontag, Illness as Metaphor - AIDS and its Metaphors, Harmondsworth (Penguin Books), 1990, 
p. 62. 
Temkin, op. cit. (note 6), p. 316. 
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The American epidemiologist-cum-anthropologist Robert Hahn offers an illuminating analysis of the 
current use of the category of so-called 'culture-bound syndromes' which touches on several points 
of the above discussion. Hahn notes the prevalent tendency to find such syndromes almost exclu-
sively among non-western peoples: "Like the popular understanding of accents in speech, culture-
bound syndromes are what other people have", to which he opposes his own view according to 
which "all syndromes are regarded as equally culture-bound, so that the concept of 'culture-bound 
syndrome' is itself not a useful distinction". See R.A. Hahn, Sickness and Healing: An Anthropolo-
gical Perspective, New Haven and London (Yale University Press), 1995, p. 50 and p. 49. 
would have considered it 'egocentric' to assume that the insights of the present time enjoy 
the unique privilege of being free from cultural admixtures while simultaneously granting that 
the medical views of the past have always been tainted with moral overtones. 1 0 2 
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1. Introduction 
In an early review of Ludwik Fleck's monograph on the Genesis and Development of a 
Scientific Fact, appearing in the German medical journal Klinische Wochenschrift, Hans 
Petersen accused him of adopting a position of extreme idealism by not recognizing the 
distinction between concept and object and conflating facts with our knowledge or interpreta-
tion of facts: 
"Reading this book, one gets the astonishing conviction that for Fleck no tangible distinction at all exists 
between fact and concept; discovery and invention; designation, linguistic expression, verbal or pictorial 
representation and what these refer to. Later he deals with a 'discovery', but what does he analyze? An 
invention, to wit the Wassermann reaction! Thus he reaches the conclusion that strictly speaking there are 
no facts and that discovery and invention are fundamentally the same".1 
Similar charges are often brought against modern variants of constructivism. Contemporary 
sociologists of scientific knowledge are accused of treating solid scientific facts as mere 
'constructions' or 'fabrications', thereby effectively turning them into 'artefacts'. It may be 
worthwhile, therefore, to discuss Petersen's criticism in some detail. 
The scientific fact to which the title of Fleck's monograph alludes is "the fact that the 
so-called Wassermann reaction is related to syphilis" (XXVTH/2). I agree with Petersen that 
the choice of this example is rather unfortunate. We can easily recognize that the 'fact' 
chosen by Fleck is not a very suitable candidate if we slightly modify its formulation from 
(1) The so-called Wassermann reaction is related to syphilis 
to 
(2) The Wassermann test for detecting syphilis is related to syphilis. 
As the latter formulation brings out clearly, it is much more natural to consider the develop-
ment of the Wassermann reaction as an invention rather than as a discovery of a fact. This, 
indeed, was also Petersen's view. Of course, all this does not exclude the possibility that a 
more thorough-going epistemological analysis might establish that discoveries should be 
H. Petersen, 'Ludwig [sie] Flecks Lehre vom Denkstil und dem Denkkollektiv', Klinische Wochen-
schrift 15 (1936): 239-42, pp. 240-41. 
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viewed as inventions. To substantiate such an epistemological claim, however, one would 
need a more suitable example than the development of the Wassermann reaction. Such an 
example is provided by the discovery of Spirochaeta pallida (now Treponema pallidum) as 
the causative agent of syphilis. This case is also, albeit much more briefly, discussed in 
Fleck's monograph. In this chapter I will offer a detailed analysis along constructivist lines 
of this particular discovery. 
Petersen also uses the example of the discovery of the pale spirochaete in syphilitic 
lesions to criticize Fleck's relativization of facts: 
"For Fleck too it is a fact that in 1905 Schaudinn discovered living entities, 'spirochaetes', in the fluid 
of certain lesions which he and others designated as syphilitic papules. He [Fleck] does not render the 
validity and reality of this event dependent on a particular thought style. Fleck will admit that one could 
have seen such spirochaetes in certain papules already in 1805, 1705, 1605, and 1505, if one had been 
in the possession of our means of investigation. This temporal regressus is not verifiable, but a compa-
rable spatial displacement is - to India for instance [..] where indigenous physicians are completely 
indifferent toward these spirochaetes. For Fleck too it is therefore not dependent on a certain thought style 
that the presence of spirochaetes in papules of a particular complexion is a 'fact'. It is, however, style-
dependent [denkstilgebunderi] how one takes up this matter [was man mit dieser Angelegenheit anfangt]. 
It is wrong to designate as a 'discovery' that Schaudinn considers these structures [Gebilde] as causative 
agents [Erreger], because this implies a theory; already the generalization of the fact of the presence 
contains a theoretical element".2 
I am convinced that Fleck would not have admitted anything of this sort! Putting aside the 
imaginary regressus into previous centuries as unverifiable, Fleck could have confidently 
taken up the challenge of a spatial displacement to India, provided that it would be native 
physicians and not Westerners who have to discover the spirochaetes in syphilitic lesions. 
From their alleged "indifference", reflecting a different thought style, it would be fairly safe 
to predict that they would not come up with the required discovery, even if they had been 
provided with all the necessary means of investigation. Moreover, Petersen's quest for 'bare' 
facts, uncontaminated by any style or theory, appears to reduce itself to absurdity. Can the 
(general) presence of spirochaetes in syphilitic papules be considered as a simple and straight-
forward fact, if this generalized formulation already implies - as Petersen himself admits -
a theoretical element? What about the recognition of these microbes as 'spirochaetes', im-
plying kinship relations with other species of spirochaetes? On Petersen's strict view, it 
would not even be allowed to speak of the discovery of the causative agent of syphilis, 
because the attribution of an aetiological status to a particular species of microbes involves 
a theory. Only the finding of a 'bare fact', not the proposal of a corresponding theoretical 
interpretation, counts as the real discovery. Claude Bernard has explicitly disavowed this 
Petersen, op. cit. (note 1), p. 241. 
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"We usually give the name of discovery to recognition of a new fact; but 1 think that the idea con-
nected with the discovered fact is what really constitutes the discovery [..]. Discovery, then, is a 
new idea emerging in connection with a fact found by chance or otherwise". See C. Bernard, An 
Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, New York (Dover), 1957, pp. 34-35. Of 
course, this formulation still begs the question if one can meaningfully speak about a fact in isola-
tion from the idea connected with it. 
Petersen, op. cit. (note 1), p. 242. 
view. 3 It has also been repudiated in the actual history of the discovery of the pale 
spirochaete. After Schaudinn's untimely death in 1906, his 'co-discoverer' Erich Hoffmann 
unveiled a maquette with his effigy bearing the words: "Dem unvergesslichen Fritz Schau-
dinn, Entdecker der Syphilisspirochaete (Berlin, 3. Marz 1905), im Namen der deutschen 
Aerzteschaft". This official recognition of Schaudinn's discovery also extends to the assumed 
aetiological status of the pale spirochaete, contrary to Petersen's strictures. 
Petersen concedes that for him too science is not a simple inventory of facts, but he 
denies that the latter are in any way conditioned by a particular thought style. In his view, 
a fact remains a fact whatever the dominant style. A thought style manifests itself only in the 
way in which different facts are related to each other. Using Fleck's example of astrological 
speculations in the early history of syphilis, Petersen asserts that we certainly recognize, as 
did people in the 16th century, the eruption of a peculiar epidemic in Naples in 1495 and the 
existence of a particular planetary constellation as facts; only the connection of those two 
facts betrays a particular thought style. Science is seen by Petersen as a stylized edifice 
erected on a foundation of facts which themselves are not contaminated by any style. 
Although many of Petersen's specific objections against Fleck's views merit further 
scrutiny, it is easy to see that his general defence of the style-independent status of facts does 
not hold water. By granting that the connections between facts are style-dependent, he effec-
tively gives away his position. To defend his view he has to establish that (purported) facts 
are 'atomic' in the sense that they cannot be further analyzed as consisting of other, more 
'elementary' facts. This would seem to be an almost impossible task. At any rate, the condi-
tion does not hold for the two 'facts' of the above example. 
According to Petersen, Fleck's conflation of discovery and invention stems from the 
general overestimation of the importance of experiments in biological research: "Here the 
confounding of discovery with invention is always close at hand: one discovers what one has 
fabricated oneself".4 Echoing Goethe's aversion to the experimental torture of nature, Peter-
sen breaks a lance for a morphologically oriented biology that will liberate itself as much as 
possible from "all special experimental conditions, destruction of the organ, fixation, stai-
ning, preparation" to eliminate the suspicion that "the entire theory is based on its own 
artefacts [Kunstprodukte]". His eschewal of experimental manipulation, weird as it is, makes 
sense in view of the fact that some modern constructivists like Latour and Woolgar and 
Knorr-Cetina have indeed based their non-realist reading of scientific knowledge on the 
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thorough artificiality of the laboratory conditions in which such knowledge is ordinarily 
produced. Knorr-Cetina points out that all or most of the source materials with which scien-
tists work are 'preconstructed' (e.g. specially bred assay rats, purified chemical substances 
obtained from industry, sterilized water running from a special faucet etc.): "[..] nowhere 
in the laboratory do we find the 'nature' or 'reality' which is so crucial to the descriptivist 
[=realist] interpretation". 5 In this connection, the realist philosopher Hans Radder speaks 
of the Bachelardian challenge to the realist interpretation of science (after Gaston Bachelard 
who already in the 1930s emphasized the productive character of scientific experimentation): 
"Simply stated, it is the question how scientific knowledge can be about a human-independent reality, if 
this reality is so thoroughly dependent on human work".6 
If modern realists do not want to abandon the experimental, interventionist approach to 
nature, they will have to confront the 'Bachelardian challenge' head on. Petersen chose the 
easy way out by giving up experimental biology altogether. Undoubtedly he thereby gave too 
much away to his constructivist opponent. 
2. The social construction of facts and artefacts 
Many philosophers of science have criticized the relativist claims of contemporary socio-
logists of scientific knowledge. Here I will discuss in some detail the objections raised by the 
Dutch philosopher Anthony Derksen as a representative example of these criticisms. 
Derksen addresses what he calls the "pseudo-problem of the sociology of science", i.e. 
whether or not scientific facts are merely 'social constructions'. By portraying scientific facts 
as the outcome of a consensus obtained through negotiation, sociologists of science like 
Harry Collins unjustly call the robustness of those facts into question and degrade them to 
the status of 'artefacts'. Or so Derksen maintains. Scientists will undoubtedly become 
involved in a social process to convince each other of the reliability or otherwise of experi-
mental results and interpretations. This process should not, Derksen holds, be described as 
'negotiating' or 'argle-bargle'. The reason is that this social process amounts to an exchange 
of arguments in which "ultimately norms and criteria with a good record turn out to be 
decisive". 7 
K.D. Knorr-Cetina, 'Towards a Constructivist Interpretation of Science', in K.D. Knorr-Cetina and 
M. Mulkay (eds.), Science Observed, London (Sage), 1983, pp. 115-140, on p. 119. See also K.D. 
Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge, Oxford (Pergamon Press), 1981, pp. 3-4. 
H. Radder, 'Science, Realization and Reality: The Fundamental Issues', Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 24 (1993): 327-49, on p. 328. 
A.A. Derksen, Wetenschap of willekeur, Muiderberg (Coutinho), 1992, p. 159. 
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Derksen has also found an ambiguity in the use of the expression 'scientific fact': "Two 
elements are involved in this [notion]: its acceptance and its being a (real) fact (the being-
constituted-such-and-such of reality)". For convenience we could designate this conception 
as the two-in-one view of a scientific fact. Sociologists of scientific knowledge, by contrast, 
adhere to a one-dimensional conception of scientific facts: "In the alternative usage of the 
expression 'scientific fact' it is sufficient that the scientific community accepts something as 
a fact. Here a scientific fact is not necessarily a (real) fact". After introducing the distinction 
between these two conceptions, however, Derksen immediately retracts the second one as a 
legitimate possibility, for he continues: "The difference between scientific views and scien-
tific facts thus disappears". 8 In other words, the adherents of the second conception do not 
'in fact' talk about 'scientific facts' at all! Exit second conception. Through a simple termino-
logical analysis Derksen has gained a victory over his constructivist opponents. 
Indeed, the victory may have been somewhat too easy. A sociologist of science like 
Harry Collins will readily admit, I presume, that he does not subscribe to Derksen's 'two-in-
one' definition of scientific facts. The reason is simple. In studying the pursuits of scientists, 
the sociologist of science does not want to saddle himself with the additional obligation to 
find out about natural reality being such-and-such or perhaps so-and-so (the latter aim is 
precisely the point of the game of the scientists who constitute the object of his sociological 
inquiry!). All realist claims about nature are bracketed. For a student of science, in contradis-
tinction to the natural scientists themselves, this self-imposed limitation is quite sensible. It 
does not preclude making significant discoveries about science. Although Derksen maintains 
that in the second conception the difference between scientific views and scientific facts 
disappears (which, from his perspective and terminology, is a correct observation), the 
sociologist of science still can make significant distinctions between a view that is accepted 
only in laboratory X and a view that is also accepted in laboratories Y, Z, A, B, C etcetera. 
Once a view has gained such a wide acceptance, it may happen that it will be taken by the 
natural scientists involved as the formulation of a 'real fact'. The relativist approach has a 
methodological advantage. As students of science, sociologists are always dealing with 
'views' of scientists, whether or not such 'views' are given the status of a 'fact'. Only from 
this point of view will it be possible to inquire why some views held within the scientific 
community will acquire a factual status. 
The Collinsian approach to the study of scientific facts might be described as agnostic: 
all realist claims with regard to natural reality are radically put within brackets. Among the 
believers (i.e. rationalist and realist philosophers of science) such an agnostic stand is con-
sidered offensive and easily mistaken for a form of atheism. Hence the oft-repeated accusa-
tion that constructivists portray solid scientific facts as mere 'social constructions' or 'arte-
Derksen, op. cit. (note 7), p. 162. 
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facts'. In return, sociologists of science like Andrew Pickering have protested against the 
philosophers' use of the qualifier 'mere' to dismiss the constructivist approach. 9 
If Derksen, as a philosopher, is to put his two-in-one conception of scientific facts to 
profitable use, he will need a privileged access to natural reality in order to be able to decide 
for himself whether it is constituted such-and-such or perhaps so-and-so. If he does not 
dispose of such an independent access, then in his search for 'real facts' he will necessarily 
have to fall back on what are accepted as facts within the scientific community - that is, on 
'views'. Practically speaking, the difference between (mere) 'views' and (real) 'facts' then 
also disappears for Derksen. His two-in-one conception thus collapses into the detested 
alternative conception according to which scientific facts are 'merely' what is accepted as 
such within the scientific community. 1 0 
Derksen still holds one last trump, his 'good reasons' or 'good arguments': 
"If after negotiation it is accepted within science that such-and-such is the case, then this happens because 
to the community's judgement it is a real fact that such-and-such is the case. The scientific community 
therefore requires good arguments for the acceptance of a candidate-fact. I have already argued that in 
the course of scientific development it has learned, and continues to learn, which arguments are good 
ones. Given the quality of these arguments we may assume with reason that what we take to be scientific 
facts are also (real) facts".11 
In accordance with his naturalistic epistemology, Derksen does not supply us with a General 
Methodology specifying what are 'good reasons' and 'good arguments'. This makes it diffi-
cult to assess Derksen's claim that the actual 'reasons' used in science offer us sufficient 
ground for holding scientific facts to be 'real' facts. Let us take, for example, Koch's postu-
lates within microbiology. Do these in general constitute 'good reasons' for recognizing a 
certain microbe as the causative agent of a particular disease? Presumably yes. But how 
should we judge those instances in which Koch's postulates are departed from, as happened 
with the acceptance of Spirochaeta pallida as the aetiological agent of syphilis? Are there 
A. Pickering, 'Knowledge, Practice and Mere Construction', Social Studies of Science 20 (1990): 
682-729. 
There is an interesting parallel here with a fundamental debate within the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. Harry Collins and Steven Yearley object to the so-called 'extended symmetry principle' 
(which grants 'agency' to non-human organisms and things like scallops and doors) of their French 
colleagues Michel Callón and Bruno Latour, precisely on the grounds that sociologists do not have 
independent access to the world of non-human organisms and things. That means that in practice 
sociologists will have to fall back selectively on scientists' reports about the behaviour of organisms 
and things. The attempt to extend the symmetry principle will thus, paradoxically, reinstate the old 
asymmetric approach. See H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in: A. Picker-
ing (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago and London (University of Chicago Press), 
1992, pp. 301-26. 
Derksen, op. cit. (note 7), p. 164. 
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also 'good reasons' for such a departure? Presumably also yes, because science itself finds 
out what are 'good reasons'. Derksen's naturalism threatens to boil down to the complacent 
position that science (almost) always knows best. Of course, the sociology of scientific 
knowledge also adopts a naturalistic approach. Here, however, all rhetoric of 'good reasons' 
and realist claims with regard to natural reality are deliberately avoided. 
After having disposed of the "pseudo-problem of the sociology of knowledge", i.e. 
whether or not scientific facts are merely 'artefacts' or 'social constructions', Derksen 
broaches the interesting question of (real?) artefacts in the context of his discussion of theory-
ladenness of observation. Is what we observe through a microscope a product of the appa-
ratus, or does it inform us about reality? Does what we see teach us something about the 
living cell, or only about the mutilations which we bring about in subjecting the latter to a 
drastic preparation? Because of the use of staining techniques, one could say in a most literal 
sense: "Our observation is coloured, and in our own favour". 1 2 
Derksen holds the view that a philosopher of science cannot make a lot of this problem. 
Whether or not we are dealing with an 'artefact' in our observations, constitutes indeed a 
recurrent and important problem for science. Such a problem is however solved by science 
itself through developing new methods and techniques and independent controls. Derksen 
holds that the problem of the theory-ladenness of observation and the role of theory has been 
grossly exaggerated by philosophers. For a philosopher his general conclusion must be 
somewhat disappointing. 1 3 
To the sociology of scientific knowledge, by contrast, the problem mentioned by Derk-
sen might present an interesting challenge, to wit, showing not just the social construction 
of 'facts' but also the social (de-)construction of 'artefacts' within one single analytical 
framework. 1 4 The genesis of 'the fact that Spirochaeta pallida (or Treponema pallidum) 
is the causative agent of syphilis' appears to be a suitable example because the problem of 
coloured observation in a literal sense has figured prominently in this particular case. 
Derksen, op. cit. (note 7), p. 165. 
Ian Hacking, in his book Representing and Intervening, devotes a complete chapter to 'Micros-
copes' (Chapter 11). He also objects to a theory-dominated philosophy of science: "The experimen-
tal life of microscopy uses non-theory to sort out artifacts from the real thing", I. Hacking, Repre-
senting and Intervening, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1986, p. 200. 
See for a similar attempt N. Rasmussen, 'Facts, Artifacts, and Mesosomes: Practicing 
Epistemology with the Electron Microscope', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 24 
(1993): 227-65. 
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In the bacteriological era, the idea that infectious diseases were caused by specific pathogenic 
agents was confirmed by an apparently interminable series of discoveries. 
Already in 1879, the aetiological agent of gonorrhoea had been discovered by the then 
23-year-old assistant to the Breslau dermatological clinic, Albert Neisser. The microbe 
responsible for another venereal disease, chancroid or ulcus molle, was identified in 1889 
by Augusto Ducrey. Both identifications were followed by pure cultures of the causative 
organisms. These discoveries reinforced the separation of syphilis from the other two 
venereal diseases. Because of these and a host of other bacteriological achievements it was 
understandable that around the turn of the century the medical world anxiously looked for-
ward to the discovery of the causative agent of syphilis. It is for this reason that Fleck can 
assert with some exaggeration: "The discovery of the causative agent of syphilis is actually 
to be attributed mainly to bacteriologists active in other fields" (15/24). According to Fleck, 
in this bakterienlustige Epoche or "era when bacteria were 'popular'" (15/24) the ground was 
well-prepared for the discovery of the pale spirochaete as the causative agent of syphilis. As 
we will see, however, this fails to do full justice to the fact that it was not so much the older 
field of bacteriology but the more recent field of protozoology (or Protistenkunde, 'protistolo-
gy') that made a decisive contribution to this particular discovery. 
For quite some time, then, there existed a vacancy for the function of 'aetiological agent 
of syphilis'. In the decades before 1905 many putative causative organisms were proposed 
to fill this vacancy; none of those candidates, however, possessed sufficiently strong creden-
tials to avoid an eventual return to the "latency stage of oblivion". 1 5 
The artificial transmission of syphilis to apes and monkeys, first accomplished with 
chimpanzees in 1903 by Elie Metchnikoff and Emile Roux of the Instituí Pasteur in Paris, 
raised new hopes for the detection of the causative agent. The German dermatologist Albert 
Neisser was among those who eagerly seized upon the new opportunities for experimental 
syphilis research. In the beginning of 1905 Neisser organized a scientific expedition to the 
Dutch East Indies to continue his experiments with primates on a much larger scale and 
under more congenial tropical conditions. The avowed aim of his expedition was to find an 
immunization method against syphilis. According to his biographer, Sigrid Schmitz, Neisser 
also entertained the secret hope that his expedition would lead to the elucidation of the 
aetiology of syphilis, or, in other words, to the discovery of the causative agent . 1 6 But 
things would run differently. 
O. Lassar, 'Ueber neuere Protozogn-Befunde', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 42 (1905): 728-30, 
p. 730. 
S. Schmitz, Albert Neisser: Leben und Werk auf Grund neuer, unveröffentlichter Quellen, Düssel-
dorf (Michael Triltsch Verlag), 1967, p. 48. For more on Neisser's research on apes and monkeys, 
see Chapter V. 
3 . The discovery: prelude and aftermath 
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On 8 February 1905 a young dermatologist, Erich Hoffmann, assistant to the dermatological 
clinic of the Royal Charité Hospital in Berlin, published a review article on the results so far 
obtained in the experimental research on primates. The article contains the following passage 
on the prospects of Neisser's expedition, which in the light of subsequent events makes for 
curious reading: 
"That is why we should hail Neisser's decision to continue his promising experiments on the Sunda Isles 
with great joy. May it be granted to the great Breslau dermatologist, whom we owe the discovery of the 
causative agent of the most frequent venereal disease, gonorrhoea, also to lighten the darkness of the 
aetiology and pathogenesis of syphilis, to the glory of himself and of German science and to the welfare 
of suffering humanity".17 
At the time of publication, Hoffmann could not yet know that only a few weeks later he 
would be assigned by his boss, Professor Edmund Lesser, as a clinical assistant to the team 
led by the protozoologist Fritz Schaudinn which was to inquire into the possible cause of 
syphilis (cf. Fleck: 16/24). Thanks to this involvement, Hoffmann would eventually gain the 
reputation of being the 'co-discoverer', with Schaudinn, of Spirochaeta pallida. While 
Neisser and his collaborators were busily experimenting with primates in the Dutch East 
Indies (on Java, not on the Sunda Isles), the darkness of the aetiology of syphilis was 
lightened in Berlin. 
But how did Schaudinn become involved? Why was a significant contribution expected 
to come from a protozoologist? To answer these questions, I have to devote a few words to 
the emergence of the field of protozoology. 1 8 
The groundwork for this new field had been laid in 1876 by Otto Bütschli when he con-
structed the vast new kingdom of 'Protozoa' as a special category of unicellular organisms. 
In Germany, the study of these organisms became a specialized branch of zoology. Well-
known authorities in this area, in addition to Bütschli, included Richard Hertwig, Franz 
Eilhard Schulze, Franz Doflein, Fritz Schaudinn, and Richard Goldschmidt. In 1902 a 
specialized professional journal, Archivfiir Protistenkunde, was launched. Around the turn 
of the century medical interest in protozoology was also increasing. In 1903, Robert Koch's 
Institute for Infectious Diseases in Berlin added a division for protozoology. The following 
year the Imperial Health Office {Kaiserliches Gesundheitsamt) in Berlin also instituted, at 
Koch's instigation, a special protozoology laboratory which was to be directed by Schaudinn. 
In 1902 and 1907, respectively, Ronald Ross and Alphonse Laveran received the Nobel 
Prizes for Medicine or Physiology for their work on malaria parasites and the role of insect 
E. Hoffmann, 'Die Bedeutung der neueren Versuche, Syphilis auf Tiere zu übertragen', Berliner 
klinische Wochenschrift 42 (1905), p. 156. 
The Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 22, no. 2 (Summer 1989) is a special issue devoted to 
the history of protozoology. I found the contributions of Natasha Jacobs (215^42), Marsha Rich-
mond (243-76), and John Corliss (307-23) particularly enlightening and informative. 
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vectors, and other pathogenic protozoa. During the heyday of colonialism, there was much 
interest in protozoa as possible aetiological agents of various tropical diseases, especially in 
the trypanosomes held to be responsible for such conditions as Nagana and sleeping sickness. 
In this connection it is also important to point out that Paul Ehrlich's chemotherapeutic 
research programme, initiated after he became director of the Institute of Experimental 
Therapy in Frankfort in 1899, was originally oriented toward trypanosomal diseases. 1 9 The 
reorientation of this programme toward syphilis occurred later and was linked with Schaudinn 
and Hoffmann's discovery (see Chapter VII). 
As a protozoologist, Schaudinn had been working on coccidians, malaria parasites, 
rhizopods, trypanosomes and spirochaetes. He had a good professional reputation. 2 0 Some 
of his contributions, however, were highly controversial. Just before his involvement in the 
search for the syphilis agent, Schaudinn had developed a speculative theory which stated that 
bird malaria parasites, trypanosomes and spirochaetes were merely different developmental 
forms of one single type of organism. This theory was 'exploded' by the American bacterio-
logists Frederick Novy and Ward McNeal, who showed that Schaudinn's interpretations were 
based on mixed infections. Schaudinn, however, stuck to his theory. With his usual dramati-
zation, Paul de Kruif wrote about the consequences of Schaudinn's 'erroneous' view: "It 
might have wrecked him ... scientifically. Yet strangely, it got him ready for the famous day 
of March 3rd, 1905, that made him immortal". 2 1 On that day Schaudinn first discerned the 
pale spirochaete through his microscope in a syphilitic papule freshly excised by Hoffmann. 
But, again, how did he become involved in the first place? In 1904 and 1905, another 
protozoologist, John Siegel, working at the Zoological Institute of Professor Franz Eilhard 
Schulze (who was also Schaudinn's former teacher!) in Berlin, claimed to have found 
protozoal agents of a number of acute exanthemas: smallpox, cowpox, foot-and-mouth 
disease, scarlatina, and syphilis. All these alleged aetiological agents were said to belong to 
P. Ehrlich and K. Shiga, 'Farbentherapeutische Versuche bei Trypanosomenerkrankungen', 
Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 41 (1904): 329-32, 362-65; P. Ehrlich, 'Chetnotherapeutische Try-
panosomen-Studien', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 (1907): 233-36, 280-83, 310-14, 341-44. 
On 17 March 1905, when Schaudinn and Hoffmann were already on the trail of the pale 
spirochaete, the German zoologist Professor J.W. Spengel wrote a letter to Elie Metchnikoff, Pas-
teur's successsor and a former zoologist, asking to support Schaudinn's candidacy for the nomina-
tion of the Nobel Prize for Medicine or Physiology. Spengel motivated his request in the following 
way: "It appears to me that the entire modern research on protozoa and especially on pathogenic 
protozoa rests on the investigations which were so brilliantly started with Schaudinn's contribution 
on the propagation of coccidians and which he later extended in such an excellent way to malaria 
parasites and rhizopods and finally to trypanosomes and spirochaetes". Metchnikoff replied that he 
could not support any other candidate as long as Robert Koch had not received the coveted Nobel 
Prize (which he duly received in 1905!). For Spengel's letter and Metchnikoff s answer, see H. 
Zeiss, Elias Metchnikow: Leben und Werk, Jena, 1932, p. 174. 
P. de Kruif, Men against Death, Hamburg/Paris/Bologna (Albatross), 1934, p. 192. De Kruif had 
received his scientific training from Frederick Novy. 
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the class of Flagellates. The supposed causative agent of syphilis was designated as Cytor-
rhyctes Ms.11 In view of the importance that could be attached to the latter finding, if true, 
the president of the Imperial Health Office called upon Schaudinn to verify the results of his 
colleague. With many misgivings about his bureaucratic obligation to check up on another 
man's work instead of doing original research of his own, Schaudinn arranged cooperation 
with the Royal University Clinic for Skin and Venereal Diseases. The clinic was to provide 
pathological material from syphilitic patients. Staff surgeon Erich Hoffmann took charge of 
the clinical side of the cooperation. Schaudinn's collaborators from the Health Office, Neu-
feld and Gonder, were also involved. 
Schaudinn was not able to confirm the findings of John Siegel, but already on 3 March 
1905 he discerned, in a freshly excised secondary syphilitic papule supplied by Hoffmann, 
a live, motile, corkscrew-like organism of extreme transparence which he immediately 
recognized as a spirochaete. Schaudinn called Hoffmann and the others to have a look, but 
at first they were unable to see anything. For the next few weeks Schaudinn and Hoffmann 
continued their investigations with new pathological material. In these fresh cases spiro-
chaetes could also be found, but again with great difficulty. Attempts were undertaken to 
stain the spirochaetes in fixed preparations - which finally succeeded to some extent with a 
so-called Giemsa solution (an eosin-azure mixture developed by G. Giemsa), but only after 
staining for 24 hours. Because of this difficulty in staining the microbe received the baptismal 
name of Spirochaeta pallida or pale spirochaete. 2 3 By 21 March 1905 Schaudinn and Hoff-
mann were convinced of the likely aetiological role of Spirochaeta pallida. They also thought 
that this species could be regularly distinguished from other kinds of spirochaetes, in particu-
lar from a coarser type found in papillomas and balanitis which was dubbed Spirochaeta 
refringens. 
Writing about Schaudinn, Paul de Kruif describes the difference in attitude on two dates, 
3 and 21 March 1905, as follows: 
"So, on the very first day on the very first case on the 3rd of March he'd seen the pale spirochaetes. But 
this day, Sunday, March 21st, he knew he'd discovered the pale horror at the bottom of syphilis".24 
This raises the question on which date the causative agent of syphilis has been discovered. 
In official histories the date is usually set at 3 March 1905. Should it perhaps be shifted to 
21 March? Or should the discovery be located at an even later date, taking the recognition 
by the scientific community as the relevant mark? And who should be credited as being the 
A summary of Siegel's findings is given in the review written by Oscar Lassar, op. cit. (note 15), 
pp. 728-29. 
At first the name Spirochaete pallida was used; later on this was changed into Spirochaeta pallida. 
Throughout this chapter I have used the latter name. 
De Kruif, op. cit. (note 21), p. 200. 
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'discoverer'? Only Schaudinn? Or was he, as Fleck maintains, "rather a standard-bearer in 
discovery than its sole agent" (42/37)? 
The first occasion for the scientific community to pass its judgement on the presumed 
discovery of the aetiological agent of syphilis was on 17 and 24 May 1905, when Schaudinn 
and Hoffmann presented their findings before the Berlin Medical Society. By this time they 
had already received confirmation from Elie Metchnikoff in Paris, who, on Schaudinn's 
request, had searched for pale spirochaetes in the syphilitic lesions of artificially infected apes 
and monkeys. 2 5 Two German investigators, A. Buschke and W. Fischer, had also found 
spirochaetes in the liver and spleen of a stillborn syphilitic child. They had their find authen-
ticated by Schaudinn and Hoffmann: "A preparation was immediately submitted for assess-
ment to Messrs. Schaudinn and Hoffmann, who declared that the spirochaetes we found 
resemble those found by them in morphological and tinctorial respects". 2 6 Although the 
pale spirochaete had by now been encountered in 7 primary lesions, 9 secondary papules, 12 
typically affected inguinal glands, in the liver and spleen of a child with congenital lues, and 
in syphilitic lesions of primates, Schaudinn and Hoffmann were still very reticent to pro-
nounce on the aetiological status of the pale spirochaete. As Hoffmann stated: "[..] also today 
we are still far from passing already a definitive judgement on the aetiological significance 
of this particular hitherto unknown microbe". 2 7 In fact, this caution had been imposed by 
the President of the Imperial Health Office. 2 8 
This imposed reticence did not however prevent a direct confrontation, before the forum 
of the Berlin Medical Society, between Schaudinn and Hoffmann, on the one hand, and two 
staff members of Professor Franz Eilhard Schulze's Zoological Institute, Dr. Thesing and 
Walter Schulze, on the other hand. The latter two supported John Siegel's Cytorrhyctes Ms 
as a rival candidate for the function of 'causative agent of syphilis' and did everything they 
could to question the credentials of the pale spirochaete. Thesing maintained that the pale 
spirochaetes shown in Schaudinn's preparations did not come from syphilitic tissue but were 
actually brought in with contaminated Giemsa stain: 
See Schaudinn's letters to Metchnikoff, 2 and 8 May 1905, reprinted in Zeiss, op. cit. (note 19), p. 
173. 
A. Buschke and W. Fischer, 'Ueber das Vorkommen von Spirochäten in inneren Organen eines 
syphilitischen Kindes', Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 31 (1905): 791-92, p. 792. It would 
thus be too much to say that their find constituted independent confirmation of Schaudinn and Hoff-
mann's findings. 
F. Schaudinn and E. Hoffmann, 'Ueber Spirochaete pallida bei Syphilis und die Unterschiede dieser 
Form gegenüber anderen Arten dieser Gattung', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 42 (1905): 673-
75, p. 675. 
A. Schuberg and H. Schlossberger, 'Zum 25. Jahrestag der Entdeckung der Spirochaete pallida', 
Klinische Wochenschrift 9 (1930): 582-86, p. 583. 
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"Giemsa stain is often mixed with dextrin and, as experience shows, offers a favourable nutritive medium 
to numerous microorganisms, among others to cocci, bacteria, and also to spirochaetes. Therefore, the 
suspicion cannot be dismissed that the demonstrated syphilis spirochaetes come for the most part not from 
the tissue but from the dyes". 2 9 
Thesing himself showed photographs of object-glasses treated with Giemsa stain (without 
preparations from pathological material!) which exhibited a certain resemblance to Schau-
dinn's photographs of pale spirochaetes. In Thesing's opinion, Schaudinn's preparations could 
therefore be dismissed as 'artefacts', representing a clear case of coloured (or stained) 
observation. 
Another objection was directed at the alleged protozoal nature of Spirochaeta pallida. 
According to Thesing, there was nothing to support this assumption: no nuclei, no undulative 
membranes and no flagella were visible. In his view, spirochaetes had to be classified as 
belonging to the bacteria. 
Finally, the differentiation between the pale spirochaete and other species of spirochaetes 
was also questioned. Schaudinn had pointed at the small size and delicacy, the number, 
steepness, and rigidness of coils, and the difficulty of staining as specific characteristics of 
Spirochaeta pallida distinguishing it from other spirochaetes: 
"If one has imprinted the characteristic image of this spiral in one's mind, then, in my opinion, one will 
always easily recognize this form again".30 
The opponents of the pale spirochaete called into question the very idea that there was a 
constant and characteristic form of this putative species. 
The controversy between the adherents of the two rival candidates for the aetiological 
agent of syphilis encouraged a sceptical attitude among other members of the medical com-
munity. At the Berlin meeting old Oscar Lassar, a died-in-the-wool dermatologist, remarked 
that in the past 25 years exactly 25 different syphilis agents had been proposed. And the 
Chairman, Excellenz von Bergmann, concluded the meeting with the words: 
"Herewith the debate is closed until yet another syphilis agent will claim our attention".31 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 17. Mai 1905', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 
42 (1905): 694. 
Schaudinn and Hoffmann, op. cit. (note 27), pp. 673-74. 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 24. Mai 1905', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 
42 (1905): 731-34, p. 734. 
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If a purported discovery requires recognition by the relevant scientific community to be 
considered a genuine discovery 3 2 , then even by 24 May 1905 the causative agent of sy-
philis could not be said to have been 'discovered' already. During the following months of 
that year, however, events would take a more favourable turn for Schaudinn and Hoffmann. 
In June 1905, Thesing's charge that the pale spirochaetes in Schaudinn's preparations 
derived from Giemsa's stain rather than from syphilitic tissue aroused an angry reaction from 
G. Giemsa. He first accused Thesing of having maltreated his stain by mixing it with dextrin. 
Giemsa also expressed his conviction that the socalled 'spirochaetes' shown by Thesing at 
the meeting of the Berlin Medical Society were nothing else man tiny crystals of methylene 
blue and methylene azure which had precipitated during the drying of the Giemsa solution: 
"These [crystals] can, as anyone can convince himself most easily, delusively suggest the 
most beautiful bacterial flora, but they will be immediately resolved when the preparation is 
washed off with water in the usual manner". 3 3 Now it was the turn of Thesing's 'spiro-
chaetes', rather than those of Schaudinn, to be exposed as artefacts. 
In the fall of 1905, Spirochaetapallida clearly had the edge over its rival, Cytorrhyctes 
Ms. An official report released on 12 August 1905, which is also cited by Fleck, declared 
that spirochaetes had already been found "by more than a hundred authors in the most 
diverse products of syphilis" (16 / 25). Such a large number of confirmations carried weight 
and could not fail to tip the balance in favour of the pale spirochaete. Still, the opposition, 
organized from the Zoological Institute in Berlin, did not give in. The adherents of Cytor-
rhyctes Ms seized upon what constituted Spirochaeta pallida's heel of Achilles: its low 
visibility. Artificial means of visualization had to be used to make the microbe (more) vis-
ible. When Giemsa staining was followed by the more powerful silver impregnation method, 
the opponents of the pale spirochaete did not hesitate to denounce the results obtained with 
the new method again as artefacts. They thus opened a new round in the debate on coloured 
(stained) observation and artefacts. In Section 5 I will deal with this debate in more detail. 
First, however, I will discuss Fleck's views on the discovery of the causative agent of 
syphilis in the next Section. 
Cf.: "Discoveries occur because they are made to occur socially by processes of social recogni-
tion", A. Brannigan, The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries, Cambridge (Cambridge University 
Press), 1981, p. 169. 
G. Giemsa, 'Bemerkungen zur Färbung der Spirochaeta pallida (Schaudinn)', Deutsche medizi-
nische Wochenschrift 31 (1905): 1026-27, p. 1027. 
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4. Fleck's views on the discovery of the pale spirochaete 
According to Fleck, "[t]he discovery of the causative agent, Spirochaeta pallida, was the 
result of steady, systematic work by civil servants" (15-16/24). In his view, the title 'discove-
rer of the syphilis agent' should properly be awarded to the "team of civil servants" that 
"carried out its work and judged its own results in [a] careful, rational, and conscientious 
manner" (16-17/25). He also referred to the Health Office as der eigentliche Entdecker 
(German: 25). Schaudinn is seen as no more than "a standard-bearer in discovery"; he 
"personified the excellent team of health officials whose work [..] cannot easily be dissected 
for individual contribution" (41-42/57). Here as elsewhere in his work Fleck assumes an 
"extremely anti-individualistic standpoint". 3 4 Can it be sustained in this particular case? 
To support his view that the discovery of the pale spirochaete was a collective achieve-
ment, Fleck relies heavily on an official report to the Secretary of State of the Interior, which 
stated that to see in Spirochaeta pallida the causative agent of syphilis is "a not unjustified 
conclusion" (16/25). Such an account is of course produced for bureaucratic reasons and does 
not necessarily reflect the points of view of those involved. We have already seen that the 
initial reticence of Schaudinn and Hoffmann with regard to the aetiological significance of 
the pale spirochaete was actually imposed on them. Fleck appears to have taken the bureau-
cratic manner of reporting, with its typical stress on the "careful, rational, and conscientious" 
procedure, as directly reflecting the character of the discovery process itself. It is illuminat-
ing to contrast Fleck's account with the reminiscences of Richard Goldschmidt, a protozoolo-
gist and geneticist who had cooperated with Schaudinn at the zoological station in Rovigno 
on the Adriatic Coast, before the latter was called back to Germany. To judge from the 
portrait sketched by Goldschmidt, Schaudinn was by no means a bureaucratic personality. 
Goldsclimidt describes Schaudinn's attitude to the Imperial Health Office and the circum-
stances leading to his involvement in the search for the syphilis agent in the following pass-
age: 
"In 1904 the Imperial Health Office called him back to Berlin. He was very unhappy with the prospect 
of spending most of his time at a desk writing administrative reports for burial in some files. That office 
was known as a hotbed of bureaucracy, where so-called administrators moved the unending merry-go-
round of reports and files as an end in itself. But things happened differently. At this time the Kaiser 
became shocked by a report on the incidence of syphilis in the armed forces, and he gave orders to the 
Health Office to try to find the cause of the disease and a cure. Thus it happened that Schaudinn finally 
R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle, 'Introduction', in R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle (eds.), Cognition and 
Fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck, Dordrecht (Reidel), 1986, p. XI. A similar criticism was already 
voiced in Hans Petersen's early review; see Petersen, op. cit. (note 1). 
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received the command of His Majesty to discover the syphilis germ, if we may describe the happenings 
a little facetiously".35 
Regrettably, I am not in a position to confirm or refute Goldschmidt's assertion that it was 
the Kaiser's alarm about the incidence of syphilis in the armed forces which induced the 
Health Office to search for the syphilis agent. This assertion, if true, would of course be grist 
to Fleck's mill. In connection with the Wassermann reaction he emphasizes the stimulus 
exercised by a high ministry official, Friedrich Althoff, as an important social motive for the 
development of this diagnostic test (68-69/90). If Goldschmidt's recollections are correct on 
this score, then we have an even more impressive social influence personified by the Kaiser 
himself in this case. In contradistinction to Fleck, however, Goldschmidt does not nunimize 
the individual contribution of Schaudinn to the discovery of the pale spirochaete: "His former 
work had made him well acquainted with this group of organisms [i.e. spirochaetes], and his 
uncanny power of observation made him see where others had failed". 3 6 Schaudinn, then, 
was not an easily exchangeable and replaceable member of an anonymous team of civil 
servants. For Goldschmidt, there was no question that Schaudinn was the real discoverer of 
Spirochaetapallida. He did not even grant the tide of 'co-discoverer' to Hoffmann. 3 7 Hoff-
mann's principal, Professor Lesser, strongly defended the latter's claim to the title of 'co-
discoverer' on several occasions, awarding the title of 'discoverer' to Schaudinn. 3 8 For my 
part, I do not wish to engage in the dispute about who precisely is to share in the honour of 
the discovery. My only aim was to point out that Fleck's designation of the Imperial Health 
Office (or the team of civil servants organized by it) as the 'true discoverer' is highly prob-
lematic. 
In a sense, if one takes an 'anti-individualistic' point of view, Fleck's designation of the 
Health Office as the collective discoverer does not even go far enough. Why should one 
limit oneself to this particular bureaucracy, why not also award the title of 'discoverer' to 
the collectivity of the "more than a hundred authors" who, according to the official report 
of August 1905, have shown pale spirochaetes "in the most diverse products of syphilis" 
(16/25)? There is nothing in Fleck's approach that militates against this extension of the title 
R. Goldschmidt, Portraits from Memory: Recollections of a Zoologist, Seattle (University of 
Washington Press), 1956, pp. 133-34. 
Goldschmidt, op. cit. (note 35), p. 134. Paul de Kruif also emphasizes Schaudinn's anti-bureau-
cratic mentality and his special capacity for observation ("his hawk-eye used to spotting extremely 
tiny, almost non-existent spirochaetes"), see de Kruif, op. cit. (note 21), p. 204. 
"After Schaudinn's early death all this was forgotten, and in the course of time Hofmann [sic] 
emerged as codiscoverer"; Goldschmidt, op. cit. (note 21), p. 134. 
See, for instance, Lesser's letter to Metchnikoff, 25 May 1905, reprinted in Zeiss, op. cit. (note 
19), p. 173; see also 'Gesellschaft der Charite-Aerzte: Sitzung vom 8. Juni 1905', Berliner kli-
nische Wochenschrift 42 (1905): 9991. 
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of discoverer. But, of course, it would reduce the very notions of 'discoverer' and 'dis-
covery' to absurdity. 
Despite the inadequacies of Fleck's collectivist approach, it contains the valuable insight 
that a discovery, to be recognized as such, has to undergo a social process of validation. It 
is the latter that stamps a purported discovery as a genuine discovery, or as Fleck asserts 
about Schaudinn's finding: "The meaning and the truth value of Schaudinn's finding is [..] 
a function of the community of those who, maintaining intellectual interaction on the basis 
of a shared intellectual past, made his achievement possible and accepted it" (40/56). 
To substantiate this view, Fleck offers what would be called in modern constructivist 
parlance a symmetrical account of the acceptance of Spirochaeta pallida and the rejection of 
Cytorrhyctes Ms as the causative agent of syphilis. Before turning to Fleck's analysis, I will 
briefly discuss the clearly asymmetrical account of the same episode offered by Goldschmidt. 
Goldschmidt describes the direct aftermath of the memorable meeting of the Berlin Medical 
Society on 17 and 24 May 1905: 
"Subsequently the entire profession declared the spirochete nonexistent and cracked jokes about its 
paleness which allowed only Schaudinn to see it. The worst of the jeering crowd was his old teacher, the 
zoologist Franz Eilhard Schulze, who, though an excellent zoologist, was the prototype of what I have 
described as a Bonze. He had become involved somehow with a young man named Siegel who claimed 
to have discovered the syphilis germ in the form of an almost submicroscopic body, a 'discovery' which 
was soon exploded. But Schulze defended him and attacked Schaudinn in the nastiest way [..] But slowly 
the confirmations of Schaudinn's findings came in [..] and Schaudinn finally received credit for his dis-
covery".39 
In his description of events Goldschmidt uses the so-called 'contingent repertoire', a type of 
discourse that is called upon to account for the activities of those scientists who, according 
to the author or speaker, subscribe to incorrect views. 4 0 The attribution of a truth value 
comes first; in this case it is taken that Siegel's microbe is not the syphilis agent (his 'dis-
covery' - within inverted commas - was soon 'exploded'). Then the behaviour of the adher-
ents of this 'pseudo-agent' can be described in social and psychological terms and not in 
terms of scientific rationality (or the 'empiricist repertoire' in the terminology of Gilbert and 
Mulkay). Thus Goldschmidt tells about Schulze that he was "the worst of the jeering crowd"; 
that he was an unpleasant authoritarian person (a 'Bonze'): that he "had become involved 
somehow with" Siegel (surely not a rational process!) and that he "attacked Schaudinn in the 
Goldschmidt, op. cit. (note 35), pp. 134-35. 
G.N. Gilbert and M. Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box: A Sociological Analysis of Scientists' Dis-
course, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1984, pp. 79-82. 
104 
nastiest way" . 4 1 The rhetorical effect of this 'contingent repertoire' is that it will obviate 
the need for assessing the arguments put forward by Schulze and company on their own 
merits. The point of the principles of symmetry and impartiality of modern constructivism 
is precisely to avoid using two different discursive repertoires, the empiricist and the contin-
gent, to account for scientific views held to be correct or incorrect. 
In his more symmetrical analysis, Fleck imagines the possibility that John Siegel's 
Cytorrhyctes Ms had been accepted as the causative agent of syphilis: "If his [Siegel's] 
findings had had the appropriate influence and received a proper measure of publicity throug-
hout the thought collective, the concept of syphilis would be different today. Some syphilis 
cases according to present-day nomenclature would then perhaps be regarded as related to 
variola and other diseases caused by inclusion bodies" (39/55). Fleck abruptly ends his 
thought experiment, however, by observing that such a possibility can only be envisioned 
logically but not construed as a historical possibility. By the turn of the century, Fleck holds, 
the concept of syphilis had already become too rigid for Siegel's microbe to be accepted as 
the causative agent. 
Fleck's analysis, though intriguing as an attempt at symmetrical explanation, is not 
convincing. It is doubtful whether the existing syphilis concept really constituted the decisive 
obstacle for the acceptance of Siegel's microbe. It is true that Siegel postulated family rela-
tionships between his 'agent of syphilis' and the causative agents of variola, smallpox, foot-
and-mouth disease and scarlet fever. In his turn Schaudinn construed a kinship relation 
between Spirochaeta pallida and the spirochaete causing relapsing fever, to say nothing of 
the controversial connection with the trypanosomes which he also suggested. In the eyes of 
an experienced dermatologist like Oscar Lassar the relationship between syphilis and the 
exanthemas mentioned by Siegel was actually much more plausible than the relationship 
between syphilis and relapsing fever: 
"One cannot ignore that there are also many analogies between the various exanthemas and syphilis. The 
relapsing fever spirillum [better: spirochaete] creates such heavy reactions within the visceral organs, 
which we do not encounter even approximately in syphilis".42 
The existing concept of syphilis was therefore not the real stumbling block for Cytorrhyctes 
Ms. It can also be argued that Fleck, by simply assuming in his thought experiment that 
Siegel's findings "had received a proper measure of publicity throughout the thought collec-
There is a striking parallel with a recent cause célèbre in Dutch AIDS research, the so-called 
Buck/Goudsmit affair. After Henk Buck's production of phosphate methylated DNA (to be used as 
medicine against AIDS) was exposed as an 'error', the evaluation of his personal character changed 
dramatically: from a 'fatherly genius' he turned into a 'tiran' mtimidating his collaborators. See R. 
Hagendijk and J. Meeus, 'De Buck/Goudsmit Affaire: Feiten, fictie en blind vertrouwen', Kermis 
en Méthode 17 (1993): 147-91, p. 171. 
Lassar, op. cit. (note 15), p. 730. 
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5. The silver spirochaete 
As we have seen, by 12 August 1905 Spirochaeta pallida had already been found by more 
than a hundred investigators in the most diverse products of syphilis. In October 1905 Fritz 
Schaudinn confidently expressed his expectation that "[t]he findings will steadily increase 
even further when all investigators acquire the necessary experience in finding and staining 
these delicate forms". 4 4 Although he reiterated his view that Spirochaeta pallida possessed 
a characteristic shape of its own which allowed it to be clearly distinguished from other 
spirochaetes, he also admitted that the recognition of this characteristic form required "a 
certain feeling for the typical" (ein gewisses Geflihlfiir das Typische). Moreover, staining 
with Giemsa solution also demanded experience and skill to avoid the occurrence of all kinds 
of artefacts [Kunstprodukte]. Schaudinn referred in particular to the hazard of insufficient 
staining, which would make other spirochaetes appear just as pale as the pale spirochaete 
would be under normal staining conditions. 4 5 
It was about this time that two investigators, the Italian Bertarelli and the French-Roma-
man microbiologist Constantin Levaditi, independently of each other developed a new method 
of staining (or rather impregnation) by means of silver nitrate. Levaditi had been inspired by 
the silver impregnation method used by Santiago Ramon y Cajal to demonstrate nervous 
tissue. The advantage of the silver impregnation method was its capacity to show pale spiro-
The English translation is somewhat inappropriate here; the German original reads: "Wäre seiner 
Erkenntnis entsprechende suggestive Wirkung und denkkollektive Verbreitung zu Teil worden [..]" 
(German: 55). 
F. Schaudinn, 'Zur Kenntnis der Spirochaete pallida: Vorläufige Mitteilung', Deutsche medizinische 
Wochenschrift 31 (1905): 1665-67, p. 1665. 
Schaudinn maintained that this had happened to two investigators, Kiolemenoglori and von Cube, 
who had found spirochaetes, which were said to be indistinguishable from Spirochaeta pallida, in 
carcinomas and other non-syphilitic lesions. 
r ive" 4 3 , evades the main point, namely, to explain why Siegel's microbe did nowhere come 
near the "measure of publicity" (derikkollektive Verbreitung) that was achieved by Schau-
dinn's agent. Why had the pale spirochaete, less than half a year after its discovery, already 
been found by more than a hundred investigators in various syphilitic lesions, whereas 
Siegel's findings were only confirmed by a few collaborators of the Zoological Institute in 
Berlin led by Professor Schulze? It would appear that such a preponderance in sheer numbers 
constitutes a real challenge for a symmetrical, constructivist explanation. Would it not be 
more natural to conclude that Schaudinn and Hoffmann's findings got so much more confir-
mation, because Spirochaeta pallida really is the agent of syphilis? 
106 
chaetes regularly as black spirals in tissue sections, whereas Giemsa staining was largely 
limited to the demonstration of those microbes in smears. 
Bertarelli had developed the silver impregnation method in the course of his experimen-
tal research on the transmission of syphilis to rabbits. By inoculating luetic material into the 
cornea he was able to produce a typical keratitis syphilitica. As a control procedure he 
retransmitted the disease from infected rabbits to monkeys, which in due course exhibited all 
the characteristic symptoms of monkey syphilis. Bertarelli's success made a new test animal, 
the rabbit, available for the experimental study of syphilis. The availability of a cheaper and 
more tractable experimental animal species than primates was actually one of the precondi-
tions for the reorientation of Paul Ehrlich's chemotherapeutic research programme toward 
syphilis. Bertarelli used his new silver impregnation method to demonstrate the presence of 
pale spirochaetes in tissue sections of the cornea. He sent his preparations to Schaudinn, who 
recognized the black spirals as specimens of Spirochaeta pallida. Thus the silver impreg-
nation method received the imprimatur of the discoverer of the pale spirochaete. 
The priority of the successful transmission of syphilis to rabbits had already been 
claimed by two adherents of Cytorrhyctes Ms, John Siegel and Walter Schulze. Their experi-
mental results were however dismissed as spurious by Erich Hoffmann and others, because 
the monkeys that were re-infected from their 'syphilitic' rabbits exhibited phenomena which 
did not correspond to the typical manifestations of monkey syphilis established by other 
investigators. 4 6 Siegel and Schulze also claimed to have demonstrated, using a normal ani-
line dye stain, Cytorrhyctes luis in the corneas of their 'syphilitic' rabbits. No wonder that 
the silver impregnation method should arouse their suspicion. 
On 7 December 1905, at a meeting of physicians of the Charité hospital, Erich Hoff-
mann demonstrated several preparations of pale spirochaetes obtained with the aid of the new 
methods of Bertarelli and Levaditi. 4 7 He made an important statement: 
"Finally, I would like to emphasize on this occasion, that now, after so many authors have furnished 
evidence for the specific nature of Spirochaeta pallida and the demonstration in tissue sections [Schnitten] 
also has succeeded, there can be no longer any doubt about the aetiological significance of this orga-
nism". 4 8 
'Berliner ophfhalmologische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 21. Dezember 1905', Berliner klinische 
Wochenschrift 43 (1906): 370-71; Dr. Wechselmann, 'Experimenteller Beitrag zur Kritik der Sie-
gelschen Syphilisübertragungsversuche auf Tiere', Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 32 (1906): 
219-20. 
Those methods differed in details. The silver impregnation method of Levaditi became the most 
widely used one. 
'Gesellschaft der CharitS-Aerzte: Sitzung vom 7. Dezember 1905', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 
43 (1906): 175-76. 
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Thus, by this time, Hoffmann was willing to drop all provisos and reservations with regard 
to the aetiological status of the pale spirochaete. 
Thanks to the silver impregnation method, the stream of new finds of pale spirochaetes, 
in particular in tissue sections of internal organs, continued to flow during the next year. 
Many authorities, e.g. Flügge, Gaffky, and Loftier, abandoned their former scepticism with 
regard to the probable aetiological status of Spirochaeta pallida. The pathological anatomist 
C. Benda declared that the results of the new method made him completely change his mind 
in the period between March and June 1906: from a "doubter" [Zweifler} he turned into a 
"confessor" [Bekenner]}9 
After Schaudinn's early death on 22 June 1906, the adherents of Cytorrhyctes Ms 
launched a full-scale attack on what they derisively called the "silver spirochaete", in a last 
effort to stem the tide. They propounded the view that the preparations obtained by silver 
impregnation were mere artefacts. Those black spirals made visible through silver nitrate 
were not spirochaetes at all, they maintained, but nerve endings, connective tissue fibres, 
elastic fibres or other tissue constituents which had disintegrated through tissue degeneration 
and subsequently taken on a spiral form as a consequence of the alcoholic preservation and 
fixation treatment required by the silver impregnation method. In September 1906, Walter 
Schulze reported about his attempts to demonstrate 'silver spirochaetes', using Levaditi's 
method, in the cornea of rabbits inoculated only with street-refuse. His article contained 
photographs showing the "silver pseudo-spirochaetes" thus obtained which closely resembled 
the 'silver spirochaetes' obtained by Bertarelli and other investigators. 5 0 In the same issue 
of the Berliner klinische Wochenschrift Schulze's colleague Hans Friedenthal presented 
photographs of silver precipitations in carcinoma tissue "which bear a deceptive resemblance 
to the silver spirals described as Spirochaeta pallida". 5 1 Likewise, a third member of the 
Zoological Institute in Berlin, Dr. Saling, also contributed to what was apparently a con-
certed action (Benda spoke about a Feldzug or 'campaign') to destroy the credibility of the 
"silver spirochaete". It is not difficult to imagine why they chose this as the strategic target 
for their attacks, for as Dr. Saling concluded from the alleged exposure of this 'artefact': 
"Therefore all those hundreds of confirmations, which allegedly prove the presence of the 
so-called 'lues spirochaete' in the internal organs, are dissolved". 5 2 
C. Benda, 'Zw Levaditifärbung der Spirochaeta pallida', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 428-32, 480-84, p. 428. 
W. Schulze, 'Die Silberspirochaete', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 43 (1906): 1213-16. 
H. Friedenthal, 'Ueber Spirochaetenbefunde bei Carcinom und bei Syphilis', Berliner klinische 
Wochenschrift 43 (1906): 1217-18, p. 1217. 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 20. Februar', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 254-59, p. 258. 
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The question of the "silver spirochaete" was put on the agenda of the Berlin Medical Society 
during four successive meetings in February and March 1907. In this "long debate between 
friends and opponents of the spirochaete" (Blaschko 5 3), almost all the issues which divided 
the two parties were extensively discussed. The oppositional party, represented by Saling, 
Walter Schulze, Hans Friedenthal, and Jancke 5 4 , stated its case clearly. The pale spiro-
chaetes which were mostly found in skin lesions and could be demonstrated in smears 
through Giemsa stain, had to be considered as harmless saprophytes just like some other 
spirochaetes such as Spirochaeta refringens. Indeed, there was no set of characteristics by 
which Spirochaeta pallida could be clearly distinguished from other spirochaetes and which 
would justify to consider it a separate species. The fact that pale spirochaetes were also 
occasionally found in syphilitic lesions, didn't say anything about their aetiological signifi-
cance. As such the pale spirochaetes stained with Giemsa solution had nothing to do with the 
so-called "silver spirochaetes" demonstrated in tissue sections by means of the silver impreg-
nation method. The latter represented nerve fibrils, elastic fibres or other normal tissue 
constituents which had disintegrated through processes of tissue necrosis or maceration. 
The adherents of Cytorrhyctes Ms had several arguments to back up their assertion 
about the non-identity of "Giemsa spirochaetes" and "silver spirochaetes". First, the two 
clearly differed in appearance. The "silver spirochaetes" looked much shorter and thicker. 
They did not accept Hoffmann's explanation that this could simply be accounted for by 
shrinkage as a consequence of fixation and paraffin preservation and the precipitation of a 
coating of silver grains around the spirochaete. 5 5 Secondly, Saling also pointed at the "enor-
mous disproportion which is manifested in the fact that in the same piece of tissue myriads 
of socalled 'spirochaetes' are present after silver impregnation on sections, but that not a 
single spirochaete appears after staining with a true dyestuff!". 5 6 Such disproportion, he 
maintained, was not known of any other bacterium or protozoon which could be stained both 
with dyes and with silver. He formulated a methodological requirement which the adherents 
of Spirochaeta pallida had to fulfil: 
"The identity of the 'Giemsa spirochaete' with the so-called 'silver spirochaete' could be made plausible 
only if in sections of material treated in accordance with all the rules of the histological art, precisely on 
the analogous sites where, in the sections impregnated with silver, the so-called 'silver spirochaetes' are 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 13. März', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 350-58, p. 355. 
Franz Eilhard Schulze and John Siegel were conspicuously absent on both occasions (May 1905 and 
February-March 1907) when the Berlin Medical Society discussed the question of the spirochaete. 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 20. Februar', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 254-59, p. 256. 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 13. März', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 350-58, p. 355. 
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located in myriads, the same spiral fibres could also be demonstrated in equivalent quantities by using a 
dyestuff".57 
This is indeed a very exacting demand. During the meetings of the Berlin Medical Society 
in February and March 1907, the "friends of the spirochaete" attempted to counter the criti-
cisms put forward by the opponents. They pointed out that 'silver spirochaetes' had not only 
been demonstrated in tissues but also in the lumen of blood and lymph vessels. Such fin-
dings, they held, could not be explained by the tissue decay theory of the opponents. 5 8 The 
latter answered that fibres and other tissue constituents might be inadvertently displaced from 
the tissue by the microtome knife. 5 9 
The pathological anatomist Orth was not impressed by the artificial 'silver spirochaetes' 
produced by the adherents of Cytorrhyctes luis. He could not hide his irritation about their 
ways of arguing: 
"Hearing the opponents and reading their publications, one could believe that they were dealing with 
scientific novices whom they had to teach the first principles of microscopic observation. For my part, 
I have to protest when Mr Friedenthal, for example, pretends that those black things which he showed 
in his pictures in the Berliner klinische Wochenschrift [..], are taken, or could be taken, for spirochaetes 
by competent investigators. No one would have hit on that idea. This is a struggle against windmills".60 
Although not all the things that were stained black by Levaditi's method were spirochaetes, 
it could safely be entrusted to the critical judgement of the competent investigators to reach 
a reasonable decision. 
Two investigators, Bab and Mühlens, emphasized that the findings of 'silver spirochae-
tes' in the livers of luetic foetusses were confirmed by the outcomes of the recently deve-
loped Wassermann reaction used for antigen determination of 'liver extracts ' . 6 1 Saling 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 13. März', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 350-58, p. 353. 
This argument had already been used by Levaditi in a first reaction to Walter Schulze's accusations. 
See C. Levaditi, 'Bemerkungen zu dem Aufsatz "die Silberspirochaete" von W. Schulze in No 37 
dieser Wochenschrift', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 43 (1906): 1368-69. 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 13. März', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 350-58, p. 350. 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 6. März', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 318-20, p. 319. 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 20. Februar', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 254-59, p. 259; 'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 27. Februar', Berliner 
klinische Wochenschrift 44 (1907): 291-95, p. 293. 
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replied that the originators of this serological test themselves had declared that it was not 
ready for practical use, as it did not yet furnish reliable results in every case . 6 2 
To support the identity of the 'silver spirochaete' and the 'Giemsa spirochaete', the 
pathological anatomist Benda showed photographs and preparations from the livers of syphi-
litic children. Smears taken from the same material which in silver-impregnated tissue sec-
tions exhibited the presence of 'silver spirochaetes', showed pale spirochaetes after staining 
with a Giemsa solution. 6 3 The opposite party, in the person of Saling, reacted by denying 
that the spirochaetes stained with Giemsa belonged to the species Pallida; they were said to 
exhibit the species characteristics of Refringens.64 To Benda this assertion was "completely 
at odds with the fact" [durchaus der Tatsache widersprechend]. The venereologist Alfred 
Blaschko commented on this disagreement: "In my view, the preparations of Mr Benda are 
not conclusive to a malevolent judge, but only to those who have any inkling of the extreme 
difficulty with which these organisms can be stained with Giemsa [emphasis added]" . 6 5 
Blaschko also argued that the methodological requirement of a complete congruence, even 
in quantitative terms, between the results of silver impregnation and Giemsa staining was 
highly unreasonable. Given its delicacy and its special tinctorial properties, it was no more 
than to be expected that Spirochaeta pallida could not be made visible with the normal dyes 
in the relatively thick tissue sections. 
During the long discussions in the Berlin Medical Society, many "friends of the 
spirochaete" must have had the feeling that in dealing with their opponents from the Zoologi-
cal Institute they were rapidly reaching the limits of reasonable debate. Their exasperating 
experience was that they could not force their opponents into line by what they considered 
as rational and convincing arguments. Their determined opponents acted much like "Awk-
ward Student" or "the obstinate dissenter" in the modern sociology of science textbooks of 
Harry Collins and Bruno Latour. 6 6 No wonder that the "friends of the spirochaete" some-
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 13. März', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 350-58, p. 354. As a matter of fact, 'antigen determination' would later be abandoned as 
spurious; 'antibody determination' would become the only reliable part of the Wassermann test. See 
Chapter VI. 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 27. Februar', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 291-95, p. 293; 'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 13. März', Berliner kli-
nische Wochenschrift 44 (1907): 350-58, p. 357. 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 27. Februar', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 291-95, p. 293; 'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 13. März', Berliner kli-
nische Wochenschrift 44 (1907): 350-58, p. 356. 
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times resorted to authority arguments. Both Hoffmann and Orth, for example, disputed the 
competence of non-medical scientists to speak about medical subjects like necrosis and 
maceration. Hoffmann also appealed to the views of Walter Schulze's own teacher, Professor 
Greeff, to defend Bertarelli's priority against Siegel and Schulze's claims to have transmitted 
syphilis to rabbits for the first time. He also emphasized that "virtually all syphilologists" and 
"almost all pathological anatomists" supported the aetiological status of Spirochaeta palli-
da.67 
As will be clear by now, the controversy about the 'silver spirochaete' was not settled. 
In his final word Saling reaffirmed his position: "All those hundreds of 'corifirmers' ['Be-
statiger"] have fallen victim to a severe delusion; and Mssrs Bertarelli, Hoffmann, Benda 
etcetera may not take it ill of me that I have some doubts about their critical judgement and 
their capacity of observation". Blaschko, in his final speech, noted that all rational arguments 
had been idle and impotent: "Who does not want to be convinced by what Mr Benda and I, 
and by what Mssrs Muhlens, Hoffmann, Bab etcetera have expounded in truly sufficient 
extension, such a person cannot be convinced in any possible way" . 6 8 Blaschko concluded 
that it was time to close the debate and to continue the work on the Spirochaeta pallida 
without regard for the views of the obstinate opponents. 
And this is indeed what would happen: from then on, the opponents' criticisms would 
be simply ignored. 
6. Problems of classification 
In an essay written in 1962, Thomas S. Kuhn noted: "[..] to discover something one must 
also be aware of the discovery and know as well what it is that one has discovered". 6 9 He 
immediately added however: "But [..] how much must one know?". Presumably Priestley did 
not know enough to be called the discoverer of oxygen, because, although he did produce 
the gas, he thought that he had 'dephlogisticated air' in his hands. Even Lavoisier's claim 
to the title of discoverer of oxygen is not fully secured, because his notion of oxygen as an 
atomic 'principle of acidity' does not correspond to present-day views. Such considerations 
are also pertinent when we discuss Schaudinn's claims to the title of discoverer of the syph-
ilis agent. He held some idiosyncratic views on the nature of this agent which were already 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 20. Februar', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 254-59, p. 256. 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 13. März', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 350-58, p. 355 and p. 356. 
T.S. Kuhn, "The Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery', reprinted in T.S. Kuhn, The Essen-
tial Tension, Chicago (University of Chicago Press), 1977: 165-77, p. 170. 
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controversial in his own time and which are no longer considered credible today. So, did 
Schaudinn 'know' what it was that he had 'discovered'? 
His most controversial view on the nature of Spirochaeta pallida derived from a specu-
lative theory which he had already developed before he became involved in the search for 
the syphilis germ. According to this theory, malaria parasites, trypanosomes and spirochaetes 
were merely different forms in the development of one single type of organism. That would 
entail that Spirochaeta pallida would be a developmental form of an organism, which would 
also comprise specific but as yet unknown types of trypanosomes and malaria parasites as 
developmental stages. In his presentation before the Berlin Medical Society in May 1905, 
Schaudinn was very reticent to enfold his precise views on this point. He stated that of only 
one cognate microbe, Spirochaeta ziemanni, more was known of its developmental cycle and 
hinted that more research needed to be done before definitive statements could be made . 7 0 
As we have seen, Schaudinn's entire theory had already been severely criticized by the 
American bacteriologists Novy and McNeal as being based on mixed infections. 
Interestingly enough, Schaudinn's "tremendously erroneous" and "idiotic" theory - to 
use Paul de Kruif s descriptions 7 1 - was not without significant effects on anti-syphilitic 
therapy. His speculative view on the close relationship between the syphilis agent and the 
trypanosomes induced Paul Ehrlich, who had attended the discussions in the Berlin Medical 
Society, to extend and subsequently redirect his chemotherapeutic research programme from 
trypanosomal diseases to syphilis. Ehrlich was not the only medical investigator to be influ-
enced by Schaudinn. The direct effect of the latter's views was that the chemical substance 
atoxyl, already in use against sleeping sickness, was widely tried as a medicine against 
syphilis. 7 2 The side-effects of atoxyl soon turned out to be unacceptably severe (it caused 
blindness), but the attempts would ultimately lead to the discovery of the 'magic bullet'. 
From the very outset, Schaudinn's view of spirochaetes as belonging to the kingdom of 
Protozoa has met with disagreement as well as assent. We have already seen that at the first 
meeting of the Berlin Medical Society in May 1905, Thesing objected to the presumed 
protozoal nature of Spirochaeta pallida and argued for its classification among the bacteria. 
The latter view was by no means confined to the opponents of the pale spirochaete. Benda, 
for instance, also subscribed to the bacterial nature of this organism. 7 3 Criteria that were 
used at the time for assigning the group of spirochaetes to the kingdom of Protozoa included: 
nearly perfect flexibility of the body, the presence of an undulating membrane, and multipli-
Schaudinn and Hoffmann, op. cit. (note 27), p. 673. 
De Kruif, op. cit. (note 21), p. 190 and p. 204. 
O. Lassar, 'Atoxyl bei Syphilis', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 (1907), p. 684; Lassar 
acknowledges the influence of Schaudinn's views on his trials of atoxyl against syphilis. 
'Berliner medizinische Gesellschaft: Sitzung vom 13 März', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 350-58, p. 358. 
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cation by longitudinal division. 7 4 It was difficult to ascertain these criteria for each and 
every member of the group of spirochaetes, and also to justify the pertinence of the criteria 
themselves. 
For several decades, the precise position occupied by the spirochaetes within the system 
of nature has been disputed among protozoologists and bacteriologists. Both disciplines have 
"claimed" this group of organisms. 7 5 According to some, "spirochetes represent[ed] a kind 
of no man's land between the true bacteria and protozoa". 7 6 Modern textbooks tend to class 
the spirochaetes (or the order of 'Spirochaetales') among the Schizomycetes (bacteria in the 
broadest sense), but also stress their special characteristics which set them apart from the 
'true' bacteria. 7 7 Since the appearance of the sixth edition of Bergey's Manual of Determi-
native Bacteriology in 1948, the order of 'Spirochaetales' is generally divided into two 
families, each of which is in turn divided into three genera. 7 8 Schaudinn's pale spirochaete 
now belongs to the family of Treponemataceae and to the genus of Treponema; correspon-
dingly, it has been renamed Treponema pallidum. 
Did Schaudinn 'know' what it was that he had 'discovered' when he thought that it was 
a protozoon? One might reasonably argue that the precise assignment of the pale spirochaete 
to higher-order taxa is not relevant for judging his claims to the title of discoverer, as long 
as he correctly delineated the pale spirochaete as a distinct species (to count as the discoverer 
of whales, one need not know that they belong to the mammals). But on this account there 
are also problems. These difficulties have been exploited by the adherents of Cytorrhyctes 
Ms. Hans Friedenthal devotes an ironic, even sarcastic paragraph to the wide variety of 
descriptions given of the pale spirochaete: 
"Whereas in Schaudinn and Hoffmann's first publication Spirochaeta pallida did not have a fixed longi-
tudinal axis, but performed bending, twisting and lashing movements with its entire body, was also 
provided with an undulating membrane and could be distinguished from spirilla through the absence of 
flagella, the image had already completely changed in Schaudinn's second communication. Spirochaeta 
pallida had lost its undulating membrane and had received flagella in return. Its life habits had also totally 
changed. Rather than about the bending and lashing movements of the whole body, we read in the second 
communication about the fixed, coiled complexion of Spirochaeta pallida. Further contributions to the 
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medical literature grant a head-like thickening of the fore-end or even of both ends to the spirochaete, 
whereas other authors claim to distinguish Spirochaeta pallida easily from other spirochaetes by its tapered 
ends. Spirochaeta pallida is described as having from three to eighty coils, so that it would be nearly 
visible with a magnifying-glass. Depending on the observers, it multiplies by longitudinal or by transverse 
division. Some even had the opportunity to catch a pair of spirochaetes copulating".79 
This passage can be read as an ironic comment on Schaudinn's previously cited statement: 
"If one has imprinted the characteristic image of this spiral in one's mind, men, in my 
opinion, one will always easily recognize this form again". 8 0 Friedenthal concludes that, 
on the basis of the often contradictory characterizations given, it is impossible for him to 
delineate and identify pale spirochaetes. The reader might assume that Friedenthal has unduly 
exaggerated the variety of descriptions for rhetorical reasons. The quoted passage exhibits 
indeed some exaggeration, but not, I think, out of all proportion. We may therefore ask 
again: Did Schaudinn 'know' what it was that he had 'discovered'? 
The extreme variability of characterizations of Spirochaeta pallida is comparable to a 
similar situation which obtained with respect to descriptions of diphteria bacilli. In his essay 
'Scientific observation and perception in general', Fleck analyzes the descriptions given of 
these microbes in several bacteriological textbooks dating from different years . 8 1 He notes 
that for the layman these descriptions would be simply inconsistent, while for the specialist -
not! -, "because [the specialist] knows that they are to be taken cum grano salis; each of 
[these descriptions] suggests certain pictures which may be, but do not have to be found 
everywhere. The most important and the most essential is the fact that the system is charac-
teristic [ . . ] " . 8 2 A wide variety of descriptions of the 'same' entity might not be as dra-
matic and alarming as was suggested by Friedenthal. 
Elsewhere, in his postwar essay 'To look, to see, to know', Fleck describes the emer-
gence of a common Gestalt or standard pattern as arising out of the "oscillating pictures" and 
"phantastic images" proposed by individual investigators: 
"[TJhe collective life produces among these oscillating possibilities a novel prescribed form, which is then 
fixed and pressed upon the individual. The collective experience and custom determine which feature is 
fundamental and what can be variable, and how far this variability can extend".83 
Friedenthal, op. cit. (note 51), p. 1217. 
Schaudinn and Hoffmann, op. cit. (note 27), pp. 673-74. 
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From this perspective it would be unreasonable to expect that a single researcher could set 
the standard for the community of researchers. It is therefore not surprising that Schaudinn 
did not lay down the definitive set of characteristics by which to distinguish the pale 
spirochaete from its kin. Perhaps he is not to be considered the discoverer of the syphilis 
agent after all? 
7. Conclusions 
In the introduction I argued that the discovery of the pale spirochaete as the causative agent 
of syphilis offers a better example for studying the social construction of a fact than Fleck's 
own example of the Wassermann reaction, because from a common-sense point of view the 
latter could be considered an invention rather than a discovery of a fact. So what does it 
mean to say that the scientific fact that Spirochaeta pallida (or Treponema pallidum) is the 
causative agent of syphilis has been (socially) constructed? 
Does it imply that this purported fact is not a real fact at all, that it is just a forgery, that 
it has been 'all made up ' or 'fabricated out of thin air'? Of course not! It is, however, testi-
mony to the force of the prevalent way of thinking that words such as 'making', 'fabrication' 
or 'construction' which accentuate the active involvement of the scientists in the process of 
discovery automatically arouse the suspicion that the results are spurious. This is also noted 
by the American philosopher Nelson Goodman in a chapter bearing the title 'The Fabrication 
of Facts': 
"[..] 'fabrication of fact' has a paradoxical sound. 'Fabrication' has become a synonym for 'falsehood' 
or 'fiction' as contrasted with 'truth' or 'fact'. Of course, we must distinguish falsehood and fiction from 
truth and fact; but we cannot, I am sure, do it on the ground that fiction is fabricated and fact found".84 
One should recall that 'fact' is etymologically derived from the Latin verb 'facere', 'to 
make'! 
Another interpretation of the above-mentioned statement could be that microbiological 
science has fashioned a new kind of microbe, called it Spirochaeta pallida, furnished it with 
the property of causing syphilis among humans, and finally let it loose unto an unsuspecting 
world. Of course, this view would be plainly ridiculous. It would turn 'discovery' of a 
pathogenic microbe into a criminal offence. Some interpretations of the construction meta-
phor in the works of Knorr-Cetina and Latour, however, seem to come perilously close to 
this view. Knorr-Cetina holds that "science secretes an unending stream of entities and 
N. Goodman, Ways ofWorldmaking, Indianapolis (Hackett), 1992 [1978], p. 91. 
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relations that make up 'the world '" 8 5 , whereas Latour sees science as engaged in the con-
tinuous multiplication or proliferation of new quasi-objects. Thus, it is said that Pasteur and 
the Pasteurians multiplied our numbers by making room for millions of invisible microbes 
as new members of the social body . 8 6 In the final chapter I will reconsider this version of 
the constructivist thesis. Here it must suffice to say that this interpretation of the construction 
metaphor was not intended in the account of the present chapter. 
What, then, would be a more plausible reading of the thesis that scientific facts are 
(socially) constructed? In my view, it should be read as saying that scientific facts, or rather 
decisions as to what the facts are (this reformulation is important!), are always the outcome 
of a process of social interaction among scientists in which data and arguments are exchanged 
but in which an element of negotiation is also inevitably present. The outcome can never be 
fully accounted for by the available empirical evidence and the accepted methodological rules 
alone - which for rationalist philosophers constitute the incarnation of rational procedure. 
Such rules combined with evidence do not decide the issues by themselves but leave ample 
space for more than one interpretation ('interpretive flexibility'). Constructivists can argue 
for this position philosophically by an appeal to the so-called Quine-Duhem thesis (or the 
thesis of the underdetermination of theories by the data) or Wittgenstein's insight that rules 
cannot determine their own application, but they preferably try to base their case on a multi-
plicity of empirical case studies. 
Microbiology offers a striking example of the 'negotiability' of methodological rules. 
As we have already seen in the previous chapter, Spirochaeta pallida was eventually accepted 
as the causative agent of syphilis even if it turned out to be impossible to satisfy Koch's 
postulates (because the microbe resisted every attempt at cultivation in nutrient media). There 
are more exceptions to Koch's rules in the history of medical science. Would such deviations 
from the ideal procedure be condoned by rationalist philosophers? 8 7 
In the present case of the aetiology of syphilis, the 'construction of a fact' was intima-
tely connected with the question of the possible creation of 'artefacts'. Seen from the pers-
K. Knorr-Cetina, 'Strong Constructivism - from a Sociologist's Point of View: A Personal Adden-
dum to Sismondo's Paper', Social Studies of Science 23 (1993): 555-63, p. 557. 
B. Latour, The Pasteurization of France, Cambridge MA and London (Harvard University Press), 
1988, pp. 35-38. 
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cause of AIDS. Virologist Peter Duisberg, the notorious critic of the widely accepted view that 
HIV is indeed the cause of AIDS, bases his case inter alia on the fact that, in his view, Koch's 
postulates have not been fulfilled. Until 1994 his opponents conceded this point, but denied that this 
circumstance constitutes a convincing reason to reject the aetiological status of HIV. In the year 
1994 an accident involving three laboratory workers occurred. As a consequence, AIDS researchers 
now claim that Koch's postulates have been fulfilled, but Duesberg still disagrees: "Duesberg told 
Science that, in his view, the lab-worker data don't prove that HIV satisfies Koch's postulates" (J. 
Cohen, 'Fulfilling Koch's Postulates', Science 266 [1994]: 1647). 
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pective of the minority group of 'opponents of the pale spirochaete' the same episode should 
rather be described as the failed deconstruction of an artefact - 'failed' in the sense that the 
opponents were unable to persuade the larger medical community of their views. According 
to rationalist and realist philosophers such as Anthony Derksen, Ian Hacking or Allan Frank-
lin, science has available several ready-made methodological criteria by which to distinguish 
genuine results from mere artefacts. One possibility is to use the 'argument from coinci-
dence' by obtaining the same result using different experimental apparatus or procedures. 
Hacking gives the example of seeing dense bodies in cells by the use of both electron and 
light microscopes: "I say that if you can see the same fundamental features of structure using 
several different physical systems, you have excellent reason for saying, 'that's real' rather 
than, 'that's an artifact'". 8 8 In this chapter we have seen that two different staining 
methods, Giemsa staining and silver impregnation, were deployed to visualize the pale 
spirochaete. This could not, however, resolve the issue at stake. 
For the 'friends of the spirochaete' the matter was clear: silver impregnation confirmed 
the results obtained by Giemsa staining and substantially enlarged the visibility of the 
microbe. The 'opponents', however, saw things differently. They stressed the dissimilar 
appearances of the 'Giemsa spirochaete' and what they referred to as "the socalled 'silver 
spirochaete'", discounting the explanation given by the other side for this difference. They 
also pointed at the great discrepancy in numbers of spirochaetes detected in similar tissues 
by using the two staining methods, thus arguing that there was no congruence in quantitative 
terms between the results of both methods. Of course, for the 'friends' such lack of exact 
quantitative correspondence was precisely what was to be expected, given the character of 
the spirochaete (its difficult stainability with Giemsa dye). In the present case, then, the issue 
at stake - genuine result or artefact? - could not be settled to the satisfaction of the opposing 
parties by the deployment of different staining methods, because there was no agreement on 
what constituted comparable outcomes or sufficient congruence. 
Nor could an appeal to the large number of independent confirmations of Schaudinn's 
and Hoffmann's findings settle the matter. The charge that the 'silver spirochaete' was a 
mere artefact aimed precisely at destroying the credibility of the greater part of those confir-
mations. Moreover, particularly in the initial stages, the characteristics attributed to the pale 
spirochaete varied almost from one publication to the next. It was only in the course of a 
collective process that a common Gestalt or standard pattern emerged out of the 'oscillating 
pictures' and 'phantastic images' proposed by individual investigators. (This is in full agree-
ment with Fleck's observations on the variability of descriptions of diphteria bacilli and other 
bacteria.) In the end the controversy on the aetiology of syphilis was 'closed' by ignoring 
I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, 
Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1986 [1983], p. 204. For a more rationalist treatment of 
the 'epistemological rales' involved in experimentation, see A. Franklin, "The Epistemology of 
Experiment', in D. Gooding et al. (eds.), The Uses of Experiment, Cambridge (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press), 1989, pp. 437-60. 
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rather than painstakingly refuting the detailed objections of the minority group of 'oppo-
nents' . As this group was able to invent new criticisms after each attempt of refutation, it 
appears that this was the only way to achieve 'closure'. 
In this chapter I have analyzed the discovery of a fact as a process of social construc-
tion. The final question that I must now consider concerns the status and meaning of the 
common-sense notion of a 'discovery'. In the preceding sections I have tried to problematize 
this notion by repeatedly raising the (admittedly somewhat rhetorical) question of when and 
by whom the causative agent of syphilis has been discovered. Was it on March 3rd, 1905, 
or on March 21st, or on May 24th, or perhaps later still; was it by Schaudinn or by Schau-
dinn and Hoffmann or by the Imperial Health Office (the 'true discoverer' according to 
Fleck) or perhaps even by the wider scientific community? By now we must be able to 
understand why such questions are rather futile. In his famous article on the discovery of 
oxygen Thomas Kuhn already observed that discovering something is not "a single simple 
act unequivocally attributable [..] to an individual and an instant in time" but "a complex 
process which involves recognizing both that something is and what it i s " . 8 9 Constructivists 
will make one further step. They will stress that the very idea of making a discovery implies, 
in the popular view, the validated status of that what has been discovered. This validated 
status, however, can only be bestowed on a certain result by the relevant scientific commu-
nity in a social process of validation. It is not contained in the presumed original act of 
discovering something. As Harry Collins remarks, "[..] if discoveries were private tilings 
which did not need public recognition there would be as many discoveries as there are 
fools" . 9 0 What makes the common-sense notion of 'discovery' unsuitable for analytical 
purposes in science studies is precisely the presupposition that recording and validation are 
both encompassed in a single act or procedure. 9 1 Fleck's suggestion that the Imperial 
Health Office was the 'true discoverer' of the pale spirochaete may have been somewhat of 
the mark, but he can be seen as groping toward a more adequate view when he asserted 
about Schaudinn's finding: "The meaning and the truth value of Schaudinn's finding is [..] 
a function of the community of those who, maintaining intellectual interaction on the basis 
of a shared intellectual past, made his achievement possible and accepted it" (40/56). The 
individual investigator proposes, the scientific community disposes. The category of dis-
covery must be transferred from what traditional philosophy of science calls the 'context of 
discovery' to what it calls the 'context of justification', or rather, to the social context of 
validation and acceptance. 
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CHAPTER V 
BETWEEN LABORATORY AND CLINIC: HOW THE WASSERMANN 
REACTION WAS MADE PRACTICALLY USEFUL (1906-1910) 
1. Introduction 
This chapter re-examines the early history of the Wassermann reaction which forms the 
central topic of Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. As Fleck explains in the 
Prologue of his monograph, a recently established scientific fact would be much more 
suitable for epistemological reflections than such commonly used examples as the facts of 
everyday life or classical physics: "I have therefore selected one of the best established 
medical facts: the fact that the so-called Wassermann reaction is related to syphilis" 
(XXVm/2). Without doubt, this particular choice had also been inspired by the circumstance 
that as a practising bacteriologist and serologist Fleck was already thoroughly familiar with 
the Wassermann reaction and its mode of execution. 
Fleck used the supposedly well-established fact of the relationship between the 
Wassermann reaction and syphilis to highlight the deficiencies of the prevalent individualistic 
approach in epistemology. In order to understand how a scientific discovery comes about, 
he argued, it is absolutely necessary to adopt a social, rather than an individualistic, point 
of view (76/102). From the latter perspective such an occurrence was bound to remain a 
miracle. Only by viewing discovery as a social event (soziales Geschehen) could the problem 
be resolved. Or so Fleck maintained. 
Among the modern adherents of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) Fleck is 
famous for this pioneering and bold step of taking a social point of view in epistemology and 
the study of science. But Fleck seems to be everybody's hero. He is also popular among the 
newer breed of constructivists like Andrew Pickering and Joseph Rouse who reject the 
'social' explanations offered by SSK proponents and advocate (different versions of) a 
science-as-practice approach as an attractive alternative. Rouse insists on the need to examine 
more closely how the 'social' is being conceived in contemporary forms of (social) 
constructivism. He accuses SSK constructivists like Collins and Bloor of reifying the 
categories of the social. More specifically, he charges them with viewing scientific 
communities "as relatively self-enclosed, homogeneous and unengaged with other groups or 
cultural practices". 1 The analysis of scientific work in terms of practices, by contrast, would 
make it possible to understand the coherence of a scientific 'field' without relying on the 
problematic notion of a communally shared background consensus. Fleck's detailed account 
J. Rouse, Engaging Science: How to Understand Its Practices Philosophically, Ithaca and London 
(Cornell University Press), 1996, p. 249. 
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of the practical work of August Wassermann and his collaborators in developing a serological 
test for syphilis is seen as an early paradigmatic example of the type of approach advocated 
by Rouse. 2 In a similar vein Pickering also interprets Fleck's case-study on the formation 
of the Wassermann reaction as an exemplary microstudy of scientific practice. He offers the 
following paraphrase of this case-study: 
"Fleck describes [the establishment of the Wassermann reaction] as a process of the reciprocal tuning of 
people and things. The serologists tuned the Wassermann reaction as a material procedure, adding now 
a little more now a little less of each reagent, letting the reaction proceed now a little longer or a little 
shorter, until the success rate of the test increased from 15% to 75%. At the same time a specific social 
community was formed: the community of disciplined practitioners competent to carry out the 
Wassermann reaction, having the 'serological touch', and internally differentiated in the 'quasi-orchestral' 
performance of the reaction".3 
This is of course Pickering's reading of Fleck's analysis; he lays more stress on the 'tuning 
of people' (as distinct from the 'tuning of things') than the latter would probably allow. The 
quoted passage illustrates, however, which aspects of Fleck's contribution are of particular 
interest to adherents of a science-as-practice approach: his view of the development of the 
Wassermann reaction as a matter of 'tuning' the material procedure, his stress on the 
importance of competence and practical skills (the "serological touch"), and his view (at least 
according to a prima facie plausible reading) of the simultaneous formation of a social 
community of competent practitioners, which lends support to a 'de-centring' of the social. 
It is important to point out, however, that in addition to this emphasis on the 'tuning' 
of the material procedure -which is so much admired by the adherents of the science-as-
practice approach -, we also find in Fleck's monograph a conception of the so-called 
serologists' collective as (to use the terms employed by Rouse in the passage quoted above) 
"relatively self-enclosed, homogeneous and unengaged with other social groups or cultural 
practices". Furthermore, he thinks of this serologists' collective as sharing a common 
background consensus, i.e. the set of precepts making up the so-called serological thought 
style (64/84). We therefore have to admit that Fleck's work exhibits the same tenet that 
Rouse holds to be a characteristic shortcoming of SSK-type constructivism (but not of Fleck). 
What is more, there appears to be an intimate connection between this particular 'defect' and 
Fleck's presumably exemplary analysis of serological practice. How is this curious paradox 
to be explained? In this chapter I will defend the view that what appears to have particular 
Ibid., p. 185. In his earlier book, Knowledge and Power (Ithaca and London [Cornell University 
Press], 1987), Rouse had already made extensive use of Fleck's work to illustrate his conception of 
the practical character of scientific knowledge. 
A. Pickering, 'Practice and Posfhumanism: Social Theory and a History of Agency', Ms. (Paper 
presented at a workshop on 'Practices and Social Order', ZiF, University of Bielefeld, Germany, 4-
6 January, 1996). 
121 
merit from the perspective of the science-as-practice approach, to wit Fleck's (almost 
exclusive) focus on the 'tuning' of the material procedure, is not such an unqualified virtue 
after all. It betrays, or so I will argue, a very inadequate understanding of the formation of 
the Wassermann reaction as a practically usable test for detecting syphilis. This shortcoming 
is indeed closely linked with the other defect in Fleck's analysis, his treating of the 
serologists' collective as a relatively self-enclosed community. Using Rouse's terminology, 
one could say that Fleck does not actually trace out the 'epistemic alignments' 4 by which 
serological practice is linked to relevant situations elsewhere, so that, strictly speaking, he 
does not elucidate at all how some locally variant experimental manipulations with blood 
samples came to be informative about the disease entity syphilis. 5 Another way of 
formulating this criticism is to say that Fleck largely ignores the 'clinical connection' and 
depicts the development of the Wassermann reaction as if it occurred exclusively within the 
four walls of the laboratory, with serologists busily "tuning their sets" (86/113). I shall 
present an alternative account of the whole episode in which systematic attention will be paid 
to the interaction between serologists and clinicians. In this way I hope to disclose the 
'epistemic alignments' linking serological and clinical (diagnostic and therapeutic) practices. 
Readers acquainted with Fleck's monograph might be inclined to object to my criticism 
that the latter treats the serologists' collective as a relatively self-enclosed community. After 
all, Fleck attributes an important role to the prevailing social attitude towards syphilis as a 
morally stigmatized disease, lending a special urgency to any attempt to find a blood test for 
detecting the dreaded scourge (77/102-103). He also refers to the existence of a socalled 
'proto-idea' (Uridee) of foul syphilitic blood demanding its own realization (77/103) and 
speaks of "the insistent clamor of public opinion for a blood test" (77/103). In addition to 
this presumed public 'demand for a blood test' Fleck also posits a more narrowly construed 
clinically motivated interest in a serological test for syphilis as the answer to "the quandary 
in which physicians found themselves because of the pleomorphism of the syphilis 
symptoms" (6/11). So does my charge against Fleck still stand? With regard to the presumed 
influence of the ancient idea of syphilitic blood, striving to realize itself behind the backs of 
the actors involved, I think that this represents a romantic dramatization rather than a serious 
historical hypothesis. 6 Apart from that, it is clear from Fleck's exposition that the social 
Rouse, op. cit. (note 1), p. 27: "Knowing is [..] mediated by 'epistemic alignments'; skills, 
models, concepts, and statements become informative about their objects only when other people 
and things interact in constructive alignment with them." 
Compare the following statement in Rouse, op. cit. (note 1), p 185: "Ludwik Fleck's study of the 
Wassermann reaction can be understood as working out how locally variant protocols for standardly 
identifying a condition of blood came to be informative about the historically interpreted disease 
entity syphilis [..]". 
See for the reasoning behind this judgement, H. van den Belt and B. Gremmen, 'Specificity in the 
Era of Koch and Ehrlich: A Generalized Interpretation of Ludwik Fleck's "Serological" Thought 
Style', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 21 (1990): 463-79, on pp. 476-77. 
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attitudes and public 'demands' that figure in his analysis occupy the place of stable 
background factors, providing as it were the motive power that drives the efforts of the 
serologists' collective without however entering the central core of their activities. This holds 
even for the more narrowly technical interest in a blood test that he imputes to physicians 
with a view to facilitating the precise delineation of the disease entity and its diagnosis. 
Although it seems prima facie plausible to postulate such a clinical interest, my historical 
account of the development of the Wassermann reaction will show that there did not exist 
among clinicians a uniform 'interest' in better diagnosis tout court, but several variously 
specified 'interests', depending inter alia on the medical specialism of the physicians and the 
therapeutic doctrines they happened to hold. 
My own analysis of the development of the Wassermann reaction is loosely (perhaps too 
loosely) inspired by Bruno Latour's ideas on 'enrollment' and 'translation of interests'. 7 Let 
me elaborate ('translate') Latour's ideas for the (simplified) situation in which serologists and 
clinicians typically find themselves, viewing it from the standpoint of the former. At no time 
can serologists afford to ignore their clinical colleagues. They are dependent on them for 
providing clinical rationales to prove the medical significance of their work, for access to 
'patient material', and in a host of other ways. A project to develop a new sérodiagnostic test 
for a particular disease can get off the ground only if the serologists succeed in securing 
clinical cooperation. But to get clinicians involved, their 'interest' has to be gained, that is, 
they have to be persuaded that their 'interests' (diagnostic or otherwise) will be served by 
the new test. In the course of this process 'interests' will usually become redefined 
('translated') in a rather subtle way; they are to some extent malleable but not, I think, 
infinitely elastic. If the end-product of this development is a simple and ready-made test 
procedure (or perhaps a 'kit '), it can be handed over to physicians and left to their discretion. 
Alternatively, the test might involve such complicated procedures that its execution must 
remain the exclusive domain of specialized serologists (as happened with the Wassermann 
reaction). But in that case too, clinicians have to become convinced of the usefulness and 
Ixustworthiness of the test. They must be willing to take a detour through the serological 
laboratory and grant it the recognized status of an obligatory station along the route to a 
sound diagnosis. 
To show that the exercise of capturing and translating interests is a rather delicate affair, 
B. Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Milton 
Keynes (Open University Press), 1987. In contrast to Latour himself, I use his notions as 
exclusively applicable to the human realm. In my view it does not make sense, except 
metaphorically, to state for instance that August Wassermann 'enrolled' serum antibodies, guinea 
pigs, and syphilis treponemas, or that he attempted to translate their 'interests'. Quite another 
matter is whether it would be useful in science studies to pay more attention to the (raw) material 
side of scientific practices. For a stimulating analysis of the relevance of research materials for the 
conduct of scientific investigation, see A.E. Clarke, 'Research Materials and Reproductive Science 
in the United States, 1910-1940', in S.L. Star (ed.), Ecologies of Knowledge: Work and Politics in 
Science and Technology, Albany (SUNY Press), 1995, pp. 183-225. 
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I will borrow from an article by Michael Mulkay, Trevor Pinch and Malcolm Ashmore on 
the so-called 'dilemma of application'. 8 Their discussion refers to the relationship between 
health economists and medical practitioners in contemporary Britain, but can be readily 
extended to the situation confronting serologists and clinicians in the early 20th century. 
According to these authors the delicacy of the endeavour to put scientific knowledge into 
practice arises from the fact that, in order to be persuaded of the usefulness of a particular 
piece of knowledge, participants must admit some deficiency in their current practices (for 
outside experts read: serologists; for participants or practitioners read: clinicians): 
"The outside experts must be able to convince participants - who, as insiders, might expect to 'know best' 
- that they do not know best. Moreover, the outsiders must convince practitioners of the inadequacy of 
existing practices without generating undue hostility and without thereby jeopardizing practitioners' 
collaboration [..]".9 
Let me translate this 'dilemma of application' more concretely to the historical case under 
consideration. Serologists had to convince clinicians of the value and reliability of the 
Wassermann reaction, but in carrying out this task they appeared to be confronted with an 
insurmountable problem: If the outcome of the Wassermann reaction confirmed the 
clinicians' judgement, this would be fine, but it would not add anything new to what 
clinicians already claimed to know. The situation would be different if laboratory reaction 
and clinical judgement pointed in opposite directions - but in that case the serologists would 
be hard-pressed to persuade the clinicians of the correctness of the reaction! My historical 
account of the development of the Wassermann reaction will show which ways were found 
to deal with this dilemma. 
Mulkay et al. emphasize the need not to generate "undue hostility" among the 
practitioners on whose cooperation outside experts will be dependent for realizing their 
projects. In this connection it may be relevant to mention that, according to several medical 
historians, in the first decade or so of the 20th century the relationship between laboratory 
and clinic was often strained and conflictual. 1 0 The 'encroachments' of new biomedical 
sciences like bacteriology and immunology/serology were sometimes bitterly resisted. Many 
clinicians were concerned that decisions on diagnosis and therapy would be transferred from 
the ward to the laboratory bench. In Germany, for instance, the outstanding clinician Ottomar 
Rosenbach had written, in 1903, a sharp indictment of the pretensions of bacteriology and 
M. Mulkay et al., 'Colonizing the Mind: Dilemmas in the Application of Social Science', Social 
Studies of Science 17 (1987): 231-56. 
Ibid., p. 233. 
See the contributions of Robert Kohler, Gerald Geison and Russell Maulitz to M.J. Vogel and C.E. 
Rosenberg (eds.), The Therapeutic Revolution, Philadelphia (University of Pennsylvania Press), 
1979, pp. 27-66, pp. 67-90 and pp. 91-107. 
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immunology in his significantly titled book Am contra Bakteriologe (Physician versus 
Bacteriologist). Rosenbach criticized the bacteriologists for their eagerness "to transfer 
decisions from the bedside to the laboratory" and to regulate aetiology, diagnosis, and 
therapy "according to an artificial scheme". 1 1 All this would, in his opinion, injure the 
standing of the medical practitioner. If such strain and tension characterized the general 
relationship between biomedical scientists and their clinical colleagues, then of course the 
prescription not to antagonize the clinicians could not be easily fulfilled. In what follows we 
will see if there was indeed such a deep fault line between serologists and clinicians on the 
more limited terrain of syphilology. 
A preliminary remark about the period of the history of the Wassermann reaction chosen 
to be covered in this chapter. When Wassermann, Neisser, and Brack first published on "a 
sérodiagnostic reaction with syphilis" (the title of their paper 1 2 ) in 1906, this did not yet 
constitute the discovery of the 'Wassermann reaction'. Fleck too recognizes that the test had 
to be 'developed' (by technical improvements and modifications), before the factual 
relationship with syphilis could be rightly said to be established. He does not, however, 
locate an exact end-point in time for the completion of this process. In a sense, of course, 
such an end-point is always relative and somewhat arbitrary, because the process is never 
fully completed. In the case of the Wassermann reaction there is the additional difficulty that 
the theoretical unclarity as to its essential character lingered on for several decades. 
Disregarding this theoretical difficulty, I have chosen the year 1910 as a provisional end-
point (developments beyond that year will be briefly discussed in a separate section). This 
has the advantage that my historical analysis will remain within the limits of the 'glorious 
decade' of syphilology, in which such breakthroughs as the discovery of the causative agent 
(1905) and the development of an effective medicine (1909-1910) also took place. A more 
substantial justification is that by 1910 the 'Wassermann reaction' (as it was now commonly 
called) had already won widespread recognition in medical circles. The circumstance that 
from that year on it would be used as a validation instrument in the clinical testing of 
Salvarsan, Ehrlich's new medicine against syphilis, testifies to this wide acceptance. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 2 I will give an overview of the 
state of the art in medical dealings with syphilis at the beginning of the 20th century, paying 
special attention to some of the therapeutic doctrines that were held in specialist circles 
charged with its treatment. This provides the background information necessary for 
understanding what happened at the 'clinical pole' in the development of the Wassermann 
reaction. Then we move in section 3 to the serological side with a more technical exposition 
of the principle of the so-called complement fixation method which formed the historical 
Cited in R.C. Maulitz, 'Physician versus Bacteriologist: The Ideology of Science in Clinical 
medicine', in Vogel and Rosenberg, op. cit. (note 10), pp. 91-107. 
A. Wassermann, A. Neisser, and C. Bruck, 'Eine serodiagnostische Reaktion bei Syphilis', 
Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift 32 (1906): 745-46. 
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starting-point for the development of the Wassermann test. On this basis Fleck's account of 
this development will be recapitulated in section 4 to have a backdrop for my own 
interpretation in the sections that follow. Section 5 will be devoted to deciphering the role 
of the German dermatologist Albert Neisser, who was very active in the initial stages of the 
development of a serological test for syphilis but whose exact role has not been adequately 
treated by Fleck. In section 6 1 will critically examine Fleck's interpretation of the somewhat 
mysterious switch from antigen to antibody determination which occurred in the course of 
attempts to develop a clinically useful test. Close examination of the work of the serologist 
Julius Citron will largely resolve this riddle. The decisive step in the development of the 
Wassermann reaction was not so much a matter of 'tuning' the material procedure as of 
finding a new clinical meaning for antibody determination. In the process Citron also found 
ways to deal with the 'dilemma of application'. Section 7 continues with discussing the work 
of other serologists (and clinicians) who followed in Citron's track in order to overcome this 
dilemma. In section 8 I will inquire, with the slightly dubious benefit of using present-day 
insights, whether the relationship between the Wassermann reaction and syphilis was actually 
such a well-established medical fact as Fleck and his contemporaries thought it was. Finally, 
in section 9 1 will formulate some general conclusions about viewing science as practice, the 
conception of the 'social', the usefulness of interest explanations and the role of raw 
materials on the basis of this particular case-study. 
2. Clinical background 
To call the period 1900-1910 the 'glorious decade' of syphilology involves some injustice to 
the large amount of effort that had been spent by the previous century in obtaining a more 
adequate knowledge of the dreadful disease. Without this preparatory work, the great 
breakthroughs at the beginning of the 20th century would have been unthinkable. At the turn 
of the century there was available a more or less complete 'clinical picture' of syphilis, 
which provided the starting-point for the discoveries and achievements that followed. 
The clinical picture of syphilis had been gradually rounded out in the course of the 19th 
century. It was as if all efforts had been oriented toward a common purpose, namely, to use 
Fleck's felicitous phrase, the precise Herausmeisselung (chiseling out) of the disease entity 
(6/11). First, syphilis had to be clearly distinguished from the other venereal diseases, 
gonorrhoea and ulcus molle. Clinical experience and inoculation experiments brought some 
enlightenment on these matters. Contributing to further enlightenment was the discovery of 
the specific agent of gonorrhoea in 1879 by the then 23-year-old assistant to the Breslau 
dermatological clinic, Albert Neisser, whom we will meet again in later stages of his career 
(the microbe was dubbed 'gonococcus' by Neisser's former classmate at the Breslau 
Gymnasium, Paul Ehrlich). After the causative agent of ulcus molle had also been identified 
in 1889 by Augusto Ducrey, the separation of syphilis from the other two venereal diseases 
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was definitive. 
Traditionally, syphilology is intimately linked with dermatology. An earlier generation of 
clinical investigators had patiently described and catalogued all the various cutaneous 
manifestations which syphilis shows in its 'secondary' and 'tertiary' stages (a terminology 
in accordance with Philippe Ricord's [1800-1889] division of the natural course of the disease 
into three stages). Since then medical students had to be thoroughly trained in distinguishing 
syphilitic eruptions from closely resembling non-syphilitic skin diseases. For Albert Neisser, 
director of the dermatological clinic in Breslau since 1882, this circumstance provided a 
motive to decline the vacant dermatology chair in Berlin offered to him, as he explained in 
1890 in a letter to the all-powerful Prussian official Friedrich Althoff: 
"Of the one hundred questions, which force themselves on the specialists or the practical physicians 
working in the relevant area during their daily practice, at least ninety turn on the decision: syphilis or 
no syphilis? The fact that syphilis mimicks nearly all known socalled idiopathic diseases implies that in 
any instance of cutaneous eruption first of all the differential diagnosis with respect to syphilis has to be 
made and examined in depth. A separation of the two subjects in a syphilis-clinic and a skin-diseases clinic 
[as corresponded to the situation in Berlin - HvdB], however, makes it impossible for the lecturer to teach 
the students precisely that which he should impart on them as the first and most important thing."13 
Actually, Neisser was already involved in planning a new, carefully designed and well-
equipped dermatological clinic in Breslau, which was opened in 1892 and became before long 
an internationally famous centre of training and research. 1 4 Syphilitic patients at this clinic 
would later be the first to provide human sera for the sake of finding a sérodiagnostic 
reaction. 
In addition to the special association with dermatology, syphilology also forged links 
with other medical specialties, because the disease not only caused eruptions on the skin but 
could also affect internal organs and organ systems ('visceral syphilis'). Indeed, as more and 
more effects of syphilis were tracked down, it became apparent that hardly any part of the 
human body, with the exception of the crystalline eye lens, was immune to its devastations. 
Particularly important was the recognition that an often lethal affection of the aorta, 
aneurysm, could also be traced to a syphilitic origin (Welch, 1875). 
Syphilology also entered the realm of neurology. In the 1870s the famous French 
syphilologist Alfred Founder (1832-1915) suggested, on the basis of statistics from his own 
private clientele, a connection between syphilis and tabes dorsalis - popularly known as spinal 
Cited in S. Schmitz, Albert Neisser: Leben und Werk auf Grund neuer, unveröffentlichter Quellen, 
Düsseldorf (Michael Triltsch Verlag), 1967, p. 25. 
A. Scholz and G. Sebastian, 'Albert Neisser and His Pupils', in: J.J. Herzberg and G.W. Körting 
(eds.), Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Dermatologie/On the History of German Dermatology, Berlin 
(Grosse Verlag), 1987, pp. 167-77. 
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consumption, "a terrifying name for patients and laymen". 1 5 In the 1890s Fournier traced 
another affection of the central nervous system, 'general paresis of the insane' (also known 
as 'progressive paralysis', 'dementia paralytica' or popularly as 'softening of the brain') or 
general paresis in present-day terminology, to a syphilitic origin. The connections of tabes 
and paresis with syphilis were only reluctantly accepted or sometimes even, as in the case 
of the great Charcot, rejected out of hand. The latter accused Fournier of "misappropriation 
of neurologic property". 1 6 Although the statistical evidence was impressively robust 
(Fournier's data were later supplemented by those of Wilhelm Erb), the problem was that 
the relationship between the two neurological disorders and syphilis was not easily 
understandable. Between the syphilitic infection and the onset of tabes or paresis perhaps two 
or three decades could elapse, long years often passed in apparent good health. Many authors 
did not consider tabes and paresis as tertiary forms of syphilis, but called them 'para-
syphilitic' or 'post-syphilitic' affections. 1 7 The connection with syphilis was thereby 
somewhat loosened theoretically, but not denied in actual practice. 
In the years after 1900 several attempts were made to determine statistically how many 
syphilitic patients died from syphilis. The results differed widely, but the estimates obtained 
in 1904 by the dermatologist Alfred Blaschko (1858-1922), general secretary of the German 
Society for the Control of Veneral Diseases, on the basis of material from the Berlin life-
insurance company Victoria were considered the most authoritative. According to Blaschko, 
some 33 percent or one-third of all syphilitics died of either tabes, paresis, or aortic 
aneurysm (6.7, 24, and 2.7 percent, respectively). The estimated incidence of syphilis was 
also high; in Blaschko's calculation, 20 percent of all men in the larger German towns 
contracted the disease during their l ives . 1 8 To judge from these figures, syphilis must 
indeed have exacted a formidable death-toll. 
However, according to more recent views, Blaschko's figures on the prognosis of 
syphilis must have been too pessimistic. We have gained a better insight into the 'natural 
history' of the disease thanks to the famous 'Oslo study' of untreated syphilis. During the 
years 1890-1910 syphilitic patients in the city of Oslo were diagnosed and hospitalized but 
not given antisyphilitic treatment, because the physician in charge, Cesar Boeck (1845-1917), 
P.K. Pel, 'Die Aetiologie und Therapie der Tabes dorsalis', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 37 
(1900), p. 629. 
Cited in J.T. Crissey and L.C. Parish, The Dermatology and Syphilology of the Nineteenth Century, 
New York (Praeger), 1981, p. 222. 
Pel, op. cit. (note 15), pp. 662-63. 
A. Blaschko, 'Syphilis und Lebensversicherung', Zeitschrift ßr die gesamte 
Versicherungswissenschaft, 1904; C. Brünns, 'Die Lebensprognose des Syphilitikers', Berliner 
klinische Wochenschrift 44 (1907): 1147-52. For an overview of different estimations in different 
countries, see J. Cassel, The Secret Plague: Venereal Disease in Canada 1838-1939, Toronto 
(University of Toronto Press), 1987, pp. 17-21. 
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was convinced that the remedy (mercury!) was worse than the disease. After the surface 
lesions had been healed, the patients would be discharged from hospital. Many years later, 
in the 1940s, most of these former patients were traced by Gjestland, who reconstructed their 
further vicissitudes in life or the probable causes and circumstances of their deaths. This 
comprehensive investigation showed that about 83 percent of all those initially diagnosed as 
syphilitically infected, when untreated, continue their lives without confronting serious health 
problems deriving from this infection. 1 9 The chances of developing, in case of untreated 
syphilis, a truly serious affection of the central nervous system are 6.5 percent; of developing 
an impairment of the cardio-vascular system, 10 percent. Walsh McDermott even declares, 
perhaps somewhat light-heartedly, that the disease of which former generations had had to 
live with such a devastating fear, turns out to have been "largely a paper t iger" . 2 0 The 
generation living at the beginning of this century, however, by no means considered syphilis 
a relatively minor inconvenience. The evil prospects for developing 'spinal consumption' or 
'softening of the brain' in later life were taken deadly seriously. 
The fact that the disease could also be transmitted to the 'innocent' children, or lead to 
spontaneous abortions and stillbirths, added to its stigma. As Crissey and Parish write, "(..) 
congenital syphilis was for everyone concerned a confrontation with reality in its harshest 
form". 2 1 A literary author like Henrik Ibsen had exploited the theme of the 'sins of the 
fathers' in his play Ghosts (1881). There was as yet no clear recognition that the mode of 
transmission was not strictly hereditary in nature. 
Incidentally, both the (from our point of view) unduly pessimistic prognosis of the 
disease and the prevalent perception of it as being hereditary in nature contributed to the 
special sense of urgency which public opinion in the early 20th century attached to the 
syphilis question. Syphilis became strongly associated with moral and physical 
degeneration. 2 2 It was, according to Fleck, this special moral emphasis on syphilis that 
would give a powerful impetus to research on the Wassermann reaction (77/102). 
After our reconstruction of the clinical picture of syphilis around 1900, we can proceed 
by reviewing the therapeutic arsenal that was available for dealing with the dreaded scourge. 
The outstanding fact about the disease, that every therapeutic intervention had to confront, 
was its insidious character. "What marks syphilis as an exceptionally gruesome (unheimliche) 
disease", Hermann Eichhorst wrote in 1891, "is the circumstance that one is never secure 
T. Gjestland, "The Oslo Study of Untreated Syphilis: An Epidemiologic Investigation of the Natural 
Course of the Syphilitic Infection Based upon a Re-Study of the Boeck-Bruusgaard Material', Acta 
Dermatology and Venereology 35 (1955), Supplement 34 (Stockholm). 
W. McDermott, 'Evaluating the Physician and his Technology', Daedalus 106 (1977): 135-57, on 
p. 147. 
Crissey and Parish, op. cit. (note 16), p. 92. 
22 See Chapter III for an exploration of this theme. 
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H. Eichhorst, Handbuch der speciellen Pathologie und Therapie ßr praktische Aerzte und 
Studirende, IV. Band: Krankheiten des Blutes und Stoffwechsels und Infektionskrankheiten, Vienna 
and Leipzig (Urban & Schwarzenberg), 1891, p. 604. 
Ibid., p. 612. It is remarkable that the remedies and cures applied by the antimercurialist fringe of 
the medical profession around 1900 were in earlier periods of history standard recipes of official 
medicine. See O. Temkin, "Therapeutic Trends and the Treatment of Syphilis before 1900', 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine 29 (1955): 309-16. On p. 312 Temkin observes: "I have the 
impression that the popularization of potassium iodide through Wallace and Ricord since 1838 made 
these decoctions [Temkin refers to "gaiacum, sarsaparilla and other 'sudorific woods'"] fade into 
near oblivion." Rather than fading into near oblivion, it seems that these 'decoctions', after falling 
from grace in the official medical world, could live on in the underworld of unofficial medicine. 
from relapses". 2 3 Acute eruptions alternate with 'latent' periods without symptoms. As a 
consequence, patients who thought themselves to be completely healed were often taken 
aback by a new onslaught of the disease. All these uncertainties were aggravated and 
overshadowed by the chances of developing late-syphilitic affections like aortic aneurysm and 
'post-syphilitic' disorders like tabes and paresis in later life. 
Within the medical orthodoxy, therapeutic intervention was based on two substances, 
mercury and iodine, of which several compounds or preparations were used in a variety of 
treatment schemes differing in mode of administration, dosage, intensity and time schedule. 
Mercury was thought to do the basic anti-syphilitic work. Iodine was used in a supplementary 
role; it was particularly helpful in suppressing the visible manifestations of tertiary syphilis. 
Mostly outside the confines of official medicine (with only a few supporters within) there was 
a large contingent of so-called anti-mercurialists who scorned the use of mercury and iodine. 
"Those eccentrics", as Eichhorst referred to them, "recommend hunger, purgation, and 
sweating cures, and also in particular decoctions prepared from guaiacum, sarsaparilla, and 
sassafras". 2 4 In the eyes of the representatives of official medicine they were Kurpfuscher 
(quacks) who cleverly exploited the public's fear of mercury or 'hydrargyrophobia' (Oscar 
Lassar) and thereby prevented many patients from receiving the correct kind of treatment. 
One should have no illusions as to the effectiveness of the remedies proposed by the anti-
mercurialists, but the painful question was whether the use of mercury was so much more 
effective that its wholesome consequences could outweigh its many negative side-effects. 
The negative side-effects were duly noted in medical handbooks. These included hazards 
like salivation, gastroenteritis, stomatitis, anemia, depression, teeth falling out, liver and 
kidney diseases, and even general mercurial intoxication. Specific modes of administration 
added specific risks. Oral administration endangered stomach and bowel in particular, 
inunction cures {Schmierkureri) could lead to contact dermatitis. Injections (Spritzkureri), both 
subcutaneous and intramuscular, were extremely painful and could lead to abscesses and 
systemic reactions. Although few patients could bear these injections, they were held by 
some specialists to be superior to an inunction cure, "which the physician can only prescribe, 
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but of which he cannot assure the correct implementation right to the end". Compliance 
with the doctor's prescriptions could not be taken for granted. The public's fear of mercury, 
professionally dismissed as 'hydrargyrophobia', was not completely unfounded. 
Although the official medical community fully agreed on the use of mercury as a remedy 
against syphilis, disagreement became paramount when the proper scheme of treatment was 
at issue. Disregarding the finer shades, we can distinguish two main schools in German 
dermatological and syphilological circles around the turn of the century. The first school 
consisted of the adherents of the so-called chronic-intermittent method, according to which 
antisyphilitic therapy should follow a fairly rigid schedule: once the diagnosis had been 
established, mercury treatments consisting of several inunction or injection cures should be 
applied at fixed intervals in time. Disappearance of the visible symptoms of syphilis was no 
reason to terminate the therapy. An outstanding proponent of this therapeutic method was 
Albert Neisser. The second school consisted of the adherents of the so-called symptomatic-
expectative method, according to which mercury treatment was indicated only when 
symptoms were present. Alfred Blaschko was a prominent member of this school. Proponents 
of the first school were often accused of substituting a rigid schematism for the physician's 
art and judgement. The adherents of the chronic-intermittent method, by contrast, found a 
rationale for their rigid approach in the unpredictable course of syphilis: disappearance of 
symptoms was no sign of definitive healing. They thought that a failure to treat syphilis 
vigorously in the early stages would lead to a higher likelihood for tabes, paresis, and 
aneurysm later on. In a sense, the rigid schedule also bound the practising physician to a 
regimen and perhaps preserved him from vacillation toward his patients. For the latter would 
only be too eager to discontinue treatment after the visible symptoms had vanished. 
The disagreement between the two schools could find no easy resolution. This reflected 
the unenviable dilemma physicians faced with regard to the treatment of syphilitics. They 
either risked pushing too far, or not far enough. The patient's health could be seriously 
endangered by mercury's harmful effects without being preserved from the later onset of 
tabes, paresis or aortic aneurysm. The physicians were only liberated from their desperate 
predicament after 1910, when Ehrlich's arsphenamine (Salvarsan) replaced mercury. With 
regard to the professional disagreement on the proper therapeutic scheme, Crissey and Parish 
observe: "(..) the matter had not been settled to the satisfaction of anyone when the 
discoveries of Ehrlich finally rendered the whole business irrelevant". 2 6 In later sections, 
however, we will see that the therapeutic disagreement existing in clinical circles has been 
a very relevant factor in the development of the Wassermann reaction; and that, for its part, 
this diagnostic test has also been instrumental in bringing about a certain rapprochement 
F. Block, review of Max Joseph, Lehrbuch der Haut- und Geschlechtskrankheiten, Deutsche 
medizinische Wochenschrift 31 (1905), p. 606. 
Crissey and Parish, op. cit. (note 16), p. 360. 
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between the rival schools, if not a complete settlement of the matter. By the time that 
Ehrlich's Salvarsan would make the entire issue obsolete, the Wassermann reaction had 
already contributed to its resolution and won sufficient clinical acceptance to be used as the 
main validation test for the magic bullet. 
Let us then turn now to a detailed analysis of the genesis and development of the 
Wassermann reaction. 
3 . The principle of the Wassennann reaction: complement fixation 
Whereas the diagnostic and especially the therapeutic practices of dermatologists and other 
clinicians were organized around the mercurial treatment of syphilitic patients, the laboratory 
practice of serology was organized around the 'experimental system' of immune 
hemolysis}1 In the course of the development of the Wassennann reaction (henceforth: 
WaR) both types of practices became more and more strongly connected to each other. 
Indeed, one may assert that it is only through such 'epistemic alignments' (Rouse) that some 
locally variant experimental manipulations with blood samples came to be informative at all 
about the disease entitity syphilis. 
According to the historian of immunology, Arthur Silverstein, after its discovery just 
before 1900 the phenomenon of immune hemolysis was rapidly converted to a full 
'experimental system', which opened new avenues for research and practical application. 2 8 
This choice of terminology is significant because in Rouse's view a laboratory is precisely 
a locus for the construction of 'experimental systems' or 'phenomenal microworlds' } 9 The 
new experimental system of immune hemolysis was to become the vehicle for a lively debate 
between Bordet and Ehrlich on immune mechanisms and the nature of complement, and 
would lead to Landsteiner's discovery of the ABO blood groups in 1901-1902, to the 
identification of paroxysmal cold hemoglobinuria (PKH) as the first autoimmune disease, and 
to the development of a sérodiagnostic test for syphilis. 
Immune hemolysis is the phenomenon that the serum of animals (say guinea pigs) which 
have been injected with the erythrocytes (red blood cells) of another animal species (say 
sheep) is able to dissolve those foreign blood cells when mixed with them in the test tube. 
This visible 'lytic' effect (hence 'hemolysis') is based on the combined action of two factors: 
specific antibodies against the foreign erythrocytes (so-called 'hemolysins') and a non-specific 
2 7 A.M. Silverstein, "The Heuristic Value of Experimental Systems: The Case of Immune Hemolysis', 
Journal of the History of Biology 27 (1994): 437-47. 
2 8 Ibid. 
2 9 Rouse, op. cit. (note 1), p. 101. In his later work (op. cit. [note 2], p. 129), Rouse uses the 
expression 'experimental system' as an equivalent to 'phenomenal microworld'. 
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factor called 'complement'. It was found by the Belgian immunologist Jules Bordet that the 
same 'complement', which is also present in the serum of untreated animals but can be 
neutralized by heating to 56° C, is also a necessary factor in other immune reactions 
involving different antibodies and 'antigens' (i.e., all those foreign substances including 
microbes or microbial products that provoke the production of specific antibodies when they 
enter a human or animal organism). 3 0 This suggested the setting up of an elegant two-stage 
test design using hemolysis as an indicator during the second stage for non-specifically 
measuring any mixture involving an antigen and its specific antibody. If one had a known 
antiserum, one could use it and the hemolytic indicator system to test for antigen. If no 
hemolysis occurs during the second stage, then the available 'complement' has apparently 
been used up or 'fixed' during the first stage, indicating the presence of a specific antigen 
with which the corresponding antibody in the serum must have reacted. Conversely, if a 
known antigen were used, one could likewise test for the presence of specific antibody. This 
is the principle of the so-called complement fixation test. It can be used either for antigen 
determination (Antigennachweis) or for antibody determination (Antikdrpernachweis). In this 
respect the test design is perfectly symmetrical. 
Bordet's complement fixation method was eagerly adopted by August Wassermann and 
his collaborators working at the Royal Institute for Infectious Diseases (Robert Koch's 
prestigious institute) in Berlin. 3 1 Wassermann and Bruck introduced a modification that 
would further extend the applicability of the test. They claimed to have shown for such 
diseases as typhoid, tuberculosis and meningitis that the test worked not only when 
suspensions of entire bacteria were used as antigen, but also when so-called 'bacterial 
extracts' were employed for this purpose (their experiments met with some criticism from 
other serologists 3 2). The modification of Wassermann and Bruck was relevant for syphilis 
because the causative agent Spirochaeta pallida (now Treponema pallidum) had, from its 
discovery in 1905, resisted all attempts at cultivation. 
In applying the complement fixation test to syphilis, Wassermann and Bruck employed 
as antigen, at least initially, extracts from organs that were rich in spirochaetes, in particular 
extracts from the livers of still-born syphilitic babies. 3 3 It was known that such livers 
J. Bordet and O. Gengou, 'Sur l'existence de substances sensibilisatrices dans la plupart des sérums 
antimicrobiens', Annales de l'Institut Pasteur 15 (1901): 289-302. 
W. Kolle and A. Wassermann, 'Versuche zur Gewinnung und Wertbestimmung eines 
Meningococcenserums', Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 32 (1906): 609-12; A. Wassermann 
and C. Bruck, 'Experimentelle Studien über die Wirkung von Tuberkelbacillen-Präparaten auf den 
tubérculos erkrankten Organismus', Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 32 (1906): 449-54. 
Especially Eduard Weil and his co-workers from the Hygienic Institute of the German University in 
Prague. 
Eventually, it was found that it was not even necessary to use 'antigen' of syphilitic origin. This 
remarkable turn of events will be discussed in later sections. 
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literally swarmed with spirochaetes, which according to one commentator made syphilitic 
foetuses a "much sought-after article" (gesuchter Artikel) in 1905, "the year of the 
spirochaetes". 3 4 To obtain these research materials in the required quantity, Wassermann 
and his acollaborators had to mobilize an extensive network of contacts. In their first research 
paper they expressed their acknowledgements to no less than thirty-six persons who had 
provided them with syphilitic foetuses. Other materials (including sera) were obtained from 
the patients of Neisser's clinic and from (nonhuman) primates that were kept in Breslau. 
The above exposition has presented only the principle of the complement fixation test 
and the WaR, but did not enter into the technical details of their practical execution. Of 
these, the quantitative aspects are most important. For one thing, the required quantity of 
complement had to be precisely determined by titration (if there were too much complement, 
it would still be available for the second stage despite the occurrence of a specific reaction 
during the first stage). More generally, accurate quantitative proportions of all 5 'reagents' 
involved in the test had to be established. Moreover, the WaR was also susceptible to many 
disturbing factors. To eliminate these possible sources of error, serologists had to operate 
with so-called 'controls'. For Fleck, a strong emphasis on the methodical necessity of 
'controls' was a general characteristic of the serological thought style (63/84). In the actual 
implementation of the WaR, about 8 to 10 parallel tests had to be conducted in addition to 
the main test, which amounted to a very cumbersome task. This elaborate ritual of 'controls' 
was thought necessary to keep disturbing influences at bay. 
4. Fleck's account of the development of the Wassermann reaction 
In this section I will describe Fleck's view on the history of the WaR as a backdrop for my 
own interpretation in later sections. Fleck uses the example of the WaR to bolster his case 
for a sociological approach in the theory of knowledge. In his opinion, we should abjure the 
common individualistic point of view in epistemology. 
Fleck points out that the decisive stimulus to apply the complement fixation method to 
syphilis was given by the well-known German official Friedrich Althoff, head of the Prussian 
Ministry of Education and Culture. 3 5 Althoff feared that Germany might fall behind France 
in the experimental research on syphilis and therefore stimulated Wassermann to work in this 
area. International rivalry in this domain was an important social motive, expressed through 
H. Beitzke, 'Ueber Spirochaete pallida bei angeborener Syphilis', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 
43 (1906): 781-84. 
For more information on Althoff, see B. vom Brocke, 'Friedrich Althoff: A Great Figure in Higher 
Education Policy in Germany', Minerva 29 (1991): 269-93. 
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Althoffs mouth as a kind of 'vox populi' (68/90). 3 6 
The development of a serodiagnosis for syphilis was not the work of a single individual, 
Fleck asserts, but of an organized collective. The polemic which erupted in 1921 and in 
which several protagonists claimed the intellectual authorship of the WaR (Wassermann and 
Brack among them), was therefore utterly futile in Fleck's eyes: the authorship essentially 
belonged to the entire collective and not to any particular individual (78/104). 3 7 
Fleck further observes that in the development of the WaR the emphasis gradually 
shifted from antigen determination to antibody determination. In their first two papers, 
published in 1906, Wassermann, Neisser, and Brack declared that they had discovered a 
specific reaction between syphilitic antigen and syphilitic antibody. 3 8 The primary aim of 
their investigation, according to Fleck, was the detection of antigen in syphilitic organs and 
syphilitic blood. Antibody determination was, again according to Fleck, considered of 
secondary importance only (70/92). The quantitative results obtained may explain why the 
authors laid so much more stress on antigen than on antibody determination. Antigen 
determination was successful in 64 out of 76 confirmed syphilitic cases, but antibody 
determination only in 49 out of 257 cases (that is, in 19 percent). Small wonder then that the 
emphasis was put so much more on the former! 
In 1907 several serological investigators (Landsteiner, Marie, Levaditi, Weil, Braun, 
and others) reported the curious fact that the WaR worked just as well when extracts from 
a normal (non-syphilitic) organ were used as 'antigen' instead of syphilitic liver extracts (73-
74/97). The idea of the original authors that they had found a specific antigen-antibody 
reaction for syphilis was now rejected. Antigen determination, which initially had shown such 
promising results, had to be abandoned too. One can easily imagine the story to have ended 
here, but it took a surprisingly new track. That was largely because antibody determination, 
strangely enough, would enjoy considerable progress. Whereas the number of positive 
outcomes in cases of confirmed syphilis was at the start barely 20 percent, this percentage 
would eventually increase to about 70 or 90. According to Fleck, it was this increase that 
"represented the actual invention of the Wassermann reaction as a useful test" (72/95). 
How did the increase come about? Fleck emphasizes that this turning point is largely 
shrouded in mystery: "The moment when this decisive turn occurred cannot be accurately 
For his description of Althoffs role Fleck relies on a statement made by Wassermann in 1921. He 
notes, however, that Bruck presented a different version of the beginnings of the serodiagnosis of 
syphilis. 
The struggle over the intellectual property of the Wassermann reaction will be analyzed in Chapter 
VI. 
A. Wassermann, A. Neisser and C. Bruck, 'Eine serodiagnostische Reaktion bei Syphilis', 
Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 32 (1906): 745-46; A. Wassermann, A. Neisser, C. Brack 
and A. Schucht, 'Weitere Mitteilungen über den Nachweis spezifisch luetischer Substanzen durch 
Komplementverankerang', Zeitschrift für Hygiene und Infektionskrankheiten 55 (1906): 451-77. 
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determined. No authors can be specified who consciously brought it about. We cannot state 
exactly when it occurred nor explain logically how it happened" (72/95). Nor is the 
testimony of those who had been directly involved very helpful in Fleck's opinion. They can 
tell us no more than that the technique had first to be worked out. It can be readily conceded 
that the test had to be "technically perfected". The reagents had to become more precisely 
matched by improving the titration methods. The reading of the outcome had also to be 
perfected to determine which degree of hemolysis inhibition represented a positive or a 
negative outcome. Fleck insists however that this technical perfecting of the instrument can 
be understood only if it is viewed as the work of an anonymous collective. It was largely a 
matter of finding a proper balance, mutually adjusting the various reagents and learning how 
to read the results (72/96). He suggests that a satisfactory trade-off between the required 
sensitivity and specificity of the reaction was also brought about by a kind of collective 
balancing act. Sometimes, when the reaction was oversensitive, the specificity of the test was 
too low ("there were too many positive results even with non-syphilitics"); at other times the 
sensitivity of the test was insufficient ("there are too many negative [results] even with 
syphilitics"): 
"The optimum intermediate position between minimum nonspecificity and maximum sensitivity had to be 
gradually established. This, however, is entirely the work of a collective consisting mostly of anonymous 
research workers, adding now 'a little more', now 'a little less' of a reagent, allowing now 'a little 
longer', now 'a little shorter' reaction time, or reading the result 'a little more' or 'a little less' 
accurately" (72-73/96). 
The idea appears to be that the collective, by constantly 'tuning' the material procedure (cf. 
Pickering as quoted in the introductory section!), gradually tinkered its way toward success, 
until, supposedly, it finally reached the golden mean between insufficient sensitivity and too 
low specificity. 
The important point for Fleck is that this gradual improvement is only thinkable as a 
process of gathering collective experience. He himself uses the metaphor of 'tuning' in this 
connection: "It is also clear that from these confused notes [the ambiguous results of the first 
experiments - HvdB] Wassennann heard the tune that hummed in his mind but was not 
audible to those not involved. He and his co-workers listened and 'tuned' their 'sets' until 
these became selective. The melody could then be heard even by unbiased persons who were 
not involved" (86/113). Fleck tends to view the serologists' collective not as a community 
of practitioners working at different institutional locations, but as one big team cooperating 
in "quasi-orchestral" harmony. 
According to Fleck the intense collective work that eventually made the WaR practically 
useful proceeded "with disregard for theoretical questions and the ideas of individuals" 
(73/97) and was undertaken as a consequence of the special social importance of the syphilis 
question (77-79/ 102-04). The same social perception of urgency was at the basis of 
"insistent clamor of public opinion for a blood test" (77/103). Apparently, this clamour was 
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O. Rosenbach, Das Problem der Syphilis und kritische Betrachtungen über ihre Behandlung, 
second, enlarged edition, Berlin (Hirschwald), 1906 (reviewed in Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 
44 [1907]: 577-78). 
O. Rosenbach, 'Genügt die moderne Diagnose syphilitischer Erkrankungen wissenschaftlichen 
Forderungen', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 43 (1906): 1157-60, onp. 1158. 
insistent enough to secure eventually its own fulfilment. 
5. The involvement of Albert Neisser 
It is remarkable that Fleck has nothing more to say about the contribution of Albert Neisser 
(1855-1916), Germany's most prominent dermatologist at the time, to the development of the 
WaR than simply this: "Neisser offered the pathological material and his experience as a 
physician" (69/91). Neisser's involvement, as a non-serologist, in the formation of the 
serodiagnosis of syphilis from the very beginning, would appear to merit a much more 
thorough-going analysis. If we are interested in Wghlighting the importance of the 'clinical 
connection' for the development of the WaR, we cannot permit to ignore Neisser's role in 
this. It will turn out that Neisser's concerns were highly idiosyncratic and not at all 
representative of the average clinician, but that is of course no reason for passing in silence 
over his contribution. Rather, the fact that the 'clinical pole' in the development of the WaR 
was apparently not uniform and monolithic gives occasion to further reflection. 
Although Neisser, as a 'physician', represented the clinical side in the cooperation with 
Wassermann and Brack, his whole medical and scientific career seems to mock at Ottomar 
Rosenbach's formula Artz contra Bakteriologe. After all, as we mentioned above, Neisser had 
started his career in 1879 with the discovery of the 'gonococcus', the specific agent of 
gonorrhoea, before he became director of the Breslau dermatological clinic in 1882. 
Rosenbach himself must have known that his formula 'physician versus bacteriologist' 
was less than adequate when applied to the medical dealings with syphilis, for in 1903 he 
published yet another polemical work, Das Problem der Syphilis, of which a revised edition 
appeared in 1906. 3 9 In it he criticized what he called the abuses of the "monistic way of 
thinking" which attempted to trace various kinds of affections back to a syphilitic origin and 
syphilis itself to a tangible microbic agent (he himself advocated a so-called 'energetic' 
approach, both for diagnosis and for therapy). His strongest denunciations were saved for 
what he called "the myth of the specific action of mercury and iodine". He commented 
sarcastically: "the only thing that is specific about the specific remedies against lues 
[=syphilis] seems to be that they will never, however often they may prove ineffective, lose 
their reputation". 4 0 By this criticism Rosenbach made himself into a mouthpiece of the anti-
mercurialists who were an influential category outside the official medical world. As a 
staunch adherent of the chronic-intermittent method in mercury therapy, Neisser was clearly 
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implicated in Rosenbach's ridicule of the specificity of mercury and iodine. 
For Rosenbach, the 'abuses' in the medical dealings with syphilis were the consequence 
of the prevailing "sway of the specialists" (das Spezialistentum). He strongly opposed the 
tendency to make the treatment of syphilis patients into a reserve for medical specialists; the 
general practitioner, the "physician without epitheton ornans", should also be active in this 
field. It thus seems that on the domain of syphilis there was not so much a dividing line of 
'physician versus bacteriologist', but rather a division between specialists and general 
practitioners, or perhaps only between official medicine and quackery. Rosenbach was fully 
aware of the fact that his criticism of the "monistic way of thinking" in the diagnosis and 
therapy of syphilis enjoyed little support from the official medical world of the specialists. 
His was an outsider's criticism. 
It will by now be clear that such a prominent representative of das Spezialistentum as 
Albert Neisser could hardly be suspected of hostility toward bacteriology and serology. Still 
we may wonder why he was interested in developing in particular a serological test for 
syphilis. Fleck fails to ask some simple questions: How did Neisser got involved and what 
was his motive for cooperating with Wassermann and Brack? What could he possibly have 
expected from something like a "sérodiagnostic reaction with syphilis" 4 1? Perhaps Fleck 
did not ask these questions because he thought the answers to be obvious. We will see that 
they are not. 
From the historical records it is not clear whether it was Neisser or Wassermann who 
took the initiative to contact the other and to enter into a closer cooperation. The statements 
of Wassermann and of his former co-worker Brack, expressed during the fierce polemic on 
the authorship of the WaR in 1921, are diametrically opposed on this score (Neisser had died 
in 1916). According to Brack it was Neisser who, during a visit to Wassermann, first 
envisaged the possibility to develop a serodiagnosis for syphilis. In that case it would have 
been the clinician who tried to 'enroll' the serologist and not vice versa! (So who 'enrolled' 
whom?) Wassermann countered Brack's statement with the assertion that it was the Prussian 
official Friedrich Althoff who, in the final analysis, had given the decisive stimulus for the 
development of the WaR (Althoff had died in 1908). 4 2 Fleck relies on Wassermann's 
assertion to stress, as we have seen, the social motive behind the work on the serodiagnosis 
of syphilis. Neither Wassermann's nor Brack's statement should be simply accepted at face 
value, however. Regrettably, Neisser's biographer, Sigrid Schmitz, does not clear up the 
matter, for she relies for her description of the contact between Wassermann and Neisser not 
on direct sources but on obituaries written by Brack and others. 4 3 One can also speculate, 
The title of their first publication on the WaR. 
A. von Wassermann, 'Zur Geschichte der Serodiagnostik der Syphilis (Bemerkungen zu den 
Brucklehen Ausführungen)', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 58 (1921): 1194-95, on p. 1195. 
Schmitz, op. cit. (note 13), p. 49. 
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of course, that Althoff has exerted pressure on both investigators, Wassermann and Neisser, 
to pool their resources for the sake of Germany's greater role in the experimental research 
on syphilis. But even if this were the case, one could still ask what particular motives the 
investigators had to act upon Althoff s suggestion. 
For Neisser as a 'clinican' such a motive appears rather easy to construe. After all, as 
Fleck describes, physicians found themselves in a diagnostic quandary "because of the 
pleomorphism of the syphilis symptoms" and this produced "a general and urgent 'demand 
for blood tests' as the means to identify this disease entity with precision" (6/11). And what 
purpose should a "sérodiagnostic reaction with syphilis" serve if not a more precise 
identification of the disease entity? However, I think it was not simply a new diagnostic test 
that Neisser was looking for. From his previous involvement in the medical and scientific 
dealings with syphilis an entirely different motive for his contribution to the development of 
the WaR can be construed. Here follows my reconstruction. 
Although Neisser had always been an adherent of a vigorous mercurial treatment of 
syphilis, its many undesirable side-effects had also motivated him almost from the start to 
look for a viable therapeutic alternative. He was therefore very much impressed by the so-
called serum therapy used by Emil Behring in 1891-92 as a cure for diphteria. The success 
of this therapy was crucially dependent on the strength of the immune serum. In the shadow 
of Behring's fame, Paul Ehrlich had actually indicated the road to practical success. To 
achieve the highest possible irnmunity in the test animal for the sake of a potent antiserum, 
it was necessary to administer steadily increasing doses of diphteria toxin to the animal . 4 4 
After Behring's success with diptheria, Neisser immediately tried to apply his own version 
of 'serum therapy' to syphilis. He inoculated 5 young prostitutes with cell-free serum from 
syphilitic patients, hoping thereby to prevent them from infection in their future occupational 
careers. He also inoculated 3 young women that were not active in prostitution. Despite 
Neisser's 'serum therapy' 4 of the 5 prostitutes subsequently contracted syphilis. He 
attributed these infections to their occupation and not to his inoculation, but at any rate it was 
clear that his attempt at immunization had failed. When Neisser published the results of his 
experiment with some delay in 1898, a veritable scandal - which became known as the 
'Neisser affair' - broke out. Neisser was made into a scapegoat who had to pay for the 
abuses that were common in German hospitals (and the affair was also abetted by antisemitic 
sentiment). In the end he was officially rebuked and fined. Thanks to Friedrich Althoff s 
protection, the damage could be kept within l imits. 4 5 
The whole affair made it clear to Neisser that henceforth experiments on human 
subjects, for the sake of finding a possible immunity against syphilis, would be blocked. He 
H. Satter, Emil von Behring, Bad Godesberg (Inter Natkmes), 1967, p. 26. 
B. Elkeles, 'Medizinische Menschenversuche gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts und der Fall 
Neisser', Medizinhistorisches Journal 20 (1985): 135^18, on p. 139. 
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needed "another experimental animal". 6 In 1902 he tried to transmit syphilis to pigs, but 
without success. Other attempts to artificially infect various animal species by many different 
researchers had also failed. The idea that syphilis was a uniquely human disease which could 
not be transmitted to other animals began to take hold. 
New perspectives were opened however in December 1903, when Metchnikoff and Roux 
of the Paris Institut Pasteur declared that they had succeeded in transmitting syphilis to two 
chimpanzees. 4 7 Soon it became apparent that the disease could also be transmitted to other 
primates. Neisser eagerly exploited the new research opportunities that were offered by the 
newly available 'animal models'. In the year 1904 he conducted extensive experiments in 
Breslau on 9 chimpanzees, 4 orang-utans, one gibbon and 7 macaques. One chimpanzee was 
injected with large quantities of serum from a fresh syphilitic patient at regular time intervals 
during eight months, to see whether he would acquire immunity against syphilis. No 
immunizing effect occurred. 
For more definitive conclusions, however, Neisser thought that a research project on a 
much larger scale and stretching over a longer period of time would be absolutely necessary. 
There was also the problem that the experimental animals in Breslau hardly cooperated; many 
died from all kinds of affections even before the experimenter could observe the effects of 
his experiments. At the beginning of the year 1905 Neisser therefore organized a scientific 
expedition to the Dutch East Indies, paid from his own pocket, to continue his experiments 
on a much larger scale. He hoped that in the Tropics the mortality among captive primates 
could be reduced. 
Neisser's hope would be disappointed. In less than one year, by the end of 1905, more 
than 900 primates (macaques, gibbons, orang-utans, etc.) had already been 'consumed' on 
his experiment station in Batavia. His attempts to achieve passive immunization did not 
exhibit any convincing results yet. But Neisser was still obsessed by the idea of a serum 
therapy for syphilis. He attributed the lack of success to the fact that the immune sera so far 
obtained were not yet sufficiently strong. In December 1905, on leave from his tropical 
expedition, Neisser declared in Breslau that it should be possible to enhance antibody 
production in the sera of infected animals, and thereby the protective power against syphilis, 
by "constantly repeated administration of the syphilitic virus" . 4 8 After all, this had also 
been the key to Behring's success. 
Neisser's involvement in the development of the WaR can be explained from this 
Ibid., p. 141. 
E. Metchnikoff and E. Roux, 'Etudes expérimentales sur la Syphilis, 1. mémoire', Annales de 
l'Institut Pasteur 17 (1903): 809-21. 
Report on a lecture by Neisser before a meeting of the Médical Section of the Schlesische 
Gesellschaft für vaterländische Kultur in Breslau, Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 43 (1906), p. 
373. 
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background. It was not his first motive to get a diagnostic test for the sake of a more simple 
detection of syphilis, as Fleck would have it. Neisser's primary interest was to have a clearer 
understanding of what he perceived as the crucial bottleneck in his quest for a serum therapy: 
the strength of the immune serum. He hoped that a serological test might be instrumental in 
overcoming this bottleneck through a quantitative assessment of the strength of the antisera, 
and thereby lead the way to an effective serum therapy. During his leave in Germany, 
between the first and second Java expeditions, Neisser therefore cooperated with the Berlin 
serologists Wassermann and Brack to develop what would become known as the Wassermann 
reaction. Syphilitic material from his patients in the dermatological clinic, but also antisera 
from the primates that were still kept in Breslau, formed his contribution to this cooperative 
venture. When he departed in November 1906 for a second expedition to Java (this time 
financed by the German Empire), he was accompanied by Brack (who had changed sides 
after Neisser's rapture with Wassermann 4 9). Brack would apply the new serological test 
in the Dutch East Indies in the service of Neisser's quest for a serum therapy. 
As it turned out, the WaR did not point the way to an effective serum therapy. It was 
indeed possible to stimulate antibody production, but Brack found that the titre of the 
antiserum never exceeded a certain maximum value, however often the administration of 
syphilitic 'virus' were repeated. The bottleneck could not be overcome. 5 0 Many detailed 
questions about syphilis, such as the contagiousness of various syphilitic lesions, were 
elucidated by Neisser's research on primates. But the main purpose was not achieved. In 
November 1907, at the end of the second Java expedition, Neisser himself declared the 
bankruptcy of the whole enterprise: "We hoped for immunization methods. But what if there 
is no immunity at all? Of that I 'm wholly convinced now." 5 1 
I hope the above reconstruction has made it sufficiently plausible that, from the outset, 
Neisser's interest in a serological reaction for syphilis was primarily motivated by therapeutic 
rather than diagnostic considerations. First and foremost, the test was supposed to free him 
from the deadlock into which his quest for an antisyphilitic serum therapy had led him. The 
tenacity with which he pursued his project over several years until the bitter end bears 
witness to Neisser's perseverance and the vigour of his therapeutic motive. All this does not 
of course imply that Neisser would develop no interest in the diagnostic possibilities of the 
The estrangement between Wassermann and Neisser probably dates from August 1906. One reason 
for the rupture between them, as transpires from correspondence published by Wassermann, was 
that the latter wanted to test the practical uselfulness of the serological reaction in several German 
clinics, whereas Neisser wanted to see this work executed exclusively in his own clinic and on his 
Java experiment station (A. von Wassermann, 'Zur Geschichte der Serodiagnostik der Syphilis', 
Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 58 [1921], p. 467). By deserting to Breslau, Bruck became 
Neisser's foremost serologist. 
C. Bruck and M. Stern, 'Die Wassermann-A. Neisser-Brucksche Reaktion bei Syphilis', Deutsche 
medizinische Wochenschrift 34 (1908): 401-04, on p. 403. 
Cited in Schmitz, op. cit. (note 13), p. 31. 
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new serological reaction once it had been discovered. 
6. From antigen to antibody determination 
According to Fleck, antigen rather than antibody determination constituted the primary aim 
of Wassermann, Neisser, and Brack in their first two publications. A close reading of those 
papers, however, will not substantiate this claim. What is rather striking is that the authors 
stress the symmetry of the reaction; they declare repeatedly that the reaction can be used in 
principle both for antigen and for antibody detection. One can hardly blame the authors for 
wanting to make the most of the very promising results obtained with antigen determination, 
but it is also notable that they were not the least discouraged by the more unfavourable 
outcomes of antibody determination. From their experience with the field of biological 
diagnostics they knew that it was not unusual to get disappointing results initially. Such bad 
results could often be expected to improve in due course. 5 2 The unfavourable results 
obtained with antibody determination did not therefore prevent the investigators from 
proclaiming as their conviction that they had really found a specific antigen-antibody reaction 
for syphilis. This is of course the cardinal point that was ignored by Fleck: to uphold the 
specificity of their reaction, the investigators had to uphold, for theoretical reasons, its 
symmetry too. If the reaction would not work both ways, its specificity would become in 
doubt (as indeed it became later on when antigen determination was rejected as spurious!). 
Fleck's tendency to consider the development of the WaR exclusively from the practical and 
technical aspect has probably been responsible for this oversight. 
We do however find a pronounced preference for antigen determination, at the expense 
of antibody determination, in the early serological work coming from the Breslau 
dermatological clinic after the rapture between Neisser and Wassermann. As it was no longer 
a matter of establishing the existence of a specific antigen-antibody reaction in syphilis, but 
of making it practically useful, there were good clinical reasons for this particular emphasis. 
From a clinical point of view, a positive outcome of the serological test for antibody 
determination would not provide much relevant information. It would mean only, or so it was 
thought at the time, that the patient had once in his lifetime been infected with syphilis 
spirochaetes, without warranting the conclusion that these were still active in his body. A 
positive outcome for antigen determination, by contrast, was held to indicate the active 
presence of spirochaetes in the patient's body. Such information would have far greater 
clinical utility. In December 1906 Neisser expressed his personal expectation that the new 
serological reaction would be "diagnostically useful and capable of filling a very important 
lacuna in our diagnostic abilities: to wit, effecting a separation between latent and cured 
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cases" . 5 3 It was, in Neisser's view, only antigen determination that could fill this gap. We 
may add that the diagnostic lacuna mentioned by him was especially troublesome for the 
adherents of the chrome-intermittent method of antisyphilitic mercury treatment. Antigen 
determination thus held the promise to free the practising physician who followed this 
treatment scheme from the dilemma of either pushing too far or not far enough. So here we 
see that Neisser's interest in antigen determination was also informed by the particular 
therapeutic doctrine he held. An additional, more 'material' reason for this interest was to 
be found in the availability in Breslau of many primates, which, after intense treatment with 
human syphilitic material, could supply strong antisera needed for antigen determination. In 
this respect Breslau had a competitive edge with regard to the other dermatological centres 
in Germany. 
Once again, however, Breslau had moved into a blind alley. Antigen determination did 
not survive the curious discovery, reported in 1907 by several investigators, that extracts 
from non-syphilitic organs worked just as well as 'antigen' as did syphilitic liver extracts (73-
74/97). This finding also destroyed the theoretical basis on which the WaR had originally 
been designed. The precise nature of the reaction now became something of a scientific 
mystery. Henceforth various theoretical proposals would be put forward to solve this riddle. 
I will not pursue this theoretical issue here. What is astonishing is that the WaR as a practical 
serological test survived the destruction of its theoretical foundation. This survival can be 
attributed to the upgrading and revaluation of antibody determination which was already 
underway when antigen determination turned out to be spurious. 
It was largely due to the work of Julius Citron, a serologist and erstwhile collaborator 
of Wassermann, that antibody determination became useful and clinically relevant. His 
contribution was not limited to the introduction of increased serum dosage, from 0.1 cc to 
0.2 cc of patient serum, as Fleck suggests (72/96). The turning of the WaR into a practically 
useful test was not just a matter of serologists perfecting the test instrument, or, in Fleck's 
image, "tailing their sets". Citron's work demonstrates that much more was involved. 
As a serologist Citron was associated to the Second Medical Clinic of the Charite 
hospital in Berlin - it is important to note that this was not a specialized clinic for skin and 
venereal diseases. The patient population of this clinic had a composition that differed from 
that of the population of the Breslau clinic. It offered special challenges and opportunities to 
Citron. 
Citron ran up against a quite remarkable phenomenon within a group of patients that all 
exhibited strong clinical indications of syphilis. Those patients who affirmed a syphilis 
infection in their anamnesis showed much less often positive antibody reactions than those 
who denied any syphilitic infection. The key to the solution of this riddle was to assume that 
both groups of patients had actually had an infection, but that only the first group, those who 
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recognized this fact, had been subjected to mercury treatment. In this way Citron discovered 
the important fact that intense antisyphilitic therapy has an influence on the outcome of 
antibody determination. Incidentally, this influence might also explain the disappointingly low 
figures for antibody determination reported by Wassermann, Neisser, and Brack in then-
second publication, for as Citron pointed out in July 1907: "the material [= the patients -
HvdB] of the Breslau dermatological clinic, which underlies the first statistics, must for the 
most part have been subjected to a specific treatment". 5 4 The early figure of 19 percent 
positive outcomes in a total of 257 confirmed syphilitic cases happened to refer to a 
nonrepresentatitive sample of patients that had been intensely treated with mercury 
(remember that Neisser was an adherent of the chronic-intermittent method!). If we take this 
circumstance into account, the alleged increase in the accuracy of antibody determination 
from barely 20 percent to about 70 or 90 percent becomes less dramatic than Fleck suggests. 
As a serologist Citron had some difficulty to convince his clinical colleagues at the 
Charité of the pertinence of the outcomes of the WaR. He found an effective way to deal 
with what has been referred to in the introductory section as the 'dilemma of application' : 
"the outside experts must be able to convince participants - who, as insiders, might expect 
to 'know best' - that they do not know best". Transferred to our context the dilemma could 
be stated thus: If the outcome of the WaR agreed with the clinicians' own judgement, it 
would tell them nothing new; if it disagreed with their judgement, they would doubt its 
validity and reliability. Citron saw an escape from this vicious circle. In cases of 
disagreement between laboratory and clinic the matter could sometimes - after the patient's 
death - be brought before the pathologist and be decided on his obduction table. As Eric 
Cassell observed in 1986: "The autopsy room used to be the central theater where disputes 
about the diagnosis of difficult diseases were resolved ( . . ) " . 5 5 On the obduction table the 
tell-tale signs of a syphilitic affection could often be established. Citron used the strategy of 
mobilizing allies (Latour). 
But what exactly did a positive outcome of the WaR using antibody deteraunation mean? 
It was Citron's most important contribution to the serodiagnosis of syphilis that he gave a 
new clinical meaning to antibody detennination. Initially he had endorsed the common view 
shared by Neisser and Brack, that only antigen determination was capable of indicating the 
presence of active spirochaetes, but later on he changed his opinion. His change of heart can 
be quite accurately located in time. On 18 July 1907 Citron still asserted: 
"The study of antigen determination would be no less important, because from it we can infer with 
J. Citron, 'Ueber Komplementbindungsversuche bei infektiösen und postinfektiösen Erkrankungen 
(Tabes dorsalis etc.) sowie bei Nährstoffen', Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 33 (1907): 1165-
71, onp. 1169. 
E.J. Cassell, 'Ideas in Conflict: The Rise and Fall (and Rise and Fall) of New Views of Disease', 
Daedalus 115 (1986): 19-41, on p. 27. 
144 
certainty the persistence of the disease, whereas the antibodies refuse us an answer as to whether the 
pathogenic virus is still active (fortwirkt) or not". 5 6 
On 28 October 1907 Citron declared however: 
" [..] in general it may be held to be correct that the presence of antibodies indicates the presence of 
active syphilis, and, conversely, that the disappearance of antibodies indicates the onset of complete 
latency or perhaps even the healing of lues. I'm standing here in a certain opposition to Neisser, Bruck, 
and Schucht, who from the presence of antibodies want to conclude no more than that at one time or 
another a luetic infection has taken place".57 
Citron appeared to have forgotten that he himself had propounded the same view only three 
months earlier! His main reason for abandoning this view now was that he had encountered 
patients whose date of infection was more than four decades ago but who still showed a high 
antibody content in their serum. Citron considered it highly implausible that the human body 
would keep antibodies for so long without use. He therefore thought it more reasonable to 
assume that in such cases active spirochaetes were still present and continued to stimulate, 
directly or indirectly, antibody production. For the time being this was only Citron's personal 
opinion. In due course it would become the view shared by most serologists and clinicians. 
This shift in the clinical meaning of antibody determination was a crucial episode in the 
development of the WaR. 
7. The Wassermann reaction in a clinical context 
In December 1908 Fritz Lesser, serologist at a private dermatological clinic in Berlin, 
addressed what he called "the cardinal question in the whole sérodiagnostics of syphilis", 
namely "the question whether a positive Wassermann reaction [using antibody determination -
HvdB] merely indicates that the person concerned has once had syphilis, or whether it proves 
extant disease". 5 8 It was not possible to answer this question by immunological experiment, 
Lesser asserted. Only a combination of serology and clinical experience, backed by 
pathological anatomy, could provide an answer. Lesser opted for the second alternative that 
"in case of a positive serum reaction the syphilitic virus is still active" 5 9 , largely because 
Citron, op. cit. (note 54), p. 1171. 
J. Citron, 'Die Serodiagnostik der Syphilis', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 (1907): 1370-73, 
on p. 1371. 
F. Lesser, 'Weitere Ergebnisse der Serodiagnostik der Syphilis', Deutsche medizinische 
Wochenschrift 35 (1909): 379-83, on p. 382. 
Ibid., p. 383. 
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of the fact that prolonged antisyphilitic therapy with mercury and iodine is able to influence 
the outcome of the WaR, that is, to turn it from strongly positive to weakly positive and 
eventually to negative. This change in the outcome of the WaR was often accompanied by 
the disappearance of the visible symptoms. Of course, the fact mat mercurial therapy is able 
to influence the outcome of the WaR only counts as an argument in favour of the validity of 
this serological test if you are already convinced that mercury is more or less effective as an 
antisyphilitic remedy. For the antimercurialists at the fringe of the medical profession 
Lesser's argument cut no ice. By the same token it was destined to receive a sympathetic 
hearing from those clinicians who prescribed mercurial treatments, either according to the 
chronic-intermittent or the symptomatic-expectative method. At last, the WaR appeared to 
supply the long-awaited proof that mercury really worked! The test could also be used to 
guide therapy. Lesser even went so far as to consider the WaR as an "individually adapted 
yard-stick for therapeutic intervention". The new aim of antisyphilitic treatment would be to 
let the symptoms disappear and to achieve a negative WaR, in order thereby to avert the 
onset of late-syphilitic disorders in later life, for as Lesser remarked: "Over the head of 
every syphilitic person with a positive reaction hangs as a Sword of Damocles tabes or 
paralysis". 6 0 
At about the same time, in January 1909, the well-known dermatologist Alfred Blaschko 
expressed his confidence in the practical usefulness of the WaR. This support was the more 
significant because it came from a clinician who had previously taken a rather skeptical 
attitude toward the WaR. What had changed his mind was the impressive evidence, 
accumulated since the second half of 1907, of 1400 serological inquiries (initially carried out 
by Julius Citron) on almost 1000 cases of his own private clientele. Beside the possibility to 
influence the outcome of the WaR by prolonged antisyphilitic treatment, there was also found 
a general parallelism between the reaction and the manifestations of the disease. These facts 
made it highly probable also for Blaschko to assume that a "positive reaction indicates the 
existence of foci of syphilitic disease (syphilitischer Krankheitsherde) in the organism". 6 1 
As an opponent of the chronic-intermittent method, which he designated as a "method 
that strikes completely blindly" (dieser ganz blind dreinschlagende Methode), Blaschko was 
however more cautious than Lesser in drawing conclusions with regard to antisyphilitic 
therapy. He agreed that a negative reaction, in addition to the disappearance of symptoms, 
constituted a new aim for therapy: treatment should in general be continued until the reaction 
became negative. However, he immediately qualified this rule. It would of course be absurd, 
he added, to pour endless quantities of mercury into patients just to achieve the aim of a 
negative reaction. The physician should always keep an eye to the general condition of the 
Ibid. 
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patient as a living person, his tolerance for mercury, possible undesirable side-effects 
etcetera. At times treatment should be temporarily discontinued if only to allow the patient 
some breathing space. According to Blaschko, the physician's art {ärztliche Kunst) was 
precisely to know how to tack and to shift; it would be bad to replace this art with a rigid, 
dead schematism. 6 2 
Thanks to the WaR, however, the old opposition between the adherents of the chronic-
intermittent method and of the symptotnatic-expectative method was already losing much of 
its pungency. The former method could strike less 'blindly' now. Its rigid schematism could 
be relaxed. Formerly, the orthodox proponents of this method would prescribe an 
antisyphilitic treatment consisting of, say, 8 cures, each cure consisting of 30 Hg inunctions 
(or 30 soluble Hg injections; or 15 insoluble Hg injections). On the basis of extensive 
statistical material measuring the effects of the number of cures on obtaining a persistently 
negative WaR, Fritz Lesser showed in January 1910 that a total number of 4 cures would be 
almost as useful as, and of course far less inconvenient than, the rigidly prescribed number 
of 8 cures . 6 3 Moreover, each separate cure could be more flexibly scheduled. Instead of 
fixing a certain quantity of mercury to be administered to the patient, it would now be 
possible to use the WaR as a criterion (Massstab) for the duration of the cure. According to 
Lesser, a positive reaction could be considered as an indicator for all symptoms, both of the 
visible eruptions on the skin and of the invisible affections of internal organs (revealed by 
pathological anatomy). Indeed, a positive WaR could itself be considered as "the most 
constant symptom of syphilis". Antisyphilitic treatment was to be oriented to the practical 
aim of achieving a (persistently) negative WaR. This was only the penultimate aim, but it 
served as a practical surrogate for the ultimate aim of warding off the dangers of tabes, 
paresis, aortic aneurysm and other cardiovascular disorders. 
Here we may pause to note that Lesser, as Citron before him, very ably dealt with the 
so-called 'dilemma of application', in particular with regard to those clinicians who followed 
the chronic-intermittent method. As Mulkay, Pinch, and Ashmore write: "(..) the outsiders 
[read: serologists] must convince practitioners [read: clinicians] of the inadequacy of existing 
practices without generating undue hostility and without thereby jeopardizing practitioners' 
collaboration in recreating in the practical realm the conditions required for the successful 
implementation of the outsiders' recommendations". 6 4 This is what Lesser did. He first 
enlisted the clinicians' support for the WaR by demonstrating with its aid the effectiveness 
of mercurial therapy. Then, in a second move, he undertook to convince them of the 
"inadequacy of existing practices" by using the WaR to demonstrate the supererogatory and 
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overly rigid character of some existing treatment schemes. 
While the use of the WaR as a criterion in antisyphilitic treatment led to a relaxation of 
the chronic-intermittent method, it also changed the symptomatic-expectative method. 
Although Blaschko did not want to consider a positive reaction itself as a symptom, by 
December 1908 he was already willing to accept it as a ground for initiating an antisyphilitic 
treatment, even in the absence of visible symptoms}5 For the adherents of the symptomatic-
expectative method the WaR therefore led to an enlargement of the indications for therapy. 
In both ways, the serodiagnosis of syphilis brought about a certain convergence of the 
two treatment schemes and thus a rapprochement between the rival therapeutic schools within 
the profession. The official medical world could close its ranks against the antimercurialists 
and other quacks. Practising physicians gained in credibility toward their patients, for it 
would now be easier to argue the necessity of a treatment in the absence of visible 
symptoms. 
The new near-consensus in the profession was duly expressed in the 1911 edition of the 
handbook of Kolle and Hetsch on bacteriology and infectious diseases: 
"The majority of clinicians and serologists nowadays takes the view that a positive reaction is a sign of 
active foci of spirochaetes (aktiven Spirochaetenherderi) with syphilis".66 
This passage speaks of clinicians and serologists, and rightly so, for as I have tried to show 
in this chapter, the development of the WaR into a practically useful test for detecting 
syphilis has actually been a joint achievement of the laboratory and the clinic. 
8. A full-blown and well-established scientific fact? 
By 1910 "the fact that the so-called Wassermann reaction is related to syphilis" (XXVIJ/2) 
was generally considered as well-established. In the preceding sections I have given a 
detailed account of the efforts of serologists to persuade clinicians of the value of this 
sérodiagnostic test by capturing and translating their interests and forging 'epistemic 
alignments' between serological and therapeutic practices. My historical analysis was brought 
to a provisional conclusion at the point where those efforts were crowned with some success. 
This was however by no means the end of the story of the 'genesis and development' of the 
WaR. It is not at all easy to locate an exact end-point in time at which this process can be 
said to have reached completion. Fleck notes that the WaR had set an enormous avalanche 
in motion. At the time of his writing (1935) more than ten thousand scientific papers had 
Blaschko, op. cit. (note 61), p. 389. 
W. Kolle and H. Hetsch, Die Experimentelle Bakteriologie ind die Infektionskrankheiten, Volume 
II, Third edition, Berlin-Vienna (Urban & Schwarzenberg), 1911, p. 657. 
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already been published on this particular subject: "There certainly cannot be many similar 
specialized problems which have so many papers devoted to them" (81/108). As yet this 
stream showed no signs of slowing down. 
Fleck sees no difficulty in this vast accumulation of scientific papers. For him it simply 
indicates the sheer size of the collective effort devoted to the serodiagnosis of syphilis. It is 
taken as support for his theory which states that a scientific fact can be established only by 
collective work. In this case, however, I 'm inclined to turn Fleck's vision on its head. If so 
much collective energy apparently had to be spent on this particular subject matter, then there 
may be something peculiar about the scientific fact that Fleck selected as his example for 
epistemological investigation. Perhaps this fact was not such a well-established fact after all. 
In other words, the very size of the collective effort may be reason for suspicion. 
As I see it, the basic source of the difficulty is to be found in the early 'decoupling' of 
theoretical and practical questions which occurred after the theoretical conception from which 
Wassermann and Brack had proceeded turned out to be untenable. In the absence of a 
convincing and generally accepted theoretical interpretation of the nature of the WaR, Fleck 
could define the 'factuality' of his chosen example only in terms of practical success: 
"The theory of the reaction as well as the historical and psychological circumstances 
surrounding its conception are of less practical importance. If the relation of the Wassermann 
reaction to syphilis is a fact, it became a fact only because of its extreme utility owing to the 
high probability of success in concrete cases" (72/95; italics in the original). 
It is doubtful whether such a 'dumb fact' of practical success, devoid of a satisfactory 
'theory of the reaction', may count as a full-blown example of a 'scientific fact'. Let us draw 
on a comparison with a different domain. Pickering describes the production of facts in the 
field of elementary particle physics as resulting from a three-way interactive stabilization 
between material procedures, interpretive accounts (the theory of the apparatus) and 
phenomenal accounts. 6 7 What was conspicuously slow in coming in the case of the WaR, 
at least during the first four or five decades of the 20th century, was a convincing 
'interpretive account' of the reaction (Fleck's "theory of the reaction") which would have 
made sense in the light of prevalent theories of immunology. For this reason the potentially 
three-way interactive stabilization process necessarily degenerated into a two-way process 
between material procedures and phenomenal accounts (that is, in this case, positive or 
negative test results indicating the presence or absence of syphilis). This two-way interactive 
stabilization, as we have seen in the preceding sections, was brought about by the forging 
of 'epistemic alignments' between serological and clinical practices. Perhaps the interaction 
between serologists and clinicians was of such extraordinary importance in the formation of 
the WaR as a practically useful test precisely because no generally accepted interpretive 
account was to fill the gap left by the original interpretation of the reaction. 
A. Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency & Science, Chicago (The University of 
Chicago Press), 1995, p. 86. 
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Not that proposed interpretations were in short supply. Part of the avalanche of scientific 
papers mentioned by Fleck was intended to solve the puzzle of the W a R . 6 8 A key piece for 
the solution of this puzzle, however, would become available only in 1942 when Pangborn 
isolated the substance against which the serum of syphilitics reacted and identified it as a 
phospholipid, which she dubbed cardiolipine.69 Even then the puzzle was not fully solved. 
A large part of the avalanche of papers consisted of proposals for modifications and 
'simplifications' of the WaR and of the closely related flocculation tests (which did not 
employ complement fixation but were based on the same 'Wassermann antibodies' or 
'reagins' as figured in the WaR). This endless stream of modifications raises doubts as to 
whether the WaR ever achieved the degree of standardization as is sometimes suggested (and 
as might be thought required for the relationship with syphilis to qualify as a full-blown 
fact!). For Rouse, Fleck's account is precisely exemplary as an analysis of how 
standardization can be attained: "Virtually every kind of scientific achievement can be 
standardized and can thereby circulate outside its original more specific context [..]. 
Sometimes standardized facts are just the correlates of standardized procedures. The 
correlation between syphilis and a complicated transformation of the blood is a fact that was 
at first manifested in a very limited context and gradually, through repetition and practical 
refinement of the procedure, was extended into new domains". 7 0 Fleck emphasizes that the 
thought collective "standardized the technical process with genuinely social methods", namely 
"through conferences, the press, ordinances, and legislative measures" (78/104; the first 
method refers primarily to the League of Nations conferences on the serodiagnosis of syphilis 
held in 1923, 1928, and 1930), but this standardization effort must have been an endless 
uphill battle in view of the numerous local variations and modifications that were generated 
time and again. Thus at the League of Nations conference of 1928 held in Copenhagen 7 
different modifications of the WaR - in addition to 9 different flocculation tests - were 
evaluated, while two years later, at the 1930 Montevideo Conference, again 7 different 
modifications were assessed, with only one modification (the socalled Harrison-Wyler 
method) being represented on both occasions. 7 1 One should therefore not overestimate the 
In Chapter VII will give a brief exposition of some current interpretations of the nature of the 
WaR, inasmuch as these are relevant for an analysis of the struggle over the 'intellectual property' 
of this serodiagnostic test. See also Fleck (80-81/106-108). 
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whether such a "standardized scheme" could be said to exist in the first place. 
C D . Westermann, Over Niet-Specifieke Positieve Reacties op Syphilis, Amsterdam (Thesis), 1945. 
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degree of standardization achieved by this "genuinely social method". 
The foregoing discussion has adduced some considerations which may call the 
appropriateness of Fleck's example into question. It is doubtful whether the correlation 
between the WaR and syphilis qualifies as a full-blown example of a scientific fact in view 
of the absence of a commonly accepted interpretation of the reaction and the lack of proper 
standardization. The force of these considerations depends on the 'grammatical' criteria 
employed in speaking about scientific facts, but as such they do not affect the presumed 
practical usefulness of the WaR. So what about the latter? 
Like most of his contemporaries, Fleck was convinced of the practical reliability of the 
WaR. As the English pathologist and bacteriologist William Bulloch stated in 1938, the WaR 
was regarded as "a test of deadly accuracy". 7 2 In technical discussions on the accuracy of 
diagnostic instruments it is customary to distinguish between the sensitivity of a test (defined 
as the conditional probability that someone having the disease will show up with a positive 
outcome) and its specificity (defined as the conditional probability that someone not having 
the disease will show up with a negative outcome). Before the Second World War, the WaR 
was generally taken to be accurate and reliable in the sense that it was seen as combining an 
adequate sensitivity with a very high degree of specificity. 7 3 A positive result on the WaR 
was normally considered sufficient reason for initiating a vigorous antisyphilitic treatment. 
Was such confidence in the high accuracy of the WaR warranted? Of course, from a 
constructivist point of view it is not allowed to ask this question, but I can hardly resist the 
temptation of committing the sin of 'Whig history' in this particular case, if only because this 
violation of principle offers a dramatic relativization of the notion of 'practical success'. 
The period after the Second World War gained new insights into the accuracy of the 
WaR, because so-called direct 'treponemal tests' like the treponema immobilisation test (TPI) 
and the FTA-fluorescein treponemal antibody test came to be available. 7 4 In contrast, the 
older WaR and flocculation tests were now designated as 'non-treponemal tests' because they 
used as 'antigen' a substance that was not directly related to the treponema (or spirochaete). 
Another circumstance was that extensive epidemiological data obtained by using the WaR had 
become available as a consequence of decisions taken in the 1930s in several US states to 
introduce compulsory pre-marital syphilis testing and of mass screening of US soldiers during 
the Second World War. This large-scale testing effort had yielded incredibly high levels of 
W. Bulloch, The History of Bacteriology, New York (Dover), 1979 [1938], p. 283. 
Fleck also implicitly assumes such a very high degree of specificity, but does not provide numerical 
data. When he discusses the increase in the success rate of the WaR (from 20 percent to 70-90 
percent in cases of confirmed syphilis), he gives percentages that relate to the sensitivity of the test. 
My account is based on the excellent analysis in I. L6wy, 'Testing for a Sexually Transmissible 
Disease, 1907-1970: the History of the Wassermann Reaction', in V. Berridge and P. Strong 
(eds.), AIDS and Contemporary History, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1993, pp. 74-
92. 
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positive results among some sections of the population. The newly available 'treponemal 
tests' confirmed the scepticism raised by these epidemiological data among some American 
physicians. The WaR turned out to be much less accurate than had been supposed earlier. 
According to Walsh McDermott, the specificity of the test was such that when used for mass 
screening, it could easily result, in some populations, in more than 50 percent of 'false 
positives ' . 7 5 
A brief technical elaboration may be in order here. The predictive value of a test (that 
is, the probability of actually having the disease given a positive test result), and therewith 
the chance of 'false positives', depends not just on its sensitivity and specificity but also on 
the prevalence of the disease among the population. Using Reverend Thomas Bayes' famous 
theorem, we can illustrate this with a simple calculation. 7 6 Suppose the specificity of the 
test is 98% and its sensitivity 80% (not such unfavourable assumptions, one might think), 
then if the prevalence is put at 10% the predictive value of the test will be 81.6% (with a 
corresponding chance of false positives amounting to 18.4%). If under these same 
assumptions the prevalence is put at 5%, however, the predictive value will be reduced to 
68% (with a corresponding increase in the chance of false positives to 32%!). 
There is no question, in the view of modern critics, that the US mass campaigns of the 
1930s against syphilis must have caused a lot of unnecessary harm. As Allan Brandt notes: 
"Many individuals during the 1930s suffered the consequences of the toxic syphilitic 
treatments although they were never infected; in some cases, these individuals were barred 
from marriage because of an incorrect Wassermann reading. They suffered the stigma 
associated with a disease they never had" , 7 7 
Of course, this whole exercise in retrospective wisdom is anathema to the genuine 
constructivist. For a constructivist, 'practical success' (like truth) cannot be more than what 
is taken as such in a certain social group. Let's therefore forget about the entire Whig history 
above! But, perhaps, we are still allowed to ask a different question: Why was the WaR 
commonly taken as practically successful among serologists and physicians (and among the 
general public as a whole) before the Second World War? What were the mechanisms for 
'mamtaining the faith'? 
liana Löwy points out that, paradoxically, it was precisely the delicacy and technical 
McDermott, op. cit. (note 20), p. 144: "Of all those people yielding positive reactions, only about 
one-half were actually syphilitic". 
The following formula is based on Bayes' Theorem: 
Predictive value 
prevalence X sensitivity 
prevalence X sensitivity + (1 - prevalence)(l - sensitivity) 
A.M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet, New York and Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1987, pp. 152-
54. 
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complexity of the WaR that could be used to maintain confidence in the accuracy of the test 
and to neutralize possible criticism: "The belief in the high specificity of the Wassermann 
reaction was always based on the assumption that the test was properly executed. On the 
other hand, the fact that the original Wassermann test was technically complicated made 
possible maintaining the faith in the specificity of the method by attributing all the 
inexplicable results to laboratory errors" . 7 8 A special version of Harry Collins' 
'experimenter's regress' can be seen to be operative here, in the sense that competence in 
performing the technical procedure was judged in part on the basis of the desired outcome. 
This is clearly expressed in the following statement by the Rockefeller Institute bacteriologist 
Hideyo Noguchi: "rrjt should be suspected that when one obtains a high percentage of 
positive reactions in non-syphilitic cases one is not doing the test properly". 7 9 
It is significant that Fleck too uses the delicacy and technical complexity of the WaR as 
grounds for granting the test the benefit of the doubt. He mentions "the poor results obtained 
even by excellent research workers at the [..] Wassermann conferences held under the 
auspices of the League of Nations" (97/127), but sees no reason to doubt the accuracy of the 
WaR. Instead, Fleck alludes to the necessity of "quasi-orchestral practice" (cf. Pickering's 
paraphrase quoted in the introductory section) in performing the test and adduces the 
disturbance caused by a change in personnel as sufficient explanation for the poor results. 
Even more problematic is Fleck's evident partiality against Wassermann's early critics. 
He stresses that each serologist must acquire experience in the practical application of 
serological techniques in general and of the WaR in particular before he will be able to 
obtain reliable results and then remarks: "A state of this kind [to wit, a state of experience] 
is what the first critics of the Wassermann reaction lacked" (96/126). Elsewhere, Fleck refers 
to the so-called "ultramethodics with a personal undertone" that Wassermann's assistant 
Meier demanded from the first critics of the WaR and which in his (Fleck's) view nicely 
illustrates the "personal factor in the emerging truth" (177 note 1/113 note 1). Fleck is 
clearly taking sides here with Wassermann and his likes against the critics. It is interesting 
to note, however, that one of those early critics, Eduard Weil, was fully aware of the 
potential of Meier's requirement for immunizing the WaR against all possible criticism: "An 
agreement on the question whether the WaR may on occasion also be positive in other 
diseases or whether [..] there exists an absolute 'specificity' can never be attained, because 
the adherents of the first group will always be accused of not mastering the 'ultramethodics 
with a personal undertone' demanded by Meier" . 8 0 
Fleck's parti-pris in this case can hardly be reconciled with the principles of symmetry 
Löwy, op. cit. (note 74), p. 78. 
Cited in Löwy, op. cit. (note 74), p. 79. 
E. Weil, 'Das Problem der Serologie der Lues in der Darstellung Wassermann's', Berliner 
klinische Wochenschrift 33 (1921): 966-970, on p. 968. 
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and impartiality that are constitutive of modern constructivism, or with his own wish to 
develop a "non-egocentric" theory of knowledge. The mechanisms for 'maintaining the faith' 
that were effective on his contemporaries also operated on him. As Lowy observes: "[..] 
even such an unorthodox critic of science as Fleck did not suspect that the Wassermann test 
[..] was far from being well established as a 'medical fact' as it was believed in the 1920s 
and 30s" . 8 1 
9. Afterthoughts and conclusions 
What does it mean to view science as practice? In the foregoing sections I have argued that 
Fleck's account of the development of the WaR, so much admired by the adherents of a 
science-as-practice approach, suffers from serious shortcomings and limitations. His vision 
of the serologists' collective as one big cooperative team tinkering its way to success, as it 
were, by 'tuning' the material procedure is a rather autistic view that ignores the importance 
of the 'clinical connection'. In my judgement, Fleck overestimates the increase in the success 
rate of the WaR (or more exactly in its sensitivity) which has been achieved by such 
tinkering and toning (if only because the initial figure of about 20 percent may have been 
unduly low owing to the special characteristics of the 'patient material' used in the early 
experiments!). His analysis also passes over what the serologist Fritz Lesser called "the 
cardinal question in the whole sérodiagnostics of syphilis", to wit, the question of whether 
antibody determination could be used to detect extant disease or merely a one-time infection 
with syphilis. This crucial question, as I have tried to show in my alternative historical 
acount, was to be resolved not by serologists autistically "tuning their sets" but through close 
interaction between serologists and clinicians. 
I believe that in some respects my analysis of the development of the WaR comes closer 
to the requirements of a science-as-practice approach than Fleck's account. Joseph Rouse in 
particular has emphasized the importance of taking account of how practices are connected 
to one another for understanding scientific knowledge: 
"Practices are always interconnected, never existing in isolation from one another, in ways that 
fundamentally affect the ongoing development of any particular practice. A typical practice needs other 
practices to enforce its norms, provide its necessary equipment and resources, educate and train its 
practitioners, confer significance on it or undercut its previous significance [..]. In order to understand 
how scientific knowledge is situated within practices, we need to take account of how practices are 
connected to one another, for knowledge will be established only through these interconnections".82 
Lôwy, op. cit. (note 74), p. 75. 
Rouse, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 156-57. 
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Thus in my analysis I have paid special attention to the interconnections between the 
laboratory practice of serologists, organized around the 'experimental system' of immune 
hemolysis, and the diagnostic and especially the therapeutic practices of dermatologists and 
other clinicians, organized around the mercurial treatment of syphilitic patients. 8 3 It was 
only by attending to the special problems and dilemmas with which clinical specialists were 
confronted in dealing with their patients that serologists could make the WaR into a 
practically useful test. Only in this way could the experimental manipulations with blood 
samples that are designated by this name become informative about the disease entity 
syphilis. 
According to Rouse's 'posthumanist' conception, practices are more than sequences of 
human activities: "practices are not just patterns of action, but the meaningful configurations 
of the world within which actions can take place intelligibly, and thus practices incorporate 
the objects that they are enacted with and on and the settings in which they are enacted". 8 4 
I want to leave it undecided here whether this indeed offers an attractive conception of 
practices, but I agree that any concrete analysis of a scientific practice should attend to the 
material and institutional setting in which and to the objects on which it is conducted. Let me 
just cite here some illustrations from my historical account of the development of the WaR 
which graphically show how a scientific practice may be crucially dependent on the special 
properties of the 'objects' or 'raw materials' with which it has to deal. In a biomedical 
context, what figures prominently among such objects is 'patient material' (Krankenmateriat), 
as it is often designated somewhat disrespectfully.8 5 Thus, as the serologist Julius Citron 
pointed out, the disappointing initial results obtained with antibody determination could be 
partly explained by the peculiar nature of the 'material' from the Breslau dermatological 
clinic, i.e. by the fact that Neisser's syphilitic patients had been heavily treated with 
mercury. If only the choice of 'patient material' had been a little bit more fortunate, Citron 
It must be noted that Pickering distances his approach from the study of practices (in the plural 
form). He focuses on practice (emphatically in the singular form), which he understands as the 
work of cultural extension and transformation in time. 'Practices', that is, on his definition, 
"specific, repeatable sequences of activities on which scientists rely in their daily work", are 
considered as components of an existing scientific culture and as not concerned with its extension in 
time. See Pickering, op. cit. (note 67), p. 4. The problem is that Rouse does not make this 
distinction. His notion of 'practices' includes more than just patterns of activities and is also 
characterized by a dimension of temporality. This is not the place, however, to sort out the 
differences between these two authors. 
Rouse, op. cit. (note 1), p. 135. 
Perhaps this usage was especially current among German medical researchers in the early 20th 
century. In his book on technology, Heidegger made a passing comment on this particular usage (I 
leave the passage untranslated): "[..] [GJehört [..] nicht auch der Mensch, ursprünglicher noch als 
die Natur, in den Bestand? Der umlaufende Rede vom Menschenmaterial, vom Krankenmaterial 
einer Klinik, spricht dafür". See M. Heidegger, Die Technik und die Kehre, Pfullingen (Günther 
Neske), 1991, p. 17. 
155 
implied, the results would have looked more promising from the start. The 'patient material' 
from the Berlin clinic to which he himself was affiliated had quite different characteristics 
and thus offered different opportunities for serological work. Other kinds of raw material also 
played crucial roles in the development of the WaR. Initially, the spirochaete-swarming livers 
of stillborn luetic babies - "a much sought-after article", according to H. Beitkze 8 6 -
constituted the source of 'antigen' for Wassermann, Neisser, and Bruck. They had ample 
access to this resource thanks to a large network of contacts (in their first research paper they 
expressed their acknowledgements to no less than thirty-six persons who had provided them 
with material). It is significant that other investigators who had a much less privileged access 
to syphilitic livers subsequently found out that extracts from normal (non-syphilitic) livers 
would be equally usable. Likewise, Neisser's artificially infected primates in Breslau lost 
their value as suppliers of strong luetic sera when the serodiagnosis switched from antigen 
to antibody determination. In science as in economic life the value of given resources may 
be highly unstable. 
The foregoing discussion also illustrates that access to raw materials may be regulated 
by social factors. (Citron's appeal to the pathologists of the autopsy room - after the death 
of the patient - to settle disputes with clinicians over the proper diagnosis offers another 
example. This option was open to him because of the circumstance that around 1900 poor 
patients were admitted to German hospitals on the condition that in the event of death then-
corpses would be available for post-mortem examination! 8 7) Social factors are supposed 
to be included in Rouse's conception of practices, but it is not entirely clear to me exactly 
how and where they fit in. He stresses that the social dimension of a practice is "radically 
open" and polemicizes against SSK constructivists on the grounds that they do not properly 
recognize this circumstance: 
"Social constructivist interpretations of practices fail to take adequate account of this openness of the social 
dimensions of practices. When they insist that social relations or interests are explanatory, they foreclose 
the possibility that those relations or interests, or even their characterization as social, may be what is at 
issue in the continuation of the practice".88 
What is the force of this principled objection? Rouse maintains that social factors and 
interests, far from being the unproblematic explanans for which the SSK constructivists take 
them, are characterized by plasticity. He cites the interconnectedness of practices as a further 
argument against the SSK position, because this interconnectedness appears to imply that the 
boundaries of social communities, and thus the identities of their members, are always 
See note 34. 
See Elkeles, op. cit. (note 45). 
Rouse, op. cit. (note 1), p. 141. 
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ambiguous and contested. 9 Rouse holds that the difference between members and non-
members, and even between agents (subjects) and non-agents, is established within practices. 
This difference is thus neither objectively nor socially determined: "What matters is 
interconnected and ongoing practical interaction with the world" . 9 0 
The issues raised by Rouse are too large to be exhaustively discussed here. The problem 
with his argument, in my view, is that it is too principled and too fundamentalistic. It has 
rather nihilistic consequences in that it removes all fixed anchoring points for an explanatory 
undertaking (indeed, he abjures any explanatory intent). I also believe that the 
interconnectedness of practices does not provide a knock-down argument against social 
explanations. In fact I 'm quite willing to concede a limited though essential explanatory role 
to 'interests' precisely in explaining the interconnection of practices, or the creation of 
'epistemic alignments' between them. One should think here primarily of those 'interests' 
which derive from the scientists' previous investments in their skills and competences. As 
SSK constructivist Steven Shapin observes: 
"[Scientists are] quite able to weigh in the balance the courses of action offered to them and the 
investments they have acquired in their skills and competences. One should say that they have an 'interest' 
in those skills and work-routines, an 'interest' in encouraging or enlisting in courses of action which 
promise to give scope and value to their skills and routines. Given a basically calculative model of the 
actor [..], 'interests' seem quite hard and durable enough to figure in a job of explanatory work".91 
As interests of this kind are mtimately related to the work performed by scientists, one might 
imagine them to deserve a prominent place in any science-as-practice approach. 9 2 Let us 
look now at how 'interests' figured in a more concrete way in the development of the WaR. 
As I have extensively argued, the dermatologist Neisser was at first primarily motivated 
by a therapeutic (and not a diagnostic) 'interest' in the development of a serological test for 
syphilis. He had literally invested extraordinary amounts of work (and money!) in his dream 
project to search for a serum therapy against syphilis, and the prospective test was supposed 
to free this project from the deadlock in which it had entered. What about Wassermann's 
'interest' in the development of the serodiagnosis of syphilis? If we assume that it was 
Neisser who proposed to him to work on this subject (as Brack suggested in 1921), then it 
is not difficult to see that Wassermann had an 'interest' to enlist in this proposed course of 
action, because a successful complement fixation test for syphilis would surely demonstrate 
8 9 Ibid., p. 145. 
9 0 Ibid., p. 146. 
9 1 S. Shapin, 'Following Scientists Around', Social Studies of Science 18 (1988): 533-50, on p. 546. 
9 2 "Given a community of competent users, there is no way to talk your way into possession of the 
relevant skill" (Shapin, ibid., pp. 545-46). 
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the importance of the modification of using so-called 'bacterial extracts' that he and Brack 
had introduced into Bordet's method (in its usual version the method could not be employed 
because the causative agent of syphilis had resisted all attempts at cultivation). In other 
words, this was certainly "a line of action which promise[d] to give scope and value to their 
routines and skills". As for the clinicians' diagnostic interest in a serological test for syphilis, 
I have argued that this should be seen in the light of the strong commitments of most of them 
to some scheme of vigorous mercurial treatment of syphilitic patients. For the clinical 
specialists, their therapeutic schemes constituted a major 'investment' to be protected and 
enlarged, and to be defended against the attacks of anti-mercurialist 'quacks'. A test which 
merely indicated that a patient had once in his lifetime been infected with syphilis 
spirochaetes, would hardly have been of interest to most clinical specialists. It would be 
different for a test which enabled them to separate cured from latent cases. For this reason 
Neisser and his collaborators in Breslau, after the failure of the search for a serum therapy, 
concentrated their energy on the ill-fated antigen determination and not on antibody 
determination. Eventually, thanks to the efforts of Julius Citron, Fritz Lesser, and others, 
the conviction gained ground that the clinical interest in detecting extant disease could be 
served by antibody determination itself. One of the most convincing arguments vis-a-vis 
clinicians was that prolonged mercurial therapy would influence the outcome of the WaR; 
the test was embraced because it appeared to provide the long-awaited proof that mercury 
was effective after all. As the WaR (using antibody determination) proved useful in 
monitoring the treatment of confirmed cases of syphilis, it was incorporated into existing 
therapeutic schemes. In the process it brought about a rapprochement between rival 
therapeutic schools among specialists, thus enabling them to close their ranks against the anti-
mercurialists at the fringe of official medicine and to gain credibility and authority towards 
their patients. The creation of 'epistemic alignments' between serological and clinical 
practices thus included attending to the clinicians' interests. Contra Rouse, we can conclude 
that the interconnectedness of practices constitutes no argument against interest explanations. 
Having defended the legitimacy of interest explanations, I must immediately add some 
important qualifications. In the typical SSK approach, interests are seen as sufficiently hard 
and durable to be used for explanatory purposes (cf. the above-quoted passage from Shapin). 
It would seem, however, that this relative 'hardness and durability' of interests is not a 
matter of a priori principle but is susceptible to empirical variation. 9 3 Let us briefly review 
our historical case in this respect. How 'hard' and 'durable' were the interests that were 
involved in the development of the serodiagnosis of syphilis? We have seen that Neisser's 
Pickering criticizes "the canonical SSK literature on the interest model" for its lack of interest in 
"how interests themselves change in practice". He admits that there are situations where interests 
remain constant through practice (it is on these situations that SSK studies have focused), but denies 
that such situations are representative. Thus in his view interests cannot be regarded as "unmoved 
movers", but are themselves subject to the "mangle of practice" and liable to redefinition. See 
Pickering, op. cit (note 67), pp. 64-65. 
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early therapeutic interest had to be given up when his search for a serum therapy ended in 
failure. Subsequently, his diagnostic interest in a test capable of separating cured from latent 
cases led to what later turned out to be the 'wrong' choice for antigen determination. 
Ironically, this interest would eventually be satisfied by antibody determination. I have also 
declared that the clinical specialists were strongly committed to their different therapeutic 
schemes of mercurial treatment, but this commitment (or 'interest') was not unalterable 
either. In fact, under the influence of the WaR, the adherents of the chronic-intermittent 
method were willing to implement a relaxation of their rigid schedule, whereas the 
proponents of the symptomatic-expectative method accepted a broadening of indications. Both 
schools thereby furthered their common interest in closing the ranks against the anti-
mercurialists and in enhancing their authority vis-à-vis the general public. It is precisely for 
the changes in therapeutic schemes induced by the incorporation of the WaR that we can say 
that the serologists not just captured but also translated the interests of the clinicians. This 
translation was not simply a linguistic matter of 'interest-talk'; it involved a restructuring of 
the clinicians' field of action possibilities. 9 4 
The upshot of this long argument is that interests can indeed play a limited explanatory 
role in accounting for the activities of scientists, but cannot be regarded as "unmoved 
movers", to use Pickering's expression. Putting them in such a role would be to erect a 
grand metaphysical scheme. On the other hand, there is no reason for a principled rejection 
of interest explanations either. Even if interests may not emerge unchanged from scientific 
practice, it does not follow that they cannot be used to explain the choices investigators made 
when they embarked upon certain lines of action. The problem calls for a thoroughly 
pragmatic assessment. 
At the end of this chapter I must mention two issues that could not be treated here, but 
that will be discussed in other chapters. First, it may have surprised the reader that our 
analysis of the development of the WaR did not involve any extended discussion of the so-
called serological thought style, whereas the notion of thought style appears to be a central 
concept in Fleck's theory. The reason is that this serological thought style, as described in 
Fleck's first chapter on the WaR (59-64/79-84), hardly plays any role at all in his subsequent 
account of the genesis and development of this sérodiagnostic test. Admittedly, Fleck writes 
that every serologist performing the WaR must participate in the thought style to perceive 
the relation between syphilis and blood as a definite form (96/127), but in this context the 
required participation means no more than that the serologist must have acquired 
comprehensive experience before he can obtain reliable results. There is no allusion here to 
the serological thought style consisting of a set of precepts as defined earlier. (Actually, the 
WaR does not exemplify the serological thougt style because it constitutes an anomaly; it 
flatly contradicts the element of 'serological specificity'!) We will have occasion to discuss 
Of course, this field would be even more drastically restructured after 1910, when Ehrlich's 
Salvarsan started to replace mercury. 
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Fleck's description of the serological thought style, and the status of the concept of thought 
style in general, in more detail in Chapter VUJ. 
The second issue that was only broached but not thoroughly discussed in this chapter 
is Fleck's rather extreme 'collectivism'. This issue is basically at stake in the analysis of the 
struggle over the intellectual ownership of the WaR and is therefore reserved for the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
MERTON VERSUS FLECK 
THE STRUGGLE OVER THE INTELLECTUAL 
OWNERSHIP OF THE WASSERMANN REACTION 
1. Introduction 
In 1979 the University of Chicago Press published the English translation of Ludwik Fleck's 
long-neglected monograph Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache 
(Basel, 1935), which had only been saved from oblivion thanks to Thomas S. Kuhn's brief 
reference to it in the preface of his famous book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962) as "an essay that anticipates many of my own ideas". 1 The English translation had 
been edited by the historian of science Thaddeus J. Trenn and the well-known sociologist 
Robert K. Merton. The latter had also mobilized financial resources, made arrangements with 
the publisher and persuaded Kuhn to contribute a foreword to i t . 2 
Although Merton has thus been instrumental in bringing out a new English edition of 
Fleck's monograph, one need not unduly psychologize to assume that he must feel at least 
somewhat ambivalent about this pioneering contribution of the Polish bacteriologist and self-
taught sociologist of science which his co-editor Trenn deems to be of "overohelming" 
relevance for current research in the sociology, history, and philosophy of science. 3 After 
all, the approach adopted by Fleck differs fundamentally from Merton's own version of the 
sociology of science, which constituted the dominant if not exclusive 'paradigm' from the 
1950s well into and 1970s. 4 There is, moreover, an undeniable similarity between Fleck's 
work and that of contemporary constructivists, several of whom had entered their professio-
nal careers in the late sixties or early seventies by subjecting the then dominant Mertonian 
paradigm to scatliing criticism. At that time, invoking Kuhn, men like Mulkay, King, Barnes 
and Dolby criticized Merton's one-sided interest in the social and institutional aspects -
particularly the normative structure or 'ethos' and the reward system - of science and took 
1 T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago (University of Chicago Press), 1962, 
pp. Vi-VII. 
2 L. Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, edited by Thaddeus J. Trenn and Robert 
K. Merton, Chicago (University of Chicago Press), 1979, p. XIV. 
3 Ibid., p. x r v . 
4 An authoritative exposition of the Mertonian paradigm can be found in Norman Storer's introducti-
on to the collection of essays published as R.K. Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and 
Empirical Investigations, edited by N. Storer, Chicago (University of Chicago Press), 1973. 
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exception to his apparent neglect of its substantive content. 5 In his monograph Fleck had 
criticized the Durkheimian sociologists of knowledge in a rattier similar vein for their treat-
ment of the substance of scientific knowledge as exempt from sociological analysis (47/85). 
The 'post-Kuhnian' critics also questioned Meiton's description and treatment of the 'scienti-
fic ethos ' . 6 As we can see in retrospect, in due course a new orthodoxy emerged from these 
criticisms: the Strong Programme and other varieties of constructivism. It was to be expected 
that after the appearance of the English translation of his monograph, Fleck would be greeted 
and embraced as a worthy precursor and pioneer of modern constructivism.7 
The charge that Merton excluded the substantive content of scientific knowledge from sociological 
consideration may seem surprising in view of the fact that in his early doctoral dissertation Science, 
Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England (published in 1938) he had extensively 
analyzed the shifting 'foci of attention' of 17th-century English science, as influenced by military 
and socio-economic factors. This preoccupation with matters of cognitive substance in science is 
however much less prominent in Merton's post-war contributions to the sociology of science which 
actually provided the building blocks for the so-called Mertonian paradigm. One might even hazard 
to say that the early dissertation does not really fit the mature paradigm. As supportive evidence for 
this we have the testimony of Thomas Gieryn who has declared that when he became Merton's 
research assistant and read the early dissertation he "was struck immediately by the contrast be-
tween the book and then-current research (1975 or so) in the sociology of science by Merton and 
his close collaborators Harriet Zuckerman, Jonathan Cole, and Stephen Cole" (see T.F. Gieryn, 
'Distancing Science from Religion in Seventeenth-Century England', Isis 79 [1988]: 582-93, on p. 
582). Merton's spouse and close collaborator, Harriet Zuckerman, has also affirmed that, for all his 
interest in the possible influence of social, cultural and economic factors on 'problem choice' in 
science, Merton never went so far as to endorse the constructivist claim that the findings of science 
are socially determined. See H. Zuckerman, "The Other Merton Thesis', Science in Context 3 
(1989): 239-67, on p. 261. One could thus still maintain that, in this rather special sense, for Mer-
ton the content of science remains exempt from sociological scrutiny. Further confirmation for this 
assertion is finally provided by a recent article of Merton's pupil Stephen Cole, who bluntly states: 
"Up until the 1970s, sociologists of science did not examine the actual cognitive content of scienti-
fic ideas, as they believed that these were ultimately determined by nature and not a product of 
social processes or variables". See S. Cole, 'Voodoo Sociology: Recent Developments in the Socio-
logy of Science', in P.R. Gross, M. Levitt, and M.W. Lewis (eds.), The Flight from Science and 
Reason, Baltimore and London (The Johns Hopkins University Press), 1997, pp. 274-87, on p. 
274. 
M.J. Mulkay, 'Some aspects of cultural growth in the natural sciences', Social Research 36 (1969): 
22-52; M.J. Mulkay, 'Norms and Ideology in Science', Social Science Information 15 (1976): 637-
56; M.D. King, 'Reason, Tradition and the Progressiveness of Science', History and Theory 10 
(1971): 3-32; S.B. Barnes and R.G.A. Dolby, "The Scientific Ethos: A Deviant Viewpoint', Archi-
ves Européennes de sociologie 11 (1970): 3-25. Kuhn has dissociated himself from these strident 
critics of Mertonian sociology and declared that their line of criticism was "seriously misdirected". 
See his Preface to The Essential Tension, Chicago (University of Chicago Press), 1977, pp. XXI-
XXII. 
"We do possess one fine pre-war work in the sociology of knowledge tradition which considers in 
detail the emergence of an accepted set of scientific doctrines and techniques. Ludwik Fleck's 
Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (1935), recently rescued from oblivion, has rapidly 
become recognized as a major contribution", B. Barnes and D. Edge (eds.), Science in Context: 
Readings in the Sociology of Science, Milton Keynes (Open University Press), 1982, p. 65. 
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As I am not fluent in Polish, I will cite from a copy of the original English text of the introduction 
which Merton was so kind to send me in response to a request for commenting on an earlier versi-
on of this chapter. 
In view of this situation, one would naturally be anxious to know Merton's considered views 
about the significance and merit of Fleck's pioneering work. He has commented more exten-
sively on the latter's contribution to the sociology of science in the introduction to the Polish 
translation of his book Social Theory and Social Structure (1982) - as if to make it more 
difficult for most of his readers to satisfy their natural curiosity! I will take the liberty to cite 
from this source. 8 In this introduction Merton declares that Fleck's work "is of more than 
merely 'historical interest' for all of us interested in the increasingly evident linkages between 
the history, philosophy, and sociology of science". He also recognizes the similarity of 
Fleck's approach to modern forms of constructivism, but simultaneously attempts to distance 
it from what he sees as the extremely relativist and subjectivist tendencies of the latter: 
"Fleck's theoretical orientation finds elliptical expression in the title of his monograph which audaciously 
refers to the genesis and development of a scientific fact. In that view, facts are not instantly and perma-
nently fixed, passive recordings of an external reality; they are constructed and consolidated through social 
processes involving individuals within a 'thought collective'. This sounds reminiscent - or better, antici-
patory - of more recent ideas on the 'social construction of knowledge' and it is. But Fleck avoids the 
radical relativism of much contemporary theorizing along these lines in recognizing that along with the 
social interactions between individuals in the collective there is also, for him, "the objective reality (that 
which is to be known)"." 
Referring to Fleck's notion of 'passive linkages' or 'passive couplings', Merton remarks that 
these elements represent the objective component of knowledge and concludes: "It is not the 
case, as a radical epistemological relativism would have it, that anything and everything 
goes". As I argued in Chapter II, Fleck's appeal to 'objective reality' and his use of the 
notion of 'passive linkages' prove a much less robust defence against antirealist positions than 
might appear at first sight and than Merton has taken them to be. On the other hand, I also 
believe that most forms of modern constructivism are less subjectivist and relativist than 
Merton evidently holds them to be. Few if any contemporary constructivists would actually 
be willing to endorse Feyeraband's slogan 'Anything goes!'. So the differences with Fleck 
may have been somewhat overstated. 
On the more positive side, Merton notes Fleck's emphasis on the unanticipated conse-
quences of cognitive and social action, especially in the latter's description of the Wasser-
mann reaction as the unforeseen and unintended outcome of the interactions among the 
members of the serologists' collective (69/91). This special emphasis resonates well with 
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Merton's own early recognition of the importance of the "unanticipated consequences of 
purposive social action" for understanding the dynamics of social processes. 9 
What I find slightly surprising about Merton's remarks on Fleck in the introduction to 
the Polish translation of his book, is that he refrains from giving any negative comment on 
the distinctly 'collectivistic' bent of the latter's sociological approach, as several other com-
mentators have objected to the "extremely anti-individualistic standpoint" assumed by 
Fleck 1 0 . From the point of view of Mertoman sociology, which holds a more balanced 
perspective on the relationship between individual and collective, there would be ample 
reason to take exception to Fleck's 'collectivism'. Fleck is however not unique in this regard. 
Since the times of Bacon, as Merton observes elsewhere, views on the progress of science 
and technology have fatefully alternated between two extremes, conceived as disjunctive 
possibilities: "either the social theory of discovery or the 'heroic' theory [...] For want of 
an alternative theory, we have been condemned to repeat the false disjunction between the 
heroic theory centered on men of genius and the sociological theory centered on the social 
determination of scientific discovery". 1 1 Apparently, Fleck also has become the victim of 
this 'false disjunction'. In his eagerness to avoid the pitfalls of the individualistic point of 
view in epistemology, he seems to have plunged himself right into the other, equally implau-
sible, extreme (cf. 76/102). 
The consequences of Fleck's 'collectivism' become apparent when we examine his 
description and analysis of the genesis and development of the Wassermann reaction as a 
diagnostically useful test for detecting syphilis (the 'scientific fact' to which the title of his 
monograph refers). Initially, Fleck points out, this test showed a bare 20 percent of positive 
outcomes in cases of confirmed syphilis, but this percentage would eventually increase to 
about 70 or 90. He considers this increase, which made the Wassermann reaction into a 
practically useful test, as the result of collective labour in which the ideas of individuals were 
largely irrelevant: "Collective experience thus operated in all fields related to the Wasser-
mann reaction until, with disregard for theoretical questions and the ideas of individuals, the 
reaction became useful" (73/97; emphasis added). According to Fleck, the principal actors 
in the drama (die Heroen der Handlung, as the German original calls them) cannot tell us 
how it happened, "for they rationalize and idealize the development" (76/101). He holds their 
defective epistemology, based on an individualistic point of view, responsible for this alleged 
inability. In Fleck's view, this defective epistemology lies also at the root of the fierce 
dispute over "authorship and contribution to the discovery of this extremely important reac-
R.K. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action', American Sociological 
Review 1 (1936): 894-904. 
R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle, 'Introduction', in R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle (eds.), Cognition and 
Fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck, Dordrecht (Reidel), 1986, p. XI. 
Merton, op. cit. (note 4), p. 352. 
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tion" (176/101 note 24) which erupted in 1921 between several of the protagonists (among 
them August Wassermann and his former collaborator Carl Brack), or "the lively polemics 
between, and personal protestations by, the various workers involved" (69/90). Fleck uses 
the occasion of this struggle over the intellectual property of the Wassermann reaction (for 
that is how we can describe it in Mertonian terms) to criticize each of the participants. He 
accuses them of using such unscientific notions as "lucky accident" or "the intuition of a 
genius" (76/102). If only they would adopt his superior sociological epistemology, Fleck 
seems to imply, then surely they would cease to fight over such futile matters as the intellec-
tual ownership of a scientific discovery. The sociological significance of such disputes, 
apparent from a Mertonian perspective, has completely eluded him. Paradoxically, the 
'collectivistic' bent of his sociological approach has led him to criticize the participants in 
this conflict rather than to treat such a dispute as a proper object for sociological analysis in 
its own r ight . 1 2 In line with his approach, Fleck considers science as an exclusively coope-
rative venture, whereas the scientific enterprise is better seen as one of competitive coopera-
t ion . 1 3 
In contrast to Fleck, Merton has tried to steer a careful middle course between the 
extremes of the individualistic (or 'heroic') and the collectivistic (or 'social') views. I think 
there is real virtue in this attempt. One of its lasting merits, in my opinion, is the recognition 
of frequently occurring conflicts over intellectual property (in the usual form of priority 
disputes) as a phenomenon that is characteristic of the institution of science and that should 
be seriously studied in its own right rather than politely ignored (as is often done by 'indivi-
dualistic' writers) or condemned as utterly futile (as is often done by 'collectivistic' writers). 
Despite all 'post-Kuhnian' criticism of Merton's sociology of science in general and of his 
reconstruction of the 'scientific ethos' in particular, this valuable element deserves to be 
Elsewhere Fleck states the view that it is the democratic duty of every individual scientist to recede 
into the background, to "withdraw his own individuality into the shadow [..] in the service of the 
common ideal" (144/188). The editors (that is, presumably, Merton) of the English translation of 
Fleck's work give the following critical comment on this: "Yet scientists typicallly engage in com-
petition, and priority disputes are not infrequent, which would suggest that Fleck's democracy of 
science remains incomplete" (163). A similar criticism could be made of Edgar Zilsel's thesis that 
with the founding of institutions like the Royal Society and the Academie des Sciences the modern 
pattern of scientific progress through cooperation has emerged: "Knowledge is no longer the busi-
ness of men of letters, anxious for personal fame, or of disputatious scholastics: the modern wes-
tern notion of scientific research has been arrived at" (E. Zilsel, Die sozialen Ursprünge der neu-
zeitlichen Wissenschaft, Frankfurt am Main [Suhrkamp], 1976, p. 150). Modern scientific research, 
based on cooperation, Zilsel maintains, has abandoned the quest for personal fame so characteristic 
of humanistic literati. But, then, why do we so often meet with priority disputes in the subsequent 
history of science? Just like Fleck, Zilsel sees the cooperation but not the competition present in the 
scientific endeavour. 
The phrase 'competitive cooperation' is used by Merton in his essay on the scientific ethos. See 
Merton, op. cit. (note 4), pp. 273-74. Compare David Hull: "Science is both a highly competitive 
and a highly cooperative affair" (D. Hull, Science as a Process, Chicago and London [University 
of Chicago Press], 1988, p. 286). 
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preserved and, if possible, expanded. This is not to say that Merton's analysis is fully satis-
factory. In the following sections I will argue that the Mertonian framework should be 
stretched by incorporating constructivist insights, so as to enable a more adequate treatment 
of disputes over intellectual ownership in science. A reconsideration of Fleck's case of the 
formation of the Wassermann reaction, and in particular of the conflict over intellectual 
property to which this discovery (or invention) gave rise, will provide the opportunity to 
assess the fruitfulness of these ideas. 
2. Priority disputes and intellectual property 
Although Merton had made his debut as a sociologist of science in 1938 with the publication 
of his dissertation on Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England1*, 
it was his 1942 essay on the so-called 'scientific ethos' - the normative framework for the 
conduct of science - which would provide the basic ingredient for the future Mertonian 
paradigm. 1 5 Compared to his pre-war work, in which he had analyzed the influence of 
Puritanism on 17th-century science and the relationship between science and technology, the 
focus is now much more on science as a relatively autonomous social institution, or in other 
words on 'pure' or 'academic' science. The normative foundations of this kind of science 
were formulated as the 'scientific ethos'. It took several more years before the outlines of 
the Mertonian paradigm became clearly visible. Important contributions were Merton's work 
on priority disputes (1957) and on 'multiple' or simultaneous discoveries (1961). These 
contributions constituted the heart of the Mertonian paradigm, because they forged a link 
between the normative structure of science (as described in the 1942 essay on the scientific 
ethos) and its reward system (to which later studies would be dedicated). Drawing the diffe-
rent threads together, Merton was finally able to offer a unified analysis of the functioning 
of science as a specific 'social system', in line with the explanatory schemes of functionalist 
sociology in general. This advance in theoretical coherence, however, went pari passu with 
a marginalization of the older theme of the relations between science and technology. 
In his 1942 essay on the normative structure of science Merton defined the scientific 
ethos as "that affectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be binding on 
the man of science". 1 6 In that early essay he specified four different norms comprising this 
ethos: communism, universalism, disinterestedness and organized skepticism (which together 
R.K. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, New York (Harper 
and Row), 1970 [1938]. 
R.K. Merton, "The Normative Structure of Science', in Merton, op. cit. (note 4), pp. 267-78. 
Merton, op. cit. (note 4), pp. 268-69. The formulation obviously predates the modern sensitivity to 
gender issues. 
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form the appropriate acronym CUDOS). He later added the values of originality and humility 
to this complex. For our purposes here, the norm of communism and the values of originality 
and humility are the most relevant. 
The norm of communism implies that the results of scientific research are published 
within a reasonable time and assigned to the community. "Secrecy is the antithesis of this 
norm; full and open communication its enactment". 1 7 The substantive findings of science 
constitute a common heritage; they do not enter into the exclusive possession of the disco-
verer or his heirs. The rights of 'intellectual property' are extremely curtailed: "property 
rights in science become whittled down to just this one: the recognition by others of the 
scientist's distinctive part in having brought the result into being". 1 8 If one thinks about it, 
this is a very strange and curious notion of 'property'; it has indeed, as Merton notes in a 
later book, a "distinctive anomalous character". 1 9 One might even wonder whether the term 
'property' is justifiably used at all in this context; wouldn't it be more appropriate to speak 
of a right of recognition of 'intellectual paternity' (or 'intellectual maternity' or, gender-
neutrally, 'intellectual parenthood' 2 0) rather than of a right of 'intellectual property'? In 
a footnote Merton gives some examples of the language used by scientists in speaking of their 
work to establish that "the notion of property is part and parcel of the institution of science", 
but these examples are not fully convincing. 2 1 True, they show that a property-related 
idiom is sometimes used by scientists, but they do not demonstrate the presence of the notion 
of 'intellectual property' in the precise, minimal sense in which it is used by Merton. 
Ibid., p. 274. 
Ibid., pp. 294-95. Compare the description on p. 273. 
R.K. Merton, The Sociology of Science: An Episodic Memoir, Carbondale and Edwardsville (Sout-
hern Illinois University Press), 1977/1979, p. 48. 
It is not easy to meet the contemporary demands of political correctitude by introducing a more 
even-handed or gender-neutral terminology, because the associated connotations of established 
usages often run counter to this attempt. Thus Wilhelm Roentgen can be designated as 'the father of 
X-rays' without difficulty, but Marie Curie is just the mother of Irene Curie, not 'the mother of 
radio-activity'. Or as Merton observes: "to 'father' a science connotes being its unique or principal 
begetter while to 'mother' a science, should the metaphor ever be instituted, would at first probably 
connote looking after the fledgling with tender loving care". See Merton, op. cit. (note 19), p. 114. 
Merton, op. cit. (note 4), pp. 294-95, note 19. Some of these examples may also raise doubts about 
the strictness of the norm of communism and about the alleged 'nrmimal' character of property 
rights in science. In Merton's first example, Ramsay is asking Rayleigh's "permission to look into 
atmospheric nitrogen" on which Rayleigh had been working. If Rayleigh is still supposed to have 
the right for giving such permission, then clearly property rights in science are not as drastically 
curtailed as is suggested by Merton. In fact, this question points to the wider problem of "protecti-
on of exploitation rights" or "the principle of fairness in exploitation of results", which, according 
to Jerry Ravetz, "has received no mention in the classic literature on the sociology, or ethics, of 
science". See J.R. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems, Harmondsworth (Allen 
Lane the Penguin Press), 1973 [1971], pp. 255-56. 
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Do we have to conclude, then, that Merton has invented this particular notion of intellectual 
property all by himself? No, his view reflects established usage in science from the end of 
the 18th century. An early instance (perhaps the earliest) in which this notion is employed 
in an eminently Mertonian sense is a letter written by Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier to Joseph 
Lakanal, deputy of the Convention, dated 18 July 1793. In this letter, Lavoisier is reacting 
to projected schemes for a common organization of scientists and artisans at a time that the 
continued existence of the Academie des Sciences is politically at risk. The most relevant 
passage of the letter reads as follows: 
"The scientist [le savant] works only out of dedication to science and to enhance the reputation which he 
enjoys. Once he has made a discovery, he will exert himself to publish it, and his aim has been achieved 
when he has secured his property, when it has become established that it is really his". 2 2 
Lavoisier contrasts this with the typical motivation of a technician or artisan (I'artiste) who 
acts out of an expectation of material benefit and tries to keep his discoveries and inventions 
to himself. 
My admittedly speculative conjecture is that the notion of 'intellectual property' in 
science in its eminently Mertonian sense, as paradigmatically expressed in Lavoisier's letter 
to Lakanal, has originated during the Revolutionary period in France. At that time new patent 
and copyright laws, replacing the Ancien Regime system of royal privileges, sought a new 
legal basis in man's supposedly natural property rights in relation to his thoughts. 2 3 Thus 
Article 1 of the Patent Law of 1791 solemnly stated that every discovery or invention in all 
branches of industry was the property of its 'author'. The same principle was also adopted 
as the basis for a new copyright law (regulating le droit d'auteur), prepared by a committee 
that was presided by Lakanal. 2 4 It is not altogether impossible that Lavoisier borrowed the 
concept of intellectual property from the sphere of patent and copyright legislation, and 
adapted it to the domain of 'academic' science. In this transposition the rights of intellectual 
property must have become drastically curtailed. 2 5 Emanating from revolutionary France, 
A.-L. Lavoisier, Oeuvres de Lavoisier, Paris, 1868, Volume IV, p. 615. I owe this reference to C. 
Boers, H. Koningsveld and J. Mertens, Natuurwetenschap in de samenleving, Wageningen, 1976, 
p. 17. They rightly call attention to the significance and relevance of Lavoisier's letter for discus-
sing the 'Mertonian' norms of science. Background information on the historical context of Lavoi-
sier's letter is provided by R. Hahn, Anatomy of a Scientific Institution: The Paris Academy of 
Sciences 1666-1803, Berkeley (University of California Press), 1971, Chapter 8: Closing the Aca-
demy, especially p. 236. 
F. Savignon, "The French Revolution and Patents', Industrial Property 28 (1989): 391-400. 
P. Roubier, Le droit de la propriété industrielle, Vol. I, Paris (Recueil Sirey), 1954, p. 68. 
In a footnote in his dissertation Merton had written: "The frequency of disputes concerning priority 
[..] constitutes an interesting problem for further research. [..] The entire question is bound up with 
the rise of the concepts of plagiarism, patents, copy-rights and other institutional modes of regula-
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the notion of intellectual property also gained currency in German idealist philosophy (Hegel, 
Schopenhauer) and science. In 19th- and early 20m-century German science, the notion of 
geistiges Eigentum is usually employed in a Mertonian sense. 2 6 A well-known example of 
early use in Germany (21 December 1823) is drawn from Goethe's Conversations with 
Eckermann: 
"Questions of science are very frequently career questions. A single discovery may make a man famous 
and lay the foundation of his fortunes as a citizen [..]. Every newly observed phenomenon is a discovery, 
every discovery is property. Touch a man's property and his passions are immediately aroused".27 
To judge from the last sentence, Goethe must have understood very clearly what priority 
disputes in science were all about. 
If priority disputes turn about matters of intellectual property, the objective occasion for 
their occurrence, according to Merton, is constituted by the fact that many discoveries in 
science are 'multiple' discoveries (discoveries made by more than one person independently 
of each other at about the same time) rather than 'singletons'. Goethe, for example, had been 
personally involved in at least two 'multiples ' . 2 8 The regular appearance of multiple disco-
veries in human history is a phenomenon that has repeatedly been noted. The observation of 
this phenomenon has often inspired strongly deterministic and 'collectivistic' views. Thus it 
is held that discoveries occur because their time has come, not because some scientific genius 
ting 'intellectual property' [..]". See Merton, op. cit. (note 14), p. 169. Although Merton has follo-
wed up the first part of this youthful suggestion with a delay of 20 years in his 1957 essay on 
'Priorities in Scientific Discovery' (see Merton, op. cit. (note 4), pp. 286-324), he has never hee-
ded the second part of it. I think that his increasingly onesided focus on the norms of 'pure' science 
(rather than the relations between science and technology) has been responsible for this omission. 
Anyway, the period of the French Revolution should be a 'strategic research site' for examining 
this matter more searchingly. For an earlier historical period, Rob niffe has analyzed how the 
conventions and procedures of the Royal Society for establishing priority failed to resolve the con-
flict between Huygens and Hooke over the invention of the balance-spring watch. See R. fliffe, '"In 
the Warehouse": Privacy, Property and Priority in the Early Royal Society', History of Science 30 
(1992): 29-68. 
One example. Emil Behring wrote about the priority struggles in which he was involved: "So habe 
ich nur mein geistiges Eigentum zu wahren gesucht, das aber auch mit aller mir zu Gebote stehen-
der Rücksichtslosigkeit" ("In that manner I have tried only to secure my intellectual property, albeit 
with all the ruthlessness I could muster"). Cited in H. Satter, Emil von Behring, Bad Godesberg 
(Inter Nationes), 1967, p. 20. 
Cited in E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848, New York (Mentor Book), without 
year [1962], p. 327. 
His discovery of the intermaxilliary bone in the human skull, reported to a friend in 1784, had been 
anticipated by Felix Vicq d'Azyr in 1780. The second discovery, the theory that the skull is made 
of modified vertebrae, was independently arrived at by Lorenz Oken. For Goethe's negative com-
ments on the latter's presentation of the discovery, see A. Schierbeek, Goethe als Natuuronderzoe-
ker, Amsterdam (Meulenhoff), 1944, p. 55. 
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happens to be around. The counterfactual claim is advanced that if Newton, Lavoisier, 
Darwin and Einstein had never lived, the discoveries which bear their names would still have 
been made at just about the same time. 'Great men' are therefore seen as dispensible. 2 9 In 
1922 the American sociologists William Ogburn and Dorothy Thomas introduced a quantita-
tive method in the study of multiple discoveries. 3 0 They (that is, Dorothy Thomas) compi-
led a list of 148 discoveries and inventions made independently by two or more persons. 
Further research, they stated, should be able to extend their list considerably. When Merton 
took up the study of 'multiples' many years later, he first tried to continue the quantitative 
approach of Ogburn and Thomas. 3 1 Later he chose a different tack and proposed the bold 
hypothesis that "all scientific discoveries are in principle multiples, including those mat on 
the surface appear to be singletons". 3 2 Many alleged singletons have turned out to be dupli-
cations after the belated publication of the notebooks of famous scientists like Cavendish or 
Gauss. But Merton's main point is that in actual practice scientists act on the operative 
assumption that discoveries in science are potential multiples: if they don't take prompt 
measures, scientists believe, they will be forestalled by others. (Such a rush to ensure priority 
can be clearly seen in Watson and Crick's successful attempt to be the first, before Linus 
Pauling, to elucidate the structure of DNA. 3 3 ) Merton also resists the 'collectivistic' con-
clusion that is usually drawn from the existence of multiples. If all discoveries are (in princi-
ple) multiples, this would not mean that all talents are reduced to the same level. "The 
greatest men of science", Merton notes, "have been involved in a multiplicity of multiples" 
(Lord Kelvin, for example, has been involved in at least 32 multiples!). 3 4 In this manner 
he tries to steer a middle course between the 'individualistic' (or 'heroic') and 'collectivistic' 
In an early essay Fleck also drew attention to the phenomenon of multiple discoveries to defend a 
'collectivistic' view: "The relative independence of the cognized from the individual is well illustra-
ted in the fact that different individuals frequently make the same discovery or invention simultane-
ously but independently from one another". See L. Fleck, 'On the Crisis of "Reality"', in Cohen 
and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 10), p. 50. 
W.F. Ogburn and D. Thomas, 'Are Inventions Inevitable? A Note on Social Evolution', Political 
Science Quarterly 37 (1922): 83-98. 
R.K. Merton, 'Singletons and Multiples in Science', in Merton, op. cit. (note 4), pp. 343-71. On 
p. 364 he reports having examined, together with Elinor Barber, 264 cases of multiples in detail in 
the context of a methodical study of multiples. The Merton-Barber data on multiples have been 
further analyzed in D.J. de Solla Price, Little Science, Big Science, New York and London (Co-
lumbia University Press), 1971 [1963], pp. 66 ff. 
Ibid., p. 356. 
Merton's essay 'Behavior Patterns of Scientists', written in 1968, reflects on The Double Helix, 
James Watson's famous account of this discovery. See Merton, op. cit. (note 4), pp. 325-42. 
Merton, op. cit. (note 4), p. 367. 
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(or 'social') theories of discovery, granting that all scientific discoveries are multiples or 
potential multiples while still leaving room for the work of genius. 3 5 
The ubiquity of multiples is one of the two pillars of Merton's work on priority disputes. 
The regular occurrence of simultaneous and independent discoveries constitutes the objective 
occasion for disputes over priority; it is however the normative structure of science (the 
'scientific ethos') which provides the cause or grounds for such quarrels. As already said, 
priority disputes turn about matters of intellectual property. Science as an institution is 
concerned with the advance of ('certified') knowledge; the more knowledge is advanced, the 
better, hence the high premium set on originality. In the institutional system of science 
original contributions, of course after having been published and thus made available to the 
community, are exchanged for recognition and esteem and all the possible rewards which 
may go with these. Such rewards range from eponymy (e.g. Halley's comet, Boyle's law, 
Brownian movement, the Wassermann reaction), medals, fellowships, membership of presti-
gious organizations to ennoblement (in the United Kingdom) and, of course, the Nobel Prize. 
All these rewards constitute a finely-graded system of stratification in science. The basic 
point, in Merton's words, is that "honorific recognition by fellow-scientists" is "the coin of 
the scientific realm". 3 6 Since the early 1960s, with the emergence of the computerized 
Science Citation Index, this informal social process of bestowing recognition has to some 
extent become formalized and instrumentalized. 3 7 
The great frequency of struggles over priority in the annals of science does not result 
from the psychological characteristics of individual scientists, but from "the institution of 
science, which defines originality as a supreme value and thereby makes recognition of one's 
Although I sympathize with Merton's attempt to steer a middle course, I think he has not been fully 
successful in its execution. From Merton's 'bold hypothesis' that all discoveries are multiples or 
potential multiples, it would seem to follow that 'great men' are indeed dispensible, however much 
he may deplore this conclusion. The formulation of this hypothesis can also be charged with being 
in principle immune to refutation and thus unsuitable for scientific investigation. Indeed this criti-
cism had already been stated by Merton himself when he expressed the suspicion that it might 
constitute an "incorrigible1' and "self-sealing hypothesis, immune to investigation" (Merton, op. cit. 
[note 4], p. 357). Merton does not actually need this 'bold hypothesis' in his study of priority 
disputes; the much less controversial assumption that multiples are not uncommon would be suffi-
cient. (Constructivists might wish to advance the further criticism that on closer inspection many 
alleged multiples will turn out to be not exactly the 'same' discoveries.) 
The idea of the 'credibility cycle', developed by Latour and Woolgar, is that this type of 'currency' 
can be converted into other advantages like higher salaries, research grants, additional assistants, 
material equipment etcetera. The accumulation of 'recognition and esteem' or rather 'credibility' in 
science resembles the accumulation of capital. Cf. B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life, 
Beverly Hills and London (Sage), 1979, Chapter 5. 
Merton discusses the origins and (ab)uses of the Science Citation Index and its relationship to his 
sociological views in Merton, op. cit. (note 19), pp. 47-54. 
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originality a major concern". 3 8 Yet the institutional emphasis on originality is counterbalan-
ced, to some extent at least, by the institutional endorsement of the value of humility. This 
value is expressed, for example, in the well-known epigram which Newton made his own: 
"If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants".39 
The value of humility also enjoins scientists to acknowledge their indebtedness to prior work 
and to insist on the limitations of their personal contributions and of scientific knowledge in 
general (cf. the almost perfunctory confessions of how little one knows). In the contest 
between recognized originality and humility, it is however the former that easily gains the 
upper hand: "Great modesty may elicit respect, but great originality promises everlasting 
fame" . 4 0 The value of originality leads scientists (or others who defend their interests) to 
engage in priority disputes, but the value of humility exacts a psychological toll for that: 
those scientists will be plagued by mixed feelings for doing s o . 4 1 The tension in the norma-
tive structure of science, between the values of originality and humility, finds expression in 
strong feelings of ambivalence towards conflicts of priority. Such conflicts are almost always 
experienced as unsavoury episodes. This also explains, Merton maintains, the resistance to 
the systematic investigation of these phenomena. 
Later work by Merton and his school has examined the functioning of the reward system 
in greater detail. Is the institution of science fair in allocating rewards? Merton's pupil 
Jonathan Cole has investigated whether women scientists have an equal chance of acquiring 
recognition and esteem. 4 2 Merton himself, together with Harriet Zuckerman, has documen-
ted the operation of the so-called Matthew effect in science. They found that more credit 
tends to be given to those scientists who already have a reputation. 4 3 Or as the Gospel of 
Merton, op. cit. (note 4), p. 294. 
See for an historical detective story on the origins of this epigram, R.K. Merton, On the Shoulders 
of Giants: A Shandean Postcript, San Diego (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), 1985 [1965]. 
Merton, op. cit. (note 4), p. 308. 
Emil Beliring is exceptional in declaring that he enjoyed priority disputes: "Solche Kämpfe haben in 
der eintönigen Forscherarbeit immer etwas Erfrischendes" ("Such battles have always something 
refreshing about them in the monotonous labour of research"). Cited in Satter, op. cit. (note 26), p. 
20. 
J.R. Cole, Fair Science: Women in the Scientific Community, New York and London (The Free 
Press), 1979. For a more recent work on this subject see H. Zuckerman, J.R. Cole and J.T. Bruer 
(eds.). The Outer Circle: Women in the Scientific Community, New York and London (W.W. Nor-
ton & Company), 1991. 
Merton, op. cit. (note 4), pp. 439-59. See also R.K. Merton, "The Matthew Effect in Science II: 
Cumulative Advantage and the Symbolism of Intellectual Property', Isis 79 (1988): 606-23. 
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Matthew already stated: "For onto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have 
abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away that which he hath". 
From the late 1960s onwards, the Mertonian paradigm received a barrage of criticism 
from a younger generation of 'post-Kuhnian' sociologists of science. This wave of criticism 
reflected both the decreasing hegemony of logical positivism within the philosophy of science 
and a growing dissatisfaction with functionalism in sociology. According to his critics, 
Merton's sociology of science was implicitly based on a positivist philosophy which considers 
discoveries as unproblematic occurrences. Kuhn's work, in particular his famous essay on 
the 'discovery' of oxygen, was cited to demonstrate the untenability of positivist views of 
discovery. 4 4 (If Fleck's monograph had been accessible at that time, critics could also have 
referred to his work!). M.D. King spelled out the implications of Kuhn's work for the study 
of priority disputes: 
"Merton, true to his positivism, does not allow that disputes might arise over the intellectual question of 
precisely what has been discovered when a discovery is made [..]. For him, the point at issue is the social 
and historical one: who discovered it and wheril What is at stake is a social matter: namely, the individual 
scientist's property rights in discoveries, and the prestige that accrues to him as a 'propertyholder'. 
Priority disputes are social facts, requiring explanation in terms of other social facts. But what Kuhn's 
position implies is that for certain discoveries, at least, the intellectual debate over what has been discove-
red and the social dispute as to who discovered it are inextricably intertwined. The one issue cannot be 
resolved in isolation from the other: to concede priority to a discoverer is to acknowledge as authoritative 
his interpretation of the discovery or, in Kuhn's terms, to treat his work as paradigmatic".45 
In other words, Merton's decision to exclude the content of science from sociological consi-
deration may become a crippling handicap even in pursuing his favoured pastime, the study 
of priority disputes. 
King's criticism must however be qualified and mitigated to some extent. In his essay 
on the history and systematics of sociological theory Merton showed himself to be keenly 
aware of the problematic nature of the 'sameness' of alleged examples of multiple discoveries 
and inventions: 
"It is no easy matter to establish the degree of similarity between independently developed ideas. Even 
in the more exact disciplines, such as mathematics, claims of independent multiple inventions are vigo-
rously debated. The question is, how much overlap should be taken to constitute 'identity'? A careful 
comparison of the non-Euclidean geometries invented by Bolyai and Lobachevsky, for example, maintains 
T.S. Kuhn, "The Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery' [1962], reprinted in Kuhn, op. cit. 
(note 6), pp. 165-77. 
King, op. cit. (note 6), p. 19. 
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that Lobachevsky had developed five of the nine salient components of their overlapping conceptions more 
systematically, more fruitfully and in more detail".46 
Despite the qualification of King's criticism that in the light of this passage is clearly called 
for, it still remains true, I tMnk, that in the Mertonian study of priority disputes questions 
of scientific content are largely excluded from consideration. Merton appears to have follo-
wed the procedure of first deciding pragmatically as an analyst which inventions or discove-
ries exhibit sufficient similarity to be regarded as multiples (this will establish the list of 
multiples) and then concentrating on what King refers to as the 'social matter' of the priority 
disputes. Insofar as Merton's work does not show the 'inextricable mtertwining' of the 
intellectual debate and the social dispute, King's criticism still stands. 
What it might mean to show such 'inextricable intertwining' can be illustrated with a 
well-known example. Steven Shapin has sketched how the historical study of the notorious 
priority dispute between Newton and Leibniz, and their respective followers, over the inven-
tion of ' the' calculus might profit from a closer examination of the various cognitive (even 
metaphysical) issues involved and their links with political struggles at the English Cour t . 4 7 
The important thing to note is that, although the Newton-Leibniz case counts as a classic 
example of a multiple invention and it is quite customary to speak of the invention of 'the' 
calculus, the contributions of both were not exactly equivalent. Leibniz's calculus was opera-
tionally different from Newton's and based on different metaphysical foundations. Those 
metaphysical foundations were politically relevant in early 18th-century England because they 
were held to entail different implications for the position of the king, a question over which 
Court Whigs (Newtonians) and Country Whigs were divided. The fierce battle of the New-
tonians against the claims of Leibniz can be better understood from this background. 
What has just been said about the Newton-Leibniz case, viz. that their respective contri-
butions were far from identical, may also be valid for many other examples of multiple 
discoveries and inventions. The Ogburn-Thomas list therefore deserves critical scrutiny. 
Yehuda Elkana, who has examined the case of the allegedly simultaneous discovery of the 
energy conservation law in detail, has stated as a general conclusion: "[TJhere are no identi-
cal discoveries made in full independence from each other: the problems posed are at least 
R.K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, New York (The Free Press), 1968, pp. 9-10. 
Merton refers to the historical work of B. Petrovievics on the Bolyai-Lobachevsky case and on the 
Darwin-Wallace case written during the 1920s and, further, to the more recent essay by Thomas 
Kuhn on the multiple discovery of energy conservation. 
S. Shapin, 'Licking Leibniz', History of Science 19 (1981): 292-305. For similar analyses of sever-
al other discoveries, see S. Schaffer, 'Scientific Discoveries and the End of Natural Philosophy', 
Social Studies of Science 16 (1986): 387-420. Schaffer highlights the strategic significance of 'dis-
covery stories' for the emergence of disciplined sciences in the early 19th century. 
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slightly different from each other and so are the solutions". 8 If this general conclusion can 
be sustained, it provides additional support for King's view that the question at issue in 
priority disputes cannot be limited to: who discovered it and when, but has to be extended 
to: what has been discovered (and by whom). 
Around 1970 Merton was not only criticized for his neglect of the content of science. 
Barnes and Dolby, and Mulkay even more, questioned the effective power of the norms and 
values of the scientific ethos to govern or guide the behaviour of scientists, and pointed out 
that these norms and values were repeatedly violated anyway. 4 9 The 'scientific ethos' could 
therefore not provide, they asserted, an effective set of rules for regulating the internal affairs 
of science. At the most it could be considered a suitable ideological repertoire to be used in 
external contacts with lay-people for furthering the interests of scientists. This issue, touching 
as it does on one of the fundamental problems of theoretical sociology, is too large to be 
discussed in this chapter. 5 0 Here I will deal only with a less radical line of criticism present 
in the contribution of Barnes and Dolby which is directly relevant to the subject of intellec-
tual property. 
Barnes and Dolby state that "the possessability of discoveries" represents a historically 
variable institutional form which reached its zenith in the professionalized science of the 19th 
century (and even then did not operate ideally) and has declined in importance ever since. 
They emphasize the inherent difficulties in attributing a discovery to one person and point 
out that "discovery as a property right is not as clear and natural as has been thought" 5 1 
(as if Merton had ever asserted anything of this kind!). They also refer to emerging new pat-
terns: "The tendency for research to be done by whole teams, no one member of which can 
Y. Elkana, 'Is There a Distinction between External and Internal Sociology of Science?', in Cohen 
and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 10), pp. 309-16, esp. p. 314. 
Barnes and Dolby, op. cit. (note 6); Mulkay, op. cit. (note 6). 
Ultimately, this issue has to do with finitist objections to the 'empowering' of norms - cf. Barry 
Barnes's criticism of 'normative functionalism' as discussed in Chapter II. In his eyes, Merton's 
treatment of the 'scientific ethos' would surely qualify as an example of 'normative functionalism'. 
David Bloor also notes that "much British sociology of knowledge rejects the standard 'Mertonian' 
account of 'norms' in explaining, say, scientific behavior". See D. Bloor, 'Left and Right Wittgen-
steinians', in A. Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago and London (The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press), 1992, pp. 266-82, on p. 273 (note). It would seem, therefore, that the 
gap separating Mertonianism and (moderate) constructivism remains unbridgeable at this basic 
level, despite my effort in this chapter to amalgamate insights from both traditions. Notice, howe-
ver, that recently Barnes, Bloor and Henry have pronounced themselves much more favourably on 
Mertonian sociology than is common among constructivists and even state that Merton's implicit 
vision of the individual and of the relationship between individual and collective has much to re-
commend itself. They hold that a balanced view like Merton's is regrettably absent in many con-
temporary forms of constructivism. See B. Barnes, D. Bloor and J. Henry, Scientific Knowledge: A 
Sociological Analysis, London (Athlone Press), 1996, p. 114. 
51 Barnes and Dolby, op. cit. (note 6), p. 21. 
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be called the discoverer of anything produced, has not caused the tension that might have 
been expected". 5 2 
I think that this prediction of the impending demise of intellectual property may be 
somewhat premature. 5 3 There is indeed a secular historical decline in the relative frequency 
of priority disputes, as has been established by Merton himself. 5 4 Apart from that, it must 
be noted that there are cases in which team research has produced tensions with regard to 
intellectual property. 5 5 The question requires at least more empirical investigation before 
such confident statements can be made with any assurance. 
The case to be discussed in the next section, namely the struggle over the intellectual 
property of the Wassermann reaction, is interesting precisely from this point of view: al-
though Wassermann and Brack initially belonged to the same 'team' which developed the 
serodiagnosis of syphilis, they later bickered between themselves over each other's share in 
the discovery (the battle was however not confined to former 'team' members because 
Wassermann's erstwhile rival and critic, Eduard Weil, also entered the fray). It is remarkable 
that Merton has nowhere analyzed such intellectual property battles (to have a term for the 
more general category which includes priority disputes) between members of one research 
team. What he has analyzed, in his later work together with Harriet Zuckerman, is the 
operation of the so-called Matthew effect both with regard to multiple discoveries and multi-
authored articles (the latter normally coming from research teams). 
Ibid., p. 22. 
The position taken by Barnes and Dolby resembles that of Zilsel (see note 12). For the latter, the 
rise of cooperative scientific research during the 17th century entailed the decline of the Renaissan-
ce scholar's quest for personal fame. Now Barnes and Dolby venture a similar prediction for 'team 
research' in the 20th century. 
Merton, op. cit. (note 4), p. 365. 
A notorious example is the "scandal'' (Fred Hoyle) of the discovery of pulsars in 1967 by the gra-
duate student Jocelyn Bell, for which her boss Anthony Hewish received the Nobel Prize in 1974. 
See W. Broad and N. Wade, Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in Science, Oxford (Oxford 
University Press), 1985 [1982], pp. 143-49. Steve Woolgar has analyzed different 'discovery ac-
counts' produced by the participants involved in this discovery and by others; see S. Woolgar, 
'Writing an Intellectual History of Scientific Development: The Use of Discovery Accounts', Social 
Studies of Science 6 (1976): 395-422. Another example is the dispute that erupted after the discove-
ry of insulin in 1921-22 between the members of the 'team' (Banting, Macleod, Collip, and Best) at 
the University of Toronto. See M. Bliss, The Discovery of Insulin, London and Boston (Faber and 
Faber), 1988 [1982]. 
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struggles over intellectual 
property 
Matthew 
effect 
multiple discoveries + + 
multiple authorship + 
The case of the conflict over the Wassermann reaction has to be placed, at least in part, into 
the empty entry of this matrix. I note in passing that the name of this serological test illustra-
tes the operation of the Matthew effect with respect to eponymy: while the first publication 
announcing the serodiagnosis of syphilis was headed by the names of Wassermann, Neisser, 
and Bruck, only the first-mentioned author was eventually honoured in the name of the 
reaction. This eponymous fact would become a strong trump card for Wassermann in the 
battle with his former collaborator and critic. 
3. The quarrel over the Wassermann reaction 
Fleck sees the genesis and development of the Wassermann reaction (to be abbreviated as 
WaR) as a process of collective experience in which the 'techmcal perfection' of this serolo-
gical test was gradually realized. In his eyes the actual 'authorship' essentially belonged to 
the entire collective and not to any particular individual (78/104). It is therefore not amazing 
that he cannot sympathize with any of the protagonists who became embroiled in the struggle 
over the intellectual ownership of the serodiagnosis of syphilis: they all must have been 
wrong for the simple fact of having engaged themselves in such a futile dispute! What is 
more, Fleck believes that he is able to explain why the views of each of the participants are 
necessarily flawed and distorted from the character of the collective process itself in which 
the WaR was constituted. He declares in a note, after the disclaimer that he does not want 
to minimize the merits of a research scientist or even to discuss merits: "I have listed various 
views on authorship and contribution to the discovery of this extremely important reaction 
only for epistemological purposes: to show that everybody makes mistakes" (176/101 note 
24, emphasis added; the last sentence reads in the German original: "um zu zeigen, dass sie 
alle danebengreifen", which is perhaps better translated as: "to show that they are all wide 
of the mark"). In my view it is rather naive to use the views expressed by those involved in 
this polemic as material for epistemological analysis without taking the stategic context of 
a dispute over intellectual ownership into account. 
Fleck's description of the genesis and development of the WaR as a process of collective 
experience has an indisputably irrational taint about it. In their introduction to the collection 
The following matrix indicates the coverage of, and the gap in, Merton's scientific interests: 
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Cognition and Fact, Robert Cohen and Thomas Schnelle aptly summarize Fleck's account 
as follows: "Fleck [..] denotes the course of research as a zig-zag determined by accidents, 
false paths, and mistakes. Epistemologically, the original foundations of work are slowly 
transformed for the scientists - in retrospect, however, the collective knows nothing of 
this. [..] The shifts in the self-conceived contents of research occur in the collective unnotice-
ably for the individual". 5 6 In this connection Fleck holds a view which I would like to 
designate, for clarity's sake, as the thesis of the retroactive epistemological distortion effect: 
after the completion of their investigations the scientists involved are no longer able to 
adequately represent the complicated route which has led to the final result. They are even 
supposed to lose the understanding for the views which they themselves held previously. 5 7 
The prime example for such an extreme distortion effect provided by Fleck is Wasser-
mann's account of the discovery of the serodiagnosis of syphilis which he presented in 
December 1920 before a meeting of the Berlin Medical Society. 5 8 It was this lecture, pu-
blished on 28 February 1921, which would arouse indignant responses from his former critic 
Eduard Weil and his one-time collaborator Carl Brack (Wassermann's former assistant Carl 
Lange also reacted, but in a less indignant mood) and thus unleash an acrimonious quarrel 
over intellectual property. 
In his lecture Wassermann declared: "You will remember that, when I created the 
serodiagnosis of syphilis, I proceeded from the idea, and with the clear intention, of finding 
a diagnostically usable amboceptor [ . . ] " . 5 9 According to Fleck, this statement is utterly 
misleading. When in 1906 Wassermann and his collaborator Brack, in cooperation with the 
Breslau dermatologist Albert Neisser, undertook to apply Jules Bordet's recently developed 
complement fixation test to syphilis, they were, again according to Fleck, primarily aiming 
at the detection of syphilitic antigen and only secondarily at the detection of syphilitic antibo-
Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 10), pp. XXII-XXIII. 
In the English translation of Fleck's monograph, the editors refer to the discussion of "the retroacti-
ve effect" in Merton, op. cit. (note 57), pp. 16, 17, 37 (See Fleck: 43 note). Although there is 
indeed a certain analogy with Merton's notion of "the retroactive effect", Fleck's thesis goes further 
in that it postulates more extreme distortions as a consequence of the retroactive effect. Merton 
refers to the retroactive effect of new knowledge "in helping us to recognize anticipations and 
adumbrations in earlier work" (p. 37). Fleck refers to the presumed retroactive effect of new know-
ledge, acquired through collective experience, in making previously held views unintellligible to the 
participants themselves. 
A. von Wassermann, 'Neue experimentelle Forschungen fiber Syphilis', Berliner klinische Wochen-
schrift 58 (1921): 193-97. 
Ibid., pp. 193-94. An amboceptor is an antibody which, according to Ehrlich's theory, has both an 
affinity for its homologous antigen and for complement. Amboceptors can therefore be used in a 
complement fixation test. 
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In the following description of the development of the WaR there is some overlap with the previous 
chapter. Rather than having to refer back to this chapter several times, I have found it preferable to 
tell a more continuous and connected story here. 
Eduard Weil and his collaborators at the Hygienic Institute of the German University in Prague had 
already criticized this modification of the complement fixation test, in particular Wassermann's 
claim that it was able, as shown in experiments with typhoid, tuberculosis and meningitis, to detect 
minute quantities of resolved antigen. This extreme sensitivity was highly suspicious in the eyes of 
Weil. From the very outset he was therefore skeptical of the claims made with regard to antigen 
dies (amboceptors). 6 0 In their initial experiments the quantitative results of antigen detec-
tion were also much more impressive than those of antibody detection: a success rate of 64 
out of 76 confirmed syphilitic cases against a poor figure of 49 out of 257 cases (that is, 19 
percent). However, in the subsequent history of the serodiagnosis of syphilis the tables would 
be completely turned. It was shown in 1907 that antigen detection was altogether unsuitable 
for a diagnostic reaction. On the other hand, the results of antibody detection would be 
gradually improved in a collective process of 'technical perfection' until a practically accepta-
ble success rate (70 - 90 percent) was achieved. According to Fleck, Wassermann projected, 
in his lecture of December 1920, the final result of this historical development into its initial 
stage. This distortion is conceived as an inevitable consequence of Wassermann's participa-
tion and involvement in the collective development process: 
"The ultimate outcome of this research thus differed considerably from that intended. But after fifteen 
years an identification between results and intentions had taken place in Wassermann's thinking. The 
meandering progress of development, in all stages of which he was certainly deeply involved, had become 
a straight, goal-directed path. How could it be otherwise? With the passing of time, Wassermann amassed 
further experience, and as he did so lost the appreciation of his own errors" (76/101). 
Is Fleck's explanation plausible? Instead of giving a direct answer to this question, it is better 
to raise the preliminary question whether the 'distortion effect' for which an explanation is 
sought is actually of the kind described by Fleck. Had Wassermann at the end of 1920 really 
'forgotten' his original views on the nature of the serodiagnosis of syphilis? 
Fleck's account of the 'distortion effect' occurring in Wassermann's lecture of December 
1920 is crucially dependent on his assertion that antigen detection rather than antibody 
detection was the primary aim of Wassermann, Neisser and Brack in their first two publica-
tions on the serodiagnosis of syphilis. This assertion is contestable. Starting from the original 
intention of these authors, namely to apply a modified version of Bordet's complement 
fixation test to syphilis, there is no reason at all for such a onesided emphasis on antigen 
detection. The complement fixation test is in principle perfectly symmetrical: depending on 
the experimental setup, it can be used for either antigen detection or antibody detection. The 
modification that had been introduced shortly before by Wassermann and some of bis colla-
borators - the use of so-called 'bacterial extracts' instead of suspensions of entire bacteria -, 
does not affect the symmetry of the test . 6 1 (It was practically relevant for the development 
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of the serodiagnosis of syphilis, because the causative agent had resisted, since its discovery, 
all attempts at cultivation. Wassermann and Brack therefore used extracts from the livers of 
stillborn luetic babies, which were known to swarm with spirochaetes, as 'antigen' in their 
original trials.) The central claim of Wassermann, Neisser and Brack in their first two 
publications was that they had established "the purely scientific fact" of a specific reaction 
occurring between luetic antigen and luetic antibody; at the same time they conceded that this 
reaction did not yet constitute a practically usable method (eine Methodefur den Praktiker). 
It is thus understandable that the authors stressed the symmetry of the reaction: contrary to 
Fleck's assertion, they declared repeatedly that the reaction could be used in principle both 
for antigen and for antibody detection. The investigators were not the least discouraged by 
the unfavourable results obtained with antibody detection: "He who has witnessed and partici-
pated in the development of biological diagnostics, knows which contradictory results various 
authors have [..] initially obtained". 6 2 The cardinal point ignored by Fleck is that the inves-
tigators, to defend their claim that they had found a specific antigen-antibody reaction for 
syphilis, had to uphold its symmetry too. If the reaction did not work both ways (for antigen 
and for antibody detection), its specificity would have become in doubt. 
We do however find a pronounced preference for antigen detection, at the expense of 
antibody detection, during a second stage in the development of the WaR when it was a 
matter, not of establishing its existence, but of making it practically useful. In the course of 
their cooperation, a disagreement arose between Wassermann and Neisser on the further 
practical development of the serological reaction for syphilis and its application to clinical 
practice. Neisser wanted to reserve this work, for the time being, exclusively to his own 
clinic in Breslau and to his experiment station in the Dutch East Indies. 6 3 Their ways par-
ted in June 1906. Wassermann's collaborator Brack took Neisser's side and moved from 
Berlin to Breslau, to become the latter's foremost serologist. It is in the early serological 
work coming from the Breslau clinic that we find a heavy emphasis on antigen detection. 
There were special clinical reasons for this particular emphasis 6 4 , but anyway it is clear 
that Wassermann, after his rupture with Neisser, cannot be held responsible for it. 
Antigen detection did not survive some curious discoveries that were reported in the 
year 1907. First it was established by several investigators (Weil and Braun, Michaelis, 
Fleischmann, Landsteiner, Miiller and Potzl) that in the serodiagnosis of syphilis luetic liver 
detection in the serodiagnosis of syphilis. 
A. Wassermann, A. Neisser, C. Brock, and A. Schlicht, 'Weitere Mitteilungen über den Nachweis 
spezifisch luetischer Substanzen durch Komplementverankerung', Zeitschrift für Hygiene und Infek-
tionskrankheiten 55 (1906): 451-77, p. 476. 
In terms of Jerry Ravetz (see note 21) this conflict can be interpreted as turning on the 'exploitation 
rights' of a new scientific finding. 
See Chapter V. 
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extracts could be replaced without injury by aqueous extracts from normal (non-syphilitic) 
organs. Soon after it was also found out by some researchers (Landsteiner, Levaditi, Porges 
and Meier) that, instead of aqueous extracts, alcoholic normal extracts could also be used for 
this purpose. The curious thing was that those normal extracts, whether aqueous or alcoholic, 
reacted with syphilitic but not with normal sera, as was indicated by the fixation of comple-
ment. While antigen detection had now to be abandoned, antibody detection, by contrast, was 
consolidated and much improved. 6 5 The elegant symmetry of the original idea, on which 
the WaR had been devised, was thus completely destroyed. Despite, or rather owing to its 
increased practical usefulness (for antibody detection), the nature of the WaR became some-
thing of a scientific mystery. Its existence constituted a veritable anomaly for immunology 
in the early decades of this century. 
The riddle of the nature of the WaR would not be solved until after 1942, when Pang-
born isolated and biochemically identified the substance against which the serum of syphilitic 
patients reacted. It was a phospholipid, which she dubbed cardiolipine.66 Cardiolipine is 
present in the syphilis spirochaete (treponema) but is also a normal constituent of host tissue. 
Blessed with the benefit of hindsight, Bernard Zalc expresses his surprise "that none of the 
researchers involved in the field of syphilis diagnosis had imagined that [..] the antigen could 
be shared by the treponema and normal organ". 6 7 Without invoking this retrospective wis-
dom, it is perhaps more easy to understand why Wassermann and his contemporaries were 
so much at a loss in interpreting the nature of the WaR. At least there was no lack of theore-
tical proposals for solving the riddle. Because Fleck considers the development of the WaR 
exclusively from a practical and technical aspect, he dismisses "the theoretical questions and 
ideas of individuals" (73/97) as unimportant. Such a dismissive attitude is not conducive to 
a careful analysis of Wassermann's pronouncements of December 1920 and of the ensuing 
polemics to which they gave rise. It also turns the development of the WaR into an irrational 
and quasi-mysterious collective process in which "the shifts in the self-conceived contents of 
research occur [..] unnoticeably for the individual". 6 8 
The new findings of 1907 were anomalous for several reasons. They were at odds with 
the then dominant idea of specificity, according to which immune reactions had to be directed 
at the causative agents or their products. Given its reactivity with normal organ extracts, the 
WaR was apparently not directed at the syphilis spirochaete or its products. The solubility 
in alcohol of the socalled 'antigen' provided a further paradox. From this it was concluded 
See Chapter V. 
B. Zalc, 'Some Comments on Fleck's Interpretation of the Etordet-Wassermann Reaction in View of 
Present Biochemical Knowledge', in Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 10), pp. 399-406. 
Ibid., p. 405. 
Cohen and Schnelle, op. cit. (note 10), pp. XXII-XXIII. 
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that the 'antigen' was not a protein but in all likelihood a lipid or 'lipoid'. The prevailing 
dogma at the time, however, was that antigens had to be proteins, for only proteins were 
considered sufficiently complex to be the bearers of biological specificity. 6 9 And if the 
socalled 'antigen' was not a real antigen, then the substance in the serum of syphilitic patients 
that reacted with this 'antigen' could not be a real antibody. Initially, Wassermann himself 
was among those who drew these conclusions from the new findings. For a time he even 
entertained the hypothesis that the socalled 'antibodies' of his reaction were syphilitic toxins. 
A different, and in more than one aspect heretical, view on the nature of the WaR was 
developed by Eduard Weil and Hugo Braun in the years 1907-1909. 7 0 They did not reject 
the idea that the WaR involved real antibodies: according to them these were directed at 
'lipoid' substances from the host tissue, which had been liberated through the action of the 
spirochaetes. This so-called 'autoantibody theory' challenged three immunological dogmas 
of the time: the idea of specificity, the 'protein dogma', and the idea of 'horror autotoxicus' 
(an organism will not produce antibodies against the substances of its own body). 
There were also physico-chemical and 'colloidal' views on the nature of the WaR. 7 1 
These resulted in new sérodiagnostic tests for syphilis like the Meinicke and Sachs-Georgi 
reactions which did not employ complement fixation but were based on flocculation instead. 
When Wassermann stated in December 1920, before the Berlin Medical Society, that 
it was his original intention to find "a diagnostically usable amboceptor", he was not neces-
sarily suggesting, as Fleck appears to understand these words, that antibody detection rather 
than antigen detection had been his primary aim from the very beginning. Wassermann's 
formulation is much more subtle and evasive. 7 2 As the content of his lecture makes clear, 
he was not so much concerned with the practical execution of the WaR as with the elucida-
tion of its nature. Wassermann referred to the general confusion with regard to his sérodiag-
nostic reaction, saying that the various parties agreed on only one point: "one does not know, 
in which the WaR consists, what it is that one measures with it". On the basis of recent 
empirical investigations performed by himself, Wassermann believed that he was able to 
bring an end to the prevalent confusion, and also, incidentally - such at least is my reading 
P. Mazumdar, 'The Antigen-Antibody Reaction and the Physics and Chemistry of Life', Bulletin of 
the History of Medicine 48 (1974): 1-21. 
E. Weil and H. Braun, 'Ueber Antikörperbefunde bei Lues, Tabes und Paralyse', Berliner klinische 
Wochenschrift 49 (1907): 1570-74; E. Weil and H. Braun, 'Ueber das Wesen der luetischen Er-
krankung auf Grund der neueren Untersuchungen', Wiener klinische Wochenschrift 22 (1909): 372-
74. 
P. Schmidt, 'Die Wassermann'sche Reaktion auf Syphilis - Eine Kolloidreaktion', Zeitschrift fir 
Chemie und Industrie der Kolloide ('Kolloid-Zeitschrift') 10 (1912): 3-7. 
After all, finding "a diagnostically usable amboceptor" can also be interpreted to mean finding "a 
specific antigen-antibody reaction", which in no way excludes its use for purposes of antigen detec-
tion. 
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of his pursuits -, to provide an interpretation of what had been discovered or invented which 
would enable him to defend his 'intellectual property' against foreign (especially French and 
Belgian) claims. This interpretation centered on the unique nature of the antibody, hence 
Wassermann's emphasis on "a diagnostically usable amboceptor". 
In his lecture Wassermann explicitly referred to "the attempts to put Bordet's, name in 
the forefront with regard to this reaction [the WaR], which surfaced during the war years in 
France and Belgium". 7 3 It must have been still fresh in Wassermann's mind that the Bel-
gian microbiologist Jules Bordet had received, in 1920, the Nobel Prize for Physiology or 
Medicine for the year 1919, for his discoveries relating to immunity. On several occasions 
Wassermann hunself had also been a nominee for that prize. According to the French histo-
rian Claire Salomon-Bayet, who has examined the protocols of the Committee for Physiology 
or Medicine, "[the prize for 1919] might equally have been attributed to A. von Wassermann 
- as far as the Committee's protocol was concerned - had it been possible at the end of the 
War to recognize the pre-eminence of a German scientist at the same time as that of a Bel-
gian scientist trained in Paris at the Pasteur Institute". 7 4 Wassermann's bitterness for the 
Nobel Prize that passed him by must have been exacerbated by the fact that the serodiagnos-
tic reaction which in other countries bore exclusively his name came to be designated in 
France and Belgium (and also in Poland) as the Bordet-Wassermann reaction.75 In defiance 
of Merton's norm of universalism, the institutional reward of eponymy is not completely free 
from nationalistic considerations. 7 6 Apparently, in those countries it was considered to 
involve only a small step to apply Bordet's complement fixation test to syphilis. 7 7 In view 
Wassermann, op. cit. (note 58), p. 197. 
C. Salomon-Bayet, 'Bacteriology and Nobel Prize Selections, 1901-1920', in C.G. Bernard, E. 
Crawford and P. Sôrbom (eds.), Science, Technology and Society in the Time of Alfred Nobel, 
Oxford (Pergamon Press), 1982, pp. 377-400, p. 386. 
Before the First World War, the sérodiagnostic test for syphilis was simply designated as 'la réacti-
on de Wassernlann,. See E. Burnet, Microbes et Toxines, Paris (Flammarion), 1911, pp. 297-300. 
Another example is Boyle's law, which in France is known as Mariotte's law. Merton has repeated-
ly drawn attention to the theme of 'national claims to priority' and the tension between 'scientific 
universalism' (in the assigning of credit) and 'ethnocentric particularism', particularly during times 
of international conflict. Then "[t]he man of science may be converted into a man of war - and act 
accordingly. Thus, in 1914 the manifesto of ninety-three German scientists and scholars - among 
them, Baeyer, Brentano, Ehrlich, Haber, Eduard Meyer, Ostwald, Planck, Schmoller, and Wasser-
mann [NB! - HvdB] - unloosed a polemic in which German, French, and English men arrayed their 
political selves in the garb of scientists"; see Merton, op. cit. (note 4), p. 271. If Wassermann was 
among those who in 1914 placed German nationalism before scientific universalism, he was later 
repaid in kind by his Belgian and French colleagues. 
In the collection Cognition and Fact, the French immunologist Bernard Zalc explains: "[I]n France 
and Belgium, this serological test is called the Bordet-Wassermann reaction to [emphasize] the fact 
that Wassermann's contribution to this serodiagnosis was to apply to syphilis the experimental 
procedure of complement deviation set-up a few years earlier by Bordet and Gengou", B. Zalc, op. 
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of this situation it is understandable that Wassermann had a strong motive to defend his 
'intellectual property' against the claims of Bordet. 
But how could Wassermann profile 'his' discovery against Bordet's method? After all, 
he and Brack had indeed started from the latter's complement fixation test, albeit from a 
modification of it. But the modification, consisting in the use of so-called 'bacterial extracts' 
instead of suspensions of entire bacteria, was perhaps too slight to make much of a differen-
ce. Besides, the use of extracts from luetic organs was precisely the element in the original 
set-up which was later abandoned. So this would not make a strong case for the defence of 
Wassermann's intellectual property. He therefore took more recent views on the nature of 
the WaR as the basis for his defence. At the same time he was careful to construct a certain 
continuity with his original views. 
In his lecture Wassermann reported about his recent inquiries into the nature of the 
WaR. In his opinion, the reaction between the serum antibody (which he now called the 
'Wassermann substance') and the so-called 'antigen' (which he conceived of as a 'lipoid') 
consisted of the formation of a reversible complex or aggregate (which he designated as the 
'Wassermann aggregate') . 7 8 In his experiments Wassermann was able to precipitate the 
'Wassermann aggregate', from which he could subsequently recover the two components. 
He further established that the Sachs-Georgi reaction was also based on the formation of the 
'Wassermann aggregate'. This flocculation reaction therefore represented only a modification 
cit. (note 66), p. 399. As a real Frenchman, he sticks to this designation throughout. In Poland, 
too, the sérodiagnostic test for syphilis was known as the Bordet-Wassermann reaction. Writing in 
Polish for a Polish audience, Fleck used the latter designation, while in his German monograph he 
complied with the attribution of eponymy current in German-speaking countries. It is claimed by 
the American medical science popularizer, Paul de Kruif, that before Wassermann and his co-wor-
kers, Jules Bordet had indeed attempted to apply the complement fixation test to syphilis. Accor-
ding to de Kruif, whose account is based on a personal conversation with Bordet in 1930, the Bel-
gian microbiologist teetered on the edge of eternal fame because, super-careful as he was, he 
"made one test too many ...". He performed a control test with syphilitic serum and normal ex-
tracts. When hemolysis did not occur (as it theoretically should have done in the absence of prior 
complement fixation), Bordet concluded that the test could not be specific and dropped the whole 
business. The joke on Bordet was that normal extracts react with syphilitic sera but not with normal 
sera; they can therefore still be employed in a practically usable test in the place of syphilitic anti-
gen. Wassermann and his co-workers eventually developed the serodiagnosis of syphilis because 
they were less careful than the super-careful Bordet. Or so de Kruif maintains. See P. de Kruif, 
Men Against Death, Hamburg/Paris/Bologna (The Albatross), 1934, pp. 204-22, esp. 219-20. 
In a reply to his former assistant Carl Lange, who had poked fun at this terminology, Wassermann 
declared that these designations were chosen not for reasons of vanity but only because the name 
WaR was already in general use. See A. von Wassermann, 'Ueber die Antikôrpernatur der Wasser-
mannsubstanz', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 58 (1921): 331-34. 'Self-eponymizing' is generally 
frowned upon in science, because it violates the value of humility. A hilarious exception that proves 
the rule is provided by the example of Stephen Stigler who formulated 'Stigler's Law of Eponymy'. 
(See S.M. Stigler, 'Stigler's Law of Eponymy', in T.F. Gieryn led.], Science and Social Structure, 
special issue of Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, series II, vol. 39, 1980, pp. 
147-57). Stigler's Law of Eponymy exhibits self-exemplifying irony, because it states: "No scienti-
fic discovery is named after its original discoverer". 
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of the WaR. From the ability of the 'Wassermann aggregate' to fix or use up complement, 
Wassermann concluded that the 'Wassermann substance' possessed all the properties that are 
characteristic of amboceptors: "It is therefore a genuine amboceptor in Ehrlich's sense". 7 9 
This is how Wassermann secured the continuity with his original views. It also explains why 
he stated, at the beginning of his lecture, that he was initially looking for "a diagnostically 
usable amboceptor" - the very words whose significance was misunderstood by Fleck. 
But the 'Wassermann substance' was not just one antibody (or amboceptor) among 
many; it was a very special and unique kind of antibody: "with it for the first time an antibo-
dy against lipoids of human or animal organ cells was isolated". 8 0 And now Wassermann 
set out a theory on the origin of this special kind of antibody which closely resembled the 
'autoantibody theory' that had been developed more than 10 years before by Weil and Braun, 
without even mentioning their names in this connection! Apparently, he could defend his 
intellectual property only by adorning his discovery with borrowed plumes. 
Wassermann's determined effort to claim 'his' intellectual property by removing Bor-
det's name completely from the serodiagnosis of syphilis leaps to the eye in the following 
passages: 
"I have made use of an instrument [Hilfsmittel] constructed by Bordet [..], namely complement fixation, 
to create something that was until then completely unknown. To draw a comparison from chemistry, it 
is as if a chemist using Liebig's counter-current condensor found a fully novel chemical fact and one 
would therefore attribute the principal merit for this discovery to Liebig. [..] 
[..] the fact that it [the WaR] does not concern a reaction on parasites, but one directed at specifically 
affected host cells, would never have been found with Bordet's original experimental setup, but only with 
my setup using organ extracts. Bordet's name has not the least to do with the reaction itself, which 
consists in the combination of the lipoid-amboceptor (Wassermann substance) and the lipoid-antigen into 
the reversible Wassermann aggregate. Only in one single indicator for this phenomenon discovered and 
now also analyzed by me, has Bordet a part. If one chooses, for the recognition of this aggregate, a 
method different from complement fixation, then Bordet will be eliminated from the entire serodiagnosis 
of syphilis, - but not I, because without Wassermann lipoid-amboceptor and without Wassermann aggre-
gate there is, until now, no serodiagnosis of syphilis, which is my intellectual product and property [mein 
geistiges Produkt und Eigentum] (emphasis in original)".81 
As we can see, the use of a modified version of the complement fixation test plays only a 
subordinate part in Wassermann's argument (he wisely suppresses the fact that the 'organ 
extracts' were initially conceived as bacterial extracts); the full emphasis of the defence of 
'his' intellectual property is on the presumed nature of the reaction. Having established that 
the Sachs-Georgi reaction involves the same 'Wassermann aggregate' as the WaR, he can 
7 9 A. von Wassermann, op. cit. (note 58), p. 197. 
8 0 Ibid. 
8 1 A. von Wassermann, op. cit. (note 58), p. 197. 
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discount the complement fixation test as only one possible instrument or indicator, besides 
flocculation, for the recognition of this 'aggregate'. Therefore, Bordet can be eliminated from 
the "entire serodiagnosis of syphilis" (incidentally, Wassermann is simultaneously extending 
his property to cover also the Sachs-Georgi and Meinicke flocculation reactions!). 
Wassermann's defence of 'his' intellectual property against the French and Belgian 
"attempts to put Bordet's name in the forefront" elicited in its turn strong responses from his 
fellow-countrymen Carl Lange, Eduard Weil, and Carl Bruck. 8 2 
Carl Lange, Wassermann's former assistant (who had however not been directly invol-
ved in the early stages of the development of the WaR), questioned the latter's claim that his 
recent empirical investigations had brought a definitive solution to the problem of the nature 
of the WaR. Lange could not discern anything new or remarkable in Wassermann's experi-
ments. At any rate, they were insufficient to establish the conclusion that the 'Wassermann 
substance' really was an antibody against lipoids. The same substance was also able to react 
with colloidal gold or with mastix, and no one would infer from these facts that the substance 
represented an antibody. 8 3 In his rejoinder Wassermann contested the legitimacy of phy-
sico-chemical analogies for elucidating the nature of biological phenomena. He was also 
ruffled by the ironic tone of Lange's reaction: "I do not find this form very tasteful vis-a-vis 
a man who has created the whole field of the serodiagnosis of syphilis [..], in particular on 
the part of an author who for many years was allowed to work in my institute". 8 4 
In his reaction to Wassermann's lecture, Eduard Weil used the opportunity to pay off 
some old scores: "Only reluctantly do we dig up the old bone of contention, which we buried 
11 years ago, because we were confronted, at that time, with an organization which did not 
treat scientific issues in the usual manner and against which we felt too weak" . 8 5 He expo-
sed the many distortions, misrepresentations and equivocations in Wassermann's historical 
account of the development of the WaR ("W. now spreads a thick veil over the actual course 
of events"). Two examples from Weil's reply. Wassermann was not just looking for "a 
diagnostically usable amboceptor", he was looking for a specific amboceptor against the 
syphilis spirochaete. Wassermann had also concealed from his audience that he himself had 
given up the antibody status of his substance after the 'antigen' proved soluble in alcohol. 
It is no disgrace to change one's views in a dynamic field of science, Weil remarked, "but 
Bordet himself did not respond to Wassermann's lecture, at least not in the pages of the Berliner 
klinische Wochenschrift. 
C. Lange, 'Entgegnung auf A. v. Wassermann's modifizierte Lipoidhypothese', Berliner klinische 
Wochenschrift 58 (1921): 330-31. 
A. von Wassermann, 'Ueber die Antikörpernatur der Wassermann-substanz: Zugleich eine Richtig-
stellung der von Lange in dieser Wochenschrift veröffentlichten Entgegnung', Berliner klinische 
Wochenschrift 58 (1921): 331-34, p. 334. 
E. Weil, 'Das Problem der Serologie der Lues in der Darstellung Wassermann's', Berliner klini-
sche Wochenschrift 58 (1921): 966-70, pp. 966-67. 
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we have no appreciation for the fact that one conceals previously expressed views, once they 
have been refuted, or even goes so far as to disavow them completely". 8 6 
Weil also broached the issue of the part played by chance in the discovery of the WaR. 
In his lecture Wassermann had opposed a widely held view about his discovery which he 
paraphrased as follows: "From that time on [after the introduction of 'alcholic extracts'] the 
discovery was depicted in the literature more or less as if I had simply applied Bordet's 
method of complement fixation [..] to the field of syphilis, that the assumption from which 
I proceeded was false, but that I found something right [etwas Richtiges] by accident". 8 7 
According to Weil, this would indeed give a truthful account of the development of the WaR, 
if one substituted 'a discovery of great practical importance' for 'something right' (cf. Fleck: 
74-75/99). 
In his rejoinder, Wassermann stated that he was ready to fulfil all of Weil's wishes as 
far as he was able to, but he did not answer any of Weil's concrete accusations of misrepre-
sentation. He confessed "frankly" that he had often changed his theoretical views on the 
nature of the WaR. One possible wish of Weil could not be satisfied: "If [..] it were finally 
Weil's wish to show to the world that I, after all the false assumptions that I made, should 
not actually deserve to be the father of such an important discovery as the serodiagnosis of 
syphilis, then I cannot fully satisfy his wishes on this score, because for that he has to 
polemicize with fortune [dem Schicksal\ and not with m e " . 8 8 Wassermann was of course 
referring to the eponymous fact that his name had become solidly associated with the sero-
diagnosis of syphilis. 
In his first reaction to Wassermann's lecture, which initiated a series of increasingly 
acrimonious exchanges with his former principal, Carl Brack also alluded to the vicissitudes 
of eponymy. According to Brack, it was all very well that Wassermann opposed French and 
Belgian attempts to put Bordet's name in the forefront, but he should not have claimed the 
serodiagnosis of syphilis as his exclusive "intellectual product and property". Induced by this 
"egocentric" stand taken by Wassermann, Brack felt in his turn obliged to defend his share, 
and that of the late Albert Neisser (who had died in 1916), in the development of the WaR. 
He thought he also owed it to Neisser's memory to reaffirm and recall that "the socalled 
Wassermann reaction" was "the result of the joint labour [gemeinsamen Arbeit] of A. v. 
Wassermann, A. Neisser, and C. Brack". It was Neisser, according to Brack, who by 
visiting Wassermann in Berlin in early 1906, had given the external stimulus [aussere Veran-
lassung] to initiate the serological investigations on syphilis and supported the endeavour 
through the supply of pathological material from his clinic. Brack himself had been in charge 
Ibid., p. 970. 
A. von Wassermann, op. cit. (note 58), p. 194. 
A. von Wassermann, 'Bemerkungen zu den Ausführungen E. Weils', Berliner klinische Wochen-
schrift 58 (1921): 970. 
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of the practical execution of this task. After "a few months of solitary and strenuous work" 
had yielded positive results, it was Brack who actually wrote the first article on the new 
sérodiagnostic reaction (which was headed by the names of Wassermann, Neisser, and 
Brack). Before he was allowed to leave Wassermann's department at the Institute for Infec-
tious Diseases in Berlin to move to Breslau, he had to dictate all the technical details of the 
test (including its several controls) to Wassermann. 
Brack recalled that in the early period the sérodiagnostic reaction was usually designated 
as the Wassermann-Neisser-Bruck reaction (or, abbreviated, WNB-R) : "In the following years, 
however, the WNB-R gradually became a Wassermann reaction, as a consequence of conside-
rations of convenience [eine Bequemlichkeitserscheinung] [ . . ] " . 8 9 Although it was custo-
mary to honour all the authors involved in serological discoveries (Brack mentioned the 
Graber-Widal, Sachs-Georgi and Weil-Felix reactions), for more than 10 years Brack had 
not protested against the designation 'Wassermann reaction' out of "piety vis-à-vis my 
respected former teacher", who himself was not responsible for this eponymy. It was only 
Wassermann's recent usurpation of the entire intellectual property of the WaR, Brack de-
clared, that had induced him to reveal the historical truth about its actual genesis. 
In his first rejoinder to Brack, Wassermann reaffirmed his right to call himself the 
"intellectual father" of the serodiagnosis of syphilis, which indeed constituted his "exclusive 
intellectual product and property" [alleiniges geistiges Produkt und Eigentum]. He quoted 
from his earlier correspondence with Neisser to support his claim. In a letter dated 1 August 
1906 (after the ways of both had already parted), Neisser had written to Wassermann: "But 
finally, dear friend, why don't you grant us here the satisfaction to develop the whole thing 
[die Sache auszuarbeiten], after you have already acquired the honour, which is rightfully 
yours, to have inaugurated the entire procedure". In the same letter Neisser had conceded 
to Wassermann, as "the one whom we owe the decisive step in this matter" (emphasized by 
Neisser himself), "a very special right to pursue these questions". 9 0 It is difficult to decide 
to what extent Neisser's statements support Wassermann's claim, for they may partly reflect 
conventionalized attributions. They are also interesting from the point of view of Ravetz's 
"principle of fairness in exploitation of results" 9 1 , which Merton failed to incorporate in 
his description of the scientific ethos. 
In his second reply, Brack denied that he wanted to contest that it was Wassermann who 
had given the instigation [Anregung] to apply the complement fixation test to syphilis: "But 
it is a long way between the instigation and the working out of an idea, and I may claim the 
C. Bruck, 'Ueber die Entwicklung der Syphilisserodiagnose', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 58 
(1921): 464-67, p. 464. 
Cited in A. von Wassermann, 'Zur Geschichte der Serodiagnostik der Syphilis', Berliner klinische 
Wochenschrift 58 (1921): 467. 
See note 21. 
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merit for having executed the latter all by myself". 9 2 Now Brack also used a different argu-
ment to counter Wassermann's tenacious insistence on his intellectual paternity of the WaR: 
"The idea, on which the serodiagnosis of syphilis was grounded and of which Wassermann 
so emphatically claims to be the intellectual father, has turned out to be erroneous. Through 
an extraordinary stroke of luck, I have discovered, during the practical execution of Wasser-
mann's idea, a syphilis reaction, the nature of which is still not clear today". 9 3 If the prin-
cipal merit for this discovery should be due to anybody or anything, Brack concluded, then 
it should accrue to this stroke of luck. A similar view had also been expressed by Weil. For 
Fleck the appeal to chance is "of no scientific value" (76/102). The category of 'lucky 
accident' has no legitimate place in his sociological epistemology. In a moment I will return 
to this problem to see whether the factor of chance has been successfully eliminated by 
Fleck. 
In his second rejoinder to Brack, Wassermann dismissed the former's account of the 
genesis of the WaR as a fairy-tale from the Thousand and One Nights: "I casually threw out 
the idea that one might create a serodiagnosis of syphilis, then went out for a walk without 
caring further about the matter, had my poor young assistant exert himself to the utmost until 
one day he surprised me with the happy news: the serodiagnosis of syphilis has been discove-
red" . 9 4 Wassermann went at great length to show that such idyllic conditions did not obtain 
in his department of Koch's institute. The method for the serodiagnosis of syphilis, he 
maintained, did not have to be elaborated by Brack; it was already available in 1905 in the 
form of the modification of the complement fixation test involving the use of extracts ob-
tained through agitation [Schuttelextrakte]. This modification was Wassermann's 'intellectual 
property', of which he could therefore dispose as he saw fit. He thus charged his collabora-
tors with applying it to typhoid, or to meningitis. It was Brack's "extraordinary stroke of 
luck" that he, and not one of his colleagues, had been assigned the job to apply the method 
to syphilis, a stroke of luck "which would become decisive in such a happy manner for 
Brack's later career". Wassermann declared that he had never detracted from Brack's merits 
as a collaborator in the development of the WaR. "But I say emphatically 'collaborator' 
[Mitarbeiter] [..] and not 'co-creator' [Mitschopfer]. The serodiagnosis has been created 
[geschaffen] [..] exclusively by me". It was improper for Brack, Wassermann stated, to try 
to reverse the roles between teacher and pupil. He should not have repaid good with evil. 
It is notable that Wassermann uses the hierarchical relationship as it existed between 
him and Brack to bolster his claims to the intellectual property of the WaR. Following his 
C. Bruck, 'Zur Geschichte der Serodiagnose der Syphilis', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 58 
(1921): 580-81, p. 581. 
Ibid. (compare Fleck: 74/98). 
A. von Wassermann, 'Zur Geschichte der Serodiagnostik der Syphilis', Berliner klinische Wochen-
schrift 58 (1921): 888-90, p. 888. 
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account, there seems to be no difference between disposing of one's intellectual property 
(over the modified complement fixation method, in this case) and assigning tasks to one's 
subordinates or 'Mitarbeiter'. In such a hierarchical world it appears to be excluded by 
definition that a Mitarbeiter can ever become a Mitschöpfer.95 It is also notable that Was-
sermann now defends his claim as to the intellectual property of the WaR exclusively on the 
basis of his modification of the complement fixation test, whereas he had earlier emphasized 
the special nature of the reaction against French and Belgian attempts "to put Bordet's name 
in the forefront". Wassermann did not have a consistent account that could be used in both 
contexts. 
In his third and last reaction, Brack contested that Wassermann's prior work on 'Schüt-
telextrakte' should entitle him to call himself the 'creator' (Schöpfer) of the WaR: "For the 
socalled WaR is not a 'creation' (Schöpfung) at all, but a pure chance discovery, which, as 
we know today, has nothing whatsoever to do with bacterial extracts, but is based on the fact 
that certain bodily substances, which are also present in normal organs, happen to react with 
luetic sera in a characteristic way, and that this reaction by chance also happens to be demon-
strable with complement fixation!".96 Thus, against Wassermann's claim to have 'created' 
the WaR, Brack reiterated his view that the principal merit for the discovery accrued to a 
stroke of luck. 
In his final rejoinder, Wassermann observed that every important discovery in the past 
has had its critics who prefer to attribute the merit to luck and chance rather than to the 
discoverer. Chance may play a certain part, but, according to Wassermann, "in such lucky 
accidents Nature reveals herself only to him who uses a new method or makes an observation 
of which he recognizes the significance". 9 7 He was of course echoing Pasteur's famous 
remark that in science chance favours the prepared mind. Wassermann claimed to have 
created the method through which Nature would yield the secret of the luetic serum. This 
definitively settled, in his view, the question of the intellectual property of the serodiagnosis 
of syphilis. 
There is an interesting parallel with the Hewish-Bell conflict over the discovery of pulsars (see note 
55). In response to Fred Hoyle's letter crediting Jocelyn Bell with the discovery, "Nobel laureate 
Hewish wrote The Times, saying in effect that Bell had been using his telescope, under his instructi-
ons, to make a sky survey which he had initiated. The possibility that the accidentally discovered 
pulsars were of human or alien origin was resolved under his direction", Broad and Wade, op. cit. 
(note 55), p. 148. Hewish also suggested that the next graduate student down the line would have 
made the discovery. "'Jocelyn was a jolly good girl but she was doing her job', says the Nobel 
laureate. 'She noticed this source was doing this thing. If she hadn't noticed it, it would have been 
negligent'." (Ibid., p. 148). Likewise, Wassermann suggested that he could have chosen any of 
Brack's colleagues to have the job done. 
C. Brack, 'Zur Geschichte der Serodiagnostik der Syphilis', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 58 
(1921): 1194. 
A. von Wassermann, 'Zur Geschichte der Serodiagnostik der Syphilis (Bemerkungen zu den 
Brack'schen Ausführungen)', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 58 (1921): 1194-95, p. 1195. 
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This series of acrimonious exchanges between Wassermann and Brack was concluded 
with an editorial statement from the Berliner klinische Wochenschrift: "Therewith we consider 
this unsavoury [unerquickliche] discussion to be closed and do not want to withhold our 
judgement, in view of the tenacity with which Mr. Brack suddenly believes to have to insist 
on property rights, that raising a priority claim 15 years after the discovery of the method 
concerned and 15 years of tacit agreement must make an impression which we now hope to 
see erased very soon - Ed. H.K. [= Hans Kohn]" . 9 8 
From a Mertonian perspective it is significant that in this editorial comment the dispute 
is called an "unsavoury discussion". We can also see the editor actively exerting himself to 
define this struggle over intellectual property as an aberrant phenomenon by expressing his 
hope that the bad impression caused by Brack might soon become obliterated. It is also 
remarkable that Brack is accused of raising a 'priority claim': apparantly, priority disputes 
so much constitute the standard case of conflicts over intellectual property, that a deviant 
instance is also interpreted in its terms. Finally, the editor's parti pris in favour of Wasser-
mann is very conspicuous, but this has probably much to do with the latter's high standing 
in the medical and scientific world of his time. 
Let me finally turn to the question of the acceptability of the notion of 'chance' or 
'lucky accident' in the epistemological analysis of discoveries and inventions. We have seen 
that Fleck rejects such notions as 'unscientific'. His sociological epistemology appears to 
assume a standpoint above that of each of the contending parties, by 'impartially' criticizing 
the views of both: "Some among the eyewitnesses talk about a lucky accident, and the well-
disposed about the intuition of a genius" (76/102). 
Fleck maintains that the recourse to chance is connected with an individualistic stand-
point; by taking a "social point of view" it can be avoided. He uses a suggestive simile to 
convey his view: "It is an accident when a stone drops into a hole. But it is inevitable that 
dust should penetrate pores; it is blown about in the environment until it finally enters, but 
each individual particle comes to rest in its particular position only by accident" (78/104). 
But we remember that Weil and Brack invoked the notion of chance to account for the 
fact that something very useful eventually emerged from false initial assumptions. Can this 
'miracle' be resolved by taking a social point of view, by considering the WaR as the out-
come of some sort of collective effort? Fleck appears to give an affirmative answer to this 
question by presenting another comparison: "How does it come about that all rivers finally 
reach the sea, in spite of perhaps initially flowing in the wrong direction, taking roundabout 
ways, and generally meandering? There is no such thing as the sea as such. The area at the 
lowest level, the area where the waters actually collect, is merely called the sea!" (78/104). 
This comparison suggests that, given enough collective effort expended on finding a sero-
reaction for the detection of syphilis, whatever comes out of it will be practically usable for 
Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 58 (1921): 1195. 
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this purpose, simply because it will be defined as such! (Under such conditions false initial 
assumptions are of course without consequence.) But this appears to be a reductio ad absur-
dum of Fleck's position. It is not amazing that he retracts from this position later on, for then 
he remarks that the WaR cannot be reconstructed "in its objective entirety" from historical 
and social factors (79/105). It thus appears that Fleck has not really eliminated 'chance' from 
his sociological epistemology. His criticism of the participants involved in the dispute over 
the WaR who used this notion is not justified. 
4. Summary and conclusions 
The argument of this chapter has been conducted on two fronts. I have tried to play off 
Merton's approach in the sociology of science against Fleck's treatment of the struggle over 
the intellectual ownership of the WaR in order to reveal the shortcomings of the latter's 
'collectivism'. Simultaneously, however, I have attempted to show that the Mertonian para-
digm itself needs extension and revision if it is to measure up to this challenge. An important 
lesson to be learnt from Merton is that priority disputes - and conflicts over intellectual 
property generally - are recurrent and interesting phenomena which deserve to be treated as 
a proper object of sociological analysis rather than being condemned as utterly futile or 
totally misconceived. The latter tack had been chosen by Fleck. Paradoxically, the 'collec-
tivistic' bent of his approach had led him to polemicize against the participants involved in 
the conflict over the WaR rather than to analyze the salient features of the dispute. 
The analysis of the struggle over the intellectual ownership of the WaR represents a 
foray into hitherto uncharted territory of the Mertonian paradigm. Until now Merton and his 
students have studied conflicts over intellectual property (in the customary form of priority 
disputes) between independent researchers involved in multiple discoveries and the differen-
tial allocation of prestige between such researchers and between the authors of multi-authored 
articles (the operation of the so-called Matthew effect), but not intellectual property battles 
between the members of a research team. The filling of this gap is of strategic value because 
some of Merton's critics, e.g. Barnes and Dolby, have suggested that the rise of team re-
search in this century did not create the tensions that might have been expected on the basis 
of Merton's theory. My view is that closer examination of the historical record will probably 
bring to light more instances of tensions and conflicts than the critics allow. The least we can 
say is that on this issue the jury is still out. 
Mertonianism and constructivism remain deeply divided over the efficacy of social 
norms and values (such as those comprising the 'scientific ethos') in regulating scientists' 
behaviour. Despite my attempts at integration and reconciliation, I have been unable to 
resolve this fundamental issue. 
In exploring the white spot of the Mertonian paradigm and performing an in-depth 
analysis of the struggle over the intellectual ownership of the WaR, I have found it necessary 
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to drop Merton's stricture on treating the content of science. Here I agree with Merton's 
'post-Kuhnian' critics. In the case of 'team' discoveries too, the question of who has taken 
a creative part in the achievement is inextricably intertwined with the substantive question 
of what exactly has been discovered. Participants can argue their case only by taking a stand 
on both questions. 
Fleck did pay attention to the views expressed by several protagonists embroiled in the 
quarrel over the WaR, but, as he said, "only for epistemological purposes". He attempted 
to show that their views exhibited characteristic retrospective distortions which reflected the 
nature of the collective process of gathering experience. Fleck cited the example of August 
Wassermann, who in his lecture of December 1920 could not but project the final outcome 
of the process back into the initial stages. Fleck maintained that new knowledge, acquired 
through collective experience, had a retroactive effect in that it made the participants lose the 
appreciation for their own previously held views. In offering this explanation Fleck lost sight 
of the strategic nature of the exchanges between the participants: each sought to press his 
own claims and combat those of others in a contest in which the intellectual property of the 
serological test for syphilis was at stake. Wassermann and, to a lesser extent, the other 
participants were thus made out as 'innocent' victims of the collective process of gaining 
experience. 
In presenting an alternative interpretation of the exchanges of views between Wasser-
mann and his opponents in the polemic of 1920-1921 1 have taken the strategic character of 
the dispute more seriously into account. The opening salvo in the series of exchanges, 
Wassermann's lecture of December 1920, can be seen as a powerful reaffirmation and 
defence of the serodiagnosis of syphilis as 'his' intellectual property against the attempts in 
France and Belgium during the First World War to put Bordet's name in the forefront (in 
those two countries the serological test had been re-labelled 'the Bordet-Wassermann reac-
tion'). To defend 'his' property, Wassermann had to 'profile' the seroreaction for syphilis 
vis-a-vis Bordet's complement fixation method. The first problem for Wassermann was that 
his initial views on the nature of the reaction were unsuitable for that purpose. He therefore 
took recourse to the so-called 'autoantibody theory', an interpretation that had originally been 
propounded by his former critic Eduard Weil, to underline the very special and unique 
properties of the serological reaction. All the while he carefully constructed a continuity with 
his former views by stating that it had been his original intention to find a "a diagnostically 
usable amboceptor" (which Fleck misread as stating that antibody detection rather than 
antigen detection had been his intention from the outset). We have seen that Wassermann's 
appropriation of the full intellectual ownership of the WaR aroused indignant reactions from, 
amongst others, his former critic Weil and his former collaborator Brack. The second diffi-
culty for Wassermann was that the substantive account of the reaction which he had em-
ployed to counter Bordet's claims could not be used against Weil and Brack. With regard to 
Weil his ultimate 'argument' was das Schicksal or 'fortune' (the eponymous fact that in 
Germany and Central Europe his name had become solidly associated with the reaction). 
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Against his erstwhile collaborator Wassermann appealed to the hierarchical relations formerly 
existing between them which by definition excluded that a 'co-worker' could ever become 
a 'co-creator'. After a series of increasingly acrimonious exchanges, the editor of the Ber-
liner klinische Wochenschrift sided with Wassermann and closed the "unsavoury discussion". 
In their replies to Wassermann, Weil as well as Brack appealed to the factor of chance 
(or an "extraordinary stroke of luck") to account for the fact that something very useful 
eventually emerged from false initial assumptions. In my view such an appeal to chance is 
quite acceptable and appropriate given the nature of the case, but Fleck found it unscientific 
to invoke this notion. He thought it possible to eliminate the chance factor by adopting a 
'social' point of view and considering the WaR as the outcome of a collective effort. I have 
argued that this elimination is only apparent, unless one is willing to endorse the absurd 
conclusion that any outcome of a collective effort will be ipso facto useful. 
Fleck's rejection of chance as a legitimate factor in the development of science betrays 
the collectivistic and deterministic tenets of his sociological theory of knowledge. Modern 
constractivists do not generally share this attitude. A keen awareness of the role of contingen-
cy and chance in human affairs may be a useful asset to question existing definitions of 
reality rather than to take them for granted. After all, constructivism lives from the realiza-
tion that things are not necessarily the way they are but might have been different. 
195 
CHAPTER VII 
FROM METHYLENE BLUE TO SALVARSAN: 
TEST ANIMALS, HUMAN SUBJECTS, AND CLINICAL TRIALS 
1. Introduction 
In a review of Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, the Dutch philosopher Gerard 
de Vries encapsulated the thrust of Fleck's programme of a sociologically-based comparative 
epistemology in a concise formulation: "Epistemology is the epidemiology of intellectual 
contact". 1 This is indeed an apt characterization of Fleck's view, for the upshot of his 
'doctrine of thought styles and thought collectives' is precisely that scientific facts are the 
outcome of intensive social interaction between the members of a thought collective, defined 
as "a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction" 
(39/54-55). 2 
At times, however, Fleck hints that this conception of 'intellectual interaction' with its 
one-sided 'intellectualistic' emphasis on the exchange of ideas may be too restrictive. Sum-
marizing the course of events leading up to a practically usable Wassermann test, he writes: 
"Skills, experience in the field, and ideas whether 'wrong' or 'right' passed from hand to 
hand and from brain to brain" (69/91). Interaction within a thought collective is not limited, 
therefore, to the exchange of ideas passing 'from brain to brain' but also includes the ex-
change of skills and experience passing 'from hand to hand'. (A similar point is made by 
Karin Knorr-Cetina in a somewhat different context, when she notes that" 'conceptual inter-
action' is not merely 'conceptual'." 3) One might even go further and also include the ex-
change of material resources like samples, raw materials, specimens, research objects, test 
animals, tools and instruments. This proposed extension finds some justification in Fleck's 
own text. Using the same example of the formation of the Wassermann test, Fleck notes that 
Albert Neisser's contribution was that he "[..] offered the pathological material" in addition 
to his experience as a physician (69/91). This 'pathological material' was derived from the 
syphilitic patients of Neisser's dermatological clinic in Breslau and also from his artificially 
infected apes and monkeys. 
G. de Vries, 'De besmettelijkheid van intellectueel contact', Kennis en methode 5(1981): 156-64, p. 
162. 
Compare David Gooding: "Natural knowledge is produced by people interacting sometimes with 
Nature and always with each other", D. Gooding, '"Magnetic curves" and the magnetic field: 
experimentation and representation in the history of a theory', in D. Gooding, T. Pinch, S. Schaf-
fer (eds.), The Uses of Experiment, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1989, p. 183. 
K.D. Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge, Oxford (Pergamon Press), 1981, p. 60. 
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Elaborating on Fleck, Gerard de Vries proposes to analyze the structure of thought collec-
tives in terms of the relationships and dependencies obtaining between their members. 
In academic areas, de Vries holds, researchers are dependent on other investigators in 
several respects, e.g. with regard to the supply of ideas; the provision of 'objects of re-
search' or materials; the offering of criticism; and, especially nowadays, the assessment of 
research proposals in connection with funding decisions. 4 The problem with de Vries's 
proposal is that he still follows Fleck in delineating thought collectives primarily along 
disciplinary lines. Fleck designated the collective that realized the Wassermann reaction as 
the 'serological thought-collective', although it transpires from his own historical description 
that non-serologists like Albert Neisser were also prominently involved. On the basis of her 
laboratory studies Karin Knorr-Cetina has criticized the strong fixation in science studies on 
the disciplinarily defined 'scientific community' as the social framework supposed to be 
relevant for the action of scientists. She offers the notion of transepistemic or transscientific 
fields to emphasize that laboratory scientists are entangled in a web of social relationships 
which extend beyond the boundaries of a scientific community. In her view, "the social 
integration [..] is based not upon what is shared [e.g. a common disciplinary background -
HvdB], but upon what is transmitted between agents". 5 She speaks of resource-relationships 
between agents, a notion that also captures the types of dependencies distinguished by de 
Vries. From all this it is clear that Fleck's phrase 'exchange of ideas' (Gedankenaustausch) 
is not nearly comprehensive enough to cover the various mutual dependencies and interac-
tions making up the epidemiology of scientific contagion. 
One might reasonably argue that a broadening of the framework of analysis from an 
exclusive concern with intellectual interaction to the inclusion of the exchange of skills, 
experience, and material resources does not go far enough. Such an analysis is still focused 
on the sphere of circulation or exchange; a full-blooded constructivist approach also needs 
to attend to the sphere of production, in other words it will have to elaborate a view of how 
scientific results are being 'constructed', 'fabricated', 'manufactured', or 'produced', and it 
also has to investigate how the spheres of production and circulation are linked to each other. 
Fleck has some rudimentary insights to offer on the 'production' of scientific knowledge (his 
'epistemology' therefore cannot be exhaustively characterized as an 'epidemiology'), but in 
recent years this subject has been more fully and consistently elaborated by Karin Knorr-
Cetina in the tradition of ethnographic laboratory studies, and by Andrew Pickering, David 
Gooding and others who attempt to move beyond the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) 
G. de Vries, 'De ontwikkeling van wetenschappelijke kennis, sociologisch beschouwd', Kermis en 
methode 6(1982): 190-220, p. 212. De Vries remarks that for non-academic areas this list should 
probably be extended. 
K.D. Knorr-Cetina, "The Ethnographic Study of Scientific Work: Towards a Constructivist Inter-
pretation of Science', in K.D. Knorr-Cetina and M. Mulkay (eds.), Science Observed: Perspectives 
on the Social Study of Science, London/Beverly Hills (Sage), 1983, pp. 115-140, p. 133. 
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towards a detailed and systematic analysis of experimental practice. Andrew Pickering, a 
principal exponent of this 'turn to practice' (or 'turn to experiment'), summarizes the new 
view of the production of scientific knowledge as follows: 
"Like any other kind of production, the production of knowledge requires resources: material resources 
such as money, manpower and machines; and conceptual resources such as ideas about how the hardware 
works, rules of thumb, theories, models and mathematical techniques. Expertise in the practical use of 
these resources is also needed, so expertise is itself a resource. [..] It makes sense, then, to think of the 
constructive practice of individual scientists as being structured by their positions within a field of resour-
ces".7 
Probably because of his preoccupation with elementary particle physics, Pickering recognizes 
the importance of machines but fails to mention such things as raw materials or experimental 
animals among the material resources. These should be explicitly included when the bio-
medical sciences, as in the present case, are the focus of study. 8 An important issue in 
contemporary science studies is whether they can do justice to the role of material resources 
in scientific practice without abandoning their constructivist tenets, that is, without falling 
back into the position of naive realism. 
Pickering conceives the constructive practice of scientists as a dialectic between resistan-
ce and accommodation. In the course of their daily pursuits scientific investigators will come 
up against all kinds of 'resistances' or unexpected problems, to which they can accomodate 
not just by revising the theory under consideration, but also by revising the interpretation of 
the working of the experimental apparatus or, more likely, by adjusting their instruments or 
changing their material procedures. They seek to achieve coherence between these different 
elements. In Pickering's view, scientific practice is shot through with chanciness and con-
This trend is exemplified in two recent collections: D. Gooding, T. Pinch, S. Schaffer (eds.), The 
Uses of Experiment, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1989; A. Pickering (ed.), Science as 
Practice and Culture, Chicago and London (The University of Chicago Press), 1992. See also I. 
Hacking, 'Philosophers of Experiment', in A. Fine and J. Leplin (eds.), PSA 1980, Vol. II (East 
Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1989), pp. 147-56. Fleck's epistemological position 
has been compared to the 'pragmatic realism' advocated by Pickering and Gooding in J. Golinski, 
"The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory: Sociological Approaches in the History of 
Science', Isis 81(1990): 492-505. 
A. Pickering, 'Forms of Life: Science, Contingency and Harry Collins', British Journal for the 
History of Science 20 (1987): 213-21, p. 220. 
Karin Knorr-Cetina also speaks of "a traffic of substances, materials and equipment" and of "an 
exchange of specimens, tools, and materials" within and between laboratories. See K. Knorr Ceti-
na, "The Couch, the Cathedral, and the Laboratory: On the Relationship betwen Experiment and 
Laboratory in Science', in A. Pickering (ed.), op. cit. (note 6), pp. 113-38, p. 128. For a stimula-
ting analysis of the relevance of research materials for the conduct of scientific investigation, see 
A.E. Clarke, 'Research Materials and Reproductive Science in the United States, 1910-1940', in 
S.L. Star (ed.), Ecologies of Knowledge: Work and Politics in Science and Technology, Albany 
(State University of New York Press), 1995, pp. 183-225. 
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tingency. 'Resistances' can only emerge in a particular practice, relative to the goals, inter-
pretations and material procedures of that practice. Successful accommodations to these 
resistances are similarly contingent: it is impossible to know in advance which revisions in 
material procedures or interpretations will restore coherence. Pickering also uses the term 
'Inning' - "in the sense of tuning a radio set or car engine" 9 - for this accommodative work, 
which is clearly reminiscent of the way Fleck describes how Wassermann and his co-workers 
fiddled with the sérodiagnostic test for syphilis to achieve a better quantitative match between 
the components of the reaction, thus enhancing the success rate of the test in cases of confir-
med syphilis from barely 20 percent to 70-90 percent: "[..] from these confused notes [i.e. 
the unpromising initial results - HvdB] Wassermann heard the tune that hummed in his mind 
but was not audible to those not involved. He and his co-workers listened and 'tuned' their 
'sets' until these became selective. The melody could then be heard even by unbiased persons 
who were not involved" (86/113). Pickering hastens to add the caveat that in scientific 
research - unlike with tuning a radio set - the character of the signal is not known in ad-
vance. 1 0 The use of the term 'tuning' can be further stretched and extended. Experimental 
practice involves a complex interplay of interdependent revisions of material procedures, 
interpretations and theories, in other words of material and conceptual 'tunings'. These may 
be accompanied by a concomitant 'tuning' and refiguring of social entities and relationships, 
involving work-styles, institutional structures, and more generally 'forms of l i fe ' . 1 1 
Even before Pickering turned from the sociology of scientific knowledge to the study 
of 'science-as-practice', Knorr-Cetina had already adopted in her ethnographic laboratory 
studies a constructivist approach which considers the products of science quite literally as the 
result of a process of fabrication. 1 2 A striking fact for the ethnographic observer visiting 
the laboratory was that in this particular setting natural scientists were nowhere confronted 
with 'Nature'. The raw materials with which scientists work are already preconstructed; 
laboratory mice and rats are specially bred 1 3 ; substances and chemicals are obtained in 
9 A. Pickering, "The Mangle of Practice: Agency and Emergence in the Sociology of Science', Ame-
rican Journal of Sociology 99 (1993): 550-89, p. 564; Pickering himself notes the resemblance with 
Fleck's use of the term 'tuning'. See also A. Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency & 
Science, Chicago and London (The University of Chicago Press), 1995, p. 22, note 35. 
1 0 Ibid. 
1 1 A. Pickering, 'Knowledge, Practice and Mere Construction', Social Studies of Science 20 (1990): 
682-729, p. 707. 
1 2 Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. (note 3); Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. (note 5). 
1 3 Klaus Amann argues that laboratory mice have been so drastically transformed into 'epistemic 
objects' that the common name 'mice' which they share with the wild and domestic mice of our 
lifeworld is in fact highly misleading; actually they are a completely different kind of animal. See 
K. Amann, 'Menschen, Mause und Fliegen', Zeitschrift fttr Soziologie 23 (1994): 22^10, esp. 29-
31. 
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purified form from industry or other labs; the water which runs from a special faucet is 
sterilized; in short, the laboratory is a locus of action from which 'nature' appears to have 
been excluded as much as possible. 1 4 Laboratories, according to a more recent formulation, 
can be seen as "made up of scientific reconfigurations of the natural in relation to the social0 
order from which epistemic benefit can be reaped". 1 5 Most constructivist analysts, Knorr-
Cetina holds, conceive of construction in terms of the moves and activities and negotiations 
of indiviuals. In her opinion, however, construction today is increasingly the work of machi-
neries of construction, a fact that is easily overlooked in historically oriented studies of 
science with an individualist bias. 
Against the background of the analytical concerns sketched above it is now possible to 
formulate the subject matter of this chapter. Its primary aim is to describe and analyze the 
intellectual, social, and material 'conditions of possibility' of Paul Ehrlich's laboratory 
practice of experimental therapeutics (or 'chemotherapy'), which in 1909 resulted in the 
discovery of salvarsan as an effective drug against syphilis. At first sight it might appear that 
this spectacular discovery, which is often depicted as the crowning achievement in the career 
of a scientific genius, is not amenable to a sociological analysis along constructivist lines. 
The objection could be made that Ehrlich's genius raises him above the 'epidemiology of 
intellectual contact'. Much more than itself having been influenced by the intellectual currents 
of his time, his independent fertile mind appears to have moulded the ways his contempo-
raries thought about immunological and other biological phenomena. Leonor Michaelis has 
even asserted that only in one respect was Ehrlich a product of his time, i.e. as being an 
'apolitical animal', but that in all other respects "it would be more correct to consider Ehr-
lich's time as a product of his person". 1 6 When Ehrlich received the Nobel Prize in 1908 
for his previous work on immunology, his one-time collaborator Wassermann declared that 
without the former's socalled side-chain theory the serodiagnostic test for syphilis would 
never have been found. 1 7 Ehrlich's inordinate influence around the turn of the century is 
also recognized by Fleck, when he observes that the notion of specificity, exemplified by 
Ehrlich's wellknown lock-and-key symbols, dominated the very depths of the science of 
serology (117/155). Given this prima facie independence of Ehrlich's thought from external 
influences, the attempt to understand his scientific pursuits as part and parcel of the 'epidemi-
ology of intellectual contact' is not without interest. Ehrlich's achievement may indeed 
The above is a paraphrase of a passage from Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. (note 5), p. 119. 
K. D. Knorr-Cetina, 'Strong Constructivism - from a Sociologist's Point of View: A Personal 
Addendum to Sismondo's Paper', Soaal Studies of Science 23 (1993); 555-63, p. 560. 
L. Michaelis, 'Zur Erinnerung an Paul Ehrlich: Seine wiedergefundene Doktor-Dissertation', Die 
Naturwissenschaften 7(1919): 165-68, p. 165. 
A. Wassermann, 'Paul Ehrlich', Münchener medizinische Wochenschrift 56 (1909): 245^17. 
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present a 'hard case' for Fleck's programme of comparative epistemology. We will see if this 
case can be accomodated. But this does not exhaust our interest in Ehrlich's work. 
Section 2 discusses the trajectory of Ehrlich's career from his early student years until 
1899, when the Instituí fiir Experimentelle Therapie was erected in Frankfurt am Main to 
enable him to conduct his practice of experimental therapeutics. This section is a necessary 
prelude in so far as it deals with the development of Ehrlich's famous sidechain or receptor 
theory, which would become an important theoretical resource for the practice of experimen-
tal therapeutics. I will also use the opportunity to compare the 'logic' of Ehrlich's scientific 
career to that of Louis Pasteur's career. The latter has been analyzed by the French sociolo-
gist Bruno Latour. 
In Section 3 I will describe and analyze the intellectual and in particular the material and 
social conditions of the practice of experimental therapeutics, first conducted in the Instituí 
für Experimenielle Therapie and from 1906 also in the Georg Speyer Haus. Drawing upon 
material, conceptual and organizational resources from the German chemical (synthetic 
dyestuffs) industry and upon 'animal model systems' first introduced by French researchers -
here we see a clear exemplification of Knorr-Cetina's 'transscientific field'! -, Ehrlich built 
a formidable consírucíion machinery for doing experimental therapeutics. His laboratories 
instituted a drastic 'reconfiguration' of the natural and social order, a kind of reshuffling 
between chemical substances, experimental ariimals and human patients, or between industria-
lists, chemists, biological researchers and clinicians. The material practice introduced by 
Ehrlich also required a particular 'social tuning' in the form of a characteristic institutional 
structure, work-style, pattern of research management, and symbiotic relations with the 
chemical industry. 
It is often claimed that Ehrlich's programme of experimental therapeutics represents a 
rational and purposive approach to the development of drugs. This claim flies in the face of 
constructivist science studies which generally emphasize the 'contingent' and 'opportunistic' 
character of research. Section 4 will therefore have a closer look at the allegedly 'rational' 
nature of Ehrlich's approach. It will also explore more fully the intellectual or theoretical 
aspects of his programme. 
If - as constructivist authors emphasize - the objects dealt with in the laboratory are 
highly artificial and bound to conditions established in that special setting, then the applicabi-
lity of the results obtained there to the 'real' or 'normal' world outside is not self-evident. 
As Knorr-Cetina and her co-workers state: "The transfer to the 'normal world' of an object 
articulated in the laboratory is therefore problematic, to which one may respond by adapting 
the 'normal world' to laboratory conditions, or by 'normalization' of the objects produ-
ced" . 1 8 Elsewhere she notes that translating scientific accounts into practice and making 
K. Knorr-Cetina (with the collaboration of K. Arnann, S. Hirschauer, K.-H. Schmidt), 'Das natur-
wissenschaftliche Labor als Ort der "Verdichtung" von Gesellschaft', Zeitschrift fir Soziologie 17 
(1988): 85-101, p. 89. The first option mentioned - adapting the 'normal world' to laboratory con-
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laboratory objects recur outside the laboratory requires hard work and cultural (social, 
political, economic and the like) intervention}9 From this angle the clinical introduction 
of salvarsan may be of particular interest. In 1908 Ehrlich could still boast that his approach 
to biomedical research would largely do away with the need to experiment on human sub-
jects. Through extensive animal experiments and in close cooperation with the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industry, he opined, the most 'optimal' drugs could be developed and selec-
ted, so that the final test on man would amount to no more, as it were, than proving the sum 
(nur noch die Probe aufs Exempel).20 As it turned out, however, this optimistic appraisal 
was a gross underestimation of the problems that would afflict the clinical introduction of 
salvarsan. In fact, the final stage in the development of this chemotherapeutic drug would 
cause Ehrlich more trouble and headaches than all the preceding stages together. It absorbed 
all his energy in the last years of his life (1909-1916). In Section 5 I will present a more 
detailed analysis of the difficulties facing the clinical introduction of salvarsan and of the 
types of work and intervention that were needed to overcome them. In the concluding section 
I will return to the analytical issues raised above. 
2. The trajectory of Ehrlich's career 
The course of Ehrlich's scientific development has been likened to the career of that other 
genius and reputed hero of microbiology and immunology, Louis Pasteur. 2 1 Just like Pas-
teur, Ehrlich could not stick to any particular discipline, but moved freely from one area to 
another. When we consider his entire career, he appears to have travelled quite a distance 
from the histological staining of leucocytes to the discovery of salvarsan, just as Pasteur 
likewise seems to have moved a long way from crystallography to inoculation against hydro-
phobia. "Yet in both cases", as Robert Muir observes in his obituary of Paul Ehrlich, "step 
seems to follow step in natural sequence". 2 2 
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The trajectory of Pasteur's career has been analyzed by the French sociologist Bruno Latour 
in his monograph Les Microbes.23 Here I will review Ehrlich's career up to its final 'chemo-
therapeutic' stage, which will be analyzed in more detail in later sections. A comparison of 
Pasteur's and Ehrlich's careers might be conducive to a better understanding of both. 
Despite the varied nature of Ehrlich's investigations in a wide range of fields, it is not 
difficult to discern a fundamental insight underlying all his work. From his early student days 
on, as Ehrlich told Wassermann, he had been 'possessed' by the idea which would become 
his Lebensgedanke, the conviction that each of the living cells and organ systems of the body 
has specific chemical affinities to (or 'avidities' for) specific substances. 2 4 This idea had 
been impressed on Ehrlich's mind when one of his teachers showed him that in chronic lead 
poisoning the toxic element was concentrated in particular organs of the body. For Ehrlich 
the medical student it was already beyond doubt that chemistry, in particular organic chemis-
try, would hold the key to unlock the secret of biological phenomena. He also expected it 
to throw light on the mysterious action of drugs and to open the possibility of a deliberate 
search for new medicines. 
During Ehrlich's student years in Strasbourg and other cities (1872-1878), the German 
synthetic dyestuffs industry was well on the way to its eventual domination of world markets; 
in due course, it would become also, in the words of Samuel Lilley, the "synthetic every-
thing-else industry". 2 5 Following the example of his cousin Carl Weigert, Ehrlich turned 
the products of this precocious science-based industry into new investigative tools for medical 
science. They proved useful as staining agents facilitating the study of various tissues. In 
other words, dyes (just like lead) are excellent instruments for visibly demonstrating selective 
affinities. In his 1878 doctoral thesis, Ehrlich used existing chemical and physical theories 
developed for explaining the attachment of dyes to textile fibres to shed light on the processes 
involved in tissue and cell slaining. 2 6 Clearly, he borrowed not only material but also con-
ceptual tools from the emerging dye industry. Michaelis has identified Ehrlich's "preference 
B. Latour, Les Microbes: Guerre et Paix suivi de Irreductions, Paris, 1984 (Editions A.M. Metail-
li6). English translation: The Pasteurization of France, Cambridge, Ma. and London, 1988 (Har-
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A.S. Travis, 'Science as a Receptor of Technology: Paul Ehrlich and the Synthetic Dyestuffs Indus-
try', Science in Context 3 (1989): 383-408. 
203 
for colours" (Vorliebe zur Farbe) as the driving factor of his career. 2 7 He would never 
become unfaitMul to his 'first love', as Wassermann expressed i t . 2 8 At this early stage, 
Ehrlich did not yet establish direct contacts with the dye industry; he procured his samples 
of dyes through the intermediary of an obliging Freiburg dealer in dyes and drugs . 2 9 
After his university training, Ehrlich extended his staining techniques to the field of 
haematology. His findings acquired diagnostic relevance for the detection and differentiation 
of leukaemias and anaemias. Ehrlich himself, however, became dissatisfied with staining 
dead preparations and entered upon the study of "real biology" (Wassermann) by developing 
the technique of vital staining. Dyestuffs would be injected into the living animal "to shift 
the dyeing operation to the organism itself". By using dyes which would lose their colour 
during reduction and which would regain it during oxidation, Ehrlich was able to obtain clues 
concerning the 'oxygen avidity' of various tissue and organ systems of living organisms. For 
this purpose he employed two vital-staining dyes (alizarin blue and indophenol blue), each 
with a different propensity to turn to its colourless form. The results of his investigations 
were reported in his Habilitation thesis on Das Sauerstoff-Bedurfniss des Organismus (1885). 
In it Ehrlich presented a theoretical model of the supposed chemical composition of cellular 
'protoplasm', which would be elaborated further in his later side-chain or receptor theo-
r y . 3 0 Ehrlich also established the selective staining effect of the dye methylene blue on 
nerve endings and tried its use for relieving pain in neuralgias. When later on the same dye 
was found to have a selective affinity for (human) malaria parasites, Ehrlich did not hesitate 
to give it a clinical trial by administering the dye to two malaria patients in 1891. Although 
the results looked promising, this particular line of research could not be pursued further 
because a suitable experimental animal on which to transmit the (human) malaria parasites 
was not available. 3 1 
It should come as no surprise that a man like Ehrlich with a basic natural science ap-
proach toward medical problems would become attracted to the aetiological tendency in 
medicine represented by Robert Koch's bacteriology. Ehrlich's first contribution to this new 
school was to devise a new staining method (1883) for Koch's recently discovered tubercle 
bacillus, thus rendering this discovery even more practically useful. Yet Ehrlich's finest 
period arrived around 1890 when bacteriological research turned its attention to the rather 
L. Michaelis, 'Die Bedeutung der Farbstoffe für Ehrlichs biologische Forschungen', Die Naturwis-
senschaften 2 (1914): 250-51, on p. 250. 
Wassermann, op. cit. (note 17), p. 247. 
Travis, op. cit. (note 26), p. 392 (footnote 6). 
A detailed analysis of Ehrlich's Habilitation thesis is given in A.S. Travis, op. cit. (note 26). 
This is still a major problem in present-day attempts to develop antimalarial vaccines. See R.S. 
Desowitz, The Malaria Capers: Tales of Parasites and People, New York and London (W.W. 
Norton & Co.), 1991, p. 226. 
204 
mysterious phenomena of (humoral) immunity. It was Ehrlich's investigations into the quanti-
tative relationships between toxins and antitoxins which enabled a precise determination of 
the effective dosage of antitoxins and thus made Emil Behring's 'serum therapy' (passive 
immunization) against diphteria into a brilliant practical success, though it was the latter who 
would reap the pecuniary benefit from this venture through his commercial deals with the 
Hoechst Dyeworks Company. 3 2 
Although Ehrlich did not fare well in the financial arrangements between Behring and 
the Hoechst company (he had been given laboratory space, without salary, in Koch's Institute 
of Infectious Diseases in Berlin), his vital contributions to the realization of diphteria anti-
toxin production were duly recognized by Friedrich Althoff, a top-level civil servant (Minis-
terialdirektor) of the Prussian Ministry of Educational and Medical Affairs, and he was made 
director of the newly created Institut für Serumforschung und Serumprüfung in Berlin-Steglitz 
in 1896. In this capacity he developed complex quantitative techniques for standardizing and 
assaying the potency of antisera. He also devised, in 1897, his ingenious side-chain theory 
to account for the formation of antibodies and the specificity of their relationship with homo-
logous antigens. Here I will briefly sketch the main outlines of this theory. In Ehrlich's 
theory, the cellular 'protoplasm' is depicted as a giant 'living' molecule possessing on its 
surface many different side-chains or receptors, each of them having specific chemical 
affinities to particular nutritive substances. Antigens, e.g. toxins or other foreign substances, 
may induce antibody formation when they happen to combine with particular side-chains of 
the protoplasm through particular chemical groups, the so-called 'haptophore' groups. Those 
side-chains are thus blocked in their normal functioning for the cellular metabolism, to which 
the protoplasm will react with replication of similar side-chains. Because this regenerative 
response is excessive ("Nature is prodigal"), there will now be a surplus of side-chains of 
this particular type. Some of these excessive receptors will be shed to the blood and hence-
forth circulate as antibodies with a specific affinity to the antigens which initially triggered 
the whole process. The characteristic feature of the side-chain theory is that it dispenses with 
the need to introduce special teleological mechanisms for explaining the apparently purposive 
character of the immune response. As Ehrlich emphasizes, according to his theory immunity 
is considered merely "a chapter of the general physiology of nutrition". 3 3 In subsequent 
years the theory became however rather complicated because of the need to postulate diffe-
rent types of receptors to account for the existence of different types of antibodies. 
Ehrlich's side-chain theory drew its inspiration from ideas that were current in organic 
and dye chemistry. The very conception of protoplasm as a 'nucleus' with many 'side-chains' 
was constructed, as the terminology bears witness, in analogy with Kekule's theory of the 
H.A. Lechevalier and M. Solotorovsky, Three Centuries of Microbiology, New York (Dover), 
1974, p. 223. 
P. Ehrlich, 'Die Schutzstoffe des Blutes', in Gesammelte Arbeiten zur Immunitätsforschung, Berlin 
(Hirschwald), 1904, 515-54, p. 546. 
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benzene ring ('nucleus') allowing for different substituents ('side-chains'). Moreover, Ehrlich 
used the lock-and-key simile first introduced by the organic chemist Emil Fischer to elucidate 
the specificity of the antigen-antibody relationship. Finally, Ehrlich distinguished between 
different chemical groups within toxin and antibody molecules, each responsible for different 
functions, which was in agreement with ways of thinking prevalent in dye chemistry. Just 
as the dye chemist Otto Witt distinguished 'haptophore' and 'chromophore' groups within the 
dye molecule to account for its attachment to textile fibres and its colouring power respecti-
vely, Ehrlich distinguished 'haptophore' and 'toxophore' groups within the toxin molecule 
to account for its combining power with protoplasm receptors and its toxicity. On the basis 
of such borrowings, Travis has metaphorically characterized Ehrlich's theory as being itself 
a 'receptor' of the German synthetic dyestuffs industry. 3 4 
In the years after 1900 Ehrlich's side-chain theory gained much popularity in medical 
circles in German-speaking countries, although it was strongly opposed by the bacteriologists 
Max Gruber and Jules Bordet and by the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius. In Germany, 
the exposition and defence of his theory became, as Lewis Rubin notes, "something of a 
cottage industry". 3 5 August Wassermann and Carl Bruck were among those who took part 
in this enterprise, each writing a brochure on the side-chain theory. After the First World 
War, the theory largely fell into disrepute. When the so-called clonal selection theories of 
antibody formation emerged after 1955, however, Ehrlich's theory was recognized in retro-
spect as a respectable precursor. 3 6 More recently, Ehrlich has even been credited with 
anticipating the latest ideas on anti-antibodies and anti-idiotype immunoregulation. 3 7 
Around the turn of the century, Ehrlich was not only interested in unravelling the 
phenomena of immunity. He also tried to understand the pharmacological action of medi-
cines. His ambition was to deliberately design drugs which would act effectively, and not just 
symptomatically, on the causes of diseases. The side-chain or receptor theory would ultima-
tely help to fulfil this ambition. In 1899, through the efforts of Friedrich Althoff and the lord 
mayor of Frankfurt am Main, Franz Adickes, Ehrlich was given the directorship of the newly 
created Institutfur Experimentelle Therapie in that city, which enabled him to pursue his new 
aims in addition to continuing the old function of state control of commercial antisera. The 
geographical proximity of two dyestuffs firms, Cassella and Hoechst, constituted an impor-
Travis, op. cit. (note 26). 
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tant asset to Ehrlich. He was offered even more favourable opportunities to investigate the 
'chemotherapy' of infectious diseases in 1906, when Franziska Speyer erected and endowed 
the Georg-Speyer Haus, adjacent to Ehrlich's Institute, in memory of her late husband (Georg 
Speyer had been a leading Jewish financier and philanthropist in the city of Frankfurt). Now 
everything was in place for a full-scale implementation of Ehrlich's chemotherapeutic re-
search programme. 
Pasteur's and Ehrlich's careers compared 
As I remarked above, Ehrlich's scientific career has been likened to that of Louis Pasteur. 
Here I will try to bring into focus those features that were common to the careers of both. 
Just like Ehrlich, Pasteur moved freely from one area of investigation to the next, although 
his biographers have also noted Pasteur's obstinate tenacity to stick to his chosen course. 
(This trait corresponds to Ehrlich's self-confessed 'monomania', despite his astonishing 
versatility. 3 8) What was in fact characteristic of Pasteur throughout his career, according 
to Bruno Latour, was his strategy of displacement (déplacement) and translation. Every time 
that one would have expected Pasteur to continue his investigations in the area of science in 
which he had just met with some success, he would take a sidestep and turn to a novel, more 
'applied' problem area that would capture the interest(s) of a larger number of people. All 
the same, he would transform the (more) 'applied' problem into a 'basic' problem to be 
solved by means that had been acquired in the area which he had just left. Starting out his 
career with some esoteric problems in crystallography which were of interest only to a 
handful of chemical colleagues, Pasteur moved on to the heated controversy on the nature 
of ferments, then to the study of the economically important 'diseases' of beer, wine, and 
silk-worms, then to the problem of spontaneous generation, then to problems of veterinary 
medicine (anthrax, chicken cholera), and, finally, to human medicine. With each newly 
chosen subject, the circle of interested people would become wider. After Pasteur success-
fully vaccinated, in 1885, two boys who had been bitten by rabid dogs, an unending stream 
of thousands of people seeking similar treatment flocked to Paris. To help them and to 
support further research, a staggering amount of 2,586,000 gold francs were collected from 
the general public, enabling the founding of the Institut Pasteur (1888). "Has credibility ever 
been converted into capital so quickly in the history of the sciences?", Latour asks rhetori-
cal ly . 3 9 Pasteur ended up as the deified 'Pasteur', the man of the century, who would give 
his name to streets in all the cities of France. 
M. Marquardt, Paul Ehrlich als Mensch und Arbeiter, Stuttgart, Berlin and Leipzig (Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt), 1924, pp. 55-56. 
Latour, op. cit. (note 23), p. 113; Pasteurization, p. 101. 
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Bruno Latour offers a simple formula to explain the 'secret' of Pasteur's career: "he inno-
vates by forming associations" (c'est en associant qu'il innove).40 For the hagiographer 
thirsting after 'genius', this formula would not do; but it is sufficient to the historian or 
sociologist, Latour maintains. As a matter of fact, Latour nowhere hides his admiration for 
Pasteur's strategy which he calls really geniale.41 Apparently, for Latour, the touch of 
genius is not in the scientific insights but in the progressive movement of displacement and 
translation. 
Ehrlich's career exhibits a similar 'logic' to that of Pasteur's. As Travis writes: "He 
[Ehrlich] moved from one area of investigation to the next as soon as he had gone as far as 
he could go - given the materials, theories, and investigative instruments and methods of the 
day. At each move he was better armed with experience to tackle new problems". 4 2 As 
Ehrlich moved from one area to another, Travis observes, his powers of persuasion increased 
accordingly. Ehrlich would become "a master at persuading [..] audiences, especially those 
who would provide financial backing". 4 3 Latour's observation made with regard to Pasteur 
- that with each newly chosen problem area the circle of those interested would become 
wider - also appears to hold for Ehrlich's career. 
Carl Browning, a former co-worker of Ehrlich's, draws attention to another salient 
aspect of Ehrlich's progressive movement through the 'credibility cycle ' 4 4 : with each new 
area of inquiry, his investigations not just captured the interest of more people but also 
became more expensive. Shortly after the turn of the century, Browning observes, Ehrlich 
had accumulated enough 'credibility capital' to embark upon the final stage of his career: 
"Ehrlich's reputation had now gained the standing which made it possible to undertake his cherished plans 
for chemotherapy. This was the most expensive of his researches in the demands on materials and skilled 
assistance in chemistry and various departments of pure and applied biology".45 
In the following sections I will examine these expensive researches more closely. 
4 0 Latour, op. cit. (note 23), p. 77; Pasteurization, p. 69. 
4 1 Ibid., p. 79; Pasteurization, p. 71. 
4 2 A.S. Travis, 'Paul Ehrlich: A Hundred Years of Chemotherapy 1891-1991', The Biochemist 13 
(1990): 9-12, p. 9. 
4 3 Ibid. 
4 4 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life, Beverly Hills and London (Sage), 1979, Chapter 5. 
4 5 CH. Browning, 'Emil Behring and Paul Ehrlich: Their Contributions to Science', Nature 175 
(1955): 570-71, p. 571. 
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3 . The practice of experimental therapeutics: intellectual, material and social conditions 
Nothing succeeds like success, as the American saying has it. In a prosperous career, new 
and larger successes are achieved by building on the smaller successes of the past. This was 
valid both for Pasteur's and for Ehrlich's career. Beyond this truism, we did not offer much 
of an explanation in the preceding section. Latour's formula of 'innovation by association' 
is not really explanatory either. It is vulnerable to the same objection as was raised by Knorr-
Cetina against the metaphor-and-analogy theory of innovation, to wit, that it is a 'theory of 
failure and mistake' as well as a 'success formula' . 4 6 As such, Latour's 'theory' does not 
discriniinate between the conditions of success and of failure, between the 'good' and the 
'bad' associations. 
An example from Ehrlich's career will illustrate the point. In 1901, at the prodding of 
Ministerialdirektor Althoff and the lord mayor Adickes, the Theodor Stern Foundation was 
persuaded to finance a cancer research station at Ehrlich's Institute in FranWurt. With the 
money went the obligation to thoroughly investigate the phenomena of cancer. Although 
some scientific results were achieved (e.g. the finding that mouse mammary tumours could 
be transplanted), in the end, after years of work on this subject, Ehrlich and his collaborators 
were unable to deliver the hoped-for medical goods. Probably for this reason Claude Dolman 
concluded: "This cancer work represented an unsought digression from his [Ehrlich's] main 
course ( . . ) " . 4 7 Undoubtedly, this judgement is retrospectively coloured by the known rela-
tive lack of success of Ehrlich's cancer work. But what if this research had led to a cure for 
cancer? Then perhaps Ehrlich's chemotherapeutic programme might have led nowhere, and 
would have been judged retrospectively as 'an unsought digression from his main course' ... 
At any rate, Ehrlich's 'association' with the Theodor Stern Foundation was no guarantee for 
a successful innovation in the area of cancer. 
It has even been suggested that Ehrlich's involvement with immunology (which brought 
him the Nobel Prize in 1908!) also constituted a deviation from the main course of his 
career, or at least an interruption between his early work on the constitution, distribution and 
action of drugs and his later chemotherapeutic work properly so called. 4 8 It would be equal-
ly plausible, however, to consider Ehrlich's long immunological intermezzo as a kind of 
incubation period in which his side-chain theory took final shape and in which the precondi-
tions for embarking on the next venture were created. Moreover, as long as expectations 
about the possibilities of 'serum therapy', nurtured by Behring's successes with diphteria and 
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tetanus, soared high, the need for a 'chemotherapeutic' approach to infectious diseases would 
appear less urgent. (In Chapter IV we have seen that the Breslau dermatologist Albert Neis-
ser was prompted by Behring's serum therapy to search for an immunization method against 
syphilis. Only in November 1907, after two expeditions to the Dutch East Indies, did he 
recognize the definite failure of his project.) 
For Ehrlich, the miraculously selective work of antibodies in natural immune responses 
also provided a challenge to the ingenuity and powers of the synthetic chemist, a kind of 
ideal model which a chemotherapeutic approach could only hope to emulate. "If one would 
charge", he wrote in 1897, "a chemist with the task of finding an antidote against an alkaloid 
or other poison, which would constitute a chemically and physiologically indifferent substan-
ce, which would neither destroy the poison nor precipitate it to an insoluble state, yet which 
would nevertheless be able to neutralize any quantity whatsoever of this poison, he would 
surely dismiss such an assignment as a chimaera. All the same, the living organism is able 
to make light work of this task, frequently within the span of a few days and for a large 
number of poisons". 4 9 In contrast to many influenced by vitalistic doctrines, Ehrlich did 
not recognize an inseparable gulf between the "biotherapeutic" and the "chemotherapeutic" 
approach; his side-chain theory had offered a chemical conception of the action of toxins and 
antitoxins. 5 0 Finding some kind of artificial substitute for naturally occurring antibodies 
was thus in principle within the realm of the feasible, however exacting the realization of this 
goal might otherwise be. In this connection I have to remind the reader of the fact that the 
expression 'magic bullets' (Zauberkugeln), which for us has become almost synonymous with 
Ehrlich's salvarsan and its modern successors and symbolic for the reductionistic strivings 
of present-day biomedical research 5 1 , was originally coined by Ehrlich to refer to anti-
bodies . 5 2 These magic bullets, "which seek their target of their own accord", provided an 
exemplar for the synthetic drugs yet to be constructed. 
At first Ehrlich did not believe that his side-chain theory, or more particularly his 
receptor concept, would also be applicable to the pharmacological activity of drugs. As 
Parascandola and Jasensky point out, "(..) it took him about ten years to apply his side chain 
Cited in E. Heymann, 'Zur Geschichte der Seitenkettentheorie Paul Ehrlichs', Klinische Wochen-
schrift 7 (1928): 1257-60, p. 1258. 
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(Hirschwald), 1904, pp. 572-628, p. 574. 
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theory to the problem of drug action". 5 3 Only by 1907 was Ehrlich willing to accept the 
idea that synthetic drugs become attached to the protoplasm of the cell by special atom 
groupings ('receptors' or 'chemoreceptors') in the same way as toxin molecules did. One 
reason for his hesitation was that many drugs could be easily extracted from tissues by 
solvents, thus exhibiting a lack of firm bonding. 5 4 Another reason was that chemically 
defined drugs did not induce antibody production. 5 5 These doubts about the applicability 
of his receptor theory to the action of drugs did not prevent Ehrlich from launching his 
chemotherapeutic programme. Although he initially thought it unlikely that drugs entered into 
a 'chemical union' with the 'living protoplasm', he was nevertheless convinced that chemical 
affinities ('in the widest meaning of the term') were involved in the interaction between drugs 
and cel ls . 5 6 That was sufficient to embark on his programme. The results to be obtained 
would subsequently lead him to revise his view on the inapplicability of the receptor theory. 
Synthetic chemistry and experimental biology 
The strategy of experimental therapeutics to find out specific curative drugs for particular 
diseases required that a large number of different chemical compounds be tested on a large 
number of experimental animals in which the diseases in question had been articially produ-
ced. To us this might appear only too obvious, but in Ehrlich's time it wasn't. Ehrlich 
criticized current pharmacology (and toxicology) precisely for its almost exclusive use of 
experiments on normal (non-diseased) animals. Existing types of research, he held, could 
lead only to the discovery of symptomatically acting drugs like analgesics, antipyretics, 
anaesthetics, sedatives etcetera, but not to truly curative drags acting on the causes of disea-
ses. Ehrlich also noted that achievements in the pharmalogical area had been largely due to 
the initiatives of chemists. Already in 1898, in a lecture before the Association for Internal 
Medicine, he indicated a different approach: 
"A change for the better will occur only when purely biological views are adopted, that is, when the 
initiative is transferred from the chemist's workshop to biological laboratories. As physicians we should 
cease to content ourselves in such important questions with auxiliary roles like adviser or even assistant 
and demand that we be given pride of place in the domain that is most properly ours".5 7 
5 3 J. Parascandola and R. Jasensky, 'Origins of the Receptor Theory of Drug Action', Bulletin of the 
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5 6 Ehrlich's suppositions on the precise nature of these chemical affinities are discussed in Parascando-
la and Jasensky, op. cit. (note 53), pp. 206-209. 
5 7 Ehrlich, op. cit. (note 50), p. 581. 
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These words have been interpreted to mean that Ehrlich's goal was "to free physicians from 
the threatened grip of the chemists". 5 8 To offer such an interpretation is to fall victim to 
the rhetoric employed by Ehrlich to impress a medical audience (when addressing an audien-
ce of chemists, as in his lecture before the German Chemical Society of 31 October 1908, 
his rhetoric was significantly different! 5 9). If anything, Ehrlich's experimental therapeutics 
had to rely even more on the support of the "chemist's workshop" for the production of large 
numbers of compounds and the systematic variation of their composition. The characteristic 
feature of his approach was the combination of synthetic chemistry with 'experimental 
biology' on a large scale, enabling extensive tests of many chemical compounds on many 
artificially infected animals. This cooperation between 'chemistry' and 'biology', it was 
hoped, would lead to the discovery of theoretical guidelines which could direct the search for 
therapeutic compounds. Only in that sense was the initiative to be taken away from the 
"chemist's workshop". 
Work on experimental therapeutics 6 0 started in earnest in 1903. Because the Franldurt 
Institute did not dispose of a chemical laboratory (as the later Georg Speyer Haus did), 
Ehrlich secured the cooperation of Arthur Weinberg, director of the nearby Cassella dyestoffs 
company, to supply him with the needed chemical compounds. The other required component 
of experimental therapeutics was an 'animal model system'. Suitable experimental animals 
are often not easy to come by. Remember that Ehrlich's early experiments with methylene 
blue on (human) malaria could not be followed up because this disease cannot be reproduced 
in animals! Ehrlich eventually settled on investigating various trypanosome infections in mice 
and rats. Trypanosomes are the protozoal agents of a number of tropical and subtropical 
diseases such as sleeping sickness (caused by Trypanosoma gambiense), the tsetse-fly cattle-
disease nagana (caused by T. brucei) and the South American horse disease Mai de Caderas 
(caused by T. equinum). The causative role of these protozoal organisms, together with that 
of their respective insect vectors, had been established only recently. During the heyday of 
J. Liebenau, 'Paul Ehrlich as a commercial scientist and research administrator', Medical History 
34 (1990): 66-78, p. 78. Liebenau wrongly ascribes Ehrlich's pronouncements to the year 1904 (in-
stead of 1898) and considers them as reflecting a sudden dissatisfaction on Ehrlich's part with the 
work going on in his Frankfurt Institute. This interpretation is wide of the mark. 
Cf.: "(..) throughout my scientific work I have exerted myself to make the insights and teachings of 
chemistry useful to medicine", P. Ehrlich, op. cit. (note 52), p. 17. 
The expression 'experimental therapeutics' was sufficiently ambiguous to include coverage of can-
cer research, bacteriological and hygienic research and the statutory control testing of commercial 
antisera for serum therapy, which were also conducted within Ehrlich's Institutflir Experimentelle 
Therapie in Frankfurt. The term 'chemotherapy', though sporadically used before, was adopted in 
September 1906 as the official designation for the research to be implemented in the Georg Speyer 
Haus. Despite the different label, there is no essential difference with the 'experimental therapeu-
tics' in the more narrow sense already conducted before that date in the Institute. 
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colonialism they enjoyed considerable medical interest. 6 1 An additional reason for Ehrlich 
to concentrate on trypanosome diseases was that they appeared beyond the reach of serum 
therapy. But the most important consideration was the availability of a suitable experimental 
animal. 6 2 
Certain species of trypanosom.es (like T. brucei and T. equinum) can be easily transmit-
ted to white mice. The parasites develop and multiply in the blood of the rodents until the 
latter, after 3 or 4 days, decease. The course of the infection can be exactly monitored by 
microscopic inspection of the blood. A drop of blood from an infected mouse can be used 
to reinfect another mouse. In this way trypanosome strains can be propagated and maintained 
in laboratories for many years. In short, mice infected with trypanosomes constitute an 
almost ideal 'experimental system' (Rouse). 
It was not to Ehrlich's credit, but to that of Alphonse Laveran and Felix Mesnil of the 
Institut Pasteur, that trypanosome-infected mice were introduced as an experimental system. 
A former co-worker of Ehrlich's, Julius Morgenroth, was not chary in his praise of the 
French contribution: 
"This excellent experimental object (Versuchsobjekt), as is constituted by the trypanosome-infected mouse, 
was first employed for chemotherapeutic trials by Laveran and Mesnil; one may view this advance in 
experimental technique as a decisive turn in the development of experimental chemotherapy".63 
Ehrlich received his first two rodents (actually they were rats, but the disease was soon 
transmitted to white mice) infected with the agent of Mal de Caderas (T. equinum) from the 
French researcher Professor Nocard in December 1902. 6 4 He immediately wrote down 
instructions to his collaborators for trying various chemical compounds on these experimental 
animals. 
The management of scientific manpower 
Besides chemical compounds and experimental animals a third type of resource was needed 
to realize Ehrlich's programme of experimental therapeutics: skilled manpower. A limited 
number of chemically and medically (or biologically) trained staff members of the Institute, 
and of the Georg Speyer Haus after 1906, could be set free to devote themselves exclusively 
M. Worboys, "The Emergence of Tropical Medicine: A Study in the Establishment of a Scientific 
Specialty', in G. Lemaine et al. (eds.), Perspectives on the Eemergence of Scientific Disciplines, 
The Hague/Paris (Mouton), 1976, pp. 75-98. 
P. Ehrlich, 'Chemotherapeutische Trypanosomen-Studien', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 
(1907): 233-36, 280-83, 310-14, 341-44, p. 234. 
J. Morgenroth, 'Die experimentelle Chemotherapie und das Problem der inneren Desinfektion bei 
bakteriellen Infektionen', Die Naturwissenschaften 1 (1913): 609-15, p. 611. 
M. Marquardt, op. cit. (note 38), pp. 71-72; Ehrlich, op. cit. (note 62), pp. 234-35. 
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to this task. Their number was supplemented by visitors from abroad who, attracted by 
Ehrlich's international reputation, volunteered to work in his laboratories: Reid Hunt, Chris-
tian Herter, and Preston Kyes from the United States, Carl Browning and Henry Dale from 
Great Britain, and Kyoshi Shiga and Sahachiro Hata from Japan, among others. 6 5 
Ehrlich kept himself in strict control of the activities of his personnel. Every morning, 
or even the night before, he wrote down detailed instructions to his several co-workers for 
their day's work on so-called "blocks" (which were copied in the copybook). 6 6 The pro-
gress of their work was also closely monitored. Ehrlich's motto was "uniform direction of 
research combined with as much independence as possible for individual researchers" (Ein-
heitliche Richtung der Forschung bei möglichst selbständigen Leistungen der Einzelnen)61, 
but in practice the emphasis was much more on the uniformity of direction than on the 
independence, or as Parascandola dryly remarks: "(..) Ehrlich did not want his coworkers 
to become too independent". 6 8 Dolman has characterized him as a "benign dictator". 6 9 
Although Martha Marquardt, Ehrlich's secretary from 1902, described his relationship to his 
assistants as "jovial and friendly", she too had to admit that "he could act very energetically 
when his instructions were not obeyed exactly" . 7 0 It is no wonder that the routine character 
of the prescribed chemical and biological investigations, combined with Ehrlich's close 
supervision, sometimes led to resentment among his staff. 7 1 However, his collaborators 
were not only supposed to reliably carry out his instructions but also to discuss the results 
with him. Ehrlich's formulations of theory, as his former coworker Carl Browning notes, 
were "often hammered on the anvil of his assistants' brains". 7 2 So the 'exchange of ideas' 
between Ehrlich and his staff, though rather asymmetrical and onesided, was not completely 
absent. Ehrlich also awarded his coworkers some credit for their work by granting them 
authorship or coauthorship of scientific publications. 
Ehrlich's style of research management and his organization of scientifically trained 
labour were not entirely his own invention. This pattern of research organization had already 
been pioneered by the German synthetic dye industry after the founding of research laborato-
6 5 Dolman, op. cit. (note 47), p. 298. 
6 6 Marquardt, op. cit. (note 38), p. 39. 
6 7 Marquardt, op. cit. (note 38), p. 44. 
J. Parascandola, "The Theoretical Basis of Paul Ehrlich's Chemotherapy', Journal of the History of 
Medicine and Allied Sciences 36 (1981): 19-43, p. 32, footnote 44. 
6 9 Dolman, op. cit. (note 21), p. 224. 
7 0 Marquardt, op. cit. (note 38), p. 42 and p. 45. 
7 1 Ibid., p. 43 and p. 45. 
7 2 Browning, op. cit. (note 45), p. 571. 
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lies. The first research director of BASF, Hehirich Caro, had characterized the "endless 
combination game" in these laboratories of coupling numerous compounds as "scientific 
mass-labour" (wissenschaftliche Massenarbeif).74 In 1909 Carl Duisberg, a director of the 
Bayer company and a future architect of the IG Farben, summed up the routinized and 
uncreative character of research work in the chemical laboratories in one blunt statement: 
"Von Gedankenblitz keine Spur!" (No trace of a flash of genius!). 7 5 The leading represen-
tatives of the industry held that new chemical products and processes were "corporate inven-
tions" (Etablissementserfindungeri), that is, they were the result of the entire research organi-
zation and could not be attributed to individual researchers. (Thus the latter's claims for 
higher royalties on patented inventions could be subverted.) The organization of research in 
Ehrlich's Frankfurt Institute and in the Georg Speyer Haus was modelled on the existing 
pattern of research management in the synthetic dye industry. Thus this industry provided 
Ehrlich not only with the material and conceptual tools he needed, but also with an organiza-
tional ' t oo l ' . 7 6 Of course, the latter had to be adapted to the practice of experimental the-
rapeutics. Ehrlich's specific contribution was that he extended and combined the 'chemical 
mass-labour' of the synthetic dye industry with 'biological mass-labour' in animal experimen-
tation. In due course, the German chemical and pharmaceutical industry was to 're-borrow' 
in its turn Ehrlich's model for conducting experimental therapeutics when several dyestuffs 
firms introduced their own departments for chemotherapy. In 1913, Carl Duisberg summed 
up the requirements for chemotherapeutic research: 
"First, we need a fully equipped chemical laboratory, then a pharmacological institute with a staff of men 
trained in medicine and chemistry, an abundance of animals to experiment upon, and finally - the latest 
E. Homburg, "The emergence of research laboratories in the dye-stuffs industry, 1870-1900', 
British Journal for the History of Science 25 (1992): 91-111. 
H. Caro, 'Ueber die Entwicklung der Theerfarben-industrie', Berichte der Deutschen Chemischen 
Gesellschaft 25 (1892): 955-1105, p. 1095. 
H. van den Belt and A. Rip, 'The Nelson-Winter-Dosi Model and Synthetic Dye Chemistry', in 
W.E. Bijker, T.P. Hughes and T. Pinch (eds.), The Social Construction of Technological Systems, 
Cambridge, MA (MIT Press), 1987, pp. 135-58. See also T.P. Hughes, American Genesis, Har-
mondsworth (Penguin Books), 1989, p. 183. 
As John Pickstone notes, the 'scientization of industry' and the 'industrialization of academic scien-
ce' are only two sides of the same coin. In terms of his typology of 'socio-cognitive types' of scie-
nce, technology and medicine (savant STM, analytical STM, experimental STM and techno-scien-
ce), Ehrlich's work clearly represents the type of techno-science. See J.V. Pickstone, 'Ways of 
knowing: towards a historical sociology of science, technology and medicine', British Journal for 
the History of Science 26 (1993): 433-58, p. 453. 
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development in the field - a chemotherapeutic and bacteriological department, equipped according to the 
ideas of Paul Ehrlich; all these must be in close connection with one another."77 
The first director of chemotherapeutic research at the Bayer factories of Wuppertal-Elberfeld 
was Heir-rich Horlein. It was under his direction that important medicines like germanine, 
atebrine, and, in the 1930s, the sulfonamides (Prontosil) would be found. In an IG Farben 
publication of 1933 Horlein noted that in Anglo-Saxon countries the word teamwork, origi-
nally at home in the world of sports, had entered into use to refer to the kind of scientific 
cooperation among researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds, as exemplified by 
Ehrlich's team. This teamwork was supposed to be directed by the leader of the team, "in 
whose hands all the different strands come together". 7 8 In this sense, Ehrlich had indeed 
been a team leader. No doubt, Horlein tried to follow in his footsteps. 
The symbiosis with the chemical industry 
Without close relationships with the German chemical industry, Ehrlich's programme could 
hardly have been implemented. We have already seen that the dyestuffs firm of Cassella near 
Frankfurt provided Ehrlich with the chemical compounds for his initial investigations on 
trypanosome infections. For this purpose alone, much more than a hundred different substan-
ces were tried, many of them (e.g. the almost 50 substituted products of trypan red) prepared 
and tailor-made on Ehrlich's special instructions. 7 9 In October 1904, Cassella entered into 
a 'community of interests' (Interessengemeinschaft) with the larger firm of Hoechst, which 
was a first step in the concentration of economic power eventually leading to the formation 
of IG Farben in 1925 . 8 0 Now Ehrlich had to deal directly with the Hoechst company, al-
ready known from his previous experience, for making arrangements over material and 
financial support in return for the company's right to take out patents on prospective new 
drugs. From the point of view of a neat separation of interests, this symbiotic relationship 
with Hoechst might appear rather dubious. As an official institution the Institut fur Experi-
mentelle Therapie was charged with the statutory control of antisera, of which Hoechst was 
the most important producer; on the other hand, this institute (and the Georg Speyer Haus 
C. Dulsberg, Chemical News 23 (1913), pp. 246-47 (emphasis added). Cited in Liebenau, op. cit. 
(note 58), pp. 77-78. 
H. Hörlein, 'Medizin und Chemie', in IG Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Medizin und Chemie, 
Leverkusen, 1933, pp. 7-25, p. 10. 
P. Ehrlich, op. cit. (note 62), p. 235. 
Beer, op. cit. (note 25), 130 and p. 145. 
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later) was to be subsidized by this same firm for conducting research on experimental thera-
peutics. 8 1 
Ehrlich defended the close cooperation with the chemical and pharmaceutical industry. 
He expounded his view in 1908, in a response to a survey by the Freie Vereinigung der 
medizinischen Fachpresse (Free Association for the Medical Press) on the question of whe-
ther physicians were allowed to accept fees from the commissioning chemical factories for 
their clinical and experimental investigation of pharmaceutical preparations. 8 2 In Ehrlich's 
view, a sharp distinction had to be made between experimental and clinical investigation. 
Experimental research on new medicines was a very costly affair, and only feasible if the 
chemical factories were willing to shoulder a large part of the expenses on materials, test 
animals and personnel: 
"The material and mental support of our chemical factories is largely indispensable for modern therapeu-
tics, and it would therefore not be advisable to loosen this natural union".83 
According to Ehrlich, the further development of experimental therapeutics held out the only 
hope of abolishing the abusive practice of introducing new medicines by experimenting on 
human patients. Restrictions on the acceptance of fees, Ehrlich declared, should not prevent 
the realization of this prospect. 
4. The contingencies of a rational approach 
It is a common view that Ehrlich's chemotherapeutic programme, guided by his sidechain 
or receptor theory, initiated a new era in pharmacological research, replacing the 'trial and 
error' and 'blind empiricism' of the old days with a 'rational' and 'purposive' search for 
causally effective drugs. Modern pharmacologists consider their attempts to deliberately 
design medicines with desirable properties on the basis of a knowledge of structure-activity 
relationships as a direct continuation of Ehrlich's work . 8 4 Ehrlich himself had proclaimed 
Liebenau, op. cit. (note 58), p. 73, suggests that "the government laboratory" was "unoffically 
endorsing Hoechst biologicals". He also states that "the Hoechst Company saw the Georg Speyer 
Haus as an extension of their own laboratory" (p. 77). Among the evidence adduced to support this 
statement is a file in the Hoechst Archive on (Albert) Neisser's expedition to the Dutch East Indies. 
It appears, however, that Liebenau has mistaken Albert Neisser, the Breslau dermatologist and a 
friend of Ehrlich's, for Max Neisser, a member of Ehrlich's staff at the Frankfurt Institute. 
Schwalbe, op. cit. (note 20). 
Ibid., p. 1732. 
H.AJ. Struijker Boudier, 'De wortels van het geneesmiddel', Wijsgerig Perspectiv 33 (1992/93): 
171-75. This author considers the 'receptor concept' (a modern refinement of Ehrlich's notion) as 
paradigmatic for modern pharmacology. 
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that "the times of purely empirical therapies have passed" and that we should aim at "a truly 
rational application of medicinal remedies" 8 5 (emphasis added). Or to use his vivid simile: 
one should not grab blindly like a bear in the soup bowl if one wanted a good piece. 8 6 
Ehrlich's advocacy of a rational and purposive approach to pharmacology may have been 
inspired by the ideal of 'zielbewusste Synthese' or 'purposive synthesis' (Caro) in dyestuffs 
chemistry. By using knowledge on the relations between chemical structure and colour or 
other properties (e.g. Otto Witt's colour theory), dye chemists thought it possible in principle 
to deliberately design and construct new dye molecules with desired qualities in the chemical 
"drawing room" (with structural formulae representing "construction drawings"). 8 7 
Many of his followers and admirers hold that Ehrlich indeed succeeded in adopting a 
rational and purposive approach to the development of drugs. Thus in 1914 Carl Bruck, who 
had been intimately involved in the development of the Wassermann reaction, emphasized 
the methodical and goal-directed character of Ehrlich's chemotherapeutic work by drawing 
the following comparison: 
"His actions can be compared to those of a marksman who exactly knows his weapon, the performances 
of his projectiles and the trajectories they must take and whose eye has always just one particular aim in 
view, which to reach is his final goal. At first the projectiles may err in the void, but the circle of their 
trajectories will become steadily narrower, the number of hits will increase, until finally, sent by the 
marksman's hand guided by observation and experience, a master shot in the bull's eye occurs".88 
Bruck added that Ehrlich's lifework did not consist of chance discoveries (in 1921, in his 
polemic with Wassermann, he would characterize the discovery of the Wassermann reaction 
as just that kind of discovery! 8 9). In the same vein, Alexander Berg has asserted that Ehr-
lich's discovery of salvarsan was in no way to be attributed to chance, but was "the fruit of 
indefatigable laboratory work, guided by the idea of a great natural scientist". 9 0 Assertions 
to the effect that Ehrlich has put the development of new medicines on a rational and scienti-
fic basis are indeed legion. 
8 5 Ehrlich, op. cit. (note 62), p. 233 and P. Ehrlich, 'On partial functions of the cell: Nobel lecture', 
in The Collected Papers of Paul Ehrlich, ed. F. Himmelweit et al., vol. III: 183-94, p. 183. 
86 
87 
89 
Cited in Parascandola, op. cit. (note 68), p. 40. 
Van den Belt and Rip, op. cit. (note 75). 
C. Bruck, 'Salvarsan und Syphilis', Die Naturwissenschaften 2 (1914): 258-63, p. 258. 
See chapter V. 
9 0 A. Berg, 'Paul Ehrlich, 1854-1915', in H. Freund and A. Berg (eds.), Geschichte der Mikroskopie: 
Leben und Werk grosser Forscher, Vol. II, Frankfurt am Main (Umschau Verlag), 1964, 79-89, pp. 
85-86. 
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The description that is usually given of Ehrlich's research is at odds with the general picture 
of scientific work that emerges from constructivist laboratory studies. Such studies repeatedly 
demonstrate the opportunistic, contingent, and idiosyncratic nature of research. 9 1 The ques-
tion thus arises whether an overly rationalized and idealized image of Ehrlich's chemothe-
rapeutic work has been drawn up or whether his pursuits are perhaps the exception to the 
rale. It is also possible, of course, that the vocabulary used - 'rational' versus 'empirical', 
'methodical' and 'purposive' versus 'blind' and 'chancelike' - may be too rigid and polarized 
for accurate description. Keeping the latter possibility in mind we will have a closer look at 
Ehrlich's chemotherapeutic work. 
Four critical observations 
The first thing to be noted is that at the start of his chemotherapeutic programme in 1902/-
1903, Ehrlich did not consider his receptor concept applicable at all to the pharmacological 
action of drugs. It took him some years before he changed his opinion in 1907. What even-
tually made him change his mind was the discovery of resistance of some trypanosome 
strains against particular substances. In itself, this discovery of resistance (Arzneifestigkeit) 
was the consequence of a 'resistance' in Pickering's sense. After repeated administrations of 
trypanocidal substances it sometimes turned out, rather unexpectedly, that trypanosomes 
could no longer be made to disappear from the blood of white mice by renewed administra-
tion. Ehrlich and his co-workers decided that the parasites, and not the rodents, had under-
gone an alteration and from then on used this phenomenon as a research tool for acquiring 
new insights in the action of drags. They found out that they could raise resistant strains of 
trypanosomes at will, by repeated administration of suitably selected and increasing dosages 
of compounds which in normal quantities would kill off those microorganisms. This pheno-
menon of resistance exhibited a remarkable specificity. Trypanosomes that had been made 
resistant to the arsenical substance atoxyl would also show resistance to other arsenical 
compounds (e.g. acetyl-atoxyl) but not to other classes of compounds such as azo dyes (e.g. 
trypan red) or basic triphenylmethane dyes (e.g. fuchsine). True, it would not be impossible 
to raise strains with a threefold resistance (i.e. against each of the three classes of substan-
ces), but then each type of resistance had to be developed separately. To explain these 
empirical data Ehrlich postulated that the cellular protoplasm of non-resistant trypanosomes 
possessed different 'Angriffsstellen' ('places of attack') or receptors for which specific classes 
of substances have particular affinities. 9 2 Drag resistance would ensue when particular 
receptors, which are normally in good working order, somehow develop a reduced affinity. 
So the receptor theory of drag action, which is often supposed to have guided Ehrlich's 
For an overview of the findings of lab studies, see Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. (note 5). Andrew Picke-
ring has characterized the dynamics of scientific practice as 'opportunism in context'. 
Ehrlich, op. cit (note 62), p. 342. 
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chemotherapeutic programme from the outset, was only developed during the course of this 
very programme. 9 3 It was not yet available when the Georg Speyer Haus was opened in 
September 1906. 
A second point concerns the choice of chemical compounds to be tested for pharma-
cological action. Ehrlich was always inspecting the long lists of new products published by 
the German chemical industry, ready to try in his animal experiments any new compound 
which showed some sign of promise. Yet the initial detection of a substance exhibiting some 
action, however slight, on a particular infection is, as Ehrlich himself emphasized, always 
and unavoidably "a matter of chance". 9 4 After finding such a 'lead', the pharmacological 
effect might be further enhanced by the systematic variation of its molecular structure, i.e. 
by introducing or eliminating various chemical groups. 
A third point is a complication of the last one. The chance factor may reside not only 
in the specific substance to be tried, but also in the particular quality of the test animals (both 
the rodents and the trypanosomes) on which it is to be tried. The discovery of the curative 
effect of atoxyl is a telling case in point. This arsenical organic compound, first obtained by 
the French chemist Bechamp in the early 1860s by heating arsenic acid with aniline, was 
marketed at the beginning of this century by the Vereinigte Chemische Werke Charlotten-
burg. The product was recommended as a tonic for anaemias and chloroses, and also for 
treating skin diseases. Probably because arsenic preparations had already been previously 
employed on sleeping sickness and other trypanosomal diseases (by David Livingstone and 
David Bruce), Ehrlich decided in 1903 to test atoxyl on his parasites of Mai de Caderas. He 
found no effect at all in his experiments conducted with Shiga and therefore discarded the 
substance. Luckily, the compound was not entirely lost from his chemotherapeutic research 
programme, because in 1905 Thomas and Breinl of the Liverpool School of Tropical Medi-
cine reported that atoxyl was able to eliminate trypanosomes from the blood of infected 
rodents. As a consequence, Ehrlich turned his attention again to atoxyl and those arsenical 
compounds which could be obtained by systematic modification of its molecular structure 
(after Ehrlich had first corrected the alleged structural formula of this substance). We know 
that salvarsan was actually at the end of the long road of molecular modification starting with 
atoxyl ... Ehrlich concluded afterwards that he had missed the potential of atoxyl on the first 
occasion in 1903, because the trypanosomes on which he and Shiga had tried the substance 
happened to be (naturally) resistant. He observed that the often unknown natural variation 
in virulence and resistance among different strains of parasites and the variation in sensitivity 
to the chemicals among different test animals always constituted a major liability in doing 
chemotherapeutic research. To prevent confusion arising from contradictory results in diffe-
Parascandola and Jasensky (op. cit., note 53) point out that the receptor theory of drug action was 
also indepently arrived at by the English physiologist John Newport Langley. 
Ehrlich, op. cit. (note 62), p. 235. 
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rent laboratories, Ehrlich even suggested that every strain of trypanosome employed should 
be given a kind of 'passport' - a profile of resistances against the main types of trypanocidal 
substances. 9 5 
The example of atoxyl also gives us an opportunity to raise a fourth critical point with 
regard to the standard view on Ehrlich's rational approach. Bruck compared Ehrlich to a 
marksman "whose eye has always just one particular aim in view", but the fact remains that 
the end result of his chemotherapeutic programme - an effective medicine against syphilis -, 
had not been his original aim when he started. In his address delivered at the opening of the 
Georg Speyer Haus, Ehrlich still proclaimed that "[ojur highest aim must always be the 
conquest of sleeping sickness [ . . ] " . 9 6 Somewhere along the route Ehrlich changed his aim 
from the conquest of sleeping sickness to the conquest of syphilis. Why this shift? The 
answer can be found in the general movement of the medical field. In the years after 1905 
the substance atoxyl attracted considerable interest from several investigators, not only for 
its possible curative effects on sleeping sickness and other trypanosomal diseases (it was 
tested in this respect by Robert Koch, among others, in a highly publicized African expedi-
tion), but also for its possible effects on diseases caused by spirochaetes such as syphilis. The 
link between trypanosomes and spirochaetes had been suggested by Fritz Schaudinn after the 
discovery in 1905 of Spirochaeta pallida as the probable causative agent of syphilis. 9 7 
Never mind that Schaudinn's speculations on the relationship between trypanosomes and 
spirochaetes appear as completely unfounded by modern standards; his contemporaries 
needed just this pointer to try new applications of atoxyl. Some physicians, e.g. the dermato-
logist Oscar Lassar, tested the substance directly on syphilitic patients. 9 8 The Berlin bacte-
riologist Paul Uhlenhuth and his collaborators took a more indirect road via animal experi-
ments. First they established the effect of atoxyl on 'chicken spirillosis' (better called chicken 
spirochaetosis 9 9), then on mice and rats artificially infected with the spirochaetes causing 
Ehrlich, op. cit. (note 62), p. 342. 
Cited in Lechevalier and Solotorovsky, op. cit. (note 32), p. 453. Ehrlich also headed the German 
delegation to the first Sleeping Sickness Conference held in London in June 1907. See M. Wor-
boys, "The Comparative History of Sleeping Sickness in East and Central Africa, 1900-1914', 
History of Science 32 (1994): 89-102, p. 97. 
See Chapter III. 
O. Lassar, 'Atoxyl bei Syphilis', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 (1907): 684-87. 
"The name 'spirilloses' which is often used as a synonym [for 'spirochaetoses'] is out of place, 
because it could lead to the assumption that the causative agents of these diseases [i.e. spirochae-
toses] are related to the known bacterial species of spirilla. The latter microorganisms have how-
ever nothing to do with the spirochaetes"; W. Kolle and H. Hetsch, Die Experimentelle Bakterio-
logie und die Infektionskrankheiten, Berlin and Vienna (Urban & Schwarzenberg), 1922 (6th editi-
on), Vol. n, p. 792. The confusing designation of 'spirilloses' is also found in Ehrlich's writings, 
and in earlier editions of this handbook. 
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European relapsing fever. Their next step was to test atoxyl on monkey syphilis, but mon-
keys proved rather intractable. Uhlenhuth finally settled on the use of the rabbit as a suitable 
test animal, after the Italian Bertarelli had demonstrated that syphilis could also be transmit-
ted to this animal species. After Uhlenhuth had found that syphilitic rabbits could be comple-
tely cured by injections of atoxyl, he started clinical trials on human subjects. 1 0 0 In the 
year 1907 quite a few investigators in several countries reported on the curative effect of 
atoxyl on human syphilitics, some of them also urging caution in its application because it 
could lead to blindness. 1 0 1 Ehrlich's decision to switch from the conquest of sleeping sick-
ness to the conquest of syphilis was thus in line with contemporary trends in the medical 
field. In other words: the scientific genius was not impervious to the 'epidemiology of 
intellectual contact'. One may also hold that Pickering's phrase 'opportunism in context' is 
applicable here. 
The need for new test animals 
The reorientation of Ehrlich's chemotherapeutic programme towards syphilis and other 
spirochaetoses required new species of test animals and new qualifications of the scientific 
manpower competent to deal with them. At first Ehrlich relied on the cooperation of his old 
classmate from the Breslau Gymnasium, Albert Neisser, who was then still in the Dutch 
Indies for his research on simian syphilis. In Batavia, Neisser and his collaborators tested 
numerous arsenical preparations sent by Ehrlich on monkeys and a p e s . 1 0 2 The dermatolo-
gist maintained a regular correspondence with Ehrlich on the results obtained. Although 
Neisser continued to cooperate after the completion of his (second) tropical expedition in 
November 1907, Ehrlich also mobilized other resources. In November 1908 he visited Paul 
Uhlenhuth in Berlin and was much impressed by the latter's ability to cure syphilitic rabbits 
and chicken suffering from fowl spirochaetosis with a single injection of atoxyl. Ehrlich 
asked Uhlenhuth to supply him with one syphilitic rabbit, which he would duly receive - but 
only after a few months' delay! (After Ehrlich's death, Uhlenhuth claimed priority for having 
laid the foundation for the chemotherapy of syphilis. 1 0 3 ) Ehrlich also corresponded with 
his Japanese friend and former co-worker, Professor Kitasato, of the Tokyo Institute of 
P. Uhleiihuth, Die Bedeutung des Tierexperitnents ßr die Medizin, besonders ßr die Erforschung 
des Wesens, der Erscheinung und Bekämpfung der Seuchen, Freiburg in Baden (Speyer & Kaerner), 
1929, p. 24. 
Cf. F. Moses, 'Der heutige Stand der Atoxylbehandlung bei Syphilis, unter Mitteilung eigener 
Beobachtungen', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 44 (1907): 929-31. 
C. Bruck, 'Albert Neisser', Die Naturwissenschaften 4 (1916): 609-17, p. 612; A. Neisser, 'Ueber 
die Verwendung des Arsacetins (Ehrlich) bei der Syphilisbehandlung', Deutsche medizinische Wo-
chenschrift 34 (1908): 1500-1504. 
On this priority claim see L. Lendle, 'Zur Geschichte der Begründung der Chemotherapie am 
Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts', Medizinhistorisches Journal 4 (1969): 24-40. 
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Infectious Diseases, asking for an assistant experienced in transmitting spirochaetes to experi-
mental animals. In the spring of 1909 Sahachiro Hata, who was thoroughly acquainted with 
rabbit syphilis, arrived at the Georg Speyer Haus in Frankfurt. Now Ehrlich had at his 
disposal a scientific assistant with the qualifications required to deal with the recently acqui-
red test animals, even apart from the legendary 'oriental patience' which was useful in 
performing routine jobs. Hata was charged with testing a large series of compounds for their 
effects on relapsing fever, fowl spirochaetosis and rabbit syphilis. Before long, in June 1909, 
he found that the compound with the number 606 (that is, the sixth compound in the series 
commencing 600) or 3,3'-diamino-4,4'-dihydroxy arsenobenzene had excellent curative 
properties in relation to its toxicity. This was the substance that would later be called salvar-
san or arsphenamine. 
The chemical design of drugs 
The above description shows that Ehrlich's chemotherapeutic programme, though conceived 
as a 'rational' undertaking, was nevertheless in its actual realization dependent on various 
contingent, opportunistic and circumstantial factors. We have not yet examined, however, 
that crucial part of the undertaking which lays most claim to being rational and purposive: 
the chemical design of new drugs. Granted that the finding of a promising 'lead molecule' 
(like atoxyl), as Ehrlich himself admitted, is largely "a matter of chance", could we not 
argue that the programme enters into its proper rational stage when it subsequently embarks 
on the systematic molecular variation of such a find? Let us therefore look somewhat more 
closely, without losing ourselves in the jungle of chemical details, at Ehrlich's strategy of 
molecular design. 
Drug action, in Ehrlich's thought, was almost exclusively a matter of chemical affinities. 
The problem with most therapeutically active substances is that they have affinities not only 
to the cells of the parasites but also to those of the host organism. They are, in Ehrlich's 
terminology, not just parasitropic but also organotropic. Antibodies represented the exemplar 
of ideal medicines to him, because as 'magic bullets' they act only on the harrnful parasites. 
For artificial medicines this ideal was unattainable, but it would be feasible - whenever a 
promising 'lead' was found - to attempt to enhance the degree of parasitotropism and to 
diminish the degree of organotropism by suitable chemical modification. In his lecture to the 
German Chemical Society Ehrlich formulated the task of chemotherapy as follows: "Wir 
mussen zielen lernen, chemisch zielen lernen!" (We must learn to shoot better by chemical 
means! ) . 1 0 4 For practical purposes it was important that the relationship between 'organo-
tropism' and 'parasitotropism', theoretical notions which derived their meaning from Ehr-
lich's receptor theory, could be defined in operational terms as the so-called therapeutic 
index, or as the ratio between 'dosis curativa' and 'dosis tolerata'. The value of the latter 
Ehrlich, op. cit. (note 52), p. 22. 
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"Surely there exist numerous problems in which one can, with particular ingenuity and modest material 
resources, reach important results, just as it is possible for a skilled craftsman to open a complicated lock 
by means of a piece of wire; but one cannot proceed in this way when [..] practical-therapeutic problems 
are at issue. Here the door is closed and blocked so firmly, that it can be opened only through violence, 
just as a fortress can no longer be conquered nowadays through betrayal and a small key but only by 
modern methods".1 0 5 
Cited in W. Greiling, Paul Ehrlich: Zijn leven en werk, Leiden (Stafleu), 1955, p. 105. 
index could be determined empirically for every possible chemical compound by straightfor-
ward though cumbersome laboratory routines. 
Ehrlich had some rules of thumb or heuristic principles to guide him in preparing 
structural variants of the given 'lead' molecule. Cumulative experience in his laboratories 
told him that the introduction of certain substituent groups would lower the toxicity of the 
compound for the host organism. Ehrlich also postulated that the trivalent arsenic radical in 
arsenical compounds, corresponding to an assumed arsenoreceptor in the parasite, was 
responsible for the trypanocidal effect. Atoxyl (i.e. the sodium salt of p-aminophenylarsonic 
acid) contained pentavalent arsenic and had no lethal effect on trypanosomes in the test tube. 
Ehrlich therefore concluded that it was converted into a trivalent arsenical compound after 
its injection into the host organism. In order to find more effective drugs, Ehrlich held, this 
reduction process should not be left to the host organism but had to be undertaken by the 
synthetic chemist. Ehrlich's strategy of molecular modification thus combined two lines of 
attack: enhancing the toxicity for the parasites through successive reduction of the arsenic 
residue of the atoxyl molecule and dimMshing the toxicity for the host organism by introdu-
cing certain substituents into the amino group. This strategy of directed molecular modifica-
tion generated promising trypanocidal and spirochaetocidal compounds like arsacetin, arseno-
phenylglycine ('number 418') and also salvarsan ('number 606'). 
To what extent, then, can Ehrlich's chemotherapeutic programme be considered a 
'rational' and 'purposive' approach to the development of new medicines? We must resist 
the temptation to assign it these qualities merely on the grounds of its ultimate success. True, 
Ehrlich did have some rules and guidelines to go by, but they were not generalizations of 
wide applicability. They had also been gained in a long and arduous process of (much more 
blind) trial-and-error. Ehrlich did not possess powerful and selective heuristics indicating a 
direct path to ultimate success through the labyrinth of almost infinite possibilities. As a 
matter of fact, he had had several hundred derivatives of atoxyl synthesized and tested, 
before hitting on one substance with apparently miraculous properties. It was perhaps not so 
much Ehrlich's ingenious theoretical viewpoints, but more his use of 'brute force' - chemical 
and biological Massenarbeit on a large scale - which eventually led to success. At the start 
of his chemotherapeutic programme, Ehrlich himself made an Uluminating comparison: 
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I tibdnk these words are a fitting description of Ehrlich's own approach. From Ehrlich's time 
to the present, pharmacologists have repeatedly proclaimed that the era of 'rational drug 
design' was just about to begin, dismissing simultaneously all previous attempts as merely 
'empirical' gropings in the da rk . 1 0 6 This should certainly give us pause to question the 
analytical value of the labels 'rational' and 'empirical'. A useful antidote is also provided by 
Ehrlich's former co-worker, Carl Browning, who in 1955 observed: 
"A more rational, planned attack on the problem would require meanwhile [..] the cooperation of agents 
with powers like those of Clerk Maxwell's 'demons'." 1 0 7 
It is finally possible to criticize 'the myth of rational drug design' from still another angle. 
This ideal, as Rein Vos has pointed out, is predicated on a hierarchical view of science, 
according to which knowledge is developed at one privileged site (the laboratory) and subse-
quently 'applied' at other sites (the practices of clinicians, pharmacists, general practitioners, 
etcetera). An alternative, non-hierarchical (heterarchical) view holds that (medical) knowled-
ge is created at different sites in mutual interaction with each o ther . 1 0 8 
The unexpected problems that afflicted the clinical introduction of salvarsan provide a 
graphic illustration of the limitations of the hierarchical view. We will turn to these in the 
next section. 
5. The clinical introduction of Salvarsan 
Back in 1908 Ehrlich had declared that after extensive animal experiments the final test of 
a newly found drug on man would be no more than 'die Probe aufs Exempel' (proving the 
sum). In March 1910, however, in a letter to an American friend, he complained bitterly that 
the difficulties of "the transferring of chemotherapy into practice" had thoroughly spoilt his 
frame of mind: 
"Beautiful though laboratory experiments are in themselves, it is difficult to transfer them into practice, 
since one finds only a few practitioners who do this properly and, as I readily admit, are really able to 
do it properly. Then disappointments rain down, and all incidents which occur during the trial of a new 
J. Parascandola, 'Carl Voegtlin and the "Arsenic Receptor" in Chemotherapy', Journal for the 
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 32 (1977): 151-71, p. 154; A. Wacker, 'Entwicklungs-
linien chemotherapeutischer Forschung', Die Naturwissenschaften 53 (1966): 396-403, p. 402. 
CH. Browning, op. cit. (note 45), p. 618. 
R. Vos, 'De mythe van rationeel geneesmiddelenontwerp', Pharmaceutisch Weekblad 121 (1992): 
749-54. 
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chemotherapeutic drag and which of course cannot be avoided at all with any new drag, are blamed on 
the originator".109 
Gone is Ehrlich's previous optimism on the simplicity of clinical trials; he now recognizes 
that during the introduction of new medicines various 'incidents' will unavoidably occur. For 
a clinical introduction to be successful, it is essential that those inevitable 'incidents' will be 
blamed on 'improper' use and not on the drug itself (or its originator). This requires, as 
Ehrlich was to find out the hard way, a careful 'stage-management' and a sustained and 
almost superhuman effort of vigilance and monitoring. 
After Hata's discovery of the effectiveness of preparation 606 against rabbit syphilis in 
June 1909, Ehrlich had not immediately arranged for clinical trials to be held. Further animal 
experiments were performed to determine the most effective dosage and mode of application 
(subcutaneous, intramuscular, or intravenous). How best to solve the substance was also the 
object of investigations. Additional tests were taken to ensure that preparation 606 would not 
produce neurological disorders in experimental animals (as some of its precursors had done 
to Ehrlich's unlucky 'dancing mice'). By the fall of 1909 Ehrlich was ready to release 
samples of his precious substance to a few selected specialists for clinical trials. In his 
instructions to them he let it be known that several aspects of dosage and mode of administra-
tion were still open to experimentation. Ehrlich kept in close contact with them. Meanwhile, 
in the winter of 1909-1910, a small pilot plant for the production of '606' was installed at 
the Georg Speyer Haus in anticipation of commercial production by the Hoechst company. 
Special vacuum apparatus had to be designed because production of the highly oxidizable 
'606' required exclusion of air. The packing of the product in glass ampules, which had to 
be sealed tight, also demanded special care. 
The results of the initial trials with '606' were reported by Ehrlich, Hata, and several 
clinicians in April 1910 at an international medical congress held in Wiesbaden. Although 
the drug did not work on advanced paralytic syphilis, in other cases it showed excellent 
results. On the authority of Professor Iversen of St. Petersburg, intravenous injection was 
recommended as the most apropriate mode of administration. Ehrlich's aim to obtain a cure 
with one shot only - his ideal of a 'therapia sterilisans magna' - proved, however, elusive. 
In most cases, repeated administration of the substance was necessary to effect a cure. 
Luckily, the spirochaetes did not develop resistance against '606' . 
The findings reported at the Wiesbaden congress found much resonance in the medical 
and lay press and led to a world-wide sensation. The result was that during the following 
months countless physicians and other visitors from all over the world would flock to and 
besiege the Georg Speyer Haus asking for Ehrlich's magic substance. At that time, however, 
Letter of P. Ehrlich to Dr A. Meitzer, 9 March 1910, printed in C.E. Dolman, 'A fiftieth anniver-
sary commemorative tribute to Paul Ehrlich, with two letters to American friends', Clio Medica 1 
(1966): 223-34, p. 231. 
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Ehrlich was not intent on making it indiscriminately available to any physician who wanted 
to use it;in any case supplies were still too limited (though frantic efforts were made to step 
up production). At a meeting of the Association of German Naturalists and Physicians held 
in Königsberg on 20 September 1910, Ehrlich declared: "I considered it necessary, before 
I would be ready to hand the drug over to practice, that observations were available on 
10.000-20.000 cases, in order that one would know exactly how large the risks are and under 
what circumstances they occur" . 1 1 0 In keeping with his so-called "concentric" ap-
proach 1 1 1 , Ehrlich decided to give the drug exclusively to qualified specialists with ade-
quate laboratory and clinical facilities. Between June and December 1910 he provided, free 
of charge, 65.000 doses of the medicine. 1 1 2 Ehrlich himself kept track of and tabulated 
the mass of information obtained in the clinical trials. When untoward effects occurred, he 
reviewed all the details of the treatment procedure to pin down the probable cause. Ehrlich's 
approach to clinical trials was praised by Professor Heubner of Göttingen in 1911 as "an 
organizational - one might be tempted to say 'moral' - achievement as great as the discovery 
of the effective chemical structure was a scientific o n e " . 1 1 3 
Speaking of Ehrlich's moral achievements, it will by now be clear that he was unable 
to keep the promise, stated in 1908, that his approach based on animal experiments would 
largely do away with the need to experiment on human patients. In a sense, the above menti-
oned "10.000-20.000 cases" on which observations had to be obtained before the drug would 
be released for general use can be considered as just so many human guinea pigs. Ehrlich 
found himself in conflict with the traditional principle in medical ethics of doing no harm. 
To relieve his conscience, he sought a different ethical principle by comparing chemotherapy 
to surgery: 
"[In surgery] as in chemotherapy we are dealing with instruments which may at times become dangerous! 
But surgery owes its triumphs to the principle that it does not shrink from a certain risk and that its chosen 
devise is not 'primum, tie noceas' but 'primwn, at profiteatur'. If we therefore have the conviction - based 
on animal experiments - that we are in the possession of a truly curative drug which can bring health to 
severely diseased patients, then it seems imperative to take a certain risk rather than to avoid it altogether 
and thwart success by leaving the patient ultimately to his own fate". 1 1 4 
A. Neisser et al., 'Die Behandlung der Syphilis mit dem Bhrlichschen Präparat 606. Verhandlungen 
auf der 82. Versammlung Deutscher Naturforscher und Aerzte in Königsberg am 20. September 
1910', Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 36 (1910): 1889-96, p. 1894. 
Greiling, op. cit. (note 105), p. 163. 
Marquardt, op. cit. (note 38), p. 90. 
Cited in Marquardt, op. cit. (note 38), p. 91. 
Cited in W. Kolle and H. Hetsch, Die Experimentelle Bakteriologie und die Infektionskrankheiten, 
Berlin and Vienna (Urban & Schwarzenberg), 1911, Vol. II, p. 668. 
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In December 1910 salvarsan - as was the trade-name chosen for the substance previously 
designated as 'Ehrlich-Hata 606' or simply '606' - was released for sale by the Hoechst 
company. The preparatory work to establish the precise action of the drug and its dosage, 
the hazards, the indications and the contra-indications had been completed, or so Ehrlich 
thought. The further vicisssitudes of the drug would be entrusted to Hoechst. Ehrlich already 
considered himself relieved from his scientific responsibility. 1 1 5 But things would run dif-
ferently. The reason was that Ehrlich had required the Hoechst company to keep him person-
ally informed about all the complications and incidents arising from the use of salvarsan. 
There would be no lack of such occurrences during the following years. 
It was about this time that, according to one observer, "the high waves of initial enthu-
siasm" began to subside and "hypercritical objections and attacks lacking objectivity" set 
i n . 1 1 6 In a letter to Simon Flexner of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, dated 
3 January 1911, Ehrlich once again complained about the widespread incompetence of 
physicians in handling his curative substance and also referred to the sometimes hostile 
atmosphere: 
"You won't believe with what clumsiness and with what deliberate and wilful enmity 606 frequently has 
been handled: the majority of dermatologists in particular have not shown up at all well. They wanted to 
do miracles with the drug, and demanded complete cure after a single small injection used in the most 
unsuitable way, and now people are yelling as if they had been swindled. Then they should turn to a 
magician rather than a scientist".117 One might think that Ehrlich's indignation was hardly justified. 
Had not he himself aroused expectations by proclaiming the ideal of a 'therapia sterilisans magna'? Was 
it unreasonable for people to attribute magical properties to a drug which after all had been designated 
as a 'magic bullet'? 
The preparation and application of the drug indeed offered great difficulties to most physi-
cians. Ehrlich had in fact added to the confusion by encouraging the initially selected specia-
lists to treat every aspect of the administration of the drug as open to experiment. As a 
result, at first almost every specialist had his own preferred solvent to get the substance into 
solution (or suspension, or emulsion) and applied his own favourite form of administration 
(subcutaneous, intramuscular, intravenous, oral, rec ta l ) . 1 1 8 Consensus on the best prepara-
tion and application emerged only slowly. Subcutaneous and intramuscular injection went into 
Greiling, op. cit. (note 105), pp. 166-67. 
J. Jadasohn, 'Unsere Erfahrungen mit Salvarsan', Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 36 (1910), 
p. 2377. 
Letter of P. Ehrlich to Prof. Dr. S. Flexner, 3 January 1911, printed in C.E. Dolman, op. cit. 
(note 109), p. 233. 
See the diversity reported in 'Berliner Dermatologische Gesellschaft: Diskussion über Ehrlich-Hata-
Behandlung', Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 36 (1910): 2175-76, 2271-72. 
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disuse because they were too painful to most patients or led to unpleasant effects like infiltra-
tions and necroses. Intravenous injection of salvarsan in alkaline solution became the recom-
mended mode of administration. Preparation of the solution, which had to be used directly, 
was however rather laborious, and many physicians shrinked from injection into the veins, 
which at that time was not yet a standard medical procedure performed with a simple stan-
dard piece of apparatus and familiar to all practitioners. In 1911, the Breslau dermatologist 
Albert Neisser declared that intravenous injection was after all "very convenient, easy and 
administered with the simplest apparatus imaginable; a rubber tube and a needle [..] if one 
masters the technique of needle insertion there are no disturbing after-effects such as infil-
tration, necroses and so on. " "Indeed", he added, "when looking over the innumerable inven-
tions of new apparatus for intravenous injections I cannot restrain a smi le" . 1 1 9 
He then went on to devote a long paragraph to a description of the technique used in 
Breslau, thus testifying that the procedure of intravenous injection was indeed all but familiar 
at the t i m e . 1 2 0 The situation in the USA appears to have been even worse. Patricia Ward 
notes that American physicians generally tended to equate intravenous injection with surgery 
and thus avoided using it. Those who dared to perform it, usually first made an incision to 
find the vein rather than injecting directly. During the course of treatment they so frequently 
caused "multiple punctures, incisions and infiltrated arms", that patients were sometimes 
discouraged to finish the c u r e . 1 2 1 
Widespread adoption of salvarsan among ordinary physicians was further hampered by 
the need to check the results of the treatment through the Wassermann reaction. Only briefly 
before, this sérodiagnostic test had become accepted as a necessary instrument to regulate the 
intensity and duration of mercurial treatment 1 2 2 , and now it was to fulfil a similar role in 
A. Neisser, 'On modern syphilotherapy with particular reference to salvarsan', Bulletin of the 
History of Medicine 16 (1944): 469-570, pp. 490-91 (translation of A. Neisser, Ueber Moderne 
Syphilistherapie mil Besonderer Berücksichtigung des Salvarsans, without place, 1911). In a letter to 
the Hoechst company, dated 30 November 1911, Ehrlich drew attention to a simple procedure for 
intravenous injection elaborated by one Dr. Fehde from Berlin, which was "much more convenient 
for the practical physician, because it avoids the many complicated apparatuses of injection"; see 
Farbwerke Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, Um die Zubereitung des Salvarsans (Dokumente aus Hoech-
ster Archiven Nr. 19), 1966, p. 64. 
Patricia Spain Ward quotes a long description of the laborious technique used in the American 
Naval Hospital in her article "The American reception of Salvarsan', Journal of the History of 
Medicine and Allied Sciences 36 (1981): 44-62, pp. 52-53. Following a suggestion of Harry Col-
lins, one could analyze how skills such as intravenous injection become part of the taken-for-gran-
ted repertoire of a certain community (e.g. physicians) or society by looking at the historical evolu-
tion of (the length of) explicit instructions for the use of particular instruments or machines. Collins 
demonstrates this for slot machines in his Artificial Experts, Cambridge, MA (MIT Press), 1990, 
pp. 106-107. 
Ward, op. cit. (note 120), p. 53. 
See Chapter IV. 
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salvarsan treatment. The execution of this difficult and complicated test was however the 
prerogative of specially trained serologists. In October 1910, Ehrlich had expressed the 
hopeful expectation that "a method of the Wassermann reaction would be found, that can also 
be executed by the practical physician" 1 2 3 , but this would remain an idle hope for the fol-
lowing decades . 1 2 4 
Even when properly administered, salvarsan could have all kinds of unpleasant side-
effects: headaches, chills, fever, itching, nausea, vomiting, etcetera. Particularly worrisome 
for Ehrlich were some indirect side-effects on the auditory, optic, oculomotor and facial 
nerves. For most specialists these were peculiar relapses of syphilis (socalled 'Neurorezi-
dive'), somehow evoked or stimulated by the use of salvarsan; others, however, interpreted 
these manifestations as toxic phenomena caused by the drug itself. 1 2 5 Albert Neisser sta-
ked his full authority to acquit the medicine of this accusation; in his opinion these conditions 
were "unmasked but not caused by ' 6 0 6 ' " . 1 2 6 In recent years, he stated, the number of 
syphilitics undergoing treatment had increased, and doctors had also become more attentive 
to the occurrence of such complications. At any rate, Neisser held, it should be possible to 
eliminate these same complications by continuing the vigorous treatment with salvarsan. 
Equally troublesome for Ehrlich was the occurrence of local inflammatory processes (so-
called Jarisch-Herxheimer reactions) after application of salvarsan. Ehrlich explained these 
as resulting from an augmented secretion of toxins from spirochaetes stimulated by the 
therapeutic agent, but even if this explanation were correct it would not be completely 
reassuring. 
In the summer of 1911 a number of fatalities resulting from encephalitis haemorrhagica 
or 'oedema of the brain' (Hirnschwellung) occurred after administration of salvarsan. The 
magic drug seemed to be incontestably implicated, but in the end Ehrlich and other investi-
gators were able to shift the blame to something else. To prepare a salvarsan solution it was 
necessary to use distilled, sterile water. Now the unexpected and rather shocking discovery 
was made that the distilled water supplied by the pharmacies was far from sterile; on the 
Neisser et al., op. cit. (note 110), p. 1894. 
liana Löwy describes the failed attempt by the Rockefeller Institute bacteriologist Hideyo Noguchi 
to introduce a simplified version of the Wassermann reaction usable by ordinary clinicians. The 
'Noguchi method' floundered on the opposition of his serological colleagues who argued that the 
Wassermann reaction was too delicate to permit its use by non-specialists. See I. Löwy, 'Testing 
for a sexually transmissible disease, 1907-1970: the history of the Wassermann reaction', in V. 
Berridge and P. Strong (eds,), AIDS and Contemporary History, Cambridge (Cambridge University 
Press), 1993, 74-92, pp. 78-79. 
L. Michaelis, 'Die Ehrlich-Hata-Behandlung in der inneren Medizin', Deutsche medizinische Wo-
chenschrift 36 (1910): 2278-84, p. 2281. 
Neisser, op. cit. (note 119), p. 486. 
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contxary, it could often be shown to contain millions of germs per cubic centimetre. 
The unusually hot summer of 1911 appeared to have been conducive to their multiplication. 
So it was not the drug but this so-called Wasserfehler (water error), due to negligent pharma-
cists' practices, that had to be blamed for the several lethal cases of oedema of the brain. 
Thereupon, the Hoechst company constructed and sold special equipment for the preparation 
of distilled water. (From 1922 onward, the firm sold ampules containing re-distilled, sterile 
water together with ampules containing (neo)salvarsan.) 
In view of all the incidents and complications attending the application of salvarsan, 
Ehrlich thought it still premature in December 1911 to actively promote its use among 
general practitioners, as was the commercial aim of the Hoechst company at that time. The 
first priority of the firm was to simplify the preparation and administration of the drug, in 
order to facilitate its adoption by ordinary physicians. In Ehrlich's judgement, however, it 
was of the greatest interest to concentrate first of all on clinical specialists and to ensure that 
in the clinics the best and most optimal treatment would be worked out. In a letter to Hoechst 
he explained why he considered the primary focus on general practitioners not a prudent 
strategy: 
"These ordinary physicians, the Wald- und Wiesenarzt [hardly translatable, something like: the physicans 
of provincial backwaters] will spoil our statistics by their incompetent treatment. It will rain abscesses, 
necroses, and neurorecidives [Neurorezidive], thus causing a vicious circle which will surely be exploited 
by the terrorists".128 
Although Ehrlich did not agree with the commercial priorities of Hoechst, he worked hard 
on the development of a new arsenical derivative, preparation number 914, which was 
introduced in June 1912 under the trade-name of neo-salvarsan. Because it dissolved in 
neutral solution, it was less diffcult to handle. 
Ehrlich was not only confronted with incidents stemming from lack of competence or unex-
pected complications arising from the use of salvarsan, he also had to stand up to other 
difficulties. At times the controversy over (neo-)salvarsan took on the character of a truly 
political struggle, merging with other themes like nationalism, antisemitism, class struggle, 
complaints about profiteering, etcetera. It must be admitted that the proponents of salvarsan 
did not always choose the most elegant methods in dealing with their opponents. Persistent 
critics were sometimes denied access to publication outlets. When Ehrlich's friends took the 
unusual step of having the Berlin police doctor and opponent of salvarsan, Dr. Dreuw, 
Letter of P. Ehrlich to the Pharmaceutical Division of Hoechst Dyeworks, dated 15 December 
1911, in Farbwerke Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, op. cit. (note 119), p. 68-69; Th. Müller, lieber 
den Bakteriengehalt des in den Apotheken erhältlichen destillierten Wassers, Munich (J. F. Leh-
manns Verlag), 1912. 
Letter of P. Ehrlich to the Pharamaceutical Division of the Hoechst Dyeworks, dated 15 December 
1911, in Farbwerke Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, op. cit (note 119), pp. 66-67. 
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dismissed from his position, they created an intransigent enemy who in the following years 
would not flinch from slander. In the beginning of 1914 he presented a memorandum to the 
Reichsgesundheitsamt (Imperial Health Office) in which he demanded a prohibition of salvar-
san on the grounds that it had been brought into commerce without sufficient prior testing 
and that it represented a severe danger to the lives and health of numerous pat ients . 1 2 9 
Forced to debate the question, the German Reichstag endorsed the drug as a valuable enrich-
ment of the therapeutic arsenal. That same year Ehrlich had to appear as a defence witness 
before a Frankfurt court to counter accusations that local prostitutes had been forced by the 
city hospital to undergo salvarsan treatment. The outbreak of the First World War brought 
an end to these political and legal quarrels. 
All the difficulties surrounding the clinical introduction of salvarsan had taken a heavy 
toll in terms of Ehrlich's health. He died on 20 August 1915 at the age of 61. 
6. Conclusions 
After the preceding historical description of Ehrlich's laboratory practice of experimental 
therapeutics and of the clinical introduction of salvarsan, it is time to reconsider the analytical 
concerns that were raised in the introductory section. 
The first issue was whether the work of a scientific genius like Ehrlich would be amen-
able to a sociological analysis along constructivist lines. The answer is in the affirmative. In 
the preceding sections I have shown that most of Ehrlich's insights and discoveries were not 
arrived at in complete independence. He borrowed extensively from others: material, concep-
tual and organizational resources from the German chemical industry, and suitable 'animal 
models' such as trypanosome-infected rodents or syphilitic rabbits from other researchers. 
Sometimes Ehrlich was also susceptible to fashionable trends in the 'epidemiology of intellec-
tual contact', as when he decided to switch from the conquest of sleeping sickness to the 
conquest of syphilis. Yet all this hardly affects his stature as a scientific genius, it only shifts 
the touch of genius to another dimension. Ehrlich's unique contribution was not so much to 
be found in his superior insights as in his determination to combine synthetic chemistry with 
extensive animal experimentation, or chemical with biological 'Massenarbeit', which eventu-
ally enabled him to open with 'brute force' the door to the chemotherapy of syphilis which 
remained closed to others. Already in his early student years he had laid the foundation for 
his later achievements by acquiring knowledge and expertise in the field of synthetic dyes 
along with his training as a physician. In due course the German chemical industry would 
're-borrow' and adopt Ehrlich's construction machinery for doing chemotherapeutic research. 
Dr. Gennerich, 'Zur Salvarsanfrage', Die Naturwissenschaften 2 (1914): 263-67. 
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A second issue was the significance to be attributed to the traffic of substances, mate-
rials, and test animals - or to 'resource-relationships' in the widest sense - as against the 
traffic of ideas or 'intellectual interaction' in a more narrow sense. The attentive reader will 
undoubtedly have noticed that my description of Ehrlich's practice has a definite 'materialist' 
(even 'raw-materialist') flavour to it in that it grants a proniinent role to the raw materials 
with which and on which he had to work. Whereas Knorr-Cetina has stated that '"conceptual 
interaction' is not merely 'conceptual'", in this particular case it could be asserted with equal 
justification that the exchange of materials was not a purely material transaction. Ehrlich 
initially used the products of the dye industry for selective staining, but he thereby became 
infected with concepts and ways of thinking prevalent in synthetic dyestuffs chemistry. Later 
on he also borrowed organizational models from the industry. So with the transmission of 
materials went the transmission of conceptual and organizational resources. 1 3 0 In the end, 
the practice of experimental therapeutics could be conducted only in intimate symbiosis with 
the chemical industry. 
A 'materialist' approach focusing on science-as-practice rather than science-as-knowled-
ge would also entail the recognition that scientific practices are partly constrained, though 
not determined, by the nature of the materials employed and the objects or animals (including 
humans) worked u p o n . 1 3 1 We have seen that Ehrlich was unable in 1891 to pursue bis 
malaria studies due to the absence of an experimental animal on which malaria parasites 
could be transmitted. Only after 1900, when an excellent experimental system in the form 
of trypanosome-infected rodents became available, could his chemotherapeutic research 
programme be launched. Even with such an ideal experimental system in place, the special 
characteristics of the particular experimental animals employed would still constitute a major 
liability for researchers, as Ehrlich was to find out when he and Shiga missed the trypanoci-
dal effect of atoxyl in 1903 because - as he explained afterwards - his trypanosome strains 
happened to be mturally resistant to that substance. The reorientation of Ehrlich's chemothe-
rapeutic programme to syphilis created a new need for suitable experimental animals. At 
first, the hundreds of monkeys and apes on which Albert Neisser experimented in the Dutch 
East Indies could be used for that purpose. Primates, however, were not the most ideal 
experimental animals for Ehrlich's programme. Only later, when a smaller and less refracto-
ry test animal, the rabbit, became available, could he fully deploy his characteristic strategy 
of biological 'Massenarbeit' in combination with synthetic chemistry. The example of Ehr-
Nelly Oudshoorn characterizes the role of research materials by the metaphor of 'carriers': "With 
this metaphor, we can understand how research materials mediate, both in establishing relationships 
between actors, and in the selection of knowledge claims". See N. Oudshoorn, 'On the Making of 
Sex Hormones: Research Materials and the Production of Knowledge', Social Studies of Science 20 
(1990): 5-33, p. 25. 
Actually, Pickering objects strongly to the notion of 'constraint'. I will address the issue later on. 
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lich's programme thus illustrates the dependence of scientific practices on the special proper-
ties of the materials, objects and animals with which they have to deal. 
Another illustration of the relevance of 'materials dependency' for scientific practices 
is provided by the development of the Wassermann reaction, as described in chapter V. Let 
us briefly summarize the main points here. The disappointing initial results obtained with 
antibody determination could be partly explained, as the serologist Julius Citron pointed out, 
by the peculiar nature of the 'material' from the Breslau dermatological clime, i.e. by the 
fact that Neisser's syphilitic patients had been heavily treated with mercury. If only the 
choice of 'patient material' had been a little bit more fortunate, Citron implied, the results 
would have looked more promising from the start. The story of the Wassermann reaction also 
illustrates that the 'field of resources' is not static and that advantageous positions in such a 
field may be only temporary. Initially, the spkochaete-swarming livers of stillborn luetic 
babies - "a much sought-after article", according to one investigator 1 3 2 - constituted the 
source of 'antigen' for Wassermann, Neisser, and Brack. They had ample access to this 
resource tliiuiks to a large network of contacts (in their first research paper on the serodia-
gnosis of syphilis they expressed their acknowledgements to no less than thirty-six persons 
who had provided them with material). When later on extracts from normal livers turned out 
to be equally usable (it is significant that this was found out by investigators who had a much 
less privileged access to syphilitic livers!), the value of the syphilitic resource rapidly dimi-
nished. Likewise, Neisser's artificially infected primates in Breslau lost their value as sup-
pliers of strong luetic sera when the serodiagnosis switched from antigen to antibody determi-
nation. In science as in economic life the value of given resources may be highly unstable. 
It may be that the above deliberations on the 'materials dependency' of scientific prac-
tices grant too much independent force to the material world, thus crossing the thin line 
separating a 'materialistic' constructivism from outright realism. Here we deal with a third 
issue which was briefly alluded to in the introductory section. From a constructivist point of 
view, the notion of research materials constraining scientific practices appears to be unaccep-
table; at the most, constractivists are ready to admit the occurrence of 'resistances' in Pick-
ering's sense . 1 3 3 It must be conceded that all the above-mentioned material 'constraints' 
(or 'resistances') were encountered in socially situated scientific practices and could not 
possibly have been established outside such practices; the notion of constraint should there-
H. Beitzke, 'Ueber Spirochaete pallida bei angeborener Syphilis', Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 
43 (1906): 781-84, p. 781. 
See Knorr-Cetina: "You can get resistances in the laboratory; but in order for these resistances to 
make sense, they have to be interpreted. The very moment you interpret them, you enter the realm 
of the social world [..]"; in W. Callebaut, Taking the Naturalistic Turn or How Real Philosophy of 
Science is Done, Chicago and London (The University of Chicago Press), 1993, p. 185. In contrast 
to Knorr-Cetina and Pickering, Jan Golinski opts for an explicit recognition of 'constraints' in the 
sociological study of scientific practice, see J. Golinski, 'The Theory of Practice and the Practice of 
Theory: Sociological Approaches in the History of Science', Isis 81 (1990): 492-505. 
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fore not be treated "as somehow structuring and thus explaining the flow of practice from 
without" . 1 3 4 This issue also has a bearing on the constructivist view of the laboratory as 
a reconfiguration of the natural and social order. The power of the laboratory, according to 
Knorr-Cetina, resides precisely in the "enculturation of natural objects". She thus emphasizes 
the malleability of natural objects. A laboratory science does not need to put up with the 
object as it is; nor does it need to accomodate the natural object where it is, anchored in a 
natural environment. Natural objects are "brought home" and subjected to the local condi-
tions of the laboratory. It is from this reconfiguration that epistemic effects are der ived. 1 3 5 
This view finds support in contemporary laboratory studies, which demonstrate for instance 
how drastically laboratory rats and mice have been transformed by breeding programmes and 
the like into 'epistemic objects' bearing no longer any comparison to their wild and domestic 
counterparts despite the common n a m e . 1 3 6 In Ehrlich's time, this transformation process 
had of course advanced much less far. Ehrlich still had to put up with 'natural' variations in 
virulence, resistance and sensitivity among his experimental organisms; nowadays, such 
variations would have been largely excluded from the outset by using specially prepared and 
selected standard organisms. This does not mean that the phrase 'reconfiguration' is only 
applicable to present-day laboratories and not to Ehrlich's institutes. For one thing, exotic 
diseases like Mal de Caderas and sleeping sickness, or rather their agents, had been literally 
'brought home' from the Tropics to Ehrlich's Institute in Franlcfurt, and incorporated into 
new host organisms: white mice. Nor did Ehrlich and his co-workers leave their experimental 
organisms in the state they found (or better: received) them; they raised, for example, special 
strains of trypanosomes with various profiles of resistances on which new chemical substan-
ces could be tried. Ehrlich even thought about introducing some kind of 'passport' to stand-
ardize the quality of the strains employed in different laboratories. Still, despite all these 
reconfiguration efforts, one would feel the need to counterbalance Knorr-Cetina's stress on 
the malleability of natural objects with a similar emphasis on their refractoriness. 1 3 7 Only 
in that way can scientific practice be understood as a dialectic between resistance and acco-
modation. 
The fourth and final issue to be discussed here is how the difficulties surrounding the 
clinical introduction of salvarsan should be interpreted from a constructivist perspective. If 
the power of the laboratory resides in the enculturation of natural objects, this is also the 
Pickering, op. cit. (note 9), p. 584, note 35. In Pickering's view, "constraints are as emergent as 
anything else". 
Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. (note 8), p. 117-18. 
Amann, op. cit. (note 13). 
In her 1983 review of laboratory studies Knorr-Cetina herself noted: "Variability caused by raw 
materials is a dreaded source of nuisance for the scientists". See Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. (note 5), p. 
125. There would be no reason to fear this variability if raw materials were perfectly malleable. 
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source of its limitations. Ehrlich had to find out, to his own surprise and chagrin, that the 
transfer of laboratory findings to the outside world was a far from simple task. Knorr-Ceti-
na's view that such a transfer requires hard work and also social intervention has been amply 
confirmed. But let us look more closely at the nature of the problem and the types of work 
and intervention used to deal with it. Laboratories do not generally leave the objects as they 
are found in their natural environment; they are 'brought home' and subjected to the local 
conditions of the laboratory setting. In this particular case the 'object', human syphilis, was 
'brought home' by having it transmitted to rabbits. It is evident, however, that by this 'trans-
lation' the very object changes its character. Rabbit syphilis is not the same as human sy-
philis. Only a few of the manifestations characteristic of the human affection are also found 
in the artificially induced disease of the rabbits (the main reason for considering the latter 
condition a form of syphilis at all is that it can in turn be transmitted to apes and monkeys, 
which then show many more symptoms similar to those of human syphilitics). Translation, 
as Latour would say, involves treating situations that are not equivalent as if they were 
equivalent. A substance that is effective for rabbit syphilis would not automatically also be 
effective for human syphilis. Traditionally, the problem has been formulated as turning on 
the representativeness and reliability of the 'animal model' for extrapolating the results 
obtained in animal studies to the human counterpart. A recent publication concludes that such 
studies are little more than heuristics, based on weak analogies. 1 3 8 The lamentation uttered 
in 1929 by the Dutch gynaecologist J.A. van Dongen with regard to the results of female sex 
hormone therapy must sound familiar to many laboratory and clinical researchers: "the route 
from the white mouse in the laboratory to homo sapiens in the consulting-room is a long 
route that is not yet br idged". 1 3 9 Ehrlich was also to find out that the 'final test' of salvar-
san on man was more than just 'proving the sum'. 
In the constructivist literature, at least two strategies have been distinguished for dealing 
with the transfer of a laboratory object to the 'normal world': adaptation of the 'normal 
world' to laboratory conditions (Latour's option) and 'normalization' of the object (Knorr-
Cetina et al.). The Dutch philosopher Gerard de Vries has offered a Latourian analysis of 
the clinical introduction of salvarsan, the upshot of which is summarized in the following 
passage: 
H. LaFollette and N. Shanks, 'Animal models in biomedical research: some epistemológica] wor-
ries', Public Affairs Quarterly 7 (1993): 113-30; David Badcott, in his paper 'Predictive value of 
animal studies in drug development: some initial philosophical observations', presented at the 
World Congress on Medicine and Philosophy in Paris on 1 June 1994, offers a less negative 
appraisal of the predictive value of animal studies. 
Cited in N. Oudshoorn, 'United We Stand: The Pharmaceutical Industry, Laboratory, and Clinic in 
the Development of Sex Hormones into Scientific Drugs, 1920-1940', Science, Technology & Hu-
man Values 18 (1993): 5-24, p. 13. 
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"The successes from the laboratory become usable in clinical practice only after the latter has been 
reorganized and become similar in certain respects to the laboratory: physicians have to learn to comply 
with the instructions just like Ehrlich's assistants; the selection of patients has to proceed in the same 
cautious manner in which test animals in the laboratory are chosen; etcetera. Without Ehrlich's extensive 
meddling with medical practice outside the laboratory, Salvarsan would never have become an effective 
medicine. Only guinea pigs and rabbits would then have benefited from his discovery".1 4 0 
If this Latourian-style analysis makes one thing clear, it is, in my view, that Latour's own 
solution, i.e. that laboratory conditions are simply transplanted to the outside world, cannot 
be the full answer to the fruitful question that he himself formulated with so much insistence: 
how does the science get out of the laboratory? As a matter of fact, the circumstances of the 
laboratory could not simply be extended to the hospital and to the wider society. There is a 
crucial difference between giving instructions to subordinate assistants and to independent 
physicians (even apart from the fact that the 'instructions' to both groups widely differed in 
substance); nor can the selection of patients be equated with the choice of experimental 
animals. So 'extension' in the strict sense did not travel very far in this particular case. It is 
nonetheless true that the success of salvarsan required Ehrlich's active intervention with 
medical practice outside his laboratory, but my point is that his meddlings cannot be fully 
understood as attempts to extend the conditions of his laboratory. 
With a lot of charity, we might perhaps recognize the 'education' of physicians into the 
proper handling of intravenous injection which proved necessary to foster the spread of 
salvarsan as an example of adapting the 'normal world' to laboratory conditions. The deve-
lopment of salvarsan into neo-salvarsan, which simplified the preparation and application of 
the substance, by contrast, can be considered as a 'normalization' of the object. The succes-
sful introduction of salvarsan also required social intervention. Ehrlich's "concentric" strategy 
of first approaching and convincing qualified specialists with laboratory facilities and then 
ordinary physicians was a clever form of 'stage-management'. Legal and political battles had 
to be fought to neutralize tenacious opposition. Another salient aspect of the clinical introduc-
tion of salvarsan also needs to be stressed. It is that 'experimentation' was not yet concluded 
when the product left the laboratory and entered the stage of clinical trials (we have seen that 
Ehrlich explicitly instructed the first specialists that most aspects of preparation and administ-
ration of the drug were still open to experimentation) or even when it entered commercial 
production. 1 4 1 Theoretically, this means that the distance between laboratory and 'normal 
world' can also be reduced from a different angle: rather than normalizing laboratory objects 
or extending laboratory conditions to the 'normal world', the latter is itself turned into a 
large-scale laboratory or field of experimentation. Such "implicit experiments", although 
G. de Vries, De Ontwikkeling van Wetenschap, Groningen (Wolters-Noordhoff), 1995 (third, revi-
sed and extended edition), p. 167. 
Compare Oudshoorn: "[..] the development of a drug does not stop the moment it appears on the 
market - that is just the beginning". See Oudshoorn, op. cit. (note 139), p. 20. 
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mostly unacknowledged, are far from exceptional during the introduction and implementation 
of new technologies. 1 4 2 Under 'normar conditions, as Bettina Heintz has observed, Pick-
ering's 'resistances' take the form of incidents and accidents. 1 4 3 (We have seen that in 
1910 Ehrlich expressed the view that various 'incidents' will indeed unavoidably occur during 
the introduction of new medicines.) The risks of experimental failure are thus shifted toward 
society and become an integral part of the development of new drugs and new technologies 
in general. Perhaps this is the inevitable price we have to pay for the benefits they also 
confer. 
W. Krohn and J. Weyer, 'Gesellschaft als Labor: Die Erzeugung sozialer Risiken durch experimen-
telle Forschung', Soziale Welt 40 (1989): 349-73 (English version: 'Society as a Laboratory: the 
Social Risks of Experimental Research', Science and Public Policy, June 1994, 173-182). Consider 
also the suggestion by Thomas Pynchon: "Suppose we considered the war itself as a laboratory!", 
which is taken up in A. Pickering, 'Cyborg History and the World War II Regime', Perspectives on 
Science 3 (1995); 1-48, esp. on pp. 6 ff. 
B. Heintz, 'Wissenschaft im Kontext: Neuere Entwicklungstendenzen der Wissenschaftssoziologie', 
Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 45 (1993): 528-52, pp. 545^16, note 34. 
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In Chapter V I observed that Fleck was unable to construe the successful development of the 
Wassermann reaction into a clinically usable test for detecting syphilis as a clear instance of 
a so-called 'stylized thought constraint'. At any rate, the entire idea of a thought style exer-
cising constraining power over individuals is rejected by modern constructivists on finitist 
grounds. This does not exclude the possibility that thought styles may constitute a distinct 
class of phenomena in their own right, worthy of systematic exploration. It is my intention 
to show in this chapter that Fleck's so-called 'serological' thought style, despite its apparently 
superfluous role in his explanatory scheme, can indeed be suitably re-defined and extended 
in such a way as to meet Jonathan Harwood's requirements for the comparative use of style 
concepts. 1 Several of the materials necessary for this reconstructive exercise have already 
been supplied in earlier chapters. After having completed this reconstruction, I will finally 
re-examine the question whether, and if so in what sense, a thought style can have a constrai-
ning power over scientific investigators. 
Fleck's description of the serological thought style 
Fleck introduced his readers to the serological thought style by presenting the first chapter 
of Dr Julius Citron's textbook, Die Methoden der Immunodiagnostik und Immunothérapie 
(1910 edition), which had the status of a 'catechism' (55-59/74-79). From this source he 
gleaned the following list of style elements (I have changed the arrangement and formula-
tion): 
(1) (serological) specificity: the reaction between antigen and antibody is specific; 
(2) systematic clinical and laboratory observation constitutes the foundation of 'diagnosis' 
(i.e. the fitting in of a result into a system of distinct disease entities); 
(3) the battle metaphor (Kampfgedanke): an infectious disease is seen as a conflict between 
a micro-organism and a host; the old proto-idea of a 'demon' has transformed itself into 
the modern notion of an aetiological 'agent'; 
(4) a rigid distinction and opposition between cellular and humoral immunity; 
(5) a strong emphasis on the methodical necessity of 'controls'; 
See Chapter II. The following account draws heavily on an earlier article on this subject. See H. 
van den Belt and B. Gremmen, 'Specificity in the Era of Koch and Ehrlich: a Generalized Interpre-
tation of Ludwik Fleck's "Serological" Thought Style', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
21 (1990): 463-79. In this article we reconstructed Fleck's 'serological' thought style as a specimen 
of the style of 'specificity'. What is new in this chapter is the contrasting of the 'specificity' (or 
'pluralist') style with an alternative, the so-called 'unitarian' style, thus allowing a more complete 
stylistic analysis in comparative terms. 
CHAPTER VIII 
RECONSTRUCTING THE 'SEROLOGICAL' THOUGHT STYLE 
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(6) the 'chemical delusion' (chemischer Wahri): toxins, antibodies and complement are seen 
as well-defined chemical substances and not simply as particular serum effects. 
Before ttirning to a systematic analysis of the 'serological' thought style, I must briefly 
comment on some of Fleck's formulations which may strike the reader as unduly partisan and 
biased. How can an analyst who advocates a comparative epistemology taking "a less egocen-
tric, more general point of view" (22/34) use such a dismissive description as "chemical 
delusion" to refer to certain views of early 20th-century immunology? Fleck's assertion that 
he has been able to distil several style components from the first chapter of Citron's textbook 
by asking what elements it contained "that cannot be justified" (59/79) only serves to reinfor-
ce our suspicions. As a standard of comparison he used what he called "new views", which 
in his opinion belonged to the future but which he held to be already discernable in the mid-
19308. This strategy makes indeed a mockery of Fleck's advocacy of a non-egocentric 
comparative epistemology and violates the modern constructivist principles of symmetry and 
impartiality. 
It appears that Fleck, from the vantage point of the alleged wisdom of the future, looked 
down contemptuously on a number of style elements as if they represented completely obso-
lete views. The irony is that the modern reader will not always share Fleck's appraisal. In 
present-day views toxins and antibodies are really well-defined chemical substances; we will 
therefore see no reason to speak of a 'chemical delusion'. 2 Fleck himself preferred to attri-
bute different serum effects to physico-chemical and colloidal changes in complex solutions 
rather than to reduce them to reactions between chemically defined substances. Just as Fleck 
looked down at Ehrlich's era as "die Epoche des chemischen Wannes" (the era of chemical 
delusion), later writers on the history of science have passed an equally unfavourable judge-
ment on the kind of 'colloidal' views Fleck adhered to and have even used the expression 
"dark age of biocolloidology". 3 In both cases we have 'Whig history' before us. 
Fleck also took an 'egocentric' stand when dealing with the style element of (serological) 
specificity. He commented very briefly: "Ein ausgesprochen mystischer Begriff!" (An extre-
mely mystical notion!) (63/84). 4 Previously, Fleck had observed that certain words are not 
logically examined but immediately make either enemies or friends, one of his examples 
being the word 'specificity' (43/59). So there is no doubt that Fleck was an enemy of 'speci-
Complement, however, has evolved from a fairly simple serum factor in the beginning of this 
century into a, by now, very complex 'complement system', comprising several substances functio-
ning in different 'pathways'. 
M. Florkin, A History of Biochemistry, Parts I and II (Comprehensive Biochemistry, Vol. 30), 
Amsterdam and New York (Elsevier Publishing Company), 1972, pp. 279-283. 
As before with "die Epoche des chemischen Wahnes" I cite from the German original, because the 
characteristic shade of meaning and tenor of Fleck's formulations have not been preserved in the 
English translation. 
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ficity'. His hostility to this notion can be related to his unfavourable opinion on the famous 
key-and-lock image that Paul Ehrlich had borrowed from Emil Fischer to visualize the 
specific reaction between antigen and antibody. In Fleck's judgement this particular image 
had had an excessive influence on the whole of immunological thinking (117/155). 
Although it is somewhat disheartening to see that Fleck did not follow his own precepts 
for a "less egocentric" epistemology, his deficient procedure also contains some hints towards 
a truly comparative analysis of thought styles. In order to achieve a description of the 'sero-
logical' thought style he identified elements from Citron's text "that cannot be justified" by 
taking the "new views" to which he himself subscribed as a criterion. However wrongheaded 
and whiggish, this strategy has at least the merit of demonstrating, if only implicitly, that 
characterization of thought styles can be done in comparative terms only. The trouble is that 
Fleck did not recognize his own views as exemplifying an alternative thought style which 
could be contrasted with the 'serological' style he was describing. Our aim must therefore 
be to find some "less egocentric, more general point of view" from which both Fleck's and 
the older serological way of thinking can be interpreted as instances of different styles. 
Looking for the unity in the diversity 
If we look again at the set of style elements that Fleck gathered together, it seems hardly 
feasible to explicate the underlying unity of this set. Do these various elements really add up 
to a distinct style? Fleck himself does not make clear in what respect his so-called 'serologi-
cal' thought style is more than the sum of its parts. His list appears to be a congeries of 
disparate elements. Nevertheless, upon examination it turns out to possess much more unity 
and coherence than one would have expected at first sight. 
The hidden unity in the collection of style elements can be expressed in one single 
keyword: specificity. This term need not be understood in the limited sense of serological 
specificity (the first style element); its meaning can be taken much more broadly. August 
Wassermann was alluding to such a broad meaning in his lecture 'Ueber den Einfluss des 
Spezifizitätsbegriffes auf die moderne Medizin' (On the impact of the concept of specificity 
in modern medicine), which he presented in 1910 at the 82nd meeting of the Verein deutscher 
Naturforscher undAerzte held at Königsberg. 5 Each fertile period in the history of medicine 
has, according to Wassermann, its own 'Grundidee' (basic idea), which, like a stone falling 
in a pond, produces ever wider circles. In Virchow's time, for instance, the basic idea was 
the notion of the cell. "But if we now ask ourselves what the basic idea for the entire modern 
trend in medicine would be, then the acute observer will have no doubt that this question 
should be answered with one word: specificity".6 Specificity is the 'Grundidee' of medicine 
A. Wassermann, 'Ueber den Einfluss des Spezifizitätsbegriffes auf die moderne Medizin', Deutsche 
medizinische Wochenschrift 36 (1910): 1860-63. 
Ibid., p. 1860. 
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in the era of Robert Koch and Paul Ehrlich. Serological specificity, but also Koch's postu-
lates and Ehrlich's chemotherapy, are all placed under Wassermann's broad umbrella. Speci-
ficity in this broad sense might be an exemplary expression of what Fleck called a "stylistic 
bond" existing "between many, if not all, concepts of a period" (9/15). We must therefore 
have a closer look at the ever wider circles our basic idea of specificity produced in different 
parts of medicine. 
In nosology we can recognize our basic idea in the ontological conception of disease. 
It is by no means a coincidence that in the second characteristic of the serological thought 
style 'diagnosis' is described as "the fitting in of a result into a system of distinct disease 
entities"; and, adds Fleck, "this assumes that such entities actually exist" (64/84). Opposed 
to the ontological conception stands what is usually called the physiological conception of 
disease. Traditional Hippocratic medicine was based on this conception; it understood illness 
as a disturbance of the proper balance of the bodily humours and had no interest in an 
abstract classification system of diseases. In the 19th century the physiological conception 
was defended by the French physician Broussais (1772-1838), who "fanatically opposed 
everything that savoured of the idea of spécificité" and held the view that symptoms follow 
no rules. 7 His great opponent Bretonneau (1778-1862) was a representative of the ontolo-
gical conception. Two centuries before, this view had already found an early advocate in 
Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689). Although the ontological conception was not invented by 
the era of Koch and Ehrlich, it rose to prominence with the rise of bacteriology. Infectious 
diseases provided paradigm cases for this view. The medical philosopher Henk ten Have 
characterized the ontological disease concept in the following way: "Like Pandora's box, 
nature harbours hostile entities that can invade the human body. These entities, moreover, 
are characterized by specificity: they are clearly distinguishable, because each of them has 
a typical combination of properties". 8 Note that the term 'specificity' is used here. More-
over diseases are also characterized as hostile entities. Fleck's Kampfgedanke (the third style 
element) is not too far off. 
To a distinct disease entity corresponds a specific aetiology. One formulation of this 
(style-dependent) 'necessary' correspondence is as follows: "The principle of etiological 
specificity of disease implies that every disease entity is produced by a quite particular cause, 
that different diseases cannot arise from the same cause, nor can different causes produce the 
same disease". 9 This has become an established principle largely as a result of the work of 
Robert Koch. Without an ontological conception of disease - if diseases were not seen as 
objectively existing, clearly distinguishable entities (or entia morborum) - the search for a 
specific aetiology would of course be meaningless. But fulfillment of the principle also 
W. Bulloch, The History of Bacteriology, New York (Dover), 1979 [1938], p. 156. 
H. ten Have, 'Ziekte als wijsgerig probleem', Wijsgerig Perspectief 25 (1984-85)-l: 5-12. 
Jendrassik, cited in K. Faber, Nosography, New York, 1930, p. 183. 
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demands that the 'causes' of diseases - in this connection living causes or 'agents' - can be 
described in a specific and unambiguous way. This was denied by the German botanist Carl 
Nageli. He recognized no boundaries between different species of bacteria, only differences 
of degree, and held that one form of bacterium could easily transform itself into another. If 
Nageli's pleomorphism had been sustained, the whole idea of a specific aetiology would have 
remained wishful thinking. Against Nageli and other adherents of this doctrine Koch per-
suasively argued, in the footsteps of Ferdinand Cohn and with the support of new techniques 
of microscopy and staining, that the pathogenic bacteria could be divided into clearly distinct 
species. Thus the principle of aetiological specificity could be fulfilled: "A distinct bacteric 
form corresponds, as we have seen, to each disease, and this form always remains the same, 
however often the disease is transmitted from one animal to another". 1 0 Koch defined the 
methodological rules (known as Koch's postulates) for the identification of specific aetiolo-
gical 'agents' of the various infectious diseases. 1 1 
The distinction and opposition between humoral and cellular immunity (the fourth style 
element on the above list) can also be brought under Wassermann's Grundidee, once we 
realize that the primary interest of German (as against French) immunology was in humoral 
immunity. This is recognized by Fleck: "the French stress the second, the Germans the first" 
(63/84). In the field of humoral immunity the basic idea of specificity could be translated into 
serological specificity. As liana Lowy declares about the debate between the 'cellular' school 
and the 'humoral' school: "In fact this polemic not only was about the mechanism by which 
immunity is obtained but dealt also with the problem of specificity. While the 'cellular' 
school was interested in non-specific mechanisms of defence against bacterial infection, the 
'humoral' school was interested in specific anti-infectious protection obtained by the media-
tion of humoral antibodies [my emphasis - HvdB]" . 1 2 
The fifth element of the 'serological' thought style - the emphasis on the methodical 
necessity of 'controls' - can also be easily assimilated to the basic idea of specificity. In his 
didactic introduction Citron urged the indispensability of carrying out control tests from the 
necessity of ascertaining the true specificity of a serological reaction: "When the specificity 
of a reaction becomes doubtful, its diagnostic utilization must accordingly suffer. For this 
reason, we must repeatedly discuss the question whether and to what extent any given reac-
R. Koch, Untersuchungen Ober die Aetiologie der Wundinfectionskrankheiten, Leipzig, 1878; cited 
in H. Freund and A. Berg (eds), Geschichte der Mikroskopie, Frankfurt am Main (Umschau Ver-
lag), 1964, p. 184. 
In Chapters III and IV we have seen that Koch's postulates were not strictly followed in the case of 
syphilis. Without having been brought into pure culture, Spirochaeta pallida was ultimately accep-
ted as the causative agent of this disease. 
I. Lowy, "The Epistemology of the Sciences of an Epistemologist of the Sciences: Ludwik Fleck's 
Professional Outlook and its Relationship to his Philosophical Work', in R.S. Cohen and T. Schnel-
le (eds), Cognition and Fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck, Dordrecht (Reidel), 1986, pp. 421-42, on 
p. 423. 
244 
tion is specific and ascertain true specificity in any way possible, especially by means of 
control tests" (Citron cited in Fleck 58-59/78). 
The sixth style element on the list, Fleck's much abused 'chemical delusion', also stands 
under the sign of specificity. The unfortunate victim of this depreciatory expression was Paul 
Ehrlich's side-chain theory, which had been formulated to elucidate the formation of anti-
bodies and the nature of the antigen-antibody reaction. The expression was not aimed at two 
rivals of Ehrlich's theory, namely Arrhenius' physico-chemical (electrolytic) theory and 
Bordet's colloid-chemical v iew. 1 3 Ehrlich's theory was the most popular among serologists 
in Germany. 1 4 Although Ehrlich was criticized by his opponents for not properly respecting 
the principle of simplicity or 'parsimony' (because for every particular serum effect he 
postulated the existence of a separate substance), the great majority of German serologists 
preferred Ehrlich's theory. In their eyes it could account in a most satisfactory way for the 
specificity of the antigen-antibody reaction. As Rubin concludes: "The specificity of the 
immune response certainly counted heavily for its popularity". 1 5 
As the above illustrates, it is indeed possible to discern a stylized unity and coherence 
in the set of style elements collected by Fleck. This unity can be expressed by the basic idea 
of specificity. The social sphere of influence of this basic idea, however, extends far beyond 
the boundaries of the collective of serologists. It may be appropriate, therefore, to consider 
Fleck's 'serological' thought style as only a part of a more general style of wider social 
scope, which we could provisionally dub the thought style of specificity. Following Wasser-
mann, we could say that the basic idea of specificity - like a stone falling in a pond - has 
'produced' ever wider circles in the fields of nosology, bacteriology and serology. Moving 
outside the narrow compass of the serological discipline (actually, Fleck's description of the 
so-called 'serological' thought style already went beyond these confines!), we can add one 
further field of medical science in which the impact of 'specificity' was clearly manifest: 
therapeutics. 
Taking this further step appears logical. The description of disease entities, the search 
for specific aetiological agents and the diagnostic (sometimes therapeutic) use of specific 
reactions between antigens and antibodies have as their counterpart in the sphere of therapeu-
tics the search for specific remedies. In this connection Ehrlich's programme of chemothe-
rapy, already mentioned by Wassermann as falling under his broad umbrella of specificity, 
deserves special attention. The programme's mission was to find specifics, or as Ehrlich 
declared concisely in 1908: "wir miissen zielen lernen, chemisch zielen lernen" (we must 
P.M.H. Mazumdar, "The Antigen-Antibody Reaction and the Physics and Chemistry of Life', Bul-
letin of the History of Mediane 48 (1974): 1-21. 
L.P. Rubin, 'Styles in Scientific Explanation: Paul Ehrlich and Svante Arrhenius on Immuno-
chemistry', Journal of the History of Medicine 35 (1980): 397-425. 
Ibid., p. 422. 
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P.M.H. Mazumdar, Speties and Specificity: An Interpretation of the History of Immunology, Cam-
bridge (Cambridge University Press), 1995. 
Ibid., p. 4 ff. Mazumdar refers to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp 
Smith, Toronto (MacMillan), 1965, p. 540 ff. Compare Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 655 ff (ac-
cording to the pagination of the original first edition of 1781). 
learn to aim in a chemical way) . 1 6 Ehrlich would hit the bull's-eye in 1909 with his disco-
very of arsphenamine or Salvarsan as an effective drug against syphilis. Fleck traces chemo-
therapy back to mercury treatment, which had been introduced at an early stage in the history 
of syphilis: "From the mercury idea a general therapeutic idea arose which contributed such 
wonderful remedies as Salvarsan among others" (17/26). Although mercury treatment indeed 
also exemplifies the basic idea of specificity, there is no need to go that far back in history 
to uncover the roots of Ehrlich's chemotherapy. As we saw in Chapter VII, Ehrlich himself 
considered his chemotherapy as a logical extension of Emil Behring's serotherapy. Natural 
antibodies were the ideal 'magic bullets'; whenever serotherapy was not practicable, how-
ever, chemical remedies should be called into service as a second best. Throughout his 
scientific career - from vital staining through immunology to chemotherapy - Ehrlich always 
remained loyal to the basic idea of specificity. His structural-chemical imagination enabled 
him to make this basic idea a particularly fruitful one for different parts of medical science. 
In search of a contrasting style 
In the foregoing analysis I have demonstrated that specificity was a recurring element in 
several fields of medical science: nosology, aetiology (bacteriology), serology/immunology, 
and therapeutics. According to Harwood's criteria, this would not yet be sufficient to warrant 
us to speak of a thought style of specificity. It is also necessary to show that this particular 
element or trait can be matched with at least one contrastive element or trait covering a 
comparable range of sectors. In other words, we have to find another style which serves as 
an alternative to the style of specificity. Happily, with regard to this requirement the prepara-
tory work has already been done. In her book Species and Specificity the historian Pauline 
Mazumdar recounts and analyzes the recurrent opposition between the protagonists of 'plura-
list' and 'unitarian' views or styles in the history of botany, bacteriology, immunology and 
immunochemistry, and blood group genetics. 1 7 If we can equate our 'specificity style' with 
her 'pluralist' style, then clearly the 'unitarian' style represents the alternative we are looking 
for. 
Mazumdar follows Immanuel Kant in noting that 'students of nature' generally fall into 
two groups: the first are always on the watch for the unity underlying the diversity of nature; 
the second try to differentiate nature, to accentuate its diversity and to divide into species 
rather than to unify into genera. 1 8 A paradigmatic example of the first group, dubbed the 
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'unitarians', is Galilei with his large following among the physicists; an example of the 
second group, dubbed the 'pluralists', is Linnaeus. Nineteenth-century German botany and 
bacteriology offered the scene for the first dramatic confrontations between 'unitarians' and 
'pluralists', personified by Carl von Nageli and Ferdinand Conn, respectively. Nageli was 
a 'unitarian' thinker par excellence: he stressed continuity in nature and differences in degree 
('quantitative Abstufungen') and did not allow for sharp boundaries between species; among 
the bacteria he did not even recognize the existence of separate species. His opponent Cohn, 
by contrast, was an arch-typical 'pluralist' who attempted to develop a morphological classifi-
cation of bacteria along Linnaean lines by division into orders and genera. It was of course 
Conn's pupil, Robert Koch, who won a decisive victory for the 'pluralist' side on the terrain 
of bacteriology, thanks to an impressive "morphological technology" (stains, solid media, 
improved microscopy). In the new German Reich Koch and his group of students and co-
workers attained institutionally secured positions of power; for them, as Mazumdar notes, 
"a belief in absolute specificity was an essential mark of group loyalty". 1 9 From bacterio-
logy the confrontation between 'unitarianism' and 'pluralism' now moved on to the domain 
of immunology. Max Gruber, trained by Nageli, attacked views of the Koch school on the 
specificity of antisera. For Gruber, such specificity was not absolute but only a matter of 
degree. Later the same subject was at stake in his clash with Paul Ehrlich, for whom, as 
Mazumdar notes, absolute specificity set the style of his theory of immunity. The defence 
of the 'unitarian' cause in immunology and especially immunochemistry was passed on to 
Gruber's student Karl Landsteiner, who later also opposed Ehrlich's views on immunity. The 
baton was finally transmitted to Landsteiner's American student at the Rockefeller Institute, 
Alexander Wiener, who in the late 1940s and 1950s stubbornly defended 'unitarian' views 
in the field of blood group genetics against attacks of the geneticists Race and Fisher. This 
constitutes the last act in the conflict that has been going on now for five generations and that 
has been extensively described in Mazumdar's book. 
Mazumdar's analysis usefully extends our account in several pertinent ways. It will have 
become sufficiently clear, I hope, that our 'specificity style' may indeed be equated with her 
'pluralist' style. She also supplies us, moreover, with the alternative style we looked for. We 
now have available a well-defined characterization with which to assess whether various 
deviant cases fit the pattern of this style. 
In Chapters IV and V we met a colourful critic of bacteriology and defender of clinical 
medicine, Ottomar Rosenbach. His trenchant criticisms of the nosological delineation of 
syphilis as a well-defined entity, his attacks on a supposedly specific microbic agent and his 
sarcastic dismissal of the 'myth' of the specific action of mercury and iodine, all fit a cohe-
rent pattern. Rosenbach's advocacy of a so-called 'energetic' approach, both for diagnosis 
and therapy, also seems to represent a unitarian style. Thus his dissident views in the field 
of bacteriology and the diagnosis and treatment of syphilis clearly exhibit stylistic coherence. 
1 9 Ibid., p. 8. 
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Another notable dissident with respect to the dominant style of specificity, of course, was 
Fleck himself. I remarked above that he did not recognize his own medical, bacteriological 
and immunological views as exemplifying a certain style, although he used them as an 
implicit yardstick for identifying and describing the so-called 'serological' thought style. We 
can attribute a stylistic significance to Fleck's preference for a colloid-chemical view (as 
against the alleged 'chemical delusion' of Ehrlich's theory) when we take cognizance of the 
fact that Landsteiner too, during a certain period of his career (from 1903 to about 1912), 
considered colloid chemistry an ideal alternative for Ehrlich's structural organic chemistry: 
"The new and exciting field of colloid chemistry, the youngest branch of physical chemistry, 
seemed to suggest that chemical specificity might play no part at all in the reactions that took 
place in the living organism". 2 0 We have already seen that Fleck, according to his own 
testimony, was no 'friend' of specificity. There are more indications that his professional 
thought was marked by a 'unitarian' style. His early rejection of the view of diseases as 
objectively given entities (see Chapter II) was not just a first step towards a constructivist 
approach to medical science, it also accords well with a 'unitarian' style in the domain of 
nosology. In the field of bacteriology Fleck's eager adoption of 'bacterial variability' and his 
rejection of the assumption of the fixity of bacterial species - which is constitutive of Koch's 
methodology (cf. Fleck: "Species were fixed because a fixed and restricted method was 
applied to the investigation [..]"; 92/122) - are equally characteristic. Fleck's professional 
thought thus exhibited stylistic coherence over a variety of different fields (nosology, bacte-
riology, immunology). Given the dominance of the Koch-Ehrlich group in the German-
speaking world of medical science, Fleck's position was clearly that of a dissident out-
sider. 2 1 
The question of stylistic constraint revisited 
In the foregoing analysis I followed Wassermann's simile of a stone falling in a pond when 
I stated that the basic idea of specificity produced ever wider circles in various fields of 
medical science. This formulation has an idealistic savour in that it attributes power and 
efficacy to a 'mere' idea. Such 'empowering' of ideational factors conflicts with the finitist 
tenets of many forms of modern constructivism. One might hold, however, that the construe-
Ibid., p. 9. See also p. 222: "Immune specificity, [Landsteiner] suggested, could be regarded as the 
sum of a number of component reactions, in themselves nonspecific". Fleck's adoption of a colloid-
chemical view of the nature of immune reactions during the mid-1930s was however rather outda-
ted by the standards of the discipline of immunology. 
Mazumdar shows that Gruber and Landsteiner were given little opportunity to propagate and elabo-
rate their deviant views in Austria and Germany. After his clash with Ehrlich, Gruber abandoned 
immunology altogether to turn to public hygiene. His student Landsteiner finally found a niche for 
completing his immunochemical lifework at the Rockefeller Institute in New York. "The power 
structure built up within the Koch-Ehrlich group may be one of the most effective ever formed in 
science" (Mazumdar, pp. 381-82). 
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tivist rejection of the power of ideas goes too far. What else does the case of 'specificity' 
show us but the example of an idea that has been immensely infuential in a number of fields? 
If the power of this basic idea is denied on a priori finitist grounds, then perhaps so much 
the worse for finitism! How to solve this apparent paradox? Do we have to drop finitism? 
Or is there something fundamentally wrong with our historical perception that the notion of 
specificity has been a very 'powerful' idea indeed? 
We may attempt to find a way out of this dilemma (or at least to soften it somewhat) 
by recognizing that speaking about the 'power' of ideas might be an elliptical mode of 
expression. To attribute power to ideas, then, would not necessarily imply the suggestion that 
ideas are able to exercise a decisive influence exclusively of their own accord, as it were, 
but might involve the much weaker claim that such ideas can make a crucial difference in 
the appropriate circumstances when they are combined and supported by suitable social 
forces. 
In this connection it is interesting to note that Mazumdar stresses the extraordinary 
importance of 'pedagogical moulding' in the transmission of a certain style of thought from 
one generation to the next. In the pluralist camp the characteristic way of thinking was passed 
on from teacher to student, e.g. from Conn to Koch and from Koch to his followers. In the 
unitarian camp teacher-student relations for propagating the faith were even more salient. An 
extensive quotation from the concluding chapter of Mazumdar's book may be appropriate 
here: 
"It is my feeling that in the culture that I have discussed here, which is mainly that of nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century German science, it is almost impossible to exaggerate the determining effect of 
[the] mixture of technology and intellectual patterning that is passed from teacher to student. It is a 
patterning that outweighs in many cases the desire to have a successful career: in the social climate of the 
time, it was the pluralists, the Koch-Ehrlich team, who were guaranteed a good position. Unitarians, from 
Nageli to Gruber and Buchner, to Landsteiner, to Wiener, all suffered the fate of outsiders, yet they 
persisted in their opposition. The young people were given a sketch, as it were, of their life's work. They 
were taught to look at the empirical data of their science in a particular way, to expect a certain structure 
in nature, and to feel that they had made a successful achievement when they had found such a struc-
ture".2 2 
The latter description neatly fits Fleck's definition of a thought style as a particular 'prepa-
redness' or 'readiness' for selective perception and thinking. Mazumdar herself refers to the 
parallel with Fleck's discussion of Citron's introductory lecture as a pedagogical induction, 
effected with "gentle constraint", into the serological style of thought (63/73). In the quoted 
passage she mentions an additional component of the process of 'pedagogical moulding', 
namely technology. As an example we can think of Koch's methods of cultivating bacteria, 
preparing solid media, staining and microscopy, which Mazumdar characterizes as a "mor-
Ibid., p. 380. 
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phological technology". New recruits were introduced into Koch's way of thinking partly by 
being trained in the use of these techniques. Occasionally, Fleck also draws attention to the 
effect of scientific devices and instruments in directing our thinking on to the tracks of a 
certain style: "Living as we do among devices and instruments from the current scientific 
thought-style, we always obtain 'objective' stimuli urging us to that way of flunking but no 
other". 2 3 Mazumdar puts the intellectual patterning effected through material techniques 
within the broader pedagogical context of framing by example. 
Pedagogical moulding, however, is not the only social force sustaining a particular 
thought style. As Mazumdar notes, "[fjhe ideas had to be fitted into a social power structure 
in order to acquire authority". 2 4 An unprecedentedly robust power structure, manifesting 
itself in the control of university chairs, directorships of institutes and journals, had been 
built up by the Koch-Ehrlich group in late 19th- and early 20th-century German bacteriology 
and immunology. Speaking of the power of the idea of specificity may be just an oblique way 
of referring to the social power of this particular group. If a belief in absolute specificity was 
a mark of loyalty to the Koch-Ehrlich group, as Mazumdar maintains, then the power of the 
group to some extent explains the influence of this idea. As a 'social' explanation, however, 
this account goes some way but doesn't travel very far. It does not explain why, or by which 
social mechanisms, the Koch-Ehrlich group adopted the idea of specificity as its hallmark in 
the first place. I must admit that I cannot think of any social explanation in the format of the 
Strong Programme (apart from the formative influence exercised on Koch by his teacher 
Colin) which would give a convincing answer to this question. Nor does Mazumdar provide 
us anything of this sort. 
A less ambitious but perhaps more feasible approach can be taken if we interpret the 
basic idea of specificity in terms of Mary Hesse's network theory as a coherence condition 
for the organization of a widely extended knowledge network. 2 5 Among (the sources of) 
such coherence conditions she also counts "relatively a priori and perhaps culturally conditio-
ned metaphysical principles" 2 6 - and it could be reasonably argued that specificity consti-
tutes just such a metaphysical principle -, but this line of thought has been blocked by Hes-
se's constructivist followers Barnes and Bloor for being too idealistic. What I want to stress 
here is that, as a coherence condition, the basic idea of specificity operated as an overarching 
'regulative principle' through which divergent research efforts extending over a broad range 
of fields - nosology, bacteriology, serology, therapeutics - could be mutually coordinated. 
L. Fleck, "The Problem of Epistomology [1936]', in R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle (eds.), Cognition 
and Fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck, Dordrecht (Reidel), 1986, pp. 79-112, on p. 109. 
Mazumdar, op. cit. (note 17), p. 381. 
M. Hesse, The Structure of Scientific Inference, Berkeley and Los Angeles (University of California 
Press), 1974. 
Ibid., p. 52. 
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Given the necessity of mutual coordination in the social division of scientific labour, one can 
easily imagine - by way of a thought experiment - a cumulative and self-reinforcing process 
being set in motion once the idea of specificity, for one reason or another, has acquired a 
foothold in any of these fields. From this initial field of strength the idea of specificity will 
then spread to the other fields. If the coordination succeeds, that is, if the idea will be put 
to successful use in the new fields, this will of course enhance its overall strength. Ultima-
tely, a coherent and robust network of knowledge may be the result. (Something like this 
may have happened in actual history inasmuch as the idea of specificity spread from bacterio-
logy to serology and from serology to therapeutics. In my judgement, its initial strength in 
the field of nosology was not sufficient to have triggered the entire movement; rather, its 
position there was strengthened through retroactive feedback from bacteriology.) Once such 
an extensive and tightly coupled network of knowledge is in place, it might be defensible to 
attribute some coristraining force to the doniinant thought style of specificity in virtue of both 
social and intellectual factors; socially, it derives from the necessity of mutual coordination 
in the social division of scientific labour; intellectually, from the solid coherence of the 
existing cognitive network. 
It is along lines such as those sketched above, I Ihink, that the riddle of the apparent 
power of the idea of specificity (and thus of the apparent compelling force of the 'serological' 
thought style which so much impressed Fleck) must be solved. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM AND THE SOCIAL 
In this chapter I shall deal more thoroughly with two 'big problems' that are raised both by 
Fleck's work and by modern constructivism and that have been broached repeatedly in 
previous chapters, to wit, the issue of realism and the complex question of how to conceive 
of 'the social' and of the relationship between the individual and the collective. The latter 
problem includes the quest for an adequate conception of social practices in general and of 
scientific practices in particular. In the course of developing a defensible and coherent 
position on these controversial issues I inevitably have to confront the relevant views of the 
philosophical and sociological literature, but I will also draw occasionally on the empirical 
materials presented in the preceding chapters. 
1. The question of realism 
"One of the curious things about being part of the new sociology of science", the American 
sociologist Susan Leigh Star once remarked, "is that one is immediately plunged into 
philosophical debates about realism and relativism". 1 With barely disguised annoyance she 
then described how she had been drawn into such debates time and again: 
"I have been involved in the sociology of science and technology for about ten years [..]. I have given 
perhaps 75 talks on various aspects of science studies. Only once have I not been asked some version of 
what I now call the 'there there' question: but are you saying it's all socially constructed? Doesn't that 
mean anything could be true? Isn't there anything out there? Are scientists making it all up?".2 
Instead of directly answering these questions, Star formulates a sociological counter-question 
by way of response: "Rather, as sociologists, let's ask: under what conditions do such 
questions about reality routinely get raised?". In my view, this evasive strategy will not 
work. The questions about reality simply won't go away, even if the sociologist tries hard 
to shift the debate to a different level of discourse. Besides, one would think that Star owes 
her perplexed audiences a serious reply. Whoever defends the thesis that scientific knowledge 
or scientific facts or even material objects are (socially) constructed must be prepared to 
answer the objections such a prima facie counterintuitive view is bound to provoke. The 
trouble is that an authoritative and unanimous answer to such objections is unlikely to be 
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formcoming from constructivist studies of science. As Star herself rightly notes: "Scholars 
in science studies have disagreed about this issue and will continue to do so for some time 
to come". 3 I shall attempt to develop my own position on this matter by critically engaging 
myself with the several views that are represented in this field. 
Representations and their objects 
As a way to simplify the whole gamut of opinions relating to this issue, let me once more 
return to the distinction between 'moderate' and 'radical' forms of constructivism that was 
introduced in Chapters I and n . Moderate constructivists either take a (methodologically 
motivated) agnostic stance toward objective reality (Collins) or profess to be ontological 
realists (the adherents of the Strong Programme), without however giving any role to a 
(purported) 'correspondence with reality' in explaining the acceptance or rejection of 
scientific theories. In short, moderate constructivists are epistemological relativists. Radical 
constructivists such as Karin Knorr-Cetina and Bruno Latour, by contrast, claim to have 
circumvented the entire epistemological debate between realism and anti-realism. They also 
claim to have opened up the closed universe of social interaction between humans in favour 
of a triumphal return of material objects and other non-human 'actants'. Characteristic of the 
turn from science-as-knowledge to science-as-practice proclaimed by other radical 
constructivists is the recognition that as a constructive practice scientific work is deeply 
engaged with the material world. Yet, despite all these apparent approaches to a more 
'realist' position, radical varieties of constructivism have not been able to avoid a head-on 
collision with current versions of scientific realism on epistemological and especially on 
ontological issues. 
The root of the trouble is to be sought in the overextended use of the construction 
metaphor by radical constructivists. Sergio Sismondo has rendered us the useful service of 
sorting out several different meanings of 'construction'. He distinguishes the following senses 
of the term: 
"(a) the construction, through the interplay of actors, of institutions, including knowledge, methodologies, 
fields, habits, and regulative ideals; (b) the construction by scientists of theories and accounts, in the sense 
that these are structures that rest upon bases of data and observations; (c)the construction, through material 
intervention, of artefacts in the laboratory; and (d) the construction, in the neo-Kantian sense, of the 
objects of thought and representation".4 
It is clear that Sismondo's distinctions are based on the different types of objects (including 
'social objects' like institutions) that are held to be (socially) constructed. Meanings (a) and 
(b) are prominent in the work of moderate constructivists; their concern is primarily with the 
Ibid., p. 202. 
S. Sismondo, 'Some Social Constructions', Social Studies of Science 23 (1993): 515-53, on p. 516. 
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construction of scientific knowledge (or with the construction of facts, but then these are 
understood as items of knowledge). The precise distinction between meanings (a) and (b) is 
not of much importance to their purposes, because 'knowledge' as a system of collectively 
held beliefs about nature is ipso facto treated as a social institution. As such this usage of the 
construction metaphor is ontologically innocuous and therefore not too offensive to scientific 
realists. Construction in sense (c) figures prominently in some of the work of Knorr-Cetina. 
She has argued that 'nature' is conspicuously absent in the scientific laboratories nominally 
devoted to its study, because the objects, raw materials and test animals that are worked upon 
or with have all been specially prepared, purified, bred or 'pre-constructed'. 5 She has thus 
drawn attention to the utter artificiality of the laboratory setting which constitutes a critical 
challenge - termed the 'Bachelardian challenge' by Hans Radder 6 - for established forms of 
realism. The fourth sense of construction, meaning (d), which is not always clearly 
distinguished from the other meanings, is the most problematic. It is to be found in the 
writings of several radical constructivists and implies a view of ontology that is highly 
offensive to various forms of scientific realism. 
What Sismondo calls the 'neo-Kantian' sense of construction involves the idea that 
objects are created by their representations. This idea has been most strongly advocated by 
Steve Woolgar. 7 He criticizes other British representatives of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge for being insufficiently radical. Sociologists like Barnes and Bloor insist on 
mamteining a clear distinction between the natural world and the theoretical accounts we give 
of it, although they emphasize that our experience of the world may in principle always give 
rise to more than one account (because of the 'underdetermination' thesis). In order to fully 
realize the 'radical potential' of the sociological study of science, Woolgar argues that we 
should be prepared to reverse the arrow, that is, to consider the natural world as a product 
of scientific knowledge rather than vice versa. This amounts to saying that accounts or 
representations constitute their objects. A clear illustration of this way of thinking can be 
found in the so-called 'splitting-and-inversion model' that was used earlier in Latour and 
Woolgar's Laboratory Life to understand the construction of scientific facts. The solid 
existence of a fact 'out there', they maintained, results from the settlement of a scientific 
controversy. As long as controversies are still raging, there is no stable reality to which 
scientific statements refer. Once agreement sets in, something strange happens: "The 
statement becomes a split entity. On the one hand, it is a set of words which represents a 
K. D. Knorr-Cetina, 'The Ethnographic Study of Scientific Work: Towards a Constructivist 
Interpretation of Science', in K. Knorr-Cetina and M. Mulkay (eds.), Science Observed: 
Perspectives on the Social Study of Science, London (Sage), 1983, pp. 115^t0. 
H. Radder, In and About the World: Philosophical Studies of Science and Technology, Albany 
(State University of New York Press), 1996, p. 74. 
S. Woolgar, Science: The Very Idea, Chichester (Ellis Horwood), 1988. 
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statement about an object. On the other hand, it corresponds to an object in itself which takes 
on a life of its own". 8 Subsequently, history is rewritten, as it were. Now it is held that the 
object has been there all along, waiting to be discovered. Thus an inversion takes place: "the 
object becomes the reason why the statement was formulated in the first place". 9 Part of the 
construction of a scientific fact is the removal of all traces indicating that construction has 
actually taken place . 1 0 A remarkable feature of Latour and Woolgar's view is that an object 
enters into existence precisely at the time of its discovery. Thus they held that the hormone 
TRF (thyrotropin releasing factor), the object figuring in their case study, began to exist at 
the time of its official discovery, in 1969, but did not exist before that year. 
Although the 'splitting-and-inversion model' of Laboratory Life is undoubtedly very 
subtle and ingenious, it also contains a thesis that is highly problematic, to wit, the idea that 
objects are created out of negotiation and eventual consensus, or in other words that 
representations, once generally shared, give rise to their objects. It is as if entities which 
initially existed only 'on paper', would suddenly jump from the pages of scientific 
publications to the real world outside the texts once scientists had made up their mind. The 
problem with this view is that it can hardly be reconciled with established conceptions of 
causality, or as Sismondo states: "The idea that representations routinely create their objects 
has little or no connection with our ordinary notions of cause and effect". 1 1 It also severely 
strains our imagination to believe that, say, microbes made their entry into the world at the 
time of Koch and Pasteur and not already much earlier. 
How widely held is this particular view in contemporary forms of constructivism? 
Sismondo suggests that in his later work Latour has effectively abandoned it, citing the 
"distinctly realist flavour" which many commentators have attributed to his more recent 
contributions. 1 2 It thus seems that the thesis mat accounts are constitutive of their objects 
has become the special hallmark of Woolgar's brand of sociology. This impression is 
deceptive. In one version or another the idea is to be found in many varieties of radical 
constructivism. It is significant that in a critical reply to Sismondo's article Knorr-Cetina 
8 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The [Social] Construction of Scientific Facts, 
Princeton, NJ (Princeton University Press), 1986 (2nd edition), pp. 176-77. 
9 Ibid. 
1 0 In their discussion Latour and Woolgar rather carelessly switch from speaking about a 'fact' to 
speaking about an 'object'. This may have to do with the particular case under study in their book. 
It deals with the formation of the fact that 'TRF (thyrotropin releasing factor) is pyro-glu-his-pro-
amide', which can also be viewed as the isolation of the object TRF, the active substance 
responsible for thyrotropin release, and the elucidation of its chemical structure. In this case, then, 
the discovery of a 'fact' is simultaneously the discovery and identification of an 'object'. 
Ibid., p. 537. 
1 1 Sismondo, op. cit. (note 4), p. 536. 
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K. Knorr Cetina, 'Strong Constructivism - from a Sociologist's Point of View: A Personal 
Addendum to Sismondo's Paper', Social Studies of Science 23 (1993): 555-63, on p. 557. 
R.N. Giere, 'Science and Technology Studies: Prospects for an Enlightened Postmodern Synthesis', 
Science, Technology, & Human Values 18 (1993): 102-12, on p. 107. 
B. Latour, Science in Action, Milton Keynes (Open University Press), 1987, p. 100. 
B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, Cambridge MA (Harvard University Press), 1993. 
openly admitted to support a version of the thesis so much criticized by the latter. 1 3 And 
I'm also convinced, against Sismondo's suggestion, that the more recent work of Latour still 
assumes the validity of the idea. The realist philosopher Ronald Giere has raised the pertinent 
question how much different Latour's position actually is from that of his one-time co-author 
Woolgar: "On the surface, there appears to be considerable difference in that Latour has no 
interest in the wholesale deconstruction of modern technoscience. He is perfectly willing to 
engage in 'realist' discourse about unproblematical entities like microbes and DNA. But if 
one asks how such entities came to be unproblematical, similarities with more radical 
versions of social constructivism [i.e. with Woolgar's position - HvdB] reappear (my 
emphasis)". 1 4 I think Giere is here on the trail to solving the oft-noted paradox about 
Latour's work in so far as it represents a strange mixture of constructivism and realism. This 
paradox derives from a duplicity that was already built into the splitting-and-inversion model 
of Laboratory Life and that has since been reinforced by Latour's adoption of the 
methodological injunction to 'follow the actors'. It is this rule which enjoins the analyst of 
technoscience to take a skeptical or agnostic attitude toward the entities under discussion as 
long as controversies are raging (because during that period scientists themselves are 
skeptical) and to become a committed realist with regard to the existence of those same 
entities after the controversies have been settled (because then the scientists have themselves 
turned into realists): "We are realists as much as the people we travel with [..]. But as soon 
as controversy starts we become as relativist as our informants". 1 5 Yet in one crucial 
respect Latour is not fully consequential in following his 'informants'; whereas they will find 
that the object on whose existence they have come to agree has been there all along, Latour 
continues to hold that this object was only brought into being by their reaching agreement. 
Due to this inconsequentiality Latour's alleged realism is a very weird kind of realism 
indeed. 
From this background we will understand more easily how 'technoscience', on Latour's 
account, is engaged in the ceaseless proliferation of ever new entities, 'hybrids' or 'quasi-
objects', or whatever these products may be called. 1 6 Society and nature, Latour asserts, 
are being 'co-produced' by technoscience - please take note that he speaks about the 
production of nature, not just representations or accounts of nature! Similar world-making 
capacities are granted to scientific practice in Knorr-Cetina's version of radical 
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constructivism, which considers laboratories as "instruments of world construction". 
According to her, "science secretes an unending stream of entities and relations that make 
up 'the wor ld ' " . 1 8 Among the objects and entities science supposedly gives rise to are not 
just counted plastics, synthetic drugs or genetically modified organisms, but also microbes, 
genes, atoms, quarks, pulsars, black holes, supernova, etcetera. Thus Latour and Knorr-
Cetina appear to deliberately blur the distinction between meanings (c) and (d) of the term 
'construction' in Sismondo's list. For the first category of objects, 'construction' refers to 
a material procedure like chemical synthesis or the technique of transgenesis - meaning (c) 
of Sismondo. For the second category of objects, 'construction' refers to someming 
completely different, namely, the social process of building consensus about the existence and 
properties of the said entities - corresponding to Sismondo's meaning (d). It is rather 
misleading to use the term 'secretion' to describe this social process as if it were a purely 
material process! 
In her reply to Sismondo and in later work Knorr-Cetina has come to the defence of the 
criticized thesis that representations create their objects. A more acceptable and plausible 
version of this thesis, in her view, states that what comes into existence when science 
'discovers' a microbe or a subatomic particle, "is a specific entity distinguished from other 
entities (other microbes, other particles) and furnished with a name, a set of descriptors, and 
a set of techniques in terms of which it can be produced and handled". 1 9 Formulated in yet 
another way, "some part of a preexisting material world becomes specified and thereby real 
as something to be reckoned with, accounted for, and inserted in manifold ways into 
scientific and everyday l i fe" . 2 0 It is also not a matter of bringing a new object into being 
by the simple act of snapping fingers; scientists have rather to struggle hard to accomplish 
such a thing. Knoir-Cetina thus looks primarily at the various ways in which the new entitity 
is assigned a place in a familiar cultural world, how it is drawn into that world, so to speak, 
and only thereby acquires a distinct identity. She is willing to grant the pre-existence of an 
(unknown) material world, but not the pre-existence of specific objects. In my opinion these 
qualifications do not suffice to warrant radical constructivist talk of refurnishing the world 
K. Knorr-Cetina et al., 'Laboratorien: Instrumente der Weltkonstruktion', in P. Hoyningen-Huene 
and G. Hirsch (eds.), Wozu Wissenschaftsphilosophie? Positionen und Fragen zur gegenwärtigen 
Wissenschaftsphilosophie, Berlin and New York (Walter de Gruyter), 1988, pp. 315-44. 
Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. (note 13), p. 557; this is a rephrasing of a previous statement dating from 
1983 ; see Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. (note 5), p. 135. It is significant that the term 'secretion' was 
already used in a similar connection by Latour and Woolgar, op. cit. (note 8): "Reality is secreted" 
(p. 243). 
K. Knorr Cetina, 'Laboratory Studies: The Cultural Approach to the Study of Science', in S. 
Jasanoff et al. (eds.), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Thousand Oaks, London, New 
Delhi (Sage), pp. 140-66, on p. 161. 
2 0 Ibid. 
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with new objects and of thereby (recreating the world. Knorr-Cetina still makes the 
existence of an object depend on human knowledge, which in Sismondo's eyes amounts to 
the fallacy of conflating ontology with epistemology (Knorr-Cetina rejects the charge, but I 
fail to see on which grounds she can do so ) . 2 1 If an object X counts as a specific object 
only if it is furnished with a name and a description, then of course it is trivially true that 
X comes into being as a specific object only as a consequence of our epistemic activities (we 
did not create X, but we contributed to the creation of X-furnished-with-a-name-and-a-
description simply because we supplied the name and the description!). If anything 
deservedly invites the charge of conflating ontology with epistemology, it is such a 
conception of 'existence'. 
Scientific realism or moderate constructivism? 
What is the alternative if we reject the radical constructivist thesis that science, by developing 
new accounts of nature, refurnishes the world with new objects? Are we then, as Knorr-
Cetina suggests, condemned to accept some strong form of scientific realism which "assumes 
the pre-existence of specific objects before they have been delimited by science in precisely 
the way they are delimited by science" 2 2? Or, in other words, do we have to accept that 
the world comes 'carved at its joints'? I do not think so. There is a third option. It is 
perfectly possible for a constructivist analyst of science to adopt, during a scientific 
controversy, a deliberately agnostic attitude vis-á-vis the entities under debate, and to persist 
in this uncommitted stance even after the scientists involved have resolved their differences! 
(What is not possible is to be an uncommitted agnostic 'across the board', that is, with regard 
to all domains of human knowledge, but that is not advocated here.) Although Latour 
maintains that "[w]e cannot be more relativist than scientists about [the stabilized parts of 
science] [..] [b]ecause the cost of dispute is too high for an average citizen, even if he or she 
is a historian or sociologist of science" 2 3 , this is just a practical difficulty, not an 
impossibility in principle. The historian or sociologist may still argue that the accepted 
theoretical accounts of the phenomena in question are not the only possible ones, even if he 
or she is unable to come up with concrete alternatives. If we avoid the duplicity of being an 
agnostic constructivist during a controversy and a dyed-in-the-wool realist thereafter, then 
we can also avoid the implausible thesis that objects are created by their representations. This 
The tendency to define 'existence' as dependent on human practices is also found in Joseph Rouse's 
otherwise balanced and sophisticated discussion of realism and anti-realism: "What it is for an x to 
exist (as an x) is constituted [..] by the ways it can be encountered in the course of intelligibly 
dealing with the world". Similarly: "what there is does depend upon what can be made manifest in 
our practices". See J. Rouse, Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science, 
Ithaca and London (Cornell University Press), 1987, p. 161 and p. 145. 
Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. (note 13), p. 557. 
Latour, op. cit. (note 15), p. 100. 
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line of approach is generally taken by moderate constructivists. I have followed this line in 
Chapters i n and IV on the history of syphilis concepts and the discovery of the causative 
agent. The point of these chapters was not that at each new turn of events medical science 
sent out new diseases or new microbes into the world, but that modern notions of syphilis 
and of its causative agent were the negotiated (provisional) outcomes of debates on carving 
up the world in different ways. 
If we have to reject radical constructivism, why opt for moderate constructivism? 
Wouldn't a strong form of scientific realism be preferable to the latter? In my judgement, 
the flavour of current versions of scientific realism is just a little bit too strong to swallow 
them whole. Take, for instance, Michael Devitt's version of scientific realism, which he 
presents as a robust realism "worth fighting for". According to this version, "tokens of most 
current common-sense and scientific physical types objectively exist independently of the 
mental" . 2 4 A realist of this variety is committed to the belief in the independent existence 
not just of stones, cats, dogs, trees (common-sense realism), but also of electrons, muons, 
black holes, curved space-time and many other unobservable entities posited by modern 
physical science (scientific realism). To me it would seem that such a form of realism is 
committing itself heavily to what is currently accepted in modern science, in apparent 
contradiction to its own maxim that the ontological question should be settled before 
epistemic issues. However that may be, the realist's world is certainly a 'ready-made' world. 
Devitt grants us the freedom which kinds to pick out from the world with words, but after 
this initial act of discretion the world itself immediately takes over: "Whatever it is to be a 
member of the kind rose simply is whatever it is to be a rose. That is something that the 
world has control over, not any of u s " . 2 5 I think the finitist theory of meaning offers a 
more plausible picture of concept application: meaning is open-ended, and created in typical 
step-by-step fashion. There is no privileged moment in time at which the meaning of a 
scientific or common-sense term (say, 'rose') is fixed once and for all. Finally, I have to 
address a certain type of argument that is often advanced in support of scientific realism. I 
would like to call it, somewhat maliciously, the Argument from Practical Success, in analogy 
to the so-called Argument from Design that was once popular for proving the existence of 
an intelligent Creator until Darwin destroyed its credibility. The undeniable success of 
modern science in practical applications, so the argument runs, would be nothing less than 
a miracle if we did not assume the scientific theories on which these applications are based 
to be true or approximately true and the entities posited therein to be really existent. To give 
a specific example: Would the fact that our CD player works, and works so well, be 
understandable at all if we did not assume the existence of photons and lasers and their 
M. Devitt, Realism and Truth, Oxford (Blackwell), second edition, 1991, p. 303. 
Ibid., p. 243. 
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properties as revealed in modern laser theory? 2 6 Now there is much to be said in reply to 
this type of argument. Formally, it has the format of a so-called 'inference to the best 
explanation', which is in fact highly controversial in modern philosophy of science. 2 7 I do 
not want to dwell on the formal aspects of this type of inference here, however, but to draw 
attention to the rather 'one-dimensional' notion of practical success that is used 
unproblematically by its protagonists. Marvelling at some selected wonders of modern 
technology, those latter-day followers of physico-theological reasoning cannot help yielding 
to the irresistable conclusion that the fountain-head of these good things, modern science, 
must have been virtually omniscient indeed, just like their pre-darwinian predecessors 
revelled in the apparent purposeful ingenuity of living nature as tangible evidence for the 
wisdom of God. But if practical successes count in favour of modern science, then what 
about the failures? Or would one want to assert that the record of scientific applications is 
made up exclusively of successes? What counts as 'success' anyway? Is the application of 
nuclear energy a clear instance of success, as its protagonists would have it, or rather of 
failure, as its critics maintain? In Chapter V we have seen that during the inter-war years the 
Wassermann reaction was generally taken as highly successful (even by Fleck!), whereas 
after the Second World War it was judged much more unfavourably. This example is not 
unique. Several constructivist studies of science and technology have shown that what is 
counted as success or failure is at least partly a matter of social negotiation. In proceeding 
from an unproblematically held one-dimensional notion of success, the Argument from 
Practical Success blithely passes over such complications. In my opinion a more skeptical 
attitude, instead of uncritically gazing at the marvels of science and technology, is called for. 
Such a stance may be found in the following passage from Fleck (this time more skeptical 
than vis-a-vis the Wassermann test!): "Practical applicability is not a touchstone [for the truth 
of a scientific theory], for due to the harmony of illusions even a false theory is applicable. 
The alchemists' gold allegedly did enrich many people, and even the cost of wars was paid 
for by alchemists' gold" . 2 8 Thus Fleck struck out at the nub of the Argument from 
Practical Success. 
Although moderate constructivism is incompatible with strong versions of scientific 
realism, it is not opposed to realism tout court; indeed it declares itself in complete accord 
with the common-sense realism of everyday life which contrasts "theory and indeed speech 
generally with reality 'itself, unverbalized reality, whatever is 'out there' independent of 
The example is taken from R. Nola, "There are More Things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio, Than 
are Dreamt of in Your Philosophy: A Dialogue on Realism and Constructivism', Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science 25 (1994): 689-727, p. 719. 
P. Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, London (Routledge), 1991. 
L. Fleck, 'Problems of the Science of Science [1946]', in R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle (eds.), 
Cognition and Fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck, Dordrecht (Reidel), 1986, pp. 113-27, on p. 127. 
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perception, thought and word". 9 Barnes, Bloor and Henry hold that the realist mode of 
speech is in all likelihood a cultural universal that is even employed by its would-be 
deconstructivist detractors. Their position agrees with that of the philosopher John Searle, 
who argues that belief in an independent external reality is a necessary presupposition for 
communication in everyday l i fe . 3 0 Devitt would not hesitate to dismiss such external 
realism as a version of what he calls fig-leaf realism, a doctrine "so weak as to be 
urnnteresting". 3 1 For his part, the anti-realist Nelson Goodman would probably agree, for 
he also holds that this minimal form of realism posits "a world not worth fighting for or 
against". 3 2 Barnes and his associates, however, think that such criticism is beside the point: 
"It is in the way that they make reference to an external world beyond speech mat people 
everywhere reveal their mastery of the realist mode of speaking, a mastery which keeps them 
safe from domination by the objects and essences which they themselves create". 3 3 Another 
advantage, I would add, is that this admittedly minimal form of common-sense realism would 
also caution against blurring the distinction between accounts and reality, or between 
representations and objects. 
The ontology of scientific practice 
What would be the proper attitude for the constructivist sociologist of science to adopt if he 
or she wanted to study the activities of scientists (and technicians) in the 'natural' setting of 
their laboratories? One would surmise that the simple belief in the existence of an external 
reality without any further commitments to the existence of specific entities would not 
suffice. Even if the study were oriented to accounting for the actions performed and decisions 
reached by the scientists and technicians, it would hardly make sense to consider those 
actions and decisions as isolated from the material context consisting of pieces of apparatus, 
chemical substances and preparations, biological specimens, experimental animals and the 
like in which they occur. So the 'material side' has somehow to be incorporated into the 
analysis, but in what way? Under what description should the material elements of the 
situation enter the account of the constructivist analyst? In my view the task calls for a 
thoroughly pragmatic approach. Take as an example the early work on the Wassermann 
reaction as described in Chapter V. It was said there that Wassermann and his collaborators 
2 9 B. Barnes, D. Bloor and J. Henry, Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis, London 
(Athlone), 1996, pp. 87-88. 
3 0 J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, New York (Free Press), 1995, p. 183 ff. 
3 1 Devitt, op. cit. (note 24), p. 23. 
3 2 N. Goodman, Ways ofWorldmaking, Indianapolis (Hackett Publishing Company), 1992 [1978], p. 
20. 
33 Barnes et al., op. cit. (note 29), p. 
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initially employed extracts from the livers of stillborn syphilitic foetuses teeming with 
spirochaetes as a source of antigen for performing the complement fixation test for syphilis. 
Was it correct for me to describe the raw materials in these terms, that is, as spirochaete-
infected livers? Or would it have been better to distantiate myself from the beliefs of the 
participants and to designate those raw materials as livers that were thought to be infected 
with spirochaetes? Perhaps. I can certainly imagine a situation where this more cautious, 
uncommitted stance would be the correct line to follow, e.g. in a context where the debate 
is not on the existence of a serological reaction for syphilis but on whether or not 
Schaudinn's pale spirochaete is the causative agent of syphilis (cf. Chapter TV). In such a 
case it would not be wise for the analyst to prejudge the debate among the antagonists by 
taking a stand on an issue on which opinions are divided. But among Wassermann's team and 
his critics this point was not in dispute, so I saw no harm in using the particular description 
that I used. Even more radically, one could call into question the wisdom of my use of the 
designation 'livers', but again to such a charge I would defend my choice by pointing out that 
the debate was surely not one about anatomy. I hope it is becoming clear what I am driving 
at. If the aim is to explain, or account for, the interpretation which a scientist bestows on a 
certain experimental result, it is usually very recommendable to keep your distance from the 
terms in which the latter Inmself or herself describes the result. It does not make sense, 
however, to extend such local and circumscribed 'agnosticism' into an attitude of generalized 
'agnosticism' - a policy that appears to be suggested by some of Harry Collins' 
methodological prescriptions. Nor would modern versions of scientific realism, on the other 
hand, be of much help. A constructivist student of scientific knowledge and of scientific 
practice cannot proceed, it is true, in a presuppositionless way. To account for the formation 
of knowledge (the 'topic' of the inquiry), he or she unavoidably starts from substantive 
assumptions about what the world (albeit even the confined 'world' of the laboratory) is like. 
Those assumptions are his or her 'resources'. There is no way to do it without resources, or 
to remain entirely uncommitted as to the character of the world. But the precise inventory 
of commitments to be made does not have to be dictated by a general philosophical doctrine 
such as scientific realism. It calls instead for pragmatic judgement that is commensurate with 
the task at hand. 
The claim of radical constructivists like Latour and Knorr-Cetina to have brought 
material objects (the 'nonhumans') back in is not fully credible. In fact, those objects bad 
never been driven out to begin with, at least not by the adherents of the Strong Programme 
who have always professed to be full-blooded materialists (the case of Collins may be a 
slightly different matter). Nor have the latter ever denied agency to things, if 'agency' is 
simply understood as 'causal agency' (e.g. things may stimulate our sense organs). They 
refuse, however, to accept the idea that 'nonhumans' can be party to the disputes and 
negotiations between scientists and others; this type of 'agency' is indeed reserved to humans. 
The other side of the alleged 'rehabilitation' of material objects and the like, is that there is 
also a tendency among radical constructivists to treat the natural world as being part of the 
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social and cultural world. I do not deny that especially in our material practices, including 
the material practices of science, the world of culture makes contact with the world of nature. 
One could even speak of an intermingling of both worlds. Everyday practices can thus be 
seen as mixtures of nature and culture. But that does not mean that nature is entirely 
absorbed into those practices. The 'nature' that is involved in human practices is just the 
'cultivated', that is, culturally domesticated and appropriated, part of nature; it does not 
exhaust the whole of nature. One can say that this cultivated part of nature which has been 
drawn into human practices consists of 'physico-cultural objects', to have a collective 
designation indicating the ontological status of tools, raw materials, domesticated plants and 
animals and the l ike . 3 4 Indeed, the practice of agriculture (literally, the cultivating of the 
land!) provides the paradigmatic example to which the material practice of laboratory science 
can be assimilated. The question is, however, whether all objects of scientific research can 
be assigned the status of physico-cultural objects, or in other words, whether they all must 
be considered as belonging to the cultivated part of nature. I don't think so. My ontological 
position disagees with that of Joseph Rouse, who, using Heideggerian terminology (but 
against Heidegger's own intentions!), tends to put items of equipment and objects of research 
on a par: "My argument suggest[s] [..] that supposedly present-at-hand things like electrons 
are ontologically no different from hammers. To be an electron is to belong likewise to a 
configuration of things we can intelligibly encounter in our purposive practices". 3 5 He 
explains this parallel more fully in another passage: "There must be nails for there to be 
hammers; for there to be electrons, there must be such things as atoms, on the one hand, and 
cathode-ray tubes on the other. That is, there must be things that they interact with and the 
equipment that enables us to interact with them". 3 6 I would like to insist on the difference 
in ontological status between electrons on the one hand, and hammers, nails and cathode-ray 
tubes on the other, if only to avoid the conflation of ontology and epistemology which Rouse 
commits in the second passage. 3 7 Let us briefly review some examples from previous 
chapters to see if this distinction can be sustained. The chemical substances synthesized by 
Ehrlich (including the drug salvarsan) can be considered physico-cultural objects - because 
The notion of 'physico-cultural objects' has been derived from Herman Koningsveld's notion of 
'bio-cultural concepts' which refer to such things as dairy-cows, breeding-stallions, fatting-calves, 
crops, weeds etcetera as used in agriculture and the agricultural sciences. See H. Koningsveld, 
'Cognitive and Social Factors in Agricultural Science', Methodology and Science 23 (1990): 142-
55. 
J. Rouse, op. cit. (note 21), p. 158. 
Ibid., p. 160. 
Rouse himself appears to be not fully consistent, because on p. 157 he states: "Electrical currents 
came into existence at the turn of the century, and they did so because human beings constructed 
them. But this could be done because there were already electrons [..]". So here the existence of 
electrons is not made dependent on configurations of things organized in human practices! 
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of the human involvement in the synthesis of these substances and the imposition of a role 
or function they have to fulfil in human endeavours. On the other hand it is clear, I think, 
that the causative agent of syphilis, Spirochaeta pallida, does not belong to the cultivated part 
of nature (and not merely because the attempted 'cultivation' on nutrient media did not 
actually succeed in this particular case!). The case of the Wassermann reaction is somewhat 
difficult, but this is because the designation itself is ambiguous. If the term is read as 
synonymous with 'Wassermann test', then the Wassermann reaction clearly is a physico-
cultural object. If the designation is however taken as referring to a particular immune 
reaction occurring in syphilitic patients, apart from any experimental setup, then the reaction 
belongs to the non-cultivated part of nature. The strains of trypanosomes figuring in Ehrlich's 
chemotherapeutic programme offer another interesting example; they were used as research 
tools (particularly after they had been bred with various profiles of resistances) and in this 
capacity they qualified as physico-cultural objects. 3 8 The mere fact of being an object of 
human cognition does not suffice, in my view, for being considered part of cultivated nature. 
To count as culturally appropriated, a natural object has at least to be assigned a function in 
some human project. Often, such assignment is accompanied by attempts to reconstruct or 
reshape the object ('construction' in Sismondo's sense [c]) in order to ensure that the latter 
will more adequately fulfil its assigned function. 
Further questions and corollaries 
One corollary from the foregoing analysis is that insights gained from the sociology of 
science may not be completely transferable to the sociology of technology. The suggestive 
phrase 'the social construction of facts and artefacts' introduced by Trevor Pinch and Wiebe 
Bijker conceals essential differences in the way scientific facts and technical artefacts are 
being 'constructed'. 3 9 The same is true of Latour's adoption of the term 'technoscience' 
which is explicitly intended to blur the distinction between science and technology. I admit 
that it is usually not very clear in concrete cases where exactly the boundary line between 
the two has to be drawn. For some purposes it might indeed be acceptable to treat science 
and technology as a kind of Siamese twin, Science&Technology, leaving undecided where 
the one ends and the other starts. There is however a real danger that different meanings of 
'construction' - especially meanings (c) and (d) of Sismondo's list - will be lumped together. 
Then the implausible sense (d) of 'construction' can evade critical scrutiny by riding 
One might suggest that spirochaetes also played the part of research tools when syphilitic livers 
containing masses of spirochaetes were employed as a source of antigen in the initial attempts of 
Wassermann and his co-workers to apply the complement fixation test to syphilis. I have no 
principled objection to this suggestion. 
T.J. Pinch and W.E. Bijker, "The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or how the 
Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology might Benefit each other', Social Studies of 
Science 14 (1984): 399-441. 
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piggyback, as it were, on the quite acceptable meaning (c). We have already seen that this 
is indeed what happens in Knorr-Cetina's and Latour's writings. 
Another matter to be re-examined is whether the so-called 'Bachelardian challenge' still 
stands as a powerful challenge to realist interpretations of science. The question raised was 
how scientific knowledge can be about a human-independent reality, if most concrete 
realizations of experimental phenomena do not exist in nature until they are artificially 
produced by human beings. 4 0 I have already made it clear that, in my view, the latter claim 
should not be construed as asserting that e.g. electrons would not exist were it not for the 
manufactured existence of cathode-ray tubes (Rouse's example) or that the hormone TRF 
would not exist were it not for the existence of bio-assays (an example of Latour and 
Woolgar). Realists may point out that by creating 'abnormal' circumstances in the artificial 
setting of the laboratory we just produce special effects which reveal the underlying 
capacities and powers of natural substances and the l ike . 4 1 This answer is acceptable but 
does not remove the full force of the challenge. We are still confronted with the weighty 
problem of how the very special insights gained in artificial laboratory settings can be 
transported to 'natural' non-laboratory settings. The philosopher of science, Nancy 
Cartwright, formulated what amounts to a new version of the challenge for the case of 
physics, which can probably be extended to other sciences: 
"Do the laws of physics that are true of systems (literally true, we may imagine for the sake of argument) 
in the highly contrived environments of a laboratory [..], do these laws carry across to systems, even 
systems of very much the same kind, in different and less regulated settings?".42 
Cartwright gives several reasons for holding that such carrying-over is far from obvious. 
Latour's question - how does the science get out of the laboratory? - still stands, although 
we have seen in Chapter VII that his own answer cannot be the full s tory. 4 3 Much more 
was involved in the clinical introduction of salvarsan than a simple transference of the 
conditions of Ehrlich's laboratory to the 'wider' society. To understand this process I used 
additional insights derived from other constructivists. Constructivist analyses do have 
Radder, op. cit. (note 6), p. 74 and p. 77. 
See Nola, op. cit. (note 26), p. 698. 
N. Cartwright, 'Fundamentalism vs the Patchwork of Laws', in D. Papineau (ed.), The Philosophy 
of Science Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1996, pp. 314-26, on p. 316. 
Radder, op. cit. (note 6), pp. 88-89, argues that the non-trivial achievement of reproducability of 
material realizations of experimental phenomena points to the existence of human-independent 
potentialities in nature. He also claims that this circumstance refutes Latour's solution (laboratory 
conditions are simply transplanted to the outside world) to the problem of the applicability of 
laboratory findings. 
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something to offer to highlight the difficulties that must be confronted when laboratory 
products are to find their way into the outside world. 
The final matter to be considered here is the accusation that constructivist analyses do 
not allow to draw a distinction between facts and artefacts (in the sense of spurious 
phenomena or results) or even worse, that they effectively degrade all facts to artefacts. If 
facts are mere (social) constructions, then in what respect do they differ from artefacts? I 
think a moderate constructivist can respond to this charge by conceding that there is indeed 
a meaningful distinction to be drawn between facts and artefacts. He or she would however 
reject the claim that it is the duty of the analyst of science to tell fact from artefact in 
concrete cases (that is the job of the scientists themselves!) or even to provide general 
standards and criteria by which this distinction can be made in actual scientific practice. It 
is true that some philosophers of science (e.g. Allan Franklin) have proposed such standards 
and criteria, but constructivists will be quick to point out that the application of these 
standards usually leaves considerable scope for indeterminacy. In Chapter TV we have seen, 
for instance, that appeal to the methodological principle of agreement between different 
observation procedures was unable to resolve the controversy about the factual or artefactual 
nature of the pale spirochaete. Nicolas Rasmussen's historical study of the so-called 
'mesosomes', identified during the 1950s with the aid of the new electron microscope, is 
even more tell ing. 4 4 It took about 15 years before these purported cell structures were 
called into question as being mere artefacts (although even now there are still researchers 
who are convinced of their factual status!). This long period militates against the idea that 
science disposes of readily applicable criteria for telling fact from artefact. Rasmussen also 
shows in detail that researchers often disagreed about the relative importance of the various 
criteria that could be brought to bear on the issue; and even where they agreed on the 
principles to be applied, they disagreed about their concrete application! It would thus seem 
that there is indeed wide scope for a constructivist analysis to handle the social construction 
of facts and the (de)construction of artefacts simultaneously using a single analytical 
framework. This is precisely what was attempted in Chapter IV. The possibility of such an 
analysis is a direct corollary of the symmetry principle. For purposes of analysis, facts and 
artefacts are put on a par and treated symmetrically, but this does not mean that the former 
are transformed into the latter. 
2. The constitution of the social 
When Fleck proclaimed that cognition is "the most socially-conditioned activity of man" 
(42/58), he was not in doubt about the meaning and import of the process of 'social 
N. Rasmussen, 'Facts, Artifacts, and Mesosomes: Practicing Epistemology with the Electron 
Microscope', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 24 (1993): 227-65. 
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conditioning'. Things are different for the adherents of modern forms of constructivism. The 
precise meaning of 'the social' and the acceptability of the very idea of social determination 
of scientific knowledge are hotly debated issues. In a recent dissertation Rob Hagendijk even 
noted that "the problems associated with constructivist approaches have more to do with 
general problems of sociological analysis and social theory than with the nature and 
organization of science". 4 5 As with the problem of realism, the range of available positions 
can be reduced to manageable proportions by distmguishing between moderate and radical 
varieties of constructivism. Whereas the former generally attempt to uphold established 
conceptions of the nature of social reality and their relevance for explaining (variations in) 
knowledge, the latter assert that there are no pre-given and fixed social structures which 
could be taken as analytical resources for explaining what goes on in scientific practice. Just 
as in the previous section, I will clarify and develop my own view on these issues by 
critically confronting the various positions that are represented in the field of constructivist 
science and technology studies. In the process I will also draw on the empirical analyses 
reported in previous chapters, which have been inspired by insights derived from both 
moderate and radical constructivists. 
Before entering into the issues which divide the ranks of constructivists, it will be 
helpful to indicate the area of agreement. Moderate and radical constructivists alike reject the 
view that scientific knowledge can be established by the solitary investigator working on his 
or her own. As the moderate constructivist Steven Shapin declares: "What counts for any 
community as true knowledge is a collective good and a collective accomplishment. That 
good is always in others' hands, and the fate of any particular claim that something 'is the 
case' is never determined by the individual making the claim". 4 6 It would seem that the 
radical constructivist Bruno Latour largely agrees, for he pronounces the following first 
principle of his actor-network approach: "The fate of facts and machines is in later users' 
hands; their qualities are thus a consequence, not a cause, of a collective action". 4 7 Of 
course, the happy agreement between moderate and radical constructivism immediately ends 
when it comes to specifying the nature of this collective action. 
My discussion will centre on the following series of critical challenges and objections 
which have been raised by radical constructivists with regard to the treatment of 'the social' 
by moderate constructivists: 
(1) Science and technology cannot be explained from given social structures, because the 
latter are themselves changed through the activities of scientists and technologists 
(Latour); 
R. Hagendijk, Wetenschap, Constructivisme en Cultuur, Amsterdam (thesis), 1996, p. 267. 
S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England, Chicago 
and London (University of Cicago Press), 1994, p. 5. 
Latour, op. cit. (note 15), p. 259. 
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(2) Reflexivity demands that the social be taken not as an explanatory resource but as a 
topic of inquiry (Woolgar, Knorr-Cetina); 
(3) Moderate constructivists illegitimately assume that the social validation of knowledge-
claims occurs in relatively self-enclosed 'scientific communities' demarcated along 
disciplinary lines (Rouse); 
(4) There is no social locus for the validation of knowledge through consensus formation 
above the level of the laboratory; the selective incorporation of previous results into 
ongoing laboratory research is all there is to the process of 'solidifying' results (Knorr-
Cetina); 
(5) In attempting to establish the social determination of scientific knowledge moderate 
constructivists treat individuals as passive automatons, 'cultural dopes' or 'interest 
dopes' rather than as knowledgeable and capable actors (Woolgar). 
Given my sympathies with moderate constructivist views as shown in the preceding section, 
it is perhaps not surprising that I will reject most of the arguments advanced by radical 
constructivists. On certain issues, however, I will make limited concessions to their point of 
view. I think radical constructivists have developed some special insights which can be 
usefully adopted by moderate constructivists without the latter being forced to swallow the 
radical skepticism vis-á-vis the social. (Indeed I have used such insights myself in previous 
chapters.) I also believe that answering the radical constructivist challenges and objections 
to the use of social categories in science and technology studies does not exhaust the issues. 
In the concluding and more constructive part of this section I will therefore take Anthony 
Giddens's so-called 'structuration theory' as a starting point for developing an integrative 
conception of social structure, agency and (scientific) practice. 
Latour's argument against social explanations 
In several of his works Latour wages a relentless battle against 'social' explanations in 
science and technology studies. In the same book from which the above-quoted principle 
derives, he also formulated the following rule of method (rule 4): "Since the settlement of 
a controversy is the cause of Society's stability, we cannot use Society to explain how and 
why a controversy has been settled. We should consider symmetrically the efforts to enrol 
human and non-human resources". 4 8 In Latour's view, facts (and technical artefacts) are 
'co-produced' along with their corresponding social structures in the constructive practices 
of technoscience. Thus George Eastman invented, simultaneously with his simple black-box 
camera, the social group of amateur photographers ('You press the button, we do the rest', 
or in French: 'Clic, clac, merci Kodak'). Another famous 'network builder' or 'society 
builder' was Louis Pasteur, the hero of Latour's book Les Microbes, of which the English 
translation expresses Pasteur's 'society building' impact: The Pasteurization of France. It was 
Ibid., p. 258. 
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especially in the French overseas colonies, according to Latour, that the 'Pasteurians' 
(microbiologists and immunologists) could exhibit their veritable society-building powers as 
they met with less resistance than in France itself. He thus rejects the 'social' explanations 
that have been given of the emergence of tropical medicine around 1900 on the basis of the 
colonial interests that were dominant at the time (in Chapter VI I I explained the initial focus 
of Ehrlich's chemotherapeutic programme on trypanosomes in the same way) . 4 9 Without 
the 'Pasteurians', Latour argues, there would have been no colonial society at all: 
"With only whites and blacks [..] that Colonial Leviathan which spread across the globe could never have 
been built. Nor can the colonial medicine of the Pasteurians be explained in terms of 'society' and its 
'interests', since the Pasteurians were capable, once more, of moving their programs of research 
sufficiently to obtain a richer definition of society than all the exploiters and exploited of the period".50 
In my view, there is nothing wrong with explaining the rise of tropical medicine from the 
social interests associated with colonialism. The explanation may not be too spectacular, but 
it is at least quite plausible. Although I admit that Latour raises an interesting point, I also 
think that his argument is not free from rhetorical exaggeration. It may be conceded that the 
'Pasteurians' contributed to building colonial society, but did they build such a society single-
handedly from scratch? Moreover, at the end of the 19th century the colonial movement was 
a powerful social current in the home countries. It was not invented by the 'Pasteurians'. 
Why should the existence of such a powerful movement be deemed irrelevant for explaining 
the great interest in tropical medicine that was exhibited at that t ime? 5 1 
I think we can do justice to Latour's insight that technoscientists often act as 'society 
builders' without ipso facto subscribing to his conclusion that 'social' explanations are 
therefore to be banned. The interventions of technoscientists may be of lesser or wider scope 
but in principle they are always aimed at particular social relationships or aspects of social 
life and never affect the structure of society as a whole . 5 2 Perhaps it would be better to 
replace the term 'society builders' by the more modest designation 'agents of social change' 
to make clear that no totality claim is involved. Precisely because technoscientists are no 
M. Worboys, "The Emergence of Tropical Medicine: a Study in the Establishment of a Scientific 
Specialty', in G. Lemaine et al. (eds.), Perspectives on the Emergence of Scientific Disciplines, The 
Hague (Mouton), 1976, pp. 75-98. 
B. Latour, The Pasteurization of France, Cambridge, MA, and London (Harvard University Press), 
1988, p. 144. 
For an in-depth examination of the extent to which Western 'imperial' concerns have shaped 
tropical medicine in the case of schistosomiasis or bilharzia, see J. Farley, Bilharzia: A History of 
Imperial Tropical Medicine, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1991. 
Why 'holistic social engineering' in the literal sense is impossible in principle is explained in K.R. 
Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, London and Henley (Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1961 [1957], 
esp. pp. 67-70. 
269 
'holistic social engineers' a la Popper, it still makes sense to interpret their social 
interventions against a background of stable social structures which are not affected by their 
overhauling efforts. As an example we can turn to the creation of high-yielding and 
'economically sterile' varieties of maize, so-callled 'hybrid corn', by American plant 
geneticists during the 1920s and 1930s. 5 3 By creating these varieties the plant geneticists 
acted as agents of social change, for they thus helped create a socio-economic order which 
offered ample room for a thriving private seed sector and in which maize farmers were also 
willing to abandon their cultural 'prejudice' against yearly seed purchases. On the other hand, 
their activities did not take place in a social void. Their choice of a 'hybridization' breeding 
strategy (rather than of an equally effective alternative which would not have resulted in 
'economically sterile' varieties) can be seen as informed by the dominant socio-economic 
interests and political power-relationships of the 'wider' society. In general, we can admit 
the idea that scientists and technologists often act as agents of social change without thereby 
being forced to give up the possibility of social explanations. 
From 'resource' to 'topic'? 
In criticizing social explanations Latour uses a characteristic mode of argumentation that is 
also employed by other radical constructivists. When moderate constractivists appeal to, say, 
interests or social structures, to explain the content of knowledge, their radical colleagues 
will typically react by claiming that these factors cannot be seen as explanatory but must 
themselves be considered as in need of explanation. In other words, their strategy is to turn 
every explanatory resource that is on offer into a topic. Sometimes this required problem 
shift is argued by invoking the demand of reflexivity. Thus in an interview Knorr-Cetina 
declared: 
"In social constructivism [that is, moderate constructivism - HvdB], social reality is used as a resource. 
Sociologists use the resource for studying natural-scientific facts and natural science. But it's never used 
as a topic. The construction of sociology - that is, of sociological categories, sociological texts, etc. - and 
of social reality in general is not studied and documented in the same way as natural-scientific facts are 
studied and documented. Now what we have to do, of course, is to be reflexive enough to apply the 
constructivist program and method also to our own resources [emphasis added - HvdB]". 5 4 
The example has been described in J.R. Kloppenburg Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of 
Plant Biotechnology, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1985. Kloppenburg's work has 
been used to make some points against Latour's actor-network theory in H. van den Belt, 'How to 
Critically Follow the Agricultural Technoscientists: Kloppenburg versus Latour', in The Agrarian 
Questions Committee (eds.), Agrarian Questions: The Politics of Farming anno 1995. Proceedings, 
Volume 1, Wageningen, The Netherlands, 1995, pp. 43-53. 
W. Callebaut, Taking the Naturalistic Turn: or How Real Philosophy of Science is Done, Chicago 
and London (University of Chicago Press), 1993, p. 117. 
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Here, I will not engage in a debate on reflexivity. It is clear, however, that a consistent 
implementation of the strategy of turning resources into topics will ultimately leave the 
analyst empty-handed. In the end, we will have a lot of phenomena to be considered as 
consequences, but no longer any causes to explain them. It seems that this is precisely the 
fate that has befallen Latour's actor-network theory. Kyung-Man Kim spells out this criticism 
in the following passage: 
"Latour's network is composed not only of scientists but also of nearly everyone and everything that 
comes into contact with them - financiers, politicians, the public, and machines, and so on. This means 
that, in contrast to traditional sociological practice, we can no longer treat science and society separately. 
One important consequence of such a simultaneous determination of the natural (scientific) and social 
order is that we cannot use society (or social factors) to account for the closure of a scientific controversy. 
For Latour, just as Nature is not the cause but the 'consequence' of the settlement of the controversy, 
Society is not the cause but the consequence of the settlement of the controversy. However, in rejecting 
both Nature and Society as 'causal factors', Latour fails to provide us with an alternative theory which 
can account for the realignment of allies - or [..] the 'restructuring' of the network of allies [my 
emphasis]".55 
In the preceding section I argued against the radical constructivist view of Nature as a 
consequence of science and technology. Now I object to the view which considers Society 
as (entirely) created by science and technology. 'Technoscience' is not the extramundane and 
extrasocietal demiurge of natural and social reality. 
Are scientific communities treated as self-enclosed? 
The American philosopher Joseph Rouse opposes what he calls the theme of "the openness 
of scientific practices" (presumed to be characteristic of the so-called cultural studies 
approach of science and technology) to "a widespread sense of scientific communities as 
relatively self-enclosed, homogeneous, and unengaged with other social groups or cultural 
practices" which he sees exemplified in the work of Thomas Kuhn and of his moderate 
constructivist successors like Harry Collins and David Bloor: "The social constructivist 
tradition [that is, moderate constructivism - HvdB] has [..] focus[ed] on either the social 
interests or the social interactions that constitute the shared beliefs, values, and concerns of 
scientific communities". 5 6 He contrasts this attributed view with Knorr-Cetina's early 
notion of 'transscientific fields' (or 'transepistemic fields'), with Latour's statement to the 
K.-M. Kim, 'Natural versus Normative Rationality: Reassessing the Strong Programme in the 
Sociology of Knowledge', Social Studies of Science 24 (1994): 39M03, on p. 403. 
J. Rouse, Engaging Science: How to Understand its Practices Philosophically, Ithaca and London 
(Cornell University Press), 1996, p. 249; in note 34 on the same page he specifies his charge: 
"prominent examples of social constructivists who emphasize the role of relatively self-enclosed 
scientific communities or forms of life include Collins 1992 (especially his notion of a 'core set') 
and Bloor 1983". 
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effect that scientific work itself destabilizes any distinction between inside and outside, and 
with the many studies which have shown "a constant traffic across boundaries that allegedly 
divide scientific communities (and their language and norms) from the rest of culture". 5 7 
Rouse's criticism of moderate constructivism, which runs together several different 
charges, is rather astonishing. When constructivist studies, inspired by the Edinburgh Strong 
Programme, first appeared in the domain of the history of science during the 1970s, they 
were identified by so-called 'internalist' historians as simply a new edition of the old 
'externalist' historiography, that is, they were condemned for paying too much attention to 
social, economic and cultural factors external to the proper sphere of science instead of 
giving due emphasis to the purely intellectual factors presumed to guide its development. And 
now, oddly enough, Rouse comes to mount precisely the opposite charge! What, then, are 
we to make of this criticism? 
Under the circumstances we could do worse than recall an early but quite balanced view 
of the matter expressed by one of the two founding fathers of the Strong Programme. 
Already in 1974 Barry Barnes wrote the following statement of principle: 
"From [our] perspective [..], the extent to which scientific change is determined or influenced by 
'external' factors is a contingent matter, requiring separate investigation for every particular instance. 
Science is a part of culture like any other. To the extent that actors define it as a bounded set of meanings, 
beliefs and activities with an 'inside' and an 'outside', we may inquire about the strength of the boundary, 
and the degree to which external determinants operate across it. There is no reason why such deterrriinants 
should be regarded as absent, or as all important [..]". 5 8 
From a (moderate) constructivist perspective the drawing of boundaries, both between science 
and the rest of culture and within science between various (sub-)disciplines, is a contingent 
social activity. 5 9 In his 1974 book Barnes was advocating more historical and sociological 
research into the constitution and effects of such boundaries. 6 0 It may be difficult or 
virtually impossible to understand intellectual debates of previous centuries through the prism 
of our 20th-century disciplinary boundaries. Rather than projecting our ideas of 'proper' 
boundaries back into historical time, we should try to understand how actors in the past 
Ibid., pp. 249-50. 
B. Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, London (Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1980 
[1974], p. 99. 
See also Barnes et al., op cit. (note 29), Chapter 6: Drawing Boundaries. 
A famous study fulfilling Barnes's desiderata is S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-
Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, Princeton (Princeton University Press), 1985. It 
deals with Robert Boyle's demarcation of proper questions of 'natural philosophy* (experimental 
science) from questions of church and state, which demarcation was contested by Thomas Hobbes. 
See also S. Shapin, 'Discipline and Bounding: The History and Sociology of Science as Seen 
through the Bxternalism-Internalism Debate', History of Science 30 (1992): 333-69. 
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themselves defined and demarcated their activities. Thus when the historian Robert Young 
attempted to reconstruct the Victorian debate on "man's place in nature", he could not limit 
his inquiries to any of the currently established fields of geology, biology or psychology but 
had to locate the debate in a "common context" of Victorian intellectual life borne by the 
leading periodical journals of the time which also gave pride of place to such a by now 
extinct entity like natural theology. 6 1 All this did not preclude that during the last two 
decades of the 19th century the "common context" would become fragmented; by then the 
boundaries around such disciplines like geology, biology and psychology as we know them 
today had been more rigidly drawn. Indeed, Barnes and other moderate constructivists hold 
that the standard pattern for science in the 20th century is to be organized and conducted in 
clearly demarcated sub-cultures of disciplines and specialties. 6 2 
Although it may be possible that moderate constructivists overestimate the strength and 
rigidity of the boundaries around contemporary disciplines and specialties, this is just a 
matter of empirical contingency, not of theoretical principle. In his criticism Rouse appears 
to assume that the existence of boundaries precludes any traffic across them. This assumption 
is clearly unwarranted. Documenting the amount of two-way traffic that constantly occurs 
between scientific communities and the rest of culture provides no compelling argument 
against a division between 'inside' and 'outside', if such a distinction is actively maintained 
by the actors involved. Indeed, moderate constructivists have themselves gathered extensive 
evidence on this score. Insofar as Rouse's argument tends to deny any distinction between 
scientific disciplines and the surrounding culture, he should ask himself if he is still entitled 
to refer to the former by using their conventional designations. But perhaps the main thrust 
of his argument is that the coherence of scientific fields should not be thought of in terms of 
shared values and beliefs. Such a charge would probably apply to Kuhn's idea of a scientific 
community as a paradigm-sharing collective, but less so, I think, to moderate constructivist 
v iews. 6 3 Anyway, the argument remains too underdeveloped to have much critical force. 
Elsewhere in his book Rouse opposes the notion of 'background knowledge' as a network 
of widely accepted or presupposed beliefs or of previously justified sentences and presents 
an alternative view: 
R.M. Young, 'Natural Theology, Victorian Periodicals and the Fragmentation of a Common 
Context', in C. Chant and J. Fauvel (eds.), Darwin to Einstein: Historical Studies in Science & 
Belief, Harlow (Longman), 1980, pp. 69-107. 
Barnes, op. cit. (note 58), p. 121. 
Harry Collins explicitly denies the view Rouse attributes to him: "The set of allies and enemies in 
the core of a controversy are not necessarily bound to each other by social ties or membership of 
common institutions [..] This set of persons does not necessarily act like a 'group'. They are bound 
only by their close, if differing, interests in the controversy's outcome. I refer to such a set of 
allies and enemies as a 'core set'." See H.M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction 
in Scientific Practice, Chicago and London (The University of Chicago Press), 1992 [1985], pp. 
142-43. 
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"Instead, my claim will be that the 'field' within which scientific claims and practices acquire their 
significance and justification involves many things that cannot be reduced to sentences or beliefs 'internal' 
to a domain of investigation: skills and techniques, instruments and material systems (including networks 
for their manufacture and supply), availability of resources (money, of course, but also staff, information, 
an audience, and so on), institutional structures, relevance to other social practices or political concerns, 
and much more".6 4 
It is interesting to observe that all of the various factors listed by Rouse also loom large in 
my own historical reconstructions of the development of the Wassermann reaction and of the 
design of a chemotherapeutic drug against syphilis (Chapters V and VU). Still, as a proposed 
'theory' about how scientific claims and practices "acquire their significance and 
justification", I think Rouse's suggestions are much too diffuse to be useful. Merely 
enumerating a motley of elements that allegedly compose a particular 'field' does not define 
the coherence of that field. 
In the historical chapters on the Wassermann reaction and on salvarsan the analysis was 
deliberately not confined to what happened within the bounds of a scientific community or 
collective demarcated along disciplinary lines. In the case of salvarsan that would have been 
hardly possible because there was no disciplinary community devoted to the pursuit of 
'chemotherapy', Ehrlich and his team being virtually unique in this regard. Indeed I found 
it useful to invoke Knorr-Cetina's notion of 'transscientific field' or 'transepistemic field' to 
highlight the resource relationships (chemical substances, money, experimental animals) 
between Ehrlich's team and the chemical industry and other actors. Although in the case of 
the Wassermann reaction there was the nascent (sub)discipline of serology, it would have 
been inadequate to give an account of the development of this sérodiagnostic test as if it 
occurred exclusively within the confines of the so-called "serologists' collective" - this was 
precisely my criticism of Fleck's analysis. If, to paraphrase Latour, the fate of a claim is in 
the hands of later users, then whoever claims to have developed a new diagnostic test or a 
new medicine for a particular disease will have to convince (the relevant segments of) the 
medical community of their usefulness and reliability. In other words, he or she has to 
'colonize the minds' of the prospective users or - in Latourian terminology - to enroll, 
capture and translate their interests. It is true that in this process all the elements mentioned 
by Rouse may have a part to play. It is equally true, however, that in our case studies there 
was no serious doubt about the social identity of the prospective users: they were, first and 
foremost, the clinical specialists charged with the diagnosis and especially the treatment of 
syphilitic patients. There was in place, then, a clear 'social forum' for assessing the claims 
put forward by Wassermann and Ehrlich and their co-workers - at the demand side rather 
than at the supply side, so to speak. 
The social locus of validation 
Rouse, op. cit. (note 56), p. 188. 
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A prominent representative of ethnographic lab studies, Karin Knorr-Cetina was confronted 
from the outset with the criticism that focusing on what happens within the scientific 
laboratory is not the most suitable approach for investigating how scientific results become 
validated and accepted. Validation and acceptance requires, so the criticism goes, a process 
of consensus formation involving a larger scientific community. To defend the value of the 
lab studies approach, Knorr-Cetina countered this criticism by asserting that it wrongly 
assumed validation and acceptance to be a process of opinion formation separate from and 
therefore not located within the actual research process. "But where do we find the process 
of validation, to any significant degree", she asked rhetorically, "if not in the laboratory 
itself? [..] What is the process of acceptance if not one of selective incorporation of previous 
results into the ongoing process of research production?". 6 5 And in a more recent interview 
she explained: "One has to get away from a conception of consensus formation as essentially 
a process of argumentation, as a sort of mentalistic process that involves the discussion of 
many scientists among each other. One has to see it much more as a material process 
£ j n 66 
I think Knorr-Cetina's argument for the self-sufficiency of the laboratory setting is 
singularly unsuccessful. It is true that laboratory outcomes will often become incorporated 
in further research by the same laboratory, but usually not before having been authenticated, 
as it were, by the relevant scientific field or community. A laboratory is not a self-enclosed 
world but operates in what Latour and Woolgar referred to as an 'agonistic field' also 
consisting of other laboratories. 6 7 It publishes its 'findings' with a view to their being 
accepted by 'the field'. If it tries to skip this process of social acceptance and 'prematurely' 
reincorporates those findings in new research processes, it will surely run a greater risk that 
the next series of results to be produced will be rejected by other laboratories. At times 
Knorr-Cetina herself reluctantly recognizes the relevance of the scientific field: "Many 
processes of consensus formation would seem to involve more than one laboratory, and 
potentially a whole scientific field".68 Her reluctance appears to derive from an aversion 
to the notion of consensus formation as a process of argumentation. It is not necessary, 
however, to construe this process in a rationalist manner as the straightforward application 
of universal criteria of appraisal leading of themselves to definite outcomes. Sociologists of 
scientific knowledge have brought the received philosophical notion of a 'context of 
justification' down to earth by admitting persuasion and negotiation among its constituent 
processes. To me it appears that one can hardly do without some such sociologized version 
K.D. Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge, Oxford (Pergamon Press), 1981, p. 8. 
Callebaut, op. cit (note 54), p. 305. 
Latour and Woolgar, op. cit. (note 8), p. 237. 
Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. (note 19), p. 161. 
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of the idea of consensus formation among scientists, unless one wants to give up accounting 
for the way knowledge-claims become accepted and facts get stabilized. Indeed, even the 
radical constructivist 'splitting-and-inversion model' holds that statements begin to refer to 
an independent reality as soon as controversies are resolved and thus assumes that processes 
of consensus formation take place. 
Are scientists and other actors made out as 'cultural dopes'? 
The criticism is sometimes raised, especially by authors who have been influenced by 
ethnomethodology, that the very attempt to demonstrate the 'social conditioning' or social 
determination of scientific knowledge involves the portrayal of scientists and other 
participants as passive automatons or mere puppets of underlying social and cultural forces -
or, in Harold GarfinkePs terminology, as 'judgmental dopes' or 'cultural dopes'. This is 
held to be inadmissable, because human agents are considered to be active rather than 
passive. They should accordingly be treated as 'knowledgeable and capable actors'. 
This particular criticism deserves close examination. It seems to fit some of Fleck's 
formulations in which scientists are made out as the 'judgmental dopes' of a compelling 
thought style. In Chapter VI we have also seen that the anti-individualistic tenets of his 
sociological approach were at least partly to blame for the inadequacies of his account of the 
struggle over the intellectual ownership of the Wassermann reaction. Thus the question arises 
whether similar criticisms can be levelled at Fleck's modern successors, especially the 
moderate constructivists. How much scope do they grant to the 'agency' of individual actors? 
Woolgar has claimed that much of the sociology of scientific knowledge is characterized 
by what he calls an "over-interested conception of the scientist". Because scientists are 
depicted as acting (that is, producing knowledge) in response to their interests, he holds that 
they are actually treated as "interest-dopes". 6 9 Moderate constructivists reject this criticism. 
To account for a scientist's actions in the light of his or her interests is to highlight the goal-
oriented character of scientific work. It is not to portray the scientist as an interest-dope 
passively responding to his or her interests. 7 0 Shapin too defends the (moderate) 
constructivist case against similar criticisms from rationalist philosophers: 
"[..] We are invited to conceive of 'social detennination' as if it were a sort of mugging. But which model 
is it really that makes out actors as 'judgmental dopes'? In an instrumentalist perspective actors are seen 
to produce and evaluate knowledge against the background of socially transmitted knowledge and 
S. Woolgar, 'Interests and Explanation in the Social Study of Science', Social Studies of Science 11 
(1981): 365-94, on pp. 374-75. 
D. MacKenzie, 'Interests, Positivism and History', Social Studies of Science 11 (1981): 498-504, 
on p. 502. See also B. Barnes, 'On the "Hows" and "Whys" of Cultural Change (Response to 
Woolgar)', Social Studies of Science 11 (1981): 481-98. 
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according to their goals. The role of the social, in this view, is to prestructure choice, not to preclude 
choice [emphasis mine - HvdB]".7 1 
Although moderate constructivists recognize the active role of human agents, they do not 
want to inflate this agency to the point where the very idea of an influencing social order 
becomes vacuous. The latter tendency can be found with some radical constructivists. Thus 
several commentators have discerned a strong voluntaristic and machiavellian tenor in 
Latour's analyses of the pursuits of Louis Pasteur and other scientists. 7 2 Yves Gingras has 
criticized Latour's tendency to describe actors "as if they were absolutely free to move in any 
direction". 7 3 Why then, he asks, do some scientists or engineers go into the minister's 
office while others do not? (In France, engineers graduating from a grande école or from a 
faculté do not have the same possibilities of access to ministries.) In other words, Gingras 
argues that we should also keep an eye to the structural constraints under which actors are 
operating. 
In my view, it would indeed be very desirable to have a balanced theoretical framework 
in which the agency of actors and the social constraints under which they act are both given 
their appropriate places. In my earlier comments on Latour's idea of technoscientists as 
'society-builders' I intended to do justice to both aspects: as well as conceding their capacity 
for acting as 'agents of social change', I also stressed that such agency does not occur in a 
social void. Granting that an integrated theoretical conception reconciling agency and social 
constraints would indeed be desirable, the critical question, of course, is whether such a 
conception is feasible at all. In the final part of this section I will inquire if Anthony 
Giddens's 'structuration theory' offers a promising starting point to elaborate the desired 
framework. 
Agency, social structure and (scientific) practices 
The 'structuration theory' developed by Anthony Giddens represents a well-known, widely 
acclaimed (though also criticized) and sustained effort to overcome and reconcile established 
dualisms in social theory, such as the dualism between individual and society, voluntarism 
and determinism, or agency and structure. 7 4 At this point of my argument it may be useful 
S. Shapin, 'History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions', in Cohen and Schnelle, op. 
cit. (note 28), pp. 325-86, on p. 370. 
Hagendijk, op. cit. (note 45), p. 105 ff. 
Y. Gingras, 'Following Scientists through Society? Yes, but at Arm's Length!', in J.Z. Buchwald 
(ed.), Scientific Practice: Theories and Stories of Doing Physics, Cichago and London (University 
of Chicago Press), 1995, pp. 123-48, on p. 138. 
The main works in which the 'structuration theory' is developed are the following: A. Giddens, 
New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies, London 
(Hutchinson), 1976; A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and 
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to consider his theory to see whether it offers a viable approach to the theoretical dilemma 
sketched above. Other authors in the field of science and technology studies have already 
turned to Giddens's theory in the hope of finding an acceptable solution to similar 
dilemmas. 7 5 An additional reason for considering his theory is that it also promises to give 
us a conceptual handle on the notion of 'practice' or 'practices', a notion that has attained 
prominence in recent contributions to the constructivist literature (as transpires, inter alia, 
from the loudly proclaimed 'turn to practice'). Not surprisingly, perhaps, the term 'practice' 
is used in a wide variety of meanings and invested with rather different theoretical stakes and 
commitments. One author even speaks of "the Babel of practice". 7 6 It thus falls upon me 
to clarify in what sense and with what theoretical intention I have used the term in this book. 
Giddens cuts through current dualisms in social theory and replaces them with a central 
insight of his own which he refers to as the notion of the duality of structure: "By the duality 
of structure I mean the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted by social 
practices: structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices". 7 7 
'Structure', Giddens holds, should not be conceived of as a kind of framework like the 
skeleton of a body or the girders of a building; instead, it should be conceived of as the 
'rules and resources' which are 'drawn upon' by actors in actual interaction. These structural 
elements have a 'virtual existence'; they exist only to the extent that they are instantiated in 
concrete practices. The paradigmatic example and source of inspiration for Giddens's 
conception of structure is the grammar of a language: the rules of grammar are drawn upon 
when the members of a linguistic community utter well-formed sentences (or perform speech 
acts). Grammar is thus constitutive of speech but is also reproduced by the series of speech 
acts which comprise daily life. The same is true for 'structure' in general, a circumstance 
that the phrase 'duality of structure' is precisely meant to capture. 'Structure' is thus both 
'enabling' and 'constraining': it enables us to act but also places limits on possible courses 
of action. To complete this abstract summary of the broad outlines of Giddens's structuration 
theory, let me add that he does not present an extended discussion justifying his use of the 
notion of 'practices'. He simply links the concept to a Wittgensteinian notion of 'rules' and 
'rule-following': "To know a rule, as Wittgenstein says, is to 'know how to go on', to know 
Contradiction in Social Analysis, London (Macmillan), 1979; A. Giddens, The Constitution of 
Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Cambridge (Polity Press), 1984. 
Hagendijk, op. cit. (note 45), pp. 125-156; W.E. Bijker, 'Do Not Despair: There Is Life after 
Constructivism', Science, Technology & Human Values 18 (1993): 113-38, on p. 123. 
B.S. Baigrie, 'Scientific Practice: The View from the Tabletop', in J.Z. Buchwald (ed.), Scientific 
Practice: Theories and Stories of Doing Physics, Chicago and London (University of Chicago 
Press), 1995, pp. 87-122, on p. 88. 
A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, London (Macmillan), 1979, p. 5. 
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how to play according to the rule. This is vital, because it connects rules and practices. Rules 
generate - or are the medium of the production and reproduction of - practices". 7 8 
Giddens's stress on the recursiveness of social life bears some resemblance to the 
emphasis on the 'self-referential' and 'performative' character of social institutions that is the 
liallmark of Barry Barnes's theory about the constitution of social reality. 7 9 According to 
Barnes's view, the nature of a 'social object' such as a social status or position is constituted 
by the surrounding context of belief and action. Thus, for example, "John is the leader of 
the gang [..] because the members know him to be the leader, and act routinely on the basis 
of what they know". 8 0 Or a certain piece of metal is money just because and insofar as the 
members of a particular society recognize it as such and accept it as a means of exchange 
for accomplishing their commercial transactions. Something similar holds for all social 
statuses and institutions. As a consequence, in Barnes's view, society appears as "a sublime, 
monumental, self-fulfilling prophecy". 8 1 This is in effect a particular way of formulating 
the recursive character of social life. 
It would seem that Giddens has succeeded in elegantly combining the aspects of 
'structure' and 'agency' in one unified theoretical conception. However, we should be wary 
about the precise terms under which this unification has been negotiated. Perhaps the happy 
reconciliation of both aspects is a little bit too smooth and too glib. At least that is what 
Giddens's critic John Thompson suggests. He argues that the theory of structuration one-
sidedly emphasizes the 'enabling' rather than the 'constraining' side of structure. Thompson 
holds that this theory allows virtually no place to a notion of 'structural constraints'. Giddens 
claims that even a prisoner who is gagged and bound and placed in solitary confinement 
remains an 'agent', for the latter can still choose the option of a hunger strike or, ultimately, 
suicide. But if the definition of agency is stretched that far, then, Thompson concludes, "any 
individual in any situation could not not be an agent". 8 2 In this way the reconciliation 
between structure and agency has been achieved too easily. According to Thompson, there 
is not only complementarity but also tension between the two. As yet the theory of 
structuration is ill-equipped to accommodate this tension. 
The probable source of the defect is Giddens's conceptualization of structure in terms 
of 'rules and resources'. Thompson directs his criticism to the first component, that of the 
7 8 Ibid., p. 67. 
7 9 See B. Barnes, The Nature of Power, London (Polity Press), 1988, especially Chapter 2. On p. 166 
Barnes himself recognizes that Giddens has moved "in much the same direction". 
8 0 Ibid., p. 49. 
8 1 Ibid., p. 52. 
J.B. Thompson, 'The Theory of Structuration', in D. Held and J.B. Thompson (eds.), Social 
Theory of Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens and His Critics, Cambridge (Cambridge University 
Press), 1989, pp. 56-76, on p. 74. 
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'rules'. He holds that the reference to Wittgenstein does not remedy the essential vagueness 
of this key notion. 8 3 There are many different kinds of rules, each with different, more or 
less important, functions in social life. Giddens does not want to claim that all kinds of rules 
are equally relevant and important for describing social structure, but neither does he have 
a criterion of importance to select a relevant set of rules. Moreover, the notion of rules 
appears an insufficient basis for describing and analyzing the (prima facie) structurally 
important phenomenon of differential opportunities and restrictions among various social 
groups (such as differential access to higher education among different classes and genders). 
Nor are structural effects exclusively obtained by actors consciously 'drawing upon' rules. 
In sum, according to Thompson's criticism, the concept of rules fails to capture essential 
aspects of social structure. 
Remarkably, Thompson devotes hardly any critical attention at all to the other 
component making up Giddens's notion of structure: resources. Giddens defines 'resources' 
somewhat obscurely as "the media whereby transformative capacity is employed as power 
in the routine course of social interaction". 8 4 He distinguishes two types of resources, 
'authoritative' and 'allocative' resources: "By 'authorisation' I refer to capabilities which 
generate command over persons, and by 'allocation' I refer to capabilities which generate 
command over objects or other material phenomena". 8 5 There is a perplexing ambiguity 
in Giddens as to whether 'resources' refer to the 'command(s)' over persons and objects or 
to the 'capabilities' which (in the passage just quoted) are said to 'generate' such command(s) 
or to 'capabilities' which (in yet another passage) are said to 'arise from' such 
command(s). 8 6 I will return to this ambiguity in a moment. On the basis of his distinctions 
between two types of resource (authoritative and allocative) and between two types of rules 
(interpretative schemes and normative rules), Giddens distinguishes four basic institutional 
dimensions (or 'modalities of structure') which in his view are possessed by all social 
practices: symbolic (semantic), political, economic, and moral-legal dimensions. This entails 
an important instruction for the study of social practices: "[N]o social practice expresses, or 
Thompson could have strengthened this point by referring to the controversies about 'rule-
following' in the exegetical literature on Wittgenstein, where we can distinguish between a 
'skeptical' view (Kripke) and a 'non-skeptical' view (Baker and Hacker). This opposition has also 
found its way to science and technology studies, with David Bloor defending the skeptical and 
Michael Lynch defending the non-skeptical view. For the debate between the latter two, see A. 
Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago and London (University of Chicago 
Press), 1992, pp. 215-300. 
Giddens, op. cit. (note 77), p. 92. 
Ibid., p. 100. 
For critical comments on this ambiguity see T.R. Schatzki, Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian 
Approach to Human Activity and the Social, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1996, p. 
145 ff. 
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can be explicated in terms of, a single rule or type of resource. Rather, practices are situated 
within intersecting sets of rules and resources that ultimately express features of the 
totality". 8 7 Hagendijk has elaborated Giddens's 'four-dimensional' analysis of social 
practices for science considered as a practice. 8 8 In principle, science can be analyzed from 
a cognitive perspective (the symbolic dimension), from political and economic perspectives 
(e.g. Latour), or from a moral-legal perspective (e.g. Merton's work on the 'scientific 
ethos'), but the distinctive character of science as a practice (or institutional domain) is 
revealed only in the particular way in which cognitive, politico-economic, and normative 
elements are combined. The same holds true for other practices or institutional domains such 
as law, journalism and administration. For each practice a particular dimension may be of 
central importance (such as the symbolic dimension for science or the normative dimension 
for law) but the other dimensions are also relevant. It will be clear from this brief discussion 
that in Hagendijk's elaboration 'practices' are taken as more or less equivalent to 
'institutional domains'. 
Other elaborations of the notion of 'practices' turn out to be possible, however, when 
we scratinize the idea of 'resources' more critically. Here I shall discuss two responses to 
the ambiguity inherent in Giddens's conceptualization. The first reaction comes from the 
American philosopher Theodore Schatzki. He denies that resources are ontologically 'on a 
level' with rules and asserts that power ultimately rests on rules, not on resources: 
"Suppose, for instance, that a boss, drawing on the authoritative resource to orchestrate employee's 
actions that is based on her identity and rights as boss, instructs an employee to post a letter by courier 
service and the employee complies. Her capacity to determine the employee's action rests on the codes 
and norms structuring business practices. This means, however, that her drawing on this authoritative 
resource really comes down to her drawing on the rules that structure the field of business 
interaction".89 
The conclusion, Schatzki holds, can be generalized from this particular example to all cases 
involving a command over persons or things, so that, "to draw on a resource is at bottom 
to draw on some set of rales in a specific situation". 9 0 In this way, resources simply drop 
out as an independent element that, in conjunction with rules, structure practices. 
Consequently, the four fundamental dimensions of social practices formulated by Giddens are 
reduced to two: the semantic and the normative. The economic and political institutional 
orders are to be seen as particular assemblages of the semantic and normative dimensions. 
8 7 Giddens, op. cit. (note 77), p. 82. 
8 8 Hagendijk, op. cit. (note 45), p. 147 ff. 
8 9 Schatzki, op. cit. (note 86), p. 155. 
9 0 Ibid. 
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(For Schatzki, practices are the basic and elementary building blocks of the social order and 
are logically prior to all other social formations.) 
I think that Schatzki's decision to drop 'resources' from among the structuring elements 
of practices is a legitimate response, given the ambiguity in Giddens's formulations. It may 
not be the most attractive response, however. One might object that the very idea of a 
'practice' essentially includes the commerce of human beings with each other and with 
material objects. Schatzki rests his case on the argument that to 'draw on' a resource comes 
down to 'drawing on' a rule or a set of rules. On some of Giddens's conceptualizations of 
'resources', this argument may indeed be valid, but it does not hold for all possible 
definitions of 'resources'. In many cases, even where access to resources is regulated by 
social rules, 'drawing on' resources does not only mean 'drawing on' the rules determining 
access, but also involves mobilization of those resources in a more physical sense. This 
reasoning invokes a much more simple and mundane, less convoluted, conceptualization of 
'resources' than that of Giddens. For this we can turn to the second response to Giddens's 
ambiguity, coming from the social historian William Sewell. The latter provides a simple 
translation of Giddens's obscure definition: "resources are anything that can serve as a source 
of power in social interactions". 9 1 He also replaces Giddens's distinction between 
'allocative' and 'authoritative' resources by a fairly simple distinction between non-human 
and human resources: 
"Norihuman resources are objects, animate or inanimate, naturally occurring or manufactured, that can 
be used to enhance or maintain power: human resources are physical strength, dexterity, knowledge, and 
emotional commitments that can be used to enhance or maintain power, including knowledge of the means 
of gaining, retaining, controlling, and propagating either human or nonhuman resources. Both types of 
resources are media of power and are unevenly distributed".92 
Sewell also notes that Giddens failed to give clear content to the notion of rales, beyond the 
reference to Wittgenstein. For a richer vocabulary, Sewell turns to the detailed descriptions 
of 'the rales of social life' provided by cultural anthropologists. The latter have uncovered 
various conventions, recipes, scenarios, principles of action, and habits of speech and gesture 
involved in the daily life of people. Sewell proposes the designation 'cultural schémas' as a 
substitute for the term 'rules', because the latter term is too easily identified with publicly 
fixed codifications of rales. He agrees, however, with Giddens's definition of rales (or 
'schémas') as "generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social 
W.H. Sewell Jr, 'A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation', American Journal 
of Sociology 98 (1992): 1-29, on p. 9. 
Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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"[..] an immense stack of Hudson Bay blankets would be nothing more than a means of keeping a large 
number of people warm were it not for the cultural schemas that constituted the Kwakiutl potlatch; but 
given these schemas, the blankets, given away in a potlatch, became a means of demonstrating the power 
A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Cambrdige (Polity 
Press), 1984, p. 21. 
Sewell, op. cit. (note 91), p. 10. 
l i fe" . 9 3 The adjective 'generalizable' rightly points to the circumstance that cultural 
schemas can be extended and transposed to new contexts and new situations whenever the 
opportunity arises. It is precisely because of this generalizability or transposability that 
cultural schemas are considered to have a 'virtual' existence. 
If rules or cultural schemas must be understood as virtual, what cannot be so 
understood, however, is resources. For non-human resources that is clear enough. Factories 
owned by capitalists, stocks of weapons in the hands of generals, land rented by peasants and 
the like can hardly be called 'virtual' because as material things they exist in time and space. 
The case of human resources is only slightly more difficult. Skills, physical strength, 
emotional commitments and knowledge, though not 'material' in the same sense as non-
human resources, are 'resources' only insofar as they are incorporated or actualized in 
people's bodies and minds: "It is not the disembodied concept of the majesty of the king that 
gives him power, but the fear and reverence felt for him by his actual subjects". 9 4 
The fact that resources have to be understood as actual rather than virtual entails serious 
difficulties for Giddens's notion of structure. As a combination of rules and resources, 
'structure' was considered to have a virtual existence. Now this view is no longer tenable. 
Nor can the famous idea of the duality of structure - with its 'virtual' order being actualized 
in and reproduced through concrete practices - be maintained in the same form. It is obvious 
that the situation calls for some drastic theoretical repair work. One possible response is to 
clean up Giddens's notion of structure by removing the element of resources. Structures, 
consisting only of cultural schemas, could then again be thought of as virtual. It would be 
necessary, however, to grant such structures some measure of causal power in animating and 
shaping actual arrays of resources. Sewell notes that resources, especially human resources, 
are indeed in some respects the manifestations and consequences of the enactment of cultural 
schemas. Thus the amount and kind of military power that a given number of enlisted men 
represents will depend on the currently established conventions of warfare (including 
chivalric codes), the notions of strategy and tactics and the training regimes that are 
available. Although non-human resources, as far as their material existence is concerned, 
cannot be seen as produced by cultural schemas, it is nevertheless true that their value as 
resources to a large extent also depends on the schemas that inform their use. Sewell offers 
a nice example borrowed from cultural anthropology to establish this point: 
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of the chief and, consequently, of acquiring prestige, marriage alliances, military power, and labor 
services [..]". 9 5 
So the option to retain a cleaned-up notion of structure (with schemas or rules, but without 
resources) that would restore its 'virtual' character is indeed feasible. Sewell nevertheless 
urges that we should not choose this particular option because it would represent a lapse into 
undiluted idealism. It would install mental structures (i.e. schemas) as the only form-giving 
instances and reduce human beings to "agents of these mental structures, actors who can only 
recite preexisting scripts" 9 6 or, as we could say, it would reduce them to 'cultural dopes'. 
Sewell therefore opts for a different solution, which at once is more materialist and also 
offers more scope for human agency than the rejected option. 
The alternative solution Sewell proposes is to redefine the duality of structure as a 
duality of schemas and resources. According to him, structure has to be understood as 
consisting both of schemas, which are virtual, and of resources, which are actual. The duality 
is expressed in the fact that in some sense schemas are the effects of resources, while 
resources are also the effects of schemas. Often, the cultural schemas can be read off from 
the material form of the resources. Take the example of a factory: "The factory gate, the 
punching-in station, the design of the assembly line: all of these features of the factory teach 
and validate the rules of the capitalist labor contract". 9 7 On the other hand, to be 
reproduced over time, schemas must be supported and regenerated by resources which are 
deployed in their enactment. Without such support, schemas would wither away. Thus, sets 
of schemas and resources mutually imply and sustain each other over time and in this manner 
constitute structures. 
The redefinition of the duality of structure as a duality of schemas and resources also 
gives rise to a more clearly articulated conception of agency. Conceiving of human beings 
as agents means, first, conceiving of them as empowered by access to resources of one kind 
or another. It means, second, conceiving of them as having the competence and capacity to 
apply existing cultural schemas to new cases in new contexts. Human beings have a 
generalized capacity for agency, Sewell holds, just as they have the capacity for respiration, 
9 5 Ibid., p. 12. The circumstance that the value of resources is largely dependent on the cultural 
schemas which inform their use has important corollaries for the meaning of sustainability. It 
implies that the attempt to measure the so-called 'environmental utilization space' (which would be 
available for exploitation without violating intergenerational justice) in a culture-free way is doomed 
to failure. On this question, see H. van den Belt, 'Measuring the Environmental Utilization Space: 
Natural or Social Limits?', paper presented at the July 1995 meeting of the International Society for 
Hermeneutics and Science, 12-15 July, 1995, Leusden, Holland. See also P. Thompson, 'Markets, 
Moral Economy and the Ethics of Sustainable Agriculture', in W. Heijman et al. (eds.), Rural 
Reconstruction in a Market Economy, Manholt Studies 5, Wageningen, the Netherlands, 1996, pp. 
39-54. 
9 6 Ibid. 
9 7 Ibid., p. 13. 
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but this general capacity is is given a more specific form by the cultural schemas and 
resources that are available in their particular social environments (cf. the general linguistic 
capacity and the learning of specific languages). He also stresses that he understands agency, 
not merely as individual, but as profoundly social or collective. 
This new conception of agency already transpired in the previously cited definition of 
cultural schemas or rules as "generalizable [or as Sewell prefers to say: transposablej 
procedures applied in the enactment of social life". "To say that schemas are transposable 
[..] is to say that they can be applied to a wide and not fully predictable range of cases 
outside the context in which they are initially learned". 9 8 It would seem that with this 
particular insight Sewell comes very close to the finitist theory of meaning which is such an 
important philosophical underpinning for the sociology of scientific knowledge. 9 9 In 
Chapter II we have seen that finitism too emphasizes the agency of human beings against any 
attempt to 'empower' rales or other cultural items. However, Sewell takes one further step 
which in my judgement is highly relevant for a theoretical understanding of practices in 
general and for scientific practices in particular. He points out that the transposability of 
cultural schemas implies the possibility of reinterpreting and remobilizing existing arrays of 
resources, precisely because resources instantiate and embody cultural schemas: "Any array 
of resources is capable of being interpreted in varying ways and, therefore, of empowering 
different actors and teaching different schemas. [..] Agency [..] is the actor's capacity to 
reinterpret and mobilize an array of resources in terms of cultural schemas other than those 
that initially constituted the a r ray" . 1 0 0 To return to the example of a factory: it may indeed 
embody capitalist notions of private property, as we saw earlier, but it may also - as Marx 
would argue - bring out the collective character of the labour process and thereby undermine 
those notions. One point that is not explicitly stated by Sewell, and that should be made 
explicit for the sake of having a more complete conception of practices, is that the 
'remobilization' of resources often involves a material transformation of them as well. By 
taking this final step, we in fact complete the transposition of finitism from the domain of 
cultural schemas to the field of resources. 
I believe that this kind of 'generalized finitism', inspired by Sewell's theory of the 
duality of cultural schemas and resources, offers a suitable synthetic framework for 
systematizing and assimilating the valuable insights that are implicitly or explicitly available 
in contemporary constructivist approaches to 'science-as-practice' (and it also provides a 
basis for rejecting the less valuable ideas proposed by these approaches!). Let me consider 
9 8 Ibid., p. 17. 
9 9 In a footnote Sewell provides an interpretation of the verb 'transpose' which brings out this 
siniilarity with finitism more fully: "The verb 'transpose' implies a concrete application of a rule to 
a new case, but in such a way that the rule will have subtly different forms in each of its 
applications" (Ibid., p. 17, footnote; emphasis added). 
1 0 0 Ibid., p. 19. 
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here the contributions of Andrew Pickering and Joseph Rouse. Pickering's theory of 'the 
mangle of practice' generalizes the Kuhnian and finitist idea of open-ended modelling so that 
it covers not just conceptual and theoretical change but also the modification of material 
procedures, the re-fitting of apparatus, and the l i ke . 1 0 1 Indeed, Pickering defines 'practice' 
(as distinct from 'practices') simply though rather idiosyncratically as "the work of cultural 
extension and transformation in time", where 'culture' is taken to refer to the stock of 
'resources' (conceptual, material, as well as social) existing at any one point in t i m e . 1 0 2 
Thus, scientific practice is considered as nothing more nor less than 'modelling' or the open-
ended modification of material, conceptual and social resources over time. I would not 
characterize such a conception of scientific practice as 'posthumanist', although this is 
precisely the label Pickering wants to stick on it. The posthumanist tendency is even stronger 
in Rouse's case. 
The theory of scientific practice(s) developed by Joseph Rouse also lays great theoretical 
store on the openness of practices: "[..] practices are radically open: whether a subsequent 
action counts as a continuation, transformation, deviation, or opposition to a practice is never 
fixed by its past instances". 1 0 3 Although this might be taken as closely resembling the 
'finitist' emphasis on the open-ended character of concept application so typical of moderate 
SSK-type constructivism, Rouse deploys this argument precisely with the aim of combatting 
the latter. He takes the openness of practices to such extremes, that any consideration of 
possible social influences or even the attribution of agency to human beings (and not to things 
or animals) is already held to be an abrogation of this openness. His argument is that the 
alleged social factors ("or even their characterization as social") "may be what is at issue in 
the continuation of the practice"; similarly, "who or what can count as an agent is itself at 
issue within various practices and is not established by a timeless nature of agency or of the 
various kinds of putative candidates for agency". 1 0 4 I wonder whether Rouse seriously 
contemplates the possibility that, for instance, in the practice of experimentally testing new 
drugs, the laboratory rats might one day emerge as the true 'agents' and administer the 
chemical preparations to the human experimenters rather than vice versa. By going the 
'posthumanist' road all the way down, Rouse risks ending up with a conception of practice 
in which human activity is no longer the central element, e.g. when he states that he 
understands practices "not as the doings of human agents but as the meaningful situations in 
A. Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency & Science, Chicago and London (University 
of Chicago Press), 1995, p. 19. 
Ibid., pp. 3-4. 'Practices' (in plural), on Pickering's understanding, relate to "specific, repeatable 
sequences of activities on which scientists rely in their daily work" (p. 4) and are taken to be a 
component of 'culture'. 
Rouse, op. cit. (note 56), p. 141. 
Ibid., p. 141 and p. 143 (note 34). 
286 
which those doings can be significant". 1 0 5 In contrast to Rouse's view, Sewell's theory 
of agency, structure and practice remains firmly located on the 'humanist' side of the 
humamsm-posthumanism divide. (Let me balance this criticism of Rouse's theory by also 
noting that it offered us the very useful notion of 'experimental systems' or 'phenomenal 
microworlds' as characteristic of laboratory work and the idea of the necessary 
interconnectedness of practices.) 
The conception of practice based on the duality of cultural schemas and resources also offers 
a useful framework in which to integrate the historical analyses presented in Chapters V and 
VTI. The reader will probably remember that my descriptions of the work of Wassermann's 
and Ehrlich's teams paid extensive attention to the material resources used in both 
endeavours. Indeed, the experimental practices of serology or chemotherapeutics could only 
start when all the necessary resources - raw materials, test animals, patient material, 
scientific and technical manpower - had been assembled. Cultural schemas were involved in 
recruiting these resources as well as in employing them effectively once they were in place. 
The acquisition of resources was often achieved through the market, i.e. by drawing on the 
rules of monetary exchange and contract law, or by more informal and complex deals (as 
between Ehrlich and chemical firms). In the latter case too, however, such deals were made 
possible thanks to the existence of intellectual property regulations concerning patents and 
the like. As Sewell rightly emphasizes, the core schema of capitalism - the so-called 
'commodity form' - is unique in allowing for an almost universal interconvertibility of 
resources. 1 0 6 Latour and Woolgar's 'cycle of credibility' whereby scientific reputations 
are converted into additional funds (and the latter again into new results and into more 
prestige) is just an example of a particular circuit inscribed within this general 
circulation. 1 0 7 It was only because Ehrlich had already passed through this cycle several 
times with ever greater success that he was able to gather the funds needed to embark on his 
very costly chemotherapeutic programme. Once he had brought a complete array of material 
and human resources together under one roof, so to speak, he had to 'animate' these 
resources by drawing on the cultural schemas of the organization and management of 
'scientific mass-labour' (just as in Sewell's example enlisted men and weapons are turned into 
military power by subjecting them to training regimes and drawing on notions of strategy and 
tactics). As I described in Chapter VII, Ehrlich had borrowed this organizational model and 
management pattern from the German synthetic dye industry, adapting them to the particular 
Ibid., p. 38. On p. 30, practices are described as "meaningful situations or configurations of the 
world". 
Sewell, op. cit. (note 91), pp. 25-26. 
In his essay 'Portrait d'un biologiste en capitaliste sauvage', Latour points out the similarity 
between the cycle of credibility within science and the circuit of capital accumulation as expressed 
in the Marxian formula M-C-M (Money-Commodity-Money); see B. Latour, La Clef de Berlin, 
Paris (La Découverte), 1993, pp. 100-129, esp. p. 125 ff. 
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"[..] I do see agency as profoundly social or collective. The transpositions of schemas and remobilizations 
of resources that constitute agency are always acts of communication with others. Agency entails an ability 
to coordinate one's actions with others and against others, to form collective projects, to persuade, to 
coerce, and to monitor the simultaneous effects of one's own and others' activities".108 
I do not entertain the illusion that the view stated in this passage is the definitive answer to 
the fundamental dilemmas about individual and society, or agency and structure, that 
continue to haunt the social sciences, but I do believe that it represents a quite reasonable and 
balanced position which is eminently worth defending. 
1 0 8 Ibid., p. 21. 
needs of his chemotherapeutic practice as he went along. He thus exhibited 'agency' in his 
competence to transpose these cultural schemas from this particular industry to the new 
context of chemotherapeutics. It is also true, however, that the specific form which 'agency' 
assumed in Ehrlich's person had been shaped under the influence of the dominating presence 
of an advanced synthetic dye industry, to such an extent that Ehrlich considered himself to 
be a dye chemist manque. In carrying on the practice of chemotherapeutics, he found himself 
condemned to rely heavily on this same industry for material and financial support. His goals 
could be reached only in intimate symbiosis with chemical firms, with all the dependencies 
and constraints thereby entailed. 
The example of Ehrlich's work thus demonstrates Sewell's point that agency is of a 
thoroughly social nature: 
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[For an English summary, see Chapter I under the section headed 'Synoptic Preview'] 
In 1935 publiceerde de Joods-Poolse arts en bacterioloog/seroloog Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961) 
een verhandeling over de historische ontwikkeling van het syfiiisbegrip en de totstandkoming 
van de Wassermann-reactie onder de titel Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaft-
lichen Tatsache. Fleck gaf daarin een kennissociologische analyse van het ontstaan van een 
wetenschappelijk feit (namelijk de relatie tussen de Wassermann-reactie en syfilis) en kan om 
die reden beschouwd worden als een voorloper en pionier van de constructivistische stroming 
in de hedendaagse wetenschapsfilosofie, -sociologie en -geschiedenis. Sleutelbegrippen in zijn 
benadering zijn de noties 'denkcollectief en 'denkstijl'. Wetenschappelijke feiten komen 
volgens Fleck tot stand in een proces van intensieve sociale interactie in het kader van een 
'denkcollectief, waarvan de leden de werkelijkheid in overeemtemming met een bepaalde 
'denkstijl' leren waarnemen. Hij demonstreerde zijn filosofische en sociologische theorie over 
wetenschapsontwikkeling met een gedetailleerde analyse van een casus die aan zijn eigen 
vakgebied was ontleend. 
Deze studie treedt in de voetsporen van Fleck. De door hem gekozen casus wordt aan 
een hernieuwde analyse onderworpen. In die zin zou je van een historisch replicatie-onder-
zoek kunnen spreken. Deze werkwijze is tamelijk uniek. Vrijwel alle commentatoren hebben 
zich gestort op de conceptuele en theoretische kwesties die door Flecks baanbrekende mono-
grafie worden opgeworpen zonder overigens in te gaan op de empirische adequaatheid van 
zijn case-study's. Dat laatste doe ik wel. Toch pretendeert deze studie meer te zijn dan alleen 
een replicatie van het werk van Fleck. Enerzijds is er een uitbreiding van het empirische 
domein. Naast de reeds door Fleck geanalyseerde ontwikkeling van het syfiiisbegrip en de 
totstandkoming van de Wassermann-reactie heb ik nog twee andere belangrijke episoden uit 
de geschiedenis van de syfilologie als extra onderwerpen aan mijn onderzoek toegevoegd, 
namelijk de ontdekking van de verwekker, Spirochaeta pallida of Treponemapallidum, door 
Schaudinn en Hoffmann in 1905 en de ontwikkeling van het effectieve geneesmiddel Salvar-
san door Ehrlich en zijn team in 1909-1910. Historisch gezien vormen deze ontdekkingen 
(resp. uitvindingen) een eenheid met de ontwikkeling van de Wassermann-reactie als serolo-
gische test voor het aantonen van syfilis (1906). Het eerste decennium van de twintigste eeuw 
is wel het meest vruchtbare genoemd uit de hele vijfhonderdjarige geschiedenis van de ziekte. 
De ontdekkingen die in dit decennium plaatsvonden zijn ook niet te beschouwen als geïsoleer-
de 'punt-gebeurtenissen' maar eerder als de knooppunten van een zich uitbreidend netwerk 
van medische kennis over syfilis. Anderzijds wil ik met de analyse van deze verschillende 
episoden uit de geschiedenis van de syfilologie niet alleen concepten en theorieën die ontleend 
zijn aan het werk van Fleck zelf, maar ook die welke in hedendaagse versies van het con-
structivisme een belangrijke rol spelen, op hun bruikbaarheid beproeven. Deze uitbreiding 
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ligt alleen al voor de hand omdat moderne constructivisten uiteenlopende lezingen van het 
werk van Fleck hebben gegeven en verschillende aspecten daaruit centraal hebben gesteld. 
Bovendien komt het de actualiteit van deze studie uiteraard ten goede wanneer zij zich met 
empirische en theoretische argumenten in de vaak heftige debatten in en rond het hedendaag-
se constructivisme weet te positioneren. 
Het hedendaagse constructivistische wetenschaps- en technologie-onderzoek biedt door 
zijn grote verscheidenheid aan stromingen en benaderingen een nogal verwarrende aanblik. 
Om het beeld wat overzichtelijker te krijgen heb ik dankbaar gebruik gemaakt van de door 
Rob Hagendijk ingevoerde onderscheiding in twee hoofdvormen van constructivisme, name-
lijk gematigd en radicaal constructivisme. Dit onderscheid wordt gemaakt alnaargelang de 
mate waarin de diverse benaderingen diepgewortelde opvattingen over natuur, maatschappij 
en wetenschappelijke kennis ter discussie stellen. Tot het gematigde constructivsme rekent 
Hagendijk de aanhangers van het sterke programma (Barnes, Bloor) en van het empirisch-
relativistische programma (Collins, Pinch). Zij nemen een relativistisch standpunt tegenover 
wetenschappelijke kennis in: variaties in kennis moeten worden verklaard door deze te 
herleiden tot sociale structuren en processen. Het bestaan van deze laatste wordt niet gepro-
blematiseerd. Radicale constructivisten proberen het epistemologische debat tussen realisme 
en anti-realisme te omzeilen. Zij achten het ook niet legitiem om uit te gaan van voorgegeven 
sociale structuren, aan de hand waarvan de inhoud van wetenschappelijke kennis zou kunnen 
worden verklaard. Zowel de natuur als de maatschappij worden gezien als een gelijktijdig 
produkt van de wetenschap, welke opgevat wordt als een verzameling praktijken die orde uit 
chaos scheppen. Elk a priori onderscheid, zoals tussen 'cognitief en 'sociaal', 'subject' en 
'object', of 'natuur' en 'cultuur', moet volgens de radicale constructivisten worden afgewe-
zen. Onder het etiket radicaal constructivisme rangschikt Hagendijk het etnografische labora-
toriumonderzoek van Knorr-Cetina, de actor-netwerkbenadering van Callon en Latour en het 
reflexieve programma van Woolgar en Ashmore. Aan dit lijstje zou ik nog de 'wetenschap-
als-praktijk' benadering van Andrew Pickering en de Heideggeriaans geïnspireerde 'prak-
tische hermeneutiek' van Joseph Rouse willen toevoegen. Het is opmerkelijk dat Fleck zelf 
niet eenduidig aan één van de twee kampen kan worden toegedeeld; sommige aspecten van 
zijn werk komen overeen met het gematigde constructivisme, terwijl andere trekken eerder 
op een affiniteit met het radicale constructivisme wijzen. 
Na een algemeen overzicht in hoofdstuk I ga ik in hoofdstuk II uitgebreid in op de 
overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen de theorie van Fleck en varianten van het moderne 
constructivisme. Flecks pleidooi voor een 'niet-egocentrische' kennistheorie kan worden 
beschouwd als een anticipatie op het door David Bloor in de jaren zeventig geformuleerde 
symmetriebeginsel dat constitutief is voor alle moderne vormen van constructivisme. Flecks 
poging de Durkheimiaanse traditie in de kennissociologie voort te zetten en door te trekken 
naar de studie der moderne wetenschap is een andere opvallende overeenkomst, vooral met 
het sterke programma. De vergelijking met hedendaagse constructivistische posities geschiedt 
verder vooral aan de hand van twee grote, fundamentele problemen die zich permanent aan 
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het sociologisch georiënteerde wetenschapsonderzoek lijken op te dringen, namelijk de vraag 
naar de aard van 'het sociale' en de relatie tussen individu en collectief enerzijds en het 
zogenoemde realismeprobleem anderzijds. Met betrekking tot het eerste probleem kan gesteld 
worden dat Fleck neigt naar een extreem collectivistisch standpunt. In overeenstemming 
daarmee kent hij aan de heersende 'denkstijl' een dwingende kracht toe over het denken en 
waarnemen van de leden van het corresponderende 'denkcollectief. Moderne constructivisten 
verwerpen op grond van Mary Hesse's zogenoemde finitistische betekenistheorie principieel 
elke 'empowering' van normen, regels, waarden, ideeën en dus ook van zoiets als een 
'denkstijl'. Met betrekking tot het realismeprobleem is Flecks standpunt vergelijkbaar met 
de positie van het radicale constructivisme, voorzover hij claimt dat tijdens het proces van 
kennisverwerving niet alleen het subject maar ook het object verandert. Met de kennis zou 
dus tegelijk de wereld waarop die kennis betrekking heeft veranderen. Deze radicaal-con-
structivistische visie botst met de verschillende realistische opvattingen over de verhouding 
tussen kennis en werkelijkheid, maar ook met de positie van het gematigd constructivisme 
(in het bijzonder het sterke programma). De analyse van het empirisch-historische materiaal 
in de hoofdstukken over verschillende episoden uit de geschiedenis van de syfilologie dient 
mede om uiteindelijk een gefundeerde en beredeneerde stellingname ten aanzien van de 
geschetste fundamentele kwesties mogelijk te maken. Het accent verschuift daarbij geleide-
lijk. Aanvankelijk staan inzichten ontleend aan het gematigd constructivisme centraal, later 
worden ook steeds meer radicaal-constructivistische inzichten in de case-study's verwerkt. 
In hoofdstuk UI bekijk ik opnieuw, in het voetspoor van Fleck en in het licht van nieuwe 
historische gegevens, de wording van het moderne syfilisbegrip vanaf de Renaissance. De 
nadruk ligt hier niet op de kritiek, maar op de consolidatie en uitbreiding van Flecks inzich-
ten (ondanks correcties die op het vlak van de historische details nodig blijken). In overeen-
stenmüng met Flecks intenties probeer ik te laten zien dat een (gematigd) constructivistische 
benadering van de historische genese van ziektebegrippen rechtmatig en vruchtbaar is. 
Daartoe kies ik als analysekader de finitistische betekenistheorie (of netwerktheorie) van 
Mary Hesse, die ook als filosofische grondslag van het gematigd constructivisme (met name 
van het sterke programma) fungeert. Mijn 'replicatie' bevestigt het (sociaal) geconstrueerde 
en cultuur-geladen karakter van het moderne syfilisbegrip. Flecks meer specifieke suggestie 
dat de constructie van het ziektebegrip vooral sterk door morele overwegingen is gekleurd 
heb ik grotendeels kunnen staven door de discussies in medische kring over de indertijd 
aangenomen erfelijkheid van syfilis en over de relatie met verwante niet-venerische ziekten 
te traceren. 
Hoofdstuk IV behandelt de ontdekking van de verwekker van syfilis. In de jaren 1905-
1907 dongen twee microbiële kandidaten, Spirochaeta pallida en Cytorrhyctes luis, naar deze 
tot dan toe onvervulde aetiologische vacature. Zo'n situatie roept als het ware om toepassing 
van het moderne symmetriebeginsel. Het is opmerkelijk dat Fleck in zijn monografie zelf 
reeds een poging heeft gedaan deze episode symmetrisch te analyseren, maar helaas had hij 
in de uitvoering daarvan een minder gelukkige hand. In dit hoofdstuk doe ik dus een nieuwe 
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poging. Ik heb me daarbij laten inspireren door het empirisch-relativistische programma van 
Harry Collins dat zich vooral op de studie van wetenschappelijke controverses heeft toege-
legd. Volgens dit programma moet de analyst een strikt agnostische houding innemen ten 
aanzien van het al dan niet bestaan van het in het geding zijnde fenomeen en de argumenten 
en handelingen van de strijdende partijen op een symmetrische en onpartijdige wijze behande-
len. De historische controverse over de aetiologie van syfilis is vanuit constructivistisch 
oogpunt zeer interessant omdat er principiële vragen werden opgeworpen over de betrouw-
baarheid van (microscopische) waarneming en de mogelijke creatie van 'artefacten' door het 
kleuren van weefselpreparaten. Dit laatste biedt de gelegenheid om de sociale constructie van 
feiten en de sociale deconstructie van artefacten tegelijk binnen één enkel kader af te hande-
len, hetgeen van belang is met het oog op de gangbare kritiek dat constructivisten elk onder-
scheid tussen feiten en artefacten uitwissen. Verder laat het hoofdstuk zien dat een weten-
schappelijke controverse niet enkel met een beroep op formele methodologische regels en 
criteria kan worden beslecht. Tenslotte ga ik in op wat volgens de constructivistische visie 
een 'ontdekking' eigenlijk inhoudt. 
In hoofdstuk V treed ik opnieuw in de voetsporen van Fleck met een nieuwe analyse van 
zijn voornaamste casus, de totstandkoming van de Wassermann-reactie als een praktisch 
bruikbare serologische test voor het aantonen van syfilis. Het "feit dat de Wassermann-reactie 
verband houdt met syfilis" was volgens Fleck "één van de best gestaafde medische feiten". 
Hij ziet de totstandkoming van dit feit als het uiteindelijke resultaat van een gezamenlijke 
inspanning van het zogenoemde 'serologisch denkcollectief. Onder leiding van August 
Wassermann werkte dit collectief, gestimuleerd door de sociale urgentie van het syfilisvraag-
stuk en door oude ideeën over syfilitisch bloed, gestaag en onophoudelijk aan het verbeteren 
en vervolmaken van de test totdat tenslotte een praktisch bruikbaar diagnostisch instrument 
werd verkregen. In dit hoofdstuk kijk ik kritisch naar de empirische en theoretische adequaat-
heid van Flecks analyse. De heb problemen met verschillende aspecten van zijn uiteenzetting, 
maar mijn hoofdbezwaar is wel dat hij voorbijgaat aan de 'klinische connectie' en de ontwik-
keling van de Wassermann-reactie beschrijft alsof deze uitsluitend binnen de vier muren van 
het laboratorium heeft plaatsgevonden, waarbij de serologen niets anders deden dan "aan hun 
apparaten draaien". In mijn alternatieve weergave van de hele episode leg ik veel meer 
nadruk op de interactie tussen serologen en klinici. Die uiteenzetting is geïnspireerd door 
Bruno Latour's ideeën over recrutering (enrollment) en het vertalen van belangen. Mulkay, 
Pinch en Ashmore hebben hieraan met hun notie van 'toepassingsdilemma's' (dilemmas of 
application) een meer toegespitste formulering gegeven. Bij hun poging klinici te overtuigen 
van de waarde en betrouwbaarheid van de Wassermann-reactie, zaten serologen aanvankelijk 
gevangen in een 'toepassingsdilemma' in de zin van Mulkay c.s.: indien de uitkomst van de 
test overeenkwam met het eigen oordeel van de klinici, zou deze hen niets nieuws vertellen; 
maar als hij daarmee strijdig was, zou zijn validiteit en betrouwbaarheid zeker in twijfel 
worden getrokken. Door klinici actief erbij te betrekken ('enrollment') kon het dilemma 
worden overwonnen, enerzijds door de technische uitvoeringswijze en klinische betekenis van 
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de Wassermann-reactie te veranderen en anderzijds door een herdefiniëring te geven van de 
diagnostische en therapeutische belangen van de klinici welke de test zou dienen. Uiteindelijk 
werd dankzij een gezamenlijke inspanning van serologen en klinici een praktisch bruikbare 
serologische test voor het aantonen van syfilis verkregen. Deze analyse beoogt niet enkel 
empirische en theoretische tekortkomingen in Flecks uiteenzetting recht te trekken, zij wil 
zich hier en daar ook voorzichtig wagen aan radicaal-constructivistische exercities. Behalve 
de reeds genoemde Latouriaanse noties van 'enrollment' en vertalen van belangen, heb ik ook 
inzichten van Pickering en Rouse met betrekking tot het praktische karakter van wetenschap-
pelijke activiteit verwerkt, in het bijzonder wat de realisatie van experimentele systemen en 
de omgang met grondstoffen, proefdieren en ook 'patiëntenmateriaar aangaat. Anders dan 
deze radicaal-constructivistsiche auteurs zie ik echter geen aanleiding de door gematigde 
constructivisten gebruikte notie van 'belangen' principieel van de hand te wijzen. Naar mijn 
oordeel komt aan de professionele belangen van serologen en klinici juist een bescheiden rol 
toe bij het verklaren van de ontwikkeling van de Wassermann-reactie. Verklaringen in termen 
van belangen zijn mijns inziens zeer wel verenigbaar met het door Latour beschreven ver-
schijnsel van het vertalen van belangen. 
Hoofdstuk VI is gewijd aan een analyse van de strijd over het intellectuele eigendom van 
de Wassermann-reactie, die in het kielzog van de ontwikkeling van deze serologische test 
losbrandde - als een soort bittere epiloog. In 1921 raakte August Wassermann verwikkeld in 
een polemiek met onder andere zijn voormalige medewerker Carl Bruck en zijn voormalige 
criticus Eduard Weil over wie zich met recht de geestelijke vader van de Wassermann-reactie 
mocht noemen. Ik wijd een afzonderlijk hoofdstuk aan deze polemiek, die destijds als een 
'onverkwikkelijke' affaire werd beschouwd, omdat zij ons de unieke gelegenheid biedt om 
de dikwijls gehekelde 'collectivistische' of 'anti-individualistische' stellingname van Flecks 
benadering kritisch te waarderen aan de hand van historisch materiaal. De conclusie van mijn 
analyse is dat de 'collectivistische' karaktertrek van Flecks kennissociologie hem inderdaad 
slecht heeft toegerust om de strijd over het geestelijk eigendom van de Wassermann-reactie 
adequaat te kunnen behandelen. Hij accepteert kritiekloos de beweringen die door de betrok-
kenen in de loop van deze strijd zijn gedaan alsof zij zonder meer hun visie op de ontwikke-
ling van de Wassermann-reactie zouden weerspiegelen, zonder dat hij rekening houdt met de 
strategische context waarin deze uitspraken werden gedaan om eigen claims op intellectueel 
eigendom te ondersteunen of die van anderen te ondermijnen. Mijn eigen weergave van deze 
'onverkwikkelijke' episode is geïnspireerd door Robert Mertons wetenschapssociologie, die 
uitgaat van een evenwichtiger visie op de relatie tussen individu en collectief. De strijd over 
geestelijk eigendom tussen de leden van een zelfde team is voor de Mertoniaanse weten-
schapssociologie een nog ongeëxploreerd thema (de meeste aandacht is uitgegaan naar priori-
teitsstrijd tussen onderling onafhankelijke wetenschappers). Ook hef ik Mertons uitsluiting 
van de inhoud van wetenschappelijke kennis uit het domein van wetenschapssociologische 
analyse op: de vraag wie een creatief aandeel heeft gehad in een ontdekking is onlosmakelijk 
verbonden met de vraag wat er precies is ontdekt. In de strijd om de Wassermann-reactie 
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konden betrokkenen hun zaak alleen bepleiten door op beide punten positie te kiezen. Op 
deze wijze probeer ik Mertoniaanse inzichten in een constructivistische benadering te integre-
ren. Gezien het feit dat Mertons sociologie uit constructivistische hoek indertijd een spervuur 
van kritiek heeft ontvangen, kan mijn poging als een pleidooi voor rehabilitatie worden 
beschouwd. 
Hoofdstuk VU behandelt de ontwikkeling van een effectief chemotherapeutisch genees-
middel tegen syfilis door Paul Ehrlich en zijn medewerkers. Flecks monografie bevat hier-
over slechts enkele incidentele opmerkingen. De reden om een hoofdstuk over dit onderwerp 
op te nemen, is, afgezien van het feit dat het een belangrijk knooppunt in het zich uitbreiden-
de conceptuele netwerk van de syfilologie vertegenwoordigt, vooral hierin gelegen dat Ehr-
lichs werk zich uitstekend leent voor een type analyse dat in recente vormen van (radicaal) 
constructivisme steeds prominenter is geworden, namelijk één met het accent op 'wetenschap-
als-praktijk' in plaats van 'wetenschap-als-kennis'. Hoewel Andrew Pickering van deze 
tendens de meest uitgesproken exponent is, kan zij ook worden aangetroffen in het werk van 
de filosoof Joseph Rouse en in het al wat oudere werk van Karin Knorr-Cetina. Ook bepaalde 
aspecten van het werk van Latour kunnen hieronder worden gerangschikt. Met name de door 
hem zo nadrukkelijk opgeworpen vraag hoe laboratoriumresultaten toepasbaar kunnen zijn 
resp. toepasbaar kunnen worden gemaakt in de wereld buiten het laboratorium (m.a.w. hoe 
de 'wetenschap' uit het laboratorium komt) kan in het kader van een analyse van 'weten-
schap-als-praktijk' een plaats worden gegeven. Een dergelijke analyse is al gedeeltelijk in 
hoofdstuk V beproefd, maar wordt in dit hoofdstuk op grotere schaal uitgevoerd. Centraal 
in dit hoofdstuk staat Paul Ehrlichs praktijk van 'experimentele therapie' (of 'chemotherapie') 
welke door moderne farmacologen vaak beschouwd wordt als het eerste begin van het ratio-
neel ontwerpen van geneesmiddelen. Hiertoe moest Ehrlich een omvangrijke 'constructie-
machinerie' (Knorr-Cetina) opbouwen door fondsen te verwerven en materiële en menselijke 
hulpbronnen bij elkaar te brengen in nauwe samenwerking met de Duitse synthetische kleur-
stofindustrie. Om deze hulpbronnen vervolgens productief aan het werk te zetten, ontleende 
hij aan diezelfde industrie een model van research-management en wetenschappelijke arbeids-
deling ('chemische Massenarbeit') dat hij verder toesneed op zijn eigen behoeften door het 
chemische werk te combineren met het op grote schaal uittesten van chemische preparaten 
op proefdieren. Het geheim van Ehrlichs succes was in feite de combinatie van 'chemische 
massa-arbeid' met 'biologische massa-arbeid' en de creatie van handige 'experimentele 
systemen' (Rouse) door de keuze van geschikte proefdieren. Uiteraard moesten Ehrlich en 
zijn medewerkers tal van problemen met grondstoffen en proefdieren overwinnen. Ook was 
de hele onderneming niet van meet af aan op het vinden van een middel tegen syfilis gericht; 
de wending naar deze ziekte vond pas tijdens de rit op grond van 'contextueel opportunisme' 
(Pickering) plaats. Aanvankelijk had Ehrlich gepocht dat door zijn gebruik van dierproeven 
op grote schaal de meest 'optimale' geneesmiddelen konden worden ontwikkeld en geselec-
teerd, zodat de uiteindelijke test op de mens niet meer dan de spreekwoordelijke proef op de 
som zou zijn. Dat zou echter heel anders uitpakken. Nadat in het laboratorium een effectief 
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middel tegen syfilitisch besmette konijnen was gevonden, moest de stap naar de wereld buiten 
het lab worden gezet en die stap had heel wat voeten in de aarde. Een constructivistische 
analyse volgens de 'wetenschap-als-praktijk' benadering laat zien welk soort problemen 
moeten worden overwonnen opdat laboratoriumproducten daadwerkelijk hun weg vinden naar 
kliniek en maatschappij. In de analyse van de casus blijkt ook de ontoereikendheid van 
Latours antwoord op de door hem zelf opgeworpen vraag: de klinische introductie van 
Salvarsan omvatte veel meer dan het overplanten van laboratoriumcondities naar de buiten-
wereld; het omvatte ook de 'normalisering van het object' (Knorr-Cetina), juridische, sociale 
en politieke interventie, en voortgaand experimenteren met het middel na de commerciële 
introductie buiten het lab (de these van de 'maatschappij als laboratorium'). 
Hoofdstuk VTfl behandelt niet een bepaalde episode uit de geschiedenis van de syfilolo-
gie, maar presenteert een reconstructie van de zogenoemde 'serologische denkstijl' die 
volgens Fleck het denken en handelen van de leden van het serologencollectief onder leiding 
van Wassermann zou hebben bepaald. Anders dan Fleck wijzen hedendaagse constructivisten, 
onder andere op grond van fimtistische argumenten, een dergelijk verklarend gebruik van het 
begrip 'denkstijl' af. Dat laat nog steeds de mogelijkheid open dat deze term verwijst naar 
een als explanandum te onderzoeken fenomeen. Ook Flecks descriptieve karakterisering van 
de serologische denkstijl roept echter vragen op. In navolging van de wetenschapshistoricus 
Jonathan Harwood betoog ik dat het stijlbegrip alleen zinvol kan worden gebruikt in een 
comparatieve opzet. Het heeft geen zin te spreken van de denkstijl van het serologencollec-
tief, als diezelfde stijl niet ook kan worden herkend in andere sectoren dan de serologie en 
als zij niet met tenminste één alternatieve stijl kan worden gecontrasteerd. Bij het uitvoeren 
van dit comparatieve onderzoek heb ik kunnen teruggrijpen op de in voorgaande hoofdstuk-
ken beschreven episoden uit de geschiedenis van de syfilologie die tezamen verschillende 
gebieden van de medische wetenschap dekken (nosologie, aetiologie, serologie, therapie). De 
eenheid van Flecks serologische denkstijl wordt gevonden in het basisidee van specificiteit. 
Zo gezien representeert zij de door Pauline Mazumdar geanalyseerde 'pluralistische' stijl, 
welke tegenover de 'unitaristische' stijl kan worden gezet. Aldus kan aan Harwoods eisen 
voor het gebruik van het stijlbegrip worden tegemoetgekomen. Tenslotte laat ik zien dat de 
'macht' van de pluralistische stijl (dus van het idee van specificiteit) gedeeltelijk kan worden 
herleid tot de ongeëvenaarde machtsstructuur die de Koch-Ehrlich groep in de Duitse genees-
kunde rond 1900 had weten op te bouwen. 
In hoofdstuk IV heb ik tenslotte, voortbouwend op de resultaten uit de voorgaande 
hoofdstukken, geprobeerd een genuanceerde (althans doordachte) positie te ontwikkelen ten 
aanzien van de twee grote, fundamentele problemen waarmee het constructivistisch weten-
schaps- en technologie-onderzoek permanent wordt geconfronteerd: het zogenoemde realisme-
probleem en de vraag naar de aard van 'het sociale' en de relatie tussen individu en collec-
tief. Het tweede probleem omvat ook de vraag naar de meest adequate concepnialisering van 
de notie van 'sociale praktijken' in het algemeen en van 'wetenschappelijke praktijken' in het 
bijzonder. Het gematigde en het radicale constructivisme nemen met het oog op beide funda-
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mentele problemen zeer uiteenlopende posities in. Radicale constructivisten trekken de 
constructiemetafoor zover door dat in hun visie niet alleen plastics of genetisch gemodificeer-
de organismen, maar ook microben, electronen en quarks als door de wetenschap geconstru-
eerde objecten worden opgevat. Dikwijls speelt hierbij het 'splitsing-en-omkering' model van 
Latour en Woolgar over het ontstaan van feiten op de achtergrond mee. Deze mijns inziens 
onhoudbare visie op de constructie van objecten (en feiten) brengt het radicale constructivis-
me in direct conflict met gangbare realistische opvattingen, ofschoon de radicale constructi-
visten zelf van mening zijn dat ze het hele debat tussen realisme en anti-realisme hebben 
overwonnen. Bij gematigde constructivisten heeft de term 'constructie' alleen betrekking op 
vorming van kennis van de natuurlijke werkelijkheid, niet op die werkelijkheid zelf of de 
objecten die haar bevolken. Aanhangers van het sterke programma stellen zich zelfs op als 
common-sense realisten tegenover die werkelijkheid. Ik acht een dergelijke positie zeer goed 
verdedigbaar. Zij verdient de voorkeur boven het zogenoemde 'wetenschappelijke realisme' 
dat te sterke ontologische commitments heeft ten aanzien van de op dit moment door de 
natuurwetenschap gepostuleerde theoretische entiteiten. Bovendien redeneert deze stroming 
op nogal problematische wijze van het praktisch succes van toepassingen naar de waarheid 
van de toegepaste theorieën en miskent ze de flexibiliteit van wetenschappelijke begrippen 
zoals deze door het finitisme wordt benadrukt. 
Wat het tweede fundamentele probleem betreft, deel ik niet de hyperkritische scepsis die 
de radicale constructivisten ten aanzien van 'het sociale' tentoonspreiden. De heb geprobeerd 
de verschillende bezwaren die zij tegen 'sociale' verklaringen van de inhoud van wetenschap-
pelijke kennis naar voren brengen stuk voor stuk te ontzenuwen. Zo is Latours argument dat 
de maatschappij geen basis levert voor dergelijke verklaringen omdat techno-wetenschappers 
zelf als maatschappijveranderaars optreden niet meer dan een halve waarheid: ook in die 
hoedanigheid vindt hun handelen immers plaats onder bepaalde, niet door henzelf gekozen 
of beheerste maatschappelijke verhoudingen. Verder zet ik mij kritisch uiteen met de door 
Rouse geuite kritiek dat de gematigde constructivisten de validering van kennisclaims te veel 
laten plaatsvinden binnen relatief afgeschermde wetenschappelijke gemeenschappen en de 
door Knorr-Cetina betrokken stelling dat de validering van zulke claims geen sociale locus 
van consensusvorming boven en buiten het laboratorium behoeft. Ook het door Woolgar 
geformuleerde verwijt dat elke poging om de sociale bepaaldheid van wetenschappelijke 
kennis aan te tonen neerkomt op het afschilderen van competente en handelingsbekwame 
individuen als passieve marionetten of 'cultural dopes' wijs ik van de hand. Wel geef ik toe 
dat het moeilijk is de juiste balans te vinden tussen de spontaneïteit en handelingsbekwaam-
heid ('agency') van individuen enerzijds en de werking van maatschappelijke structuren 
('constraints') anderzijds. Een theoretische benadering die aan beide aspecten recht doet, zou 
zeer welkom zijn. Daarom ga ik tenslotte na of de bekende 'structuratietheorie' van Anthony 
Giddens wellicht aan deze desiderata voldoet. De door William Sewell voorgestelde modifica-
tie van deze theorie lijkt uiteindelijk redelijk te voldoen. Wordt bij Giddens sociale structuur 
als samenstel van regels en hulpbronnen ('rules and resources') gezien als een virtuele orde 
297 
die in concrete praktijken wordt gereproduceerd, bij Sewell wordt de dualiteit van structuur 
geherformuleerd als een dualiteit van virtuele elementen, namelijk regels oftewel culturele 
schema's, en actuele elementen, namelijk hulpbronnen. Het inzetten van (materiële en mense-
lijke) hulpbronnen wordt geïnformeerd door culturele schema's; omgekeerd zijn deze laatste 
voor hun reproductie aangewezen op actueel gebruik bij de accumulatie van hulpbronnen. De 
handelingsbekwaamheid van individuen ('agency') wordt in dit kader gedefinieerd als toegang 
tot hulpbronnen en de competentie om bestaande culturele schema's in nieuwe contexten toe 
te passen. Sewells nadruk op de transponeerbaarheid van culturele schema's naar nieuwe 
situaties vertoont grote gelijkenis met het finitisme. Ook vat hij 'agency' als door-en-door 
sociaal op. Zijn conceptualisering van de notie van sociale praktijken, zo betoog ik tenslotte, 
is in staat om de waardevolle elementen uit de 'wetenschap-als-praktijk' benadering van 
Pickering en de 'praktische hermeneutiek' van Rouse in zich te integreren zonder de dubieuze 
posthumanistische en 'anti-sociale' lading van deze beide laatste mee aan boord te nemen. 
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